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The Democratization of Artificial Intelligence 
Net Politics in the Era of Learning Algorithms
Andreas Sudmann
Diagnoses of time are naturally a difficult undertaking. Nevertheless, it is proba-
bly an adequate observation that, in our present historical situation, the concern 
for the stability and future of democracy is particularly profound (cf. Rapoza 2019). 
The objects of this concern are, on the one hand, developments which seem to have 
only a limited or indirect connection with questions of technology, such as the 
current rise of right-wing populism and authoritarianism, especially in Europe 
and in the US, or “the resurgence of confrontational geopolitics” (Valladão 2018). 
On the other hand, we witness an increasingly prevalent discourse that negotiates 
the latest developments in artificial intelligence (AI) as a potentially serious threat 
to democracy and democratic values, but which—with important exceptions—
seems to be largely disconnected from the specific political conditions and de-
velopments of individual countries (cf. Webb 2019). Within this discourse, prob-
lematizing AI as jeopardizing democratic values and principles refers to different, 
but partly linked phenomena. Central reference points of these discussions are, 
for instance, the socio-political consequences of AI technologies for the future 
job market (catch phrase: “the disappearance of work”), the deployment of AI to 
manipulate visual information or to create ‘fake news’, the geo-political effects of 
autonomous weapon systems, or the application of AI methods through vast sur-
veillance networks for producing sentencing guidelines and recidivism risk pro-
files in criminal justice systems, or for demographic and psychographic targeting 
of bodies for advertising, propaganda, and other forms of state intervention.1
Prima facie, both forms of concern about the global state of democracy do not 
have much in common, but it is precisely for this reason that one needs to ex-
plore their deeper connections. For example, US President Donald Trump recently 
launched a so-called “American AI initiative”, whose explicit goal is to promote 
the development of smart technologies in a way that puts American interests first. 
1  It goes without saying that not all of those aspects that for some reason appear to be worthy of 
critique represent an immediate danger to the democratic order of a society. However, it is also 
obvious that government and society must find answers to all problems of AI.
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At about the same time, Google/Alphabet announced that they had opened their 
first AI Lab in Ghana. Headquartered in Silicon Valley, the tech giant continues its 
strategy of establishing AI research centers all around the world: New York, Tokyo, 
Zurich, and now Ghana’s capital Accra. According to the head of the laboratory, 
Moustapha Cisse, one of its goals will be to provide developers with the necessary 
research needed to build products that can solve some of the problems which Afri-
ca faces today. As an example of the successful implementation of such strategies, 
it is pointed out that with the help of Google’s open source machine learning li-
brary TensorFlow an app for smartphones could be developed that makes it possi-
ble to detect plant diseases in Africa, even off line.
The ‘humanistic’ AI agenda of Google/Alphabet and other tech companies 
seems, at first glance, to be in sharp contrast to the “America First” AI policy by 
Donald Trump. However, the fact that the Silicon Valley corporations are in-
creasingly striving to promote democratic values such as accessibility, participa-
tion, transparency, and diversity has nothing to do with a motivation to distance 
themselves from the course of the current US government. Rather, the number of 
critics who see Google, Facebook, and the other tech giants themselves as serious 
threats to democracy and/or acting in contrast to democratic values, in terms of 
their business strategies, data practices, and enormous economic and socio-cul-
tural power, is growing. 
Accordingly, these companies have been under considerable pressure to re-
spond to this increasing criticism. Facebook in particular was involved in two 
major scandals, both concerning Trump’s presidential campaign. First, in 2017, 
it gradually became known that Russian organizations and individuals, most of 
them linked to the Saint Petersburg based Internet Research Agency (an internet 
troll farm), had set up fake accounts on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
Instagram, and attempted to capitalize on controversies surrounding the 2016 US 
presidential election, partly by means of creating fake news. Another scandal in-
volved the data analysis and political consulting company Cambridge Analytica. 
As it became public in March 2018, the company had access to and presumably 
analyzed the data of over 80 million Facebook users without their prior consent in 
order to support Trump’s campaign.
As a consequence of these scandals, not only Zuckerberg but also Google’s CEO 
Sundar Pichai recently testified to Congress in Washington. During those hear-
ings, Zuckerberg in particular admitted several failures in the past and promised 
to intensify cooperation with government institutions and NGOs, as well as to 
investigate measures to improve data protection and finally to implement them 
accordingly. As far as Europe is concerned, the European General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”) already contains legal requirements for improving and com-
plying with data protection. In the congressional hearings, Zuckerberg declared 
that he is in principle willing to support similar measures of state regulation in the 
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US. At the same time, he expressed fears that Chinese competitors could techno-
logically outperform his corporation because the country traditionally puts much 
less emphasis on data protection issues than Europe or the US (cf. Webb 2019). 
However, there are other reasons for Facebook’s willingness to cooperate in terms 
of data protection policies: At least since the takeover of WhatsApp and Insta-
gram, Facebook has achieved a de facto monopoly position in the social media 
sector. The situation is similar with Amazon in e-commerce and Google in search 
engines – and it is precisely this enormous hegemonic position which is increas-
ingly subject of intense debates. Recently, even co-founder and former spokesman 
of Facebook, Chris Hughes (2019), criticized Zuckerberg’s company as a threat to 
the US economy and democracy, and advocated for the company to be broken up 
in order to allow more competition in the social media sector. For various reasons, 
it is rather questionable whether such a scenario could occur in the near or distant 
future. Nevertheless, criticism of global “platform capitalism” (Srnicek 2016) or 
“surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff 2018) is growing, and this also concerns the role 
of AI in what recently has sometimes been called the new “data economy” (cf. for 
instance Bublies 2017).
Not least with regard to the problems and phenomena mentioned so far, the 
aim of this volume is to explore the political dimension of AI, with a critical focus 
on current initiatives, discourses, and concepts of its so-called ‘democratization’. 
One of the special characteristics of the latter term is that it is vague and con-
crete at the same time. As the current AI discourse reveals, the concept can refer 
to many different phenomena and yet evokes an ensemble of more or less corre-
sponding or coherent conceptions of its meaning. Accordingly, democratization 
can be understood as the realization of an ethic, aiming at political information, 
a willingness to critique, social responsibility and activity, as well as of a politi-
cal culture that is critical of authority, participative, and inclusive in its general 
orientation. Democratization can thus be conceived as a political, interventionist 
practice, which in principle might be (and of course has been) applied to society in 
general as well as to several of its subsystems or individual areas (like technology).2
One central question to be critically examined in this volume is to what extent 
network politics (and particular those related to ideas and activities of democrati-
zation) have been placed under new conditions with a view to the broad establish-
ment and industrial implementation of AI technologies. The concept of network 
politics is understood here as a heuristic umbrella term for a broad spectrum of 
2  Of course, in political theory, the term also signifies a transition to a more democratic regime, or 
describes the historical processes of how democracies have developed. For a discussion of the 
term democracy and democratization cf. Birch (1993), for discussing on the relationship of de-
mocracy and technology, cf. for instance the contributions in Mensch/Schmidt (2003), Diamond/
Plattner (2012) or Rockhill (2017).
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critical research, to shed light on the different forms of how networks and politics 
are intertwined and related, both as socio-technical discourses and practices. As 
such, it addresses the network dimension of politics as well as the political condi-
tions, implications, and effects of different types of social, cultural, or technolog-
ical networks, including but not limited to the Internet or so-called social media.3 
Accordingly, the volume does not only aim at exploring the political aspects of the 
relationship between AI and Internet technologies in the narrower sense (e.g. le-
gal frameworks, political content on social media etc.). Rather, the critical focus 
involves looking at the networked and mediated dimension of all entities involved 
in the production and formation of current and historical AI technologies. 
First of all, such a task needs some clarifications regarding the concept of AI 
because the term encompasses various approaches which are not always precisely 
differentiated, particularly in public discourse. When people talk about AI these 
days, their focus is mostly on so-called machine learning techniques and especial-
ly artificial neural networks (ANN). In fact, one can even say that these accounts 
are at the very center of the current AI renaissance. Sometimes, both terms are 
used synonymously, but that is simply wrong. Machine learning is an umbrella 
term for different forms of algorithms in AI that allow computer systems to an-
alyze and learn statistical patterns in complex data structures in order to predict 
for a certain input x the corresponding outcome y, without being explicitly pro-
grammed for this task (cf. Samuel 1959, Mitchell 1997). ANN, in turn, are a specif-
ic, but very effective approach of machine learning, loosely inspired by biological 
neural networks and essentially characterized by the following features (cf. Good-
fellow/Bengio/Courville 2016): 
1. the massive parallelism of how information is processed/simulated through 
the network of artificial neurons
2. the hierarchical division of the information processing, structured in learning 
simple patterns to increasingly complex ones, related to a f lexible number of 
so-called hidden layers of a network
3. the ability of the systems to achieve a defined learning goal quasi-automati-
cally by successive self-optimization (by means of a learning algorithm called 
“backpropagation”)
Indeed one can claim that the current boom of ANN and machine learning in 
general is quite a surprise, given that the technological foundations of this so-
called connectionist approach in AI have already been researched since the early 
days of computer science and cybernetics (cf. e.g. McCulloch/Pitts 1943, Hebb 1949, 
Rosenblatt 1958). However, with the notable exception of some shorter periods, 
3  For an overview on the long tradition of research on net politics, cf. for example Lovink (2002).
The Democratization of Artificial Intelligence 13
ANN have been considered more or less a dead-end in the history of AI research 
(Sudmann 2016, 2018a). This assessment is likely to be radically different today, 
even if a considerable number of commentators are pointing to (still) fundamen-
tal limitations of ANN or continue to uphold the importance of other approaches 
in AI research, for instance symbolic and rule-based forms (cf. Pasquinelli 2017, 
Marcus 2018).
There is some dispute concerning when exactly the current AI boom started. 
Some experts stress certain development leaps around 2009 in the field of natu-
ral language processing (NLP) and speech recognition. However, progress in the 
field of computer vision (CV) was of particular importance. In 2012, a research 
team at the University of Toronto won a competition for image recognition called 
ImageNet, reducing the error rate of previous approaches by more than half. This 
leap in performance became possible because so-called convolutional neural net-
works (CNN), i.e. networks optimized for the task of computer vision, were, for 
the first time, consistently and effectively trained on the basis of GPUs, i.e. fast, 
parallel-organized computer hardware, as they have been typically implemented 
in modern game consoles (Sudmann 2016). 
In any case, the major IT corporations also quickly registered progress in the 
field of computer vision and ANN, which led to a veritable boom in the acquisition 
and financing of start-ups. One of these start-ups was DeepMind, which was ac-
quired by Google in 2013 for 650 million US dollars. Three years later DeepMinds’s 
AI system AlphaGo was able to beat the human world champion in the board game 
Go. With the success of AlphaGo, the AI boom had arrived in the mainstream, i.e. 
AI quickly became a dominant discourse in many areas of culture and society, in-
cluding most fields of sciences (Sudmann 2018a, 2018b). 
The latter does not mean that ANN were completely unknown in the fields of 
humanities and social sciences in the years before 2016. Especially around the 
early 1990s, interest in ANN grew considerably in areas like cognitive science and 
the philosophy of mind, shortly after the first industrial implementations of ANN 
took place and thanks to the establishment of the backpropagation learning algo-
rithms in the 1980s (Sudmann 2018a, cf. also the interview with Alexander Waibel 
in this anthology). However, it can hardly be denied that in many disciplines the 
overall attention for ANN was rather limited even back then. In the end, the up-
swing of ANN in the 1980s turned out to be quite short, which is why some ob-
servers feel validated in their belief that the next AI winter will come – it is just a 
question of time. Of course, such an event could happen again, but currently there 
is no indication for this, rather the contrary seems to be the case.
Nevertheless, the ubiquitous talk of an “AI revolution” and the rhetoric of 
progress by Silicon Valley techno-utopists alone is a massive provocation for many 
critics, not only in the field of humanities, but also outside the academic world. 
Undeniably, since the very beginning, the debate on AI has typically been char-
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acterized by either skeptical, utopian or dystopian narratives (cf. Sudmann 2016, 
2018b).4 And even today, careful mediations between these positions are still rare. 
As such, many discussions on AI are geared towards the speculative horizon of a 
near and distant future. And it is also no coincidence that AI has been described 
ironically as the very field of research that is concerned with exploring what com-
puters cannot yet do (cf. Michie 1971). In other words: As soon as a computer mas-
ters certain abilities, such a system is no longer considered to be AI. Hence, AI is 
permanently shifted into the realm of utopia (or dystopia).
At the same time, we have only recently entered a historical stage in which the 
gap between AI as science fiction or technical utopia and AI as existing technology 
of the empirical world seems to be closing. Of course, one may rightly point out 
here that, for example, self-driving cars were already being tested on roads during 
and even before the 1980s,5 or that first machine translation systems for languages 
were actually being developed in the 1950s (cf. Booth/ Locke 1955), but this does not 
change the fact that both technologies have only recently acquired or come close to 
the potential of applicability that the global economy expects of them.
AI’s industrial usability and its increasingly outperforming human capabili-
ties in various fields of applications seem to be new phenomena. However, com-
puters have been a form of ‘AI’ from the very first day and were as such able to do 
things humans (alone) were not equally capable of, for example cracking the code 
of the German encryption machine Enigma (cf. Kittler 2013, cf. Dotzler 2006).
Given the rapid speed of new innovations and the expansion of fields of ap-
plication, it is by no means an easy task to determine how AI reconfigures the 
relation between humans, technology, and society these days and impacts how 
we might be able to grasp the political and historical dimension of this shift in an 
adequate manner.
Finding an answer to this question implies a ref lection of problems that have 
been discussed in the AI debate since the very beginning, for example the trans-
ferability of traditionally anthropocentric concepts such as perception, thinking, 
logic, creativity, or learning to the discussion of ‘smart machines’. Indeed, it is still 
important to critically address the anthropological difference between humans 
and machines, to deconstruct the attributions and self-descriptive practices of AI, 
as Anne Dippel and VN Alexander demonstrate in their respective contributions. 
In her essay, Anne Dippel combines three stand-alone commentaries, each deal-
ing with a different facet of AI, and each revolving around a different underly-
4  Already back in the late 1980s, the German media scholar Bernhard Dotzler wrote that all known 
forecasts of AI could already be found in Turing’s writings (1989).
5  For example, the so-called Navlab group at Carnegie Mellon University has been building ro-
bot vehicles since 1984. Carnegie Mellon was also the first university to use ANN for developing 
self-driving cars.
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ing metaphor: intelligence, evolution, and play. Her first commentary constitutes 
an auto-ethnographic vignette which provides a framework for the ref lection on 
artificial ‘intelligence’ and the alleged capacity of machines to ‘think’; both—as 
Dippel argues—very problematic metaphors from a feminist perspective with 
regard to the (predominantly) female labor of bearing and rearing intelligent hu-
man beings. The second one is an insight into her current ethnographic fieldwork 
amongst high-energy physicists, who use machine-learning methods in their dai-
ly work and succumb to a Darwinist metaphor in imagining the significance of 
evolutionary algorithms for the future of humanity. The third commentary looks 
into ‘playing’ algorithms and discusses the category of an ‘alien’, which, albeit 
controversial in the field of anthropology, she considers much more suitable in 
order to understand AI than a direct personification, bringing a non-human en-
tity to life. VN Alexander in turn stresses in her text that there is no evidence that 
AI systems are really capable of making ‘evidence-based’ decisions about human 
behavior. AI might use advanced statistics to fine-tune generalizations; but AI is 
a glorified actuary table, not an intelligent agent. On the basis of this skeptical 
account, she examines how Alan Turing, at the time of his death in 1952, was ex-
ploring the differences between biological intelligence and his initial conception 
of AI. Accordingly, her paper focuses on those differences and sets limits on the 
uses to which current AI can legitimately be put.
In addition to a critical analysis of current AI discourses and its central con-
cepts, it is equally important to understand the assemblages of media, infrastruc-
tures, and technologies that enable and shape the use of AI in the first place. To 
meet this challenge, it is necessary to take due account of the specific character-
istics and historical emergence of the heterogeneous technologies and applica-
tions involved (cf. Mckenzie 2017). Axel Volmar’s contribution “Productive Sounds: 
Touch-Tone Dialing, the Rise of the Call Center Industry and the Politics of Voice 
Assistants”, for example, ref lects on the growing dissemination of voice assistants 
and smart speakers, such as Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s Siri, Google’s Assistant, Mi-
crosoft’s Cortana, or Samsung’s Viv, which represent, in his words, a “democra-
tization of artificial intelligence by sheer mass exposure”. He engages with the 
politics of voice assistants, or more specifically, of conversational AI technologies 
by relating them to a larger history of voice-based human-machine interaction 
in remote systems based on the workings of “productive sounds”—from Touch-
Tone signaling through on-hold music and prerecorded messages to interactive 
voice response (IVR) systems. In this history, Volmar focuses on changing forms 
of phone- and voice-related work and labor practices and different forms of value 
extraction from the automatization and analysis of telephonic or otherwise medi-
ated speech. He argues that while domestic and potentially professional office end 
users embrace voice assistants for their convenience and efficiency with respect 
to web searches and daily routines; businesses, tech corporations, surveillance 
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states, and other actors aim to gain access to the users’ voice itself, which is seen 
as a highly valuable data source—a ‘goldmine’—for AI-based analytics.
Another interesting field in which AI and in particular machine learning tech-
niques are increasingly deployed is the financial market and its various forms of al-
gorithmic trading. As Armin Beverungen shows in his article, financial trading has 
long been dominated by highly sophisticated forms of data processing and com-
putation in the dominance of the “quants”. Yet over the last two decades high-fre-
quency trading (HFT), as a form of automated, algorithmic trading focused on 
speed and volume rather than smartness, has dominated the arms race in finan-
cial markets. Beverungen suggests that machine learning and AI are changing the 
cognitive parameters of this arms race today, shifting the boundaries between 
‘dumb’ algorithms in HFT and ‘smart’ algorithms in other forms of algorithmic 
trading. Whereas HFT is largely focused on data and dynamics endemic to finan-
cial markets, new forms of algorithmic trading enabled by AI are expanding the 
ecology of financial markets through ways in which automated trading draws on 
a wider set of data (such as social data) for analytics such as sentiment analysis. 
According to Beverungen, in order to understand the politics of these shifts it is 
insightful to focus on cognition as a battleground in financial markets, with AI 
and machine learning leading to a further redistribution and new temporalities 
of cognition. A politics of cognition must grapple with the opacities and tempo-
ralities of algorithmic trading in financial markets, which constitute limits to the 
democratization of finance as well as its social regulation.
In order to shed light on the political dimension of global AI infrastructures, 
we should not only examine how AI is used in the private sector by the tech giants, 
but also take into account that the public sector is more and more on a quest to 
become data-driven, promising to provide better and more personalized services 
and to increase the efficiency of bureaucracy and empower citizens. For example, 
taking Norway as a case study, Lisa Reutter and Hendrik Storstein Spilker discuss 
early challenges connected to the production of AI-based services in the public 
sector and examine how these challenges ref lect uncertainties that lie behind the 
hype of AI in public service. Through an ethnographic encounter with the Norwe-
gian Labor and Welfare Administration’s data science environment, their chapter 
focuses on the mundane work of doing machine learning and the processes by 
which data is collected and organized. As they show, decisions on which data to 
feed into machine learning models are rarely straightforward, but involve dealing 
with access restrictions, context dependencies, and insufficient legal frameworks. 
As Reutter and Spilker demonstrate, the data-driven Norwegian public sector is 
thus in many ways a future imaginary without practical present guidelines. 
For the task of critically addressing the specifics of different AI phenomena, 
it is crucial to explore appropriate paths, concepts, and levels of critique. Since 
Kant, critique has meant questioning phenomena with regard to their function-
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ing and their conditions of possibility. According to Foucault, critique can also be 
understood as the effort or even art to find ways “not to be governed like that and 
at that cost” (Foucault 1997 [1978]: 45). In turn, a further concept of critique seeks 
to examine the idealistic imaginations of society in comparison with its real con-
ditions and to explore why and to what extent these social ideals may (necessarily) 
be missed (or not). For Marx, this form of critique entailed analyzing why one is 
confronted with the necessary production of illusion and false consciousness, a 
focus to which Adorno and Horkheimer felt equally committed in their critical 
analysis of the Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944/1972).
Of course, these are only some of many possible trajectories of critical think-
ing useful for a profound investigation of an increasingly AI-driven world. Fur-
thermore, we should bear in mind that AI provides new constellations and con-
figurations of socio-technological assemblages, which might not be investigated 
adequately through the lenses of old concepts of critique, as Geert Lovink has ar-
gued with regard to internet and social media technologies (2011: 88). 
Hence, it is important to question the very concepts of critical analysis we mo-
bilize for our understanding of digital culture. For instance, Tobias Matzner’s text 
engages with some prominent critical positions regarding current applications of 
AI. In particular, he discusses approaches that focus on changes in subjectivity as 
an inroad for critique, namely Wendy Chun and Antoinette Rouvroy. While Rouv-
roy forms a general verdict against what she calls “algorithmic governance”, Chun 
suggests to ‘inhabit’ the configurations of subjectivity through digital technology. 
Matzner’s text aims at a middle ground between these positions by highlighting 
the concrete situation of the concerned subjects. To that aim, Linda Martìn Al-
coff’s work on habitualization as situated subjectivity is connected with ref lec-
tions from media theory. In concluding, this perspective on situated subjects is 
connected to the question of a democratic configuration of AI technologies.
The question of AI critique concerns hardly less the problem of its appropriate 
scaling. In the chapter by Jonathan Roberge, Kevin Morin, and Marius Senneville, the 
authors contend that in order to connect the macro-level issues related to the cul-
ture of AI and the micro-level of inscrutability within deep learning techniques, 
a third analytical level is required. They call this mezzo-level “governmentality”, 
i.e. they discuss how power relations and the distribution of authority within the 
field are specifically shaped by the structure of its organizations and institutions. 
Taking the Montréal hub as a case study—and based on their 2016-2018 ethno-
graphical work—they focus on two interrelated matters: a) the redefinition of the 
private-public partnership implied in deep learning, and b) the consequences of 
the “open science model” currently in vogue.
Furthermore, we should take into account that recent developments of smart 
machines may ref lect some general shifts and continuities in shaping the infra-
structures and environments of human-machine relations. The essay “Reduction 
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and Participation” by Stefan Rieger, for example, deals with a noteworthy strategy 
in media environment. It is a movement towards a holistic conception of the body 
and an approach to include all senses—even the lower ones. Above all, according 
to Rieger, these senses play a crucial role in the course of a ubiquitous natural-
ization. The consequence is a story of technological evolution and its irresistible 
success which follows a storyline diverging from the well-known topoi of aug-
mentation and expansion. The intentional reduction of a technically possible high 
complexity is conspicuous. It is affected by aspects of internet politics, democra-
tization, and the question of who should have access to media environments at all 
(and in what way). “Reduction and Participation” meets the demands to include 
other species and forms of existence. The aim of such demands is to expand the 
circle of those who gain agency and epistemic relevance, which also affects the 
algorithms themselves, as Rieger argues.
The question of agency and epistemic relevance reminds us that the project 
of AI critique itself also has an important history that needs to be considered. In 
fact, the development of AI has always been accompanied by a critical ref lection 
in terms of its political, social, or economic dimensions and contradictions. And 
oftentimes, the computer scientists and engineers themselves were the ones to 
articulate these different forms of critique.
For example, already the cyberneticist Norbert Wiener noted in 1950:
Let us remember that the automatic machine, whatever we think of any feelings 
it may have or may not have, is the precise economic equivalent of slave labor. Any 
labor which competes with slave labor must accept the economic consequences 
of slave labor. It is perfectly clear that this will produce an unemployment situa-
tion, in comparison with which the present recession and even the depression of 
the thirties will seem a pleasant joke. This depression will ruin many industries—
possibly even the industries which have taken advantage of the new potentiali-
ties. (Wiener 1988 [1950]: 162) 
Indeed, one of the most intensively discussed AI topics today revolves around the 
speculative question of how far automation driven by robots and smart machines 
leads to a turmoil on the labor market and may cause extensive job loss. For ex-
ample, AI experts like Kai Fu Lee believe that 40% of the world’s jobs could be re-
placed by AI and robots within the next 15 years (Reisinger 2019; cf. also Frey/Os-
borne 2017). Such forecasts, however numerous they may be in circulation these 
days, are above all one thing: sometimes more, sometimes less well-derived or 
well-founded speculations. How the world will be in 15 years is not predictable, 
neither by clever scientists nor by intelligent machines. Nevertheless, Norbert 
Wiener’s quote at least illustrates that critique and speculation go hand in hand, 
both then and now.
The Democratization of Artificial Intelligence 19
Similarly, many critical points made by Joseph Weizenbaum in his seminal 
work Computer Power and Human Reason (1976) enjoy a renaissance in current 
discussions on AI. In case of Weizenbaum’s book, his critical intervention was 
twofold: On the one hand, he was also motivated to emphasize the fundamen-
tal differences between man and machine and/or between thinking/judging and 
calculating, including highlighting certain fundamental limits of what AI can be 
capable of; on the other hand, Weizenbaum warned that there are tasks that a 
computer might be able to accomplish but that it should not do. Many subjects 
discussed and arguments proposed by Weizenbaum are specifically echoed and 
further developed in current debates on “AI ethics” (cf. Cowls/Floridi 2018; Tad-
deo/Floridi 2018). But unlike Weizenbaum, whose critical ref lections were essen-
tially based on classic symbolic AI, today’s AI ethics debate faces the challenge 
to adequately understand the media, technology, and infrastructures of machine 
learning systems and artificial neural networks, whose logic of operations are sig-
nificantly different from what has sometimes been called “good old fashioned AI” 
(Sudmann 2018b). And this is a particularly difficult task, since due to the margin-
al status of ANN there is no profound tradition of expertise in this particular field 
of AI, neither in many disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, nor even 
in the natural and technical sciences (cf. also the interview with Alexander Waibel 
in this volume).
In addition, since the beginning of the AI boom, many of the leading re-
searchers have given up their jobs as professors or employees at universities or 
taken leaves of absence to set up start-ups or work for the big tech giants. On the 
one hand, the enormous salary opportunities (whether as an employee or as the 
founder of a start-up) are tempting; on the other hand, many scientists also accept 
jobs with the major tech companies because they assume that the conditions for 
their research are significantly better in business than at university (for instance, 
in terms of access to learning data or powerful computers, access to funds for re-
search). 
Most companies and especially the countless start-ups that have been founded 
in recent years in the wake of the AI boom are also constantly complaining about 
the lack of experts in the field, which they perceive as a major brake for further 
innovations. Many institutions have recognized this problem and are investing 
billions in training, research, and development of AI. Nevertheless, the question 
arises according to which criteria, with which goals, and under which conditions 
this funding takes place. Against this background, it is imperative that private 
and public funding of AI also includes support for critical research. Certainly, the 
latter is above all a task for the humanities and social sciences. But in order to 
master this task adequately, they depend on dialogue and cooperation with the 
‘hard sciences’.
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However, there is another reason why research on and with current AI technol-
ogies, especially with regard to their political dimension, poses a major challenge, 
which even experts cannot easily overcome. As has been extensively discussed in 
recent years, ANN in particular are regarded as a fundamentally opaque technol-
ogy of AI. While computer scientists are in fact able to observe and measure the 
activity of each individual neuron and of their connections independent of their 
number, they cannot or only to a limited extent understand or explain the activ-
ities of ANN (cf. also my contribution to this volume). It is obvious that this spe-
cific black box problem has serious political-ethical implications and effects. For 
example, it is one thing whether AI technologies are used, say, for the recognition 
of medieval handwritings or for recommending certain products to consumers. 
However, when AI technologies are used to evaluate a person’s creditworthiness 
or to decide whether a particular person might commit a particular crime based 
on their appearance and behavior, the situation is obviously a different one.
As Dan Mcquillan argues in his essay, AI is a political technology and is as 
such being used to sustain austerity, but its politics are obscured by its technical 
opacity and by a narrative of ethics. The concrete operations of AI, acting through 
statistical regression and optimization, produce thoughtlessness and epistemic 
injustice. Meanwhile, AI’s predictive classifications extend bureaucratic govern-
mentality into the future, which it seeks to preempt. However, AI is fragile and 
only solves what Bergson called “ready-made problems”. According to Mcquillan, 
we need to approach AI in a way that enables us to take sides with the possible 
against statistical probabilities. His article sets out both a feminist and situated 
approach to developing non-oppressive AI, and the forms of collective commu-
nity and workplace structures necessary to achieve it. Similarly, Yvonne Förster 
problematizes that especially current AI applications are a black box and operate 
without being able to give an account of the underlying reasons, and the under-
lying causal processes themselves also remain opaque. In her essay, she discusses 
the concept of invisibility and opacity from a phenomenological perspective and 
explores the relation of experience and perception to technology.
Democratizing AI
Compared to the long tradition of AI critique, the discourse of “democratizing AI” 
is a relatively new one. Basically, the discourse has emerged since it has become 
widely known that AI is now intervening in all areas of global culture and society. 
The following aspects, among others, have contributed to the emergence and dis-
semination of this discourse:
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1. the extensive critique of AI technologies with regard to their social, econom-
ic, and political implications, manifestations, and effects
2. the long tradition of dystopian imaginations of AI
3. the practices of datafication and data analytics of the big tech companies and 
their hegemonic role in the current and future development of AI
4. the assessment of ANN as a fundamentally opaque technology of information 
processing and data analytics
Terms such as democratization and democracy are sometimes used as if one could 
always refer to them positively or affirmatively. At the same time, theories of de-
mocracy constantly remind us that the idea of democracy meaning the “rule of 
the people” presupposed significant exclusions at all times. In the ancient polis of 
Greece only free citizens—but not women, slaves, or someone who did not own 
land—were allowed to vote and act politically. This tradition of exclusion was 
bound to continue for a long time. According to John Locke’s conception, which 
was decisive for the development of English parliamentarism, the right to vote 
was still given only to the property owners, and of course we should not forget 
that well into the 20th century, women were not allowed to take part in elections 
in democratic societies. Even today, people who have lived in a particular country 
for many years, although in principle subject to all of its laws, are excluded from 
national elections unless they have the necessary citizenship.
As we have recalled at the beginning, AI technology already has helped poli-
ticians to get elected. Against this background, it is obvious to ask whether and 
when machines themselves will be allowed to vote, or more generally to speculate 
whether and when they will be perceived as entities that possess certain rights, 
like a human being. And it is quite remarkable that even though machines are not 
allowed to vote (yet), they already can be elected—as it happened in 2018, when an 
AI system in Japan (Tama City, Tokyo) was running for mayor. The AI system in 
question promised that thanks to its statistical methods it could effectively eval-
uate the advantages and disadvantages of requests by citizens; it claimed to make 
fair decisions, to strive for consensus in conf licts of interest, and also to focus on 
absolute transparency with regard to the use of taxes. When the votes were count-
ed, it turned out that the AI system came in last of all candidates. The outcome is 
perhaps unsurprising, even in technology-obsessed Japan. People there, as well as 
in other countries, might accept AI-systems and robots as tools, servants, or toys, 
but it seems difficult to imagine a political representation by machines other than 
in terms of very dystopian scenarios.6
6  Even though not only in Japan, but also in Europe or the US, the presence of machine is a normal-
ity in governments (also cf. Agar 2003).
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Indeed, the very fact that the cultural imaginary of AI has been shaped so ex-
tensively by dystopian narratives probably still causes people to fear the coexis-
tence with intelligent machines, or at least to feel profound discomfort. Against 
this background, recent efforts of democratizing AI, as described in the following, 
can indeed be understood as working against such a dystopian view of the com-
mon future of humans and machines, as people imagine it. 
However, it is important to note here that the demand for a democratization 
of AI inevitably implies that such technologies are in themselves undemocratic, or 
at least have the strong tendency or potential to be incompatible with democratic 
values and practices. And there are good reasons for this conceptualization of AI. 
If the development of intelligent machines is aimed at replacing or surpassing hu-
mans, or if AI is seen as a driving force for economic growth and a condition for 
securing hegemonic geopolitical power, in all these instances, the technology has 
prima facie nothing to do with the establishment and protection of democratic 
values such as equality in the emphatic sense. Similarly, the current discussions 
about algorithmic biases point to fundamental problems of inequality and differ-
ence associated with the large-scale implementation of AI systems in all areas of 
society.
For instance, Alexander Monea’s chapter examines how attempts to make com-
puter vision systems accessible to users with darker skin tones has led to either 
the hypervisibility of phenotypic racial traits, particularly morphological features 
like hair texture and lip size, or the invisibility of race. Drawing on critical race 
theory and the problematic history of racial representation in photographic me-
dia, he demonstrates how racial biases are prevalent in the visual datasets that 
many contemporary computer vision algorithms are trained on, essentially hard-
coding these biases into our computer vision technologies, like Google Photos. The 
most frequent industry reaction to these hardcoded racial biases is to render race 
invisible in the system, as was done with Google Photos. He further shows how 
the invisibility of race in computer vision leads to the familiar problems of ‘color 
blindness’, only expressed in new media. The author argues that these constitute 
fundamental problems for the potential democratization of AI and outlines some 
concrete steps that we might take to more strongly demand egalitarian computer 
vision systems.
Nevertheless, at least some people believe that AI might have the potential in 
itself to open up a new utopian horizon of freedom, equality, fraternity, and could 
furthermore even be used productively to secure world peace (cf. Valladão 2018). 
In Thomas Hobbes’ theory of state, the Leviathan (as the embodiment of a fictive 
social and governing contract) is conceptualized as the necessary condition of 
possibility for a peaceful coexistence among people. Without it, mankind would 
fall back into the state of nature, into the war of all against all. However, as history 
since Hobbes has shown, the modern state is an extremely precarious, fragile en-
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tity, incapable of providing lasting protection for all its members. More important-
ly, the sad truth is that there has never been a state or democracy since, say, the 
French Revolution that was fully able to meet the demands of freedom, equality, 
or solidarity in their emphatic sense. 
Against this background, the utopian vision (and for some certainly dystopian 
imagination) of delegating responsibility for the political and the control of soci-
ety entirely to machines does not seem completely absurd. But if one can envisage 
mankind deciding to better put their fate in the hands of superior machines, then 
it is also still conceivable that people at some point also might or will stand up for 
the realization of a truly better global society—without any help of AI as a political 
entity or “peace machine” (Honkela 2017).
Current concepts of democratizing AI, however, have little in common with 
a critique aiming at a fundamental transformation of society. Nevertheless, the 
concept of a democratic AI, as a project of the present, still remains very closely 
related to utopian visions and motivations inasmuch as it resembles ever so many 
strategies and concepts of democratization that have been developed throughout 
history in relation to taste, art, media, technology, or society as a whole.
Current ideas of democratizing AI share strong similarities with utopian-po-
litical ideas of the cyberspace, virtual reality, and of course the Internet, as they 
have been especially prevalent since the early 1990s (cf. Egloff 2002). The idea that 
cyberspace and/or the Internet (the concepts are not identical, yet often used as 
synonyms) are in themselves an emancipatory space that used to be called “cy-
ber-utopianism” and has been the subject of criticism since 1995 at the latest, for 
example by the Critical Art Ensemble. Conversely, even today many scientists, art-
ists, and net activists adhere to the idea that either the Internet and/or cyberspace 
actually mark a space of freedom, subversion, and resistance that must be defend-
ed, despite all its heterogeneous contradictions and problems.
The utopian-idealistic dimension of democratization is also visible in the cur-
rent use of the concept by the large tech corporations in connection with AI. They 
present the concept of a “democratic AI” first and foremost as a great promise of 
universal, all-inclusive accessibility, participation, and transparency. For example, 
for Microsoft the democratization of AI essentially means putting the technology 
into the hands of “every person and every organization” (cf. Microsoft News Cen-
ter 2016; cf. Johnson 2017a).
As far as the official agendas of tech giants are concerned, various strate-
gies are currently being pursued to achieve this goal: First, a general idea is to 
advance the simplification, standardization, and automation of AI, so that even 
non-experts inside and outside companies and universities can increasingly use 
the corresponding technologies (such as ANN) for their purposes and applications. 
Second, the large IT companies want to grant users, scholars, and companies open 
access to various cloud services, from computational resources (such as Google’s 
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Tensor Processing Units, i.e. specific chips to accelerate machine learning opera-
tions), to program libraries and frameworks like Scikit, PyTorch, Keras, or Tensor-
Flow, training data sets like MNIST or ImageNet, to various other software tools 
that are helpful for the broader dissemination and improvement of AI.
Unsurprisingly, the corporations do not provide their services without indi-
vidual interests or the expectation of anything in return: For example, Google re-
quires researchers who use their resources to make their own research results and 
perhaps also their code available open source (Johnson 2017b). In addition, they 
speculate that open-sourcing their tools might also have the effect that indepen-
dent developers contribute to their improvement without incurring significant 
costs (cf. Lomonaco/Ziosi 2018). Moreover, big companies like Microsoft benefit 
from the fact that the open source idea itself enjoys a high reputation in the tech 
research community and that researchers have an interest in their work being 
highly visible and widely recognized (cf. Bostrom 2017).
Critically engaging with the promise to provide developers access to emerg-
ing machine learning technologies and to enable them to infuse their applications 
with smartness or intelligence, Marcus Burkhardt’s text asks how machine learn-
ing and AI as fields of technological development and innovation are structured 
in themselves. By providing an initial mapping of the coding cultures of machine 
learning and AI on GitHub, he argues that it is important to attend more closely 
to the hitherto largely neglected infrastructural layers of code libraries and pro-
gramming frameworks for developing critical perspectives on the social and cul-
tural implications of machine learning technologies to come.
Beyond certain advantages connected to different actions of opening AI, many 
researchers, institutions, and companies tend to stress that solving problems in 
this field is a collective endeavor that cannot be achieved individually, which is 
why it is necessary to share ideas and methods as widely and as openly as possible. 
Problems and contradictions of economic and scientific competition, however, 
are rarely discussed. On the surface, it seems like AI research is essentially driven 
by an unbound idealism. The reality, however, is that the field is indeed character-
ized by fierce international competition for talent, capital, and other ‘resources’. 
And at the heart of the big tech companies’ agenda is the tenacious struggle for 
being the first to overcome the unsolved problems of AI and/or to achieve the ul-
timate goal of a general artificial intelligence, a so-called strong AI, i.e. a machine 
capable to master or learn any task similar to or better than a human being.
This also applies to the so-called non-profit organization that even has inte-
grated the “openness” idea in its brand name: OpenAI. As I demonstrate in my 
own contribution for this volume, OpenAI has somehow been the avant-garde of 
the current “AI democratization” hype, also by foregrounding its commitment 
to democratic values like access, participation, and transparency. But if one ex-
amines the activities of the organization hitherto, the investment of OpenAI is 
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more about making progress to solve the foundational technological problems in 
AI, rather than focusing on how the concept of an open, democratic AI could be 
further developed in a technologically and conceptually meaningful way.
For the moment, if one critically examines the rhetoric of companies like Goo-
gle or Microsoft, it looks as if the promise of a democratic AI has already been 
fulfilled by its accessibility. Especially in the case of technology, however, democ-
ratization not only means access to its use, but also the possibility of its control (cf. 
Lomonaco/Ziosi 2018). If and how such a process can be organized and shaped in 
a reasonable way, for example through state supervision or other measures, is still 
an open question, and maybe it cannot be answered in general. But the crucial 
point here is that those companies who advocate the “democratization of AI” must 
at least in principle be willing to restrict their sovereignty and/or to accept inter-
ventions by other external entities. 
The latter, however, is unlikely to be in the interests of the large tech corpora-
tions. Indeed, the simple fact that the tech giants so fully embrace the idea of a 
“democratic AI” strongly indicates how little the concept threatens their economic 
or cultural power, quite to the contrary.
Nevertheless, the democratization of AI, as advocated by the large tech groups, 
is not only about controversial concepts of access, transparency, and participation. 
Furthermore, the concept also entails the goal to serve ‘good purposes’, i.e. solv-
ing the world’s small and large problems. Microsoft’s “AI for Earth” initiative, for 
example, aims at fighting climate change or eliminating inequalities in the health 
care system. Given such an agenda, it is, of course, awkward that Microsoft was 
recently accused of working with researchers from China’s National University 
of Defense Technology, controlled by the country’s Central Military Commission, 
collaborating on AI problems that commentators thought to be usable for state 
surveillance technologies. Microsoft dismissed these accusations by pointing out 
that the research papers in question had as much or little to do with surveillance 
as WiFi or a Windows operating system would have. In addition, the company 
pointed out that such forms of international cooperation are very typical in the 
field of AI research. 
However the situation may be in this specific case, it is clear that especially in 
the field of AI, it has always been difficult to distinguish between a military and 
civilian use.7 For example, similarly as with other AI application fields, a large part 
of research in the field of machine translation and natural language processing 
(for the political discussion of this field of AI, cf. the interview with Alexander 
7  Sometimes it is also a matter of disputes within a company whether orders from the military 
should be accepted. Cf. the recent protests by Google employees against the so-called “Maven 
project” (cf. vgl. Shane/Wakabayashi 2018). For a recent discussion on the miliary use of AI see 
also Ernst/Schröter/Sudmann (2019).
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Waibel in this volume), has been funded by the military, specifically by programs 
supported by DARPA. This commitment is no coincidence. Especially during the 
Cold War, there was a high demand for translations from Russian into English 
(and vice versa on the side of the Soviets for translations from English to Russian). 
Furthermore, global military operations and disaster management efforts have 
always stimulated a general interest in the rapid translation of large quantities of 
foreign-language texts. Finally, one should note that the field of machine transla-
tion had been based on basic mathematical and cryptologic knowledge from the 
start—developed during the Second World War by researchers in the military and 
secret services.  
As the use of AI for military goals shows, “openness” and “transparency” can-
not count as positive values per se. According to Nick Bostrom (2017), openness 
to security measures or openness about goals can be good, but openness about 
source code does not necessarily have to be. Accordingly, Bostrom advocates a 
differentiated approach to “open AI”: When it comes to developing technologies 
that have the potential to cause considerable damage, they should naturally not 
be disclosed.
Particularly with regard to ANN technology, the fundamental question arises 
as to which extent requirements of transparency and openness can be realized 
at all, given that specifically the connectionist approach of ANN has to be under-
stood as being fundamentally opaque at its core (Sudmann 2017). Nevertheless, 
various approaches of a so-called “Explainable AI” at least try to reduce the opacity 
of current AI systems.
As Schieferdecker, Großmann, and Schneider stress in their contribution to this 
volume, software-based systems using AI methods for different tasks are es-
sentially characterized by their “criticality ,̓́ by which they mean their usage in 
safety- and security-critical domains like transportation and automotive, bank-
ing and finance, healthcare, cyber-security or industrial automation. As the au-
thors explain, this criticality of numerous AI-based systems demands rigorous 
and effective quality engineering in pre-deployment phases and at runtime. In 
their article, the authors review the state of the art in safeguarding AI-based sys-
tems by so-called “verification and validation methods”, taking a particular look 
at the principal function components of AI-based systems and their extended 
quality requirements. Since any AI is primarily developed in software, the prin-
cipal approach to the quality engineering of software-based systems in general is 
reviewed. According to Schieferdecker, Großmann, and Schneider, testing is the 
best-known and most effective V&V method and will most probably also form the 
basis for dealing with AI-based systems: It can be used for confirming or witness-
ing outcomes of AI-based systems, it can become a digital common for their com-
parison and benchmarking, and thus contribute to a shared knowledge basis of AI.
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Against the background of the phenomena outlined so far, it is quite obvious 
that the political economy of AI is a great challenge for policymakers. As Frank 
Pasquale shows in his essay, so-called centralizers encourage the accumulation of 
data in very large firms, while in contrast decentralizers want to see more dis-
persed innovation. Although both have very different visions for long-run eco-
nomic development, each can help counter the untrammeled aspirations (and 
disappointing everyday reality) of stalwarts of digital capitalism. They also con-
tribute to our understanding when giant firms try to solve what Friedrich Hayek 
has identified as the “knowledge problem”—which and when they exacerbate it via 
obscurity and obfuscation. If conglomeration and vertical mergers actually pro-
mote AI that solves real-world problems—of faster transport, better food, high-
er-quality health care, and more—authorities should let them proceed. According 
to Pasquale, industrial bigness helps us understand and control the natural world 
better. But at the time, he argues that states should block the mere accumulation 
of bargaining power and leverage, even if it is in the service of AI development. 
Policymakers need to find ways to address the contradictions and diverging per-
ceptions regarding the regulation of technology. One important task here is to 
translate political decisions into laws that are appropriate in practice, but that also 
take into account the criticism of these technologies. But what role can laws play 
in the democratization of AI? This is the question the chapter by Christian Djefall 
addresses. His text highlights the dimensions of AI’s openness and shows that AI 
can be beneficial and detrimental to democracy. Constitutional law actually calls 
for a democratization of AI. Reliance on and delegation to AI systems requires a 
democratic rebalancing. The chapter then goes on to explore how AI can be de-
mocratized. It identifies three layers that describe a series of choices: the techni-
cal layer, the social layer, and the governance layer. On the technical layer, there 
are many choices to be made; a specific concept like designability could help to 
identify choices that enable democratic governance. The inf luence of AI systems 
is often not rooted in technology but attributed to AI through social choices. In 
administrative law, automated decisions are endowed with the power of the law. 
The governance layer shows how technologies can be inf luenced by overarching 
choices. This can be done for example by frames and organization. Taking all lay-
ers together, there is ample room for democratic determination of AI applications.
It is perhaps a question of debate to what extent machine learning algorithms 
as “cultural machines” (Finn 2017) already have an inf luence on our daily life and 
changed the sociocultural experiences we make in this world. The discussion on 
the cultural impact of machine learning and ANN has also recently intensified 
around the question of how AI can be considered creative and perhaps even chang-
es our understanding of art (practices). The public discussions on this were fueled 
by an auction at Christie’s, where a painting ‘created’ with the help of an AI-system 
was sold for a high price. Interestingly enough, the art collective responsible for 
Andreas Sudmann28
this painting claimed that they want to “explain and democratize AI through art”. 
It was probably foreseeable that AI would also be coopted quickly by the art world. 
But recent discussions on “creative AI” tend to omit that the problem of machines’ 
supposed creativity is by no means new, as Jens Schröter shows in his article. In 
fact, already in the 1960s, in so-called “information aesthetics”, similar questions 
were discussed. In his essay, Schröter therefore historicizes the current debates 
and argues that the question of whether machine-creativity or machine-art is 
possible cannot be answered by abstractly contrasting ‘man’ and ‘machine’ (AI).
The relationship between art, creativity, and smart machines shows that the 
discussion about the politics and democratization of AI must not be restricted to 
certain areas (economy, military) or to certain groups of actors (e.g. “The Big Tech 
Giants”). Instead, we should consider that the critique of AI and the commitment 
to democratizing it is also supported by many NGOs, academic institutions, jour-
nalists, or politicians; actors whose efforts undoubtedly deserve their own por-
trayal. This book is therefore only a small contribution to a controversial field of 
discussion whose contours, relations, and conditions have yet to be explored.
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Metaphors We Live By1 
Three Commentaries on Artificial Intelligence 
and the Human Condition
Anne Dippel
Prelude
In the following essay, I want to bring together three stand-alone commentaries, 
each dealing with a different facet of artificial intelligence, and each revolving 
around a different underlying metaphor: intelligence, evolution, and play. The 
first commentary constitutes an auto-ethnographic vignette, which provides a 
framework for the ref lection on artificial “intelligence” and the alleged capacity 
of machines to “think”; both very problematic metaphors from the feminist per-
spective on (predominantly) female labour of bearing and rearing intelligent hu-
man beings. The second one is an insight into my current ethnographic fieldwork 
amongst high-energy physicists who use machine-learning methods in their daily 
work and succumb to a Darwinist metaphor in imagining the significance of evo-
lutionary algorithms for the future of humanity. The third commentary looks into 
“playing” algorithms and brings into the conversation the much-debated anthro-
pological category of an “alien” which, as I argue, is much more relevant in order 
to understand AI than a direct personification, bringing a non-human entity to 
life. 
A New Non-artificial Intelligent Life is Born
I am looking at a newly born human being. Day by day I keep him company, as 
he practices increasingly complex bodily movements, senses the inner emotions 
of other bodies around him or reacts to a sea of indistinguishable voices, despite 
not being able to understand the meaning of a single word. While he keeps to his 
1  The title of a famous book published by George Lakof f and Mark Johnson in 1980. I want to thank 
Sonia Fizek for her invaluable help in revising this article.
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own ref lexes, I am witnessing a life-changing event: the emergence of an all but 
artificial intelligence. Slowly, the motor activities become increasingly controlled, 
the musculature is gradually building up, and the gaze seems to follow points of 
interest somewhat consciously, with a dose of curiosity and awe. A young human 
learns. 
Seeing the development of a new life, makes me radically rethink the concepts 
of artificial intelligence and machine learning, and even more so the significance 
of language, which has the power to shape political reality. 
Can machines think, asked Alan M. Turing almost seventy years ago (1950). 
His provocative metaphor until today conditions the way computer scientists tend 
to perceive the capacity of algorithms to process data and yield “intelligent” (or 
rather intelligible) results. The image of an intelligent machine has grown strong 
in the public eye. Today, we talk of “smart” infrastructures, smart TVs, smart 
homes, even smart cities; all exemplifying the so-called “smartness mandate” 
(Halpern, Mitchel, Gheoghegan 2017).
Can machines learn? It is no longer a question, but an assumption and a meth-
od used in almost every discipline reliant on big data, from physics, over market-
ing and finance to agriculture. Thinking and learning, inherently human qualities, 
when used with reference to machines seem to make little sense. They are often 
dismissed as innocent metaphors. But words have power. Not only do they de-
scribe the surrounding reality, but shape the way we think and act (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980). In that sense, machine “intelligence” is much more than a rhetori-
cal device. It inf luences our perception of it as an (in)human quality.
The concept of intelligence originates from a very specific and narrow under-
standing of what it means to behave as an intelligent entity. Christoph von der 
Malsburg, considered a pioneer of artificial intelligence and originally trained as 
a particle physicist, in his neurobiological research on intelligence focused mainly 
on visual cognition and memory (Malsburg 1990). It is not difficult to draw a par-
allel to the contemporary understanding of machine learning algorithms, often 
praised for their beyond human capacity to recognize patterns out of a pool of 
gargantuan data sets. To an anthropologist who considers anthropocentric crite-
ria of difference to be fundamentally suspect, this oversimplified human versus 
machine metaphorical comparison seems somewhat disappointing in its naiveté, 
if not spine-chilling. Von der Malsburg triumphantly argued that human brains 
do not exceed the memory capacity of more than one gigabyte. But humans are 
not fed with raw data sets. And machines, unlike humans, do not necessarily have 
a palimpsestuous biological memory of experiences but rather are an extended 
memory, to play along with von der Malsburg’s metaphor of a capacious container 
for data storage. 
Above all, human intelligence and memory do not stand in an one-dimension-
al relationship to each other. Intelligence is an embodied process, highly depen-
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dent on received attention and care. It is enough to take a quick look at a newly 
born human to dismiss the blind enthusiasm of computer science to create ar-
tificial life. In this context, machine learning seems like an empty disembodied 
metaphor. It is the body (of the infant and their mother), which is central in the 
development of intelligence. For a newborn, the physical and the psychological are 
inseparable. The body and the mind are not yet split, subject to Cartesian dualism. 
They do not exist as separate entities, or rather exist in a mutual embrace. All is 
embodied, and all is mindful. Facial expressions, gestures and voice operate with-
out the socio-cultural censor. Their face slowly learns how to laugh, at first coinci-
dentally, later in a more focused manner. It seems, as if the baby’s consciousness 
was gradually contracting to a fully developed “I”. At first small threads appear 
like, then they expand, grow and open  to become a mindful being. But before that 
happens, the baby simply exists. Infants develop their intelligence in dealing with 
the environment. They demand to be noticed and perceived although they are not 
able to understand what attention really is.
All those daily observations I have been collecting as a feminist mother and 
an anthropologist have lead me to believe that any comparison of human and ar-
tificial intelligence must be considered bizarre if not utterly pointless at best. The 
observations of the social and emotional complexity of an infant, whose head ac-
counts for a third of its body weight and who has no language and can be more 
than language at the same time, have made it clear to me that the concept of an 
undifferentiated intelligence as such is the most dangerous aspect in the political 
debate on AI. At the heart of research on artificial intelligence lies an extremely 
oversimplified and disembodied understanding of the term, which not only over-
estimates machine intelligence and underestimates the biological complexity of 
humans, but brings with it the danger of dismissing the significance of being a 
responsible human agent altogether. 
While neuro-computer scientists spent time dreaming of self-replicating algo-
rithmic intelligence, uncounted female bodies keep nourishing and nurturing the 
yet to be born human intelligence. While science keeps appropriating humans as 
embodied metaphors to praise the artificial life instead, a true wonder of creation 
a female body is capable of, remains barely touched by the admirable gaze of the 
(overwhelmingly male) techno-scientific world. It is the politics of embodied care 
(Hamington 2001) or politics of care in technoscience (Martin, Myers, Viseu 2015) 
that needs to be brought back into a larger social conversation on artificial intelli-
gence and its relation to what it means to be human. 
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The Promethean Dream of Artificial Intelligence in Physics 
In my usual anthropological fieldwork I do not study infants, but sit vis-à-vis sci-
entists who work with artificial intelligence; to be more precise with very specific 
machine learning algorithms, which are able to sieve through endless data of par-
ticle decays. The European Center for Nuclear Research (CERN) is home to quite 
a few high-energy particle physicists who see themselves as “gods playing with 
the help of the computer”. At CERN, researchers increasingly rely on supervised 
machine learning in their everyday work. Already in the 1980s the so-called MVA 
(multivariable analysis), a form of machine learning, was deployed at CERN (Gal-
ison 1997).
At first, high-energy particle physicists developed algorithms for pattern rec-
ognition of rare subatomic collision events independently of computer scientific 
expertise. The communities of physicists and computer scientists were not always 
as strongly connected as they are today. With the establishment of the “particle 
accellerator Large Hadron Collider” (LHC), however, those two seemingly distant 
communities merged. High Energy Physics has experienced a gradual “informati-
zation” of its knowledge base, dependent on high-performance computers capable 
of storing data density and performing the Monte Carlo analyses required to pre-
determine events and test theories on the basis of physical measurements.
In the past 15 years more and more computer scientists have entered the ev-
eryday research practice as CERN annual statistics indicate, supporting phys-
icists in coding and simulating experiments (CERN Annual Statistics Website 
2019). CERN invests in computer scientists and in different areas of computer re-
search, from machine learning algorithms to quantum computing. The “trained” 
algorithms collect, detect, and analyze seas of data. Contemporary high-energy 
physicists may be described as “code sorcerers” (Chun 2013), making sense of the 
world through the lens of pseudo-random algorithms. Thus, it is no surprise that 
their visions for the future of humanity are so deeply conditioned by the logics of 
the algorithmic infrastructure “living” around them. Most of the physicists, how-
ever, would dismiss this assumption. They tend to perceive algorithms as medi-
ated tools, which may have the capacity to extend our minds, but at the same are 
entirely controlled and tamed by physicists. Both categories, the human and the 
machine, are clearly separated, each having a different role and hierarchy in the 
experiment.  Physicists are convinced of the superior position of humans vis-à-vis 
algorithms, however intelligent. If there is any doubt about the semiotic-material 
analysis of physics, it usually is voiced outside of the field, for example in media 
studies or philosophy, i.e. disciplines, that ref lect the “mediatedness” of contem-
porary knowledge in natural sciences. Physics sees itself as an impartial referee, 
untouched by the logics of the medium. In other words, how and what the observ-
er sees remains uninf luenced by the apparatus devised to see the observed. 
Metaphors We Live By 37
At the same time, the convictions of an almost sterile human-tool separation 
are accompanied by the speculations of a future cyborg, a human of tomorrow 
enhanced by artificial intelligence and almost inseparable from it. Such cybor-
gian visions are shared by many physicists, especially those working in the de-
partments devoted to more speculative and future-oriented research at CERN, 
for instance on the so-called evolutionary algorithms inspired by the principles 
of biological evolution (reproduction, mutation, recombination, selection). It 
is here that one can find computer science visionaries like Rodrigo Suarez, one 
of my informants. In machines he sees a continuum of intelligence, develop-
ing from a single cell to a fully-f ledged human and reaching their final state 
in a computer. Even if he is not entirely convinced that AI could reach a hu-
man-like status, he dreams that one day humans could evolve and live eternal-
ly, free from fear and illness, as cyborgs enhanced by artificial intelligence. Rod- 
rigo Suarez does not see any difference between the concepts of intelligence of 
a biological cell, a computer or that of a human being. In our conversation I drive 
him to the edge of his argumentation, but for Rodrigo Suarez (and many other 
computer scientist) these exist only advantages of an eternal life, even if the im-
mortality dream is to be reached by the fittest few. The principle of evolution does 
not account for fairness or justice for all. There seems to be a crude Darwinist 
opinion embedded in the algorithmic concepts that drive current research pol-
itics on AI. While computer science is bringing man back to the centre, natural 
culture research decenters him. The enlightenment figure spelled with capital “M” 
(Tsing 2015) reclaims his position of power. Evolutionary algorithms, still in an 
early developmental stage, rest on the dream of fusing “epistemology and ontolo-
gy” (Bruder 2018, 153), as well as mind and body with technology, contributing to 
the raise of homo automaton sapiens. 
For some this might be just a narcissist dream of production and reproduction 
(uterus envy?), maybe even a hubris in the ancient Greek sense, a way of playing 
Prometheus or Eva, trying to steal the f lame or the apple (Dippel 2011). It is hard 
to find balance, it seems, between techno-optimism and techno-pessimism, espe-
cially for a scientist working as one of the new shamans of technology. Regardless, 
any politics of artificial intelligence needs to take humans into account.
Artificial Intelligence as an Alien at Play
The Promethean dream seems to be best illustrated when machines and humans 
“face” each other at a play table, in a direct ludic confrontation. In the recent his-
tory of cybernetics several pivotal games took place, for instance Mac Hach VI 
versus US Chess Federation player (1967) or the iconic IBM’s supercomputer Deep 
Blue versus Garry Kasparov (1996, 1997). In both cases the human was defeated 
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by the sheer power of computation. In 2015, a very different contestant entered 
a global scene. Alpha Go, a computer program able to play the game of Go (much 
more strategically complex than chess), won against a human player. Following 
the first victory, it went on to beat the professional Go player Lee Sedol. AlphaGo 
uses a Monte Carlo tree search algorithm (the same method used in high-energy 
physics at CERN) to find new optimal moves. 
Such examples show how deeply the longing for human-machine comparison 
is embedded within the history of technological development. Humans are the 
standard that serves for technology as the main criterion in terms of intelligence. 
The game between Lee Sedol and AlphaGo has also raised the question of “ali-
enness”—does artificial intelligence play in a different way than humans do? Can 
we use the category of “play” with reference to an algorithm at all? Do computers 
play? All the above questions are more complex than it seems, especially when tak-
ing into account the fact that AlphaGo opted for moves which, in their appetite 
for extreme risk, seemed almost inhuman. As the Deep Mind team emphasizes: 
“AlphaGo’s strategy embodies a spirit of f lexibility and open-mindedness: 
a lack of preconceptions that allows it to f ind the most effective line of 
play” (DeepMind.com). Artificial intelligence tends to deal well with a vision of 
a potentially harmful sacrifice, if it leads to an unparalleled compensation in the 
game. On a more general philosophical level, we could say that it has no conscious-
ness or any understanding of its own possible “death”. This opens a very different 
playfield, in which every decision can be as risky as the logics of checks and bal-
ances allows for. 
Artificial intelligence remains in a non-existential relationship to anything 
that matters to humans (cf. Dippel 2018). After all, machines have been created 
precisely for the purpose of relieving or facilitating the existential condition of 
humankind (cf. Giedion 1982). One could argue from an anthropological perspec-
tive that man—the “capital M guy that made the anthropocene” (Tsing 2015)—has 
created a “metaphorical counterpart” of himself (Lévi-Strauss 1973, 238); a dispos-
itive of difference in times when the conventional border regulations between hu-
mans and other living creatures have become questionable. I see thus two major 
pathways in the visions of AI. On the one hand, we can observe the production of 
an artificial intelligence as a “metaphorical counterpart”, to extend upon the an-
thropologist Claude Levi-Strauss and his comparison between humans and birds. 
Both species form relationships and build nests amongst many other similarities, 
but there is one thing that we as humans cannot do—f lying. In that sense birds 
are seen as a metaphorical counterpart, in which the dream of f lying and extend-
ing our limited capacities is stored. Artificial intelligence is like a bird of sorts. It 
allows us to see what we are and what we are not; what we dream to become, but 
can perhaps never be. On the other hand, the inclusive version of artificial intelli-
gence based on the concepts of a “third nature” (Richter & Rötzer 2018), of cyborgs 
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(Haraway 1991) and of nature-culture (Gesing, Knecht, Flitner & Amelang 2019), 
existing regardless of the political sphere and the social consequences. 
The first concepts of artificial intelligence, as Norbert Wiener famously put it, 
were about creating modern slaves (1972, 72). The old fears of the relationships be-
tween master and servant are ref lected in the debates about the politics of artifi-
cial intelligence since its early days (Winner 1977). Instead of looking for an order 
that would enable a better society, the current concepts blindly reproduce existing 
relations of domination and post-colonialism. The vision of artificial intelligence 
today succumbs to mostly neoliberal and positivist worldview, pushing the ideal 
for a never ceasing automated work (Gregg 2018). Fostering class-biased dreams 
to bring an end to the working class, it serves predominantly elitist fantasies. It 
does not consider creating a sustainable environment allowing humans to find 
their place within nature. Instead, it fosters nature as “the other” that needs to be 
dominated through technology. 
But technology tends to wander off in unforeseeable directions, providing 
fertile ground for ideology (Latour 2006). Current issues around social media 
are serving as a very fitting example here. Made to connect friends and families 
across the globe, they have become disruptive and manipulative tools in the polit-
ical sphere, deeply inf luencing the human capacity to understand complex texts 
or to keep attention for an extended time. This perhaps trivial example only shows 
that it is of paramount importance today to investigate artificial intelligence not 
only from a specifically technical angle, but in a broader socio-cultural and politi-
cal context. As researchers and as citizens, we need to stay alert. 
“Fed” by the People and for the People
Artificial intelligence should be seen for what it truly is, a technological alien. To 
neglect this “alienness” or otherness of AI it so to misunderstand its capacity to 
lead to a utopian potential for other politics. In fact, only by treating AI as the 
technologically Other allows us to see it as something that “eludes the orders of 
self and culture, while at the same time challenging them” (Leistle 2015). And to 
challenge the status quo, we may begin with a conscious use or criticism of pow-
erful metaphors, attributing to AI either human capacities or embedding it within 
a specific socio-political framework (in this case, a neo-liberal and positivist one). 
The White House report on artificial intelligence of the late Obama admin-
istration reads: “Developing and studying machine intelligence can help us bet-
ter understand and appreciate our human intelligence. Used thoughtfully, AI 
can augment our intelligence, helping us chart a better and wiser path forward” 
(Technology Council Committee 2016, 7, 39). Such grandiose political assump-
tions, however, should be embedded in a new social reality, where every citizen 
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has open access to the AI-driven goods. Researchers, politicians, the private sec-
tor and public opinion need to come to the point of communalization and peo-
ple’s empowerment of artificial intelligence, which may be difficult imagine in 
the current political and economical system. In that sense, AI should be owned 
by the people, because it is overwhelmingly “fed” by the people, for instance in a 
daily practice of using digital technology and thus allowing technology companies 
to collect our data in order to feed their algorithms shrouded behind corporate 
non-disclosure agreements. The future of humanity and AI should not succumb 
to a Darwinist vision. In this utopian context, artificial intelligence could be a true 
medium, and a mediator—not a dark privatized Leviathan, manipulated for those 
who love to lead war, hold power, and accumulate resources. For a vision like this 
to come true, a larger social dialogue is needed reaching beyond the optimiza-
tion logics of fast computing and automated labour. It asks for humans that prac-
tice vita activa and take on responsibility instead of dreaming to outsource it to 
a techno-god. 
With this remark I would like to bring this essay to a closure for a much more 
demanding creature is waiting to be nourished, not with raw data, but with milk, 
attention and care. His intelligence will require many more years to develop, in-
dependent from the super-computer’s calculating power and Monte Carlo search 
algorithms. Feeding my son requires much more than “having enough content” 
(Stokel-Walker 2019). It is a labour of love, passed by women and men from gener-
ation to generation since the beginning of humanity. One, which does not need a 
“metaphorical counterpart” in technology.
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Artificial Intelligence (AI) designers try to mimic human brain capabilities with 
“self-learning” neural networks trained by crowd-sourced selection processes or 
other “unsupervised” selection processes. Presumably, the logic of the input data 
is inscribed in the structure of the artificial network similarly to the way input 
shapes a human brain. Yet decades on, AI-trained chat bots and translation apps 
still fail to vault the low bar of the Turing Test. It is becoming clear that AI is not 
able to interpret signs within f luid contexts. Is biological computation qualita-
tively different from present-day machine computation?  At the time of his death, 
Alan Turing was investigating how biological reaction-diffusion processes create 
patterns, which, in turn, constrain cellular responses and differentially trigger 
development. Similar mechanisms are now thought to provide the temporal and 
spatial constraints for ensembles of neurons allowing them to perform sensory 
binding and to form and recall memories. Had he lived to continue his work, Tur-
ing might have reoriented AI research to better address the challenge of creating 
contextual constraints, which may be what is needed to produce the unpredict-
able and almost miracle-like responses we call human judgement. As it is, orga-
nized statistically, current AI applied to human affairs is only good for stereo-
typing, which, of course, undermines the basic premise of individual democratic 
freedom.
Like an organism, a “smart” machine can seek an object, read a code, locate 
a pattern and make generalizations. Like an organism, a machine can even be 
designed to pursue self-preserving goals. However, we cannot say that machines 
currently possess humanoid intelligence. AI bots cannot understand people be-
cause they are not good with language. They do not get irony, new metaphors, 
metonyms, puns or jokes. Language is fundamentally allusive, not literal, as Tur-
ing once demonstrated in a letter to a friend:
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Turing believes that machines think
Turing lies with men
Therefore machines do not think (1952b).
The fact that Siri cannot get this joke is not because there is not world enough and 
time to train the network; it is symptomatic of the essential difference between AI 
and Biological Intelligence (BI). Selection processes, such as those used to train 
AI networks, cannot evolve true intelligence. I can make such a bold statement 
because selection processes, such as those that neo-Darwinists have claimed have 
evolved animal intelligence, do not, in fact, do the job. The failure of AI chat bots 
is the proverbial dead canary indicating a much bigger problem, an oversimpli-
fied conception of the evolution and development of intelligent action. AI may be 
better than BI at mechanistic rule-bound actions like driving cars, but it is inca-
pable of determining what humans mean or intend to do. The public should not be 
asked to trust AI, accepting that how it works is just a mystery. This paper aims 
to pull back the Wizard of AI’s curtain, revealing that this allegedly superhuman 
intelligence is in fact just a tool, a very powerful one, that is being used by a few to 
control the many.
A Twenty-First Century Evolutionary Theory of Innovation
To theoretical biologists it is becoming clear that, although the natural selection 
of small random changes in genetic material plays a role in evolutionary processes, 
the outcome of such selection is the stabilization of a species and the reduction of 
diversity. Innovation, we now believe (See Turing, 1952a; Margulis & Sagan, 2002; 
Reid, 2007; Shapiro, 2011; Noble, 2016) is likely due to large, interrelated mutation-
al events, like hybridization, gene duplication, lateral gene transfer, transposons, 
symbiogenesis and, importantly to this discussion, the thermodynamic self-or-
ganizing semiotic processes discovered by Turing. Such mechanisms tend to pro-
duce new ready-made tools (not randomly assembled stuff) whose functions can 
then be selected or not. This isn’t your father’s evolutionary theory. 
AI is designed on the assumption that adaptive learning follows the ran-
dom-change with gradual selection neo-Darwinian model of the 1950s. AI, like 
natural selection, makes generalizations based on a statistical definition of fit-
ness: the most frequently reappearing patterns are selected. AI learns with re-
peated positive and negative reinforcement. BI can learn this way too, but it can 
also have epiphanies.
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Algorithms Versus Semiotic Habits
To try explain why AI lacks of a sense of humor, I start by noting that while com-
puters use digital codes and develop algorithms apart from contexts, living cells use 
analog signs and develop self-reinforcing semiotic habits within contexts. This pa-
per will explore the differences between AI and BI from the perspective of Biose-
miotics, a newly developing, transdisciplinary field related to the fields of Cyber-
netics, Complex Systems Science and Biochemistry.  According to Biosemiotics, 
whereas a code requires a precise translation of one form into another, a sign can 
be translated into a variety of forms depending on the relative similarity and/or 
proximity of other signs and transducers. It may be that this f lexibility of bio-
logical signs allows signal transduction to f low easily, to be communicated syn-
chronously and coherently to neighboring cells, even if the signal is not quite the 
correct or conventional one. It may be that this difference between AI and BI can 
account for AI’s failure to adequately translate signs in contexts. 
If AI’s self-learning algorithms seem to work well sometimes to predict hu-
man actions, this is because stereotypes are often true. AI is currently being used 
in US court systems to help determine sentences, exaggerating structural social 
prejudices in the data fed to the AI network. The likelihood that a criminal will 
re-offend is predicted by categorizing him or her as a type. The result is blacks get 
tougher sentences than whites with comparable data points (Angwin et al., 2016). 
AI is stereotyping on steroids. 
AI is also being applied to the management of the public at large. According to 
Andrew Hallman, Deputy Director for Digital Innovation at the US Central Intel-
ligence Agency, thanks to all the data collected on Internet users, the agency can 
now use Deep Learning to better “anticipate the development of social unrest and 
societal instability…three to five days out” (Konkel, 2016). This has me worried that 
a pre-crime unit is up and running.  It cannot be true that sacrificing our privacy 
will keep us safe. Mass surveillance and Big Data collection can only serve the pur-
pose of silencing dissent and maintaining the status quo, not anticipating actual 
crimes. Complex systems, like humans, tend to behave non-linearly: the ability to 
predict individual behavior does not improve in proportion to the increase in the 
amount of data that is used to make the predictions.
Although neural net designers use feedback and feedforward in an attempt to 
mimic non-linear biological processes, no creative mechanism is included, and 
the resulting intelligence resembles nameless, faceless bureaucracies that have 
accreted procedures for dealing with citizenry over many generations and which 
are not only conservative but which tend to narrow options more and more with 
each iteration. 
The first step toward democratizing AI is to unmask this supposedly bet-
ter-than-human judge. AI is no agent; it is a powerful and potentially useful tool 
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that should be in the hands of the many not just the few. A democratic digital so-
ciety, Michael Kwet (2018) has cogently argued, requires uncompromised privacy, 
open-source software, as well as decentralized personal cloud systems that allow 
direct sharing of information. If collection of personal data is thus halted, courts 
and surveillance agencies will not be able to use AI to control individuals based on 
their memberships in or associations with various groups. I hope that my analysis 
of the differences between present-day AI and BI can convince the public to be 
more skeptical of the supposed wisdom or accuracy of AI predictions.
What Turing Knew about BI
Turing invented the most practical tool humans will likely ever wield. And yet his 
engineering successes were driven by an impractical desire to understand the na-
ture of human intelligence. We follow his lead here as we try to understand how to 
best use computing tools in the twenty-first century. 
In the 1950s, after proposing his model for a “self-learning” computer, Tur-
ing’s thinking began to take, what might be called in hindsight, a Second-Order 
Cybernetics or Artificial Life turn. He began conducting experiments and studies 
in mathematical biology. While Andrew Hodges (1983), Turing’s main biographer, 
saw his interest in plant and animal morphogenesis as a departure from his inter-
est in mimicking intelligence, Jack Copeland (2004), who provides the definitive 
commentary on Turing’s science, points out that Turing made it clear that this 
new work was a further investigation of intelligent computation, even though his 
attention had fallen upon giraffe patterns, Fibonacci spirals and leaf generation. 
Turing discovered the spontaneous processes by which unorganized systems 
organize themselves without interference, without external selection. C.H. Wad-
dington (1940) had suggested to Turing that development simply falls into order 
somehow, f lows down the path of least resistance.  It was Turing who suggested 
that an instability, a chance pattern—not an inducer specifically designed for that 
function—could initiate the f low from less order to more order, from chaos to dif-
ferentiation (or, to nod to Gregory Bateson, a difference that makes a difference). 
Ilya Prigogine, who won the Nobel Prize for related research, met with Turing in 
Manchester in 1952 and discussed the theory (Hodges, 1983: 587). Not until 1972 in 
a paper in Physics Today did Prigogine recognize Turing’s contribution. 
Turing argued that reactions that diffused away from the point of instability 
result in the so-called morphogenic fields that differentially determine gene ac-
tion, as described by Waddington. While biologists were interested in what this 
meant for embryology, what Turing was after was knowledge of how neurons 
might similarly differentiate and self-organize. In a 1951 letter to neurophysiol-
ogist J. Z. Young, Turing remarks, “The brain structure has to be one which can 
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be achieved by the genetical embryological mechanism” (qtd in Copeland, 2004: 
517). Although we do not know if Turing thought development was analogous to 
learning, it turns out that it is. His mother Sara Turing may not have been in-
correct when she opined that her son had been on the verge of an “epoch-making 
discovery” when he died (qtd in Hodges, 1984: 624).
AI Compared to BI
When Turing first designed his self-learning network computer, he had assumed, 
tacitly following neo-Darwinism, that humans make random guesses when they 
do not know a procedure for solving a problem. In 1948 in “Intelligent Machinery,” 
he claims, “training a human child depends largely on a system of rewards and 
punishments” for good and bad guesses respectively (Copeland, 2004: 425). Tur-
ing designed a chess-playing program with optional moves that could be tried at 
random. If a move ultimately led to failure, it would not be reinforced. Turing’s 
neural network was designed to start out unorganized and become organized 
with appropriate “interference,” mimicking eduction. Similar kinds of connection-
ist approaches are used today in most self-learning algorithms. The “instruction 
table,” as Turing called a program, is embodied in the network as it is altered 
by reward and punishment. Feedback can be administered by a programmer or 
crowd-sourced on the Internet.  Although this approach is called self-learning 
or self-organizing, as Turing noted, such approaches still require “interference” 
from the outside.
The newest phase of AI is referred to as “unsupervised” learning. For example, 
a visual recognition network was exposed to millions of random unlabeled images 
on the Internet. It eventually detected some commons patterns of, you guessed 
it, cat faces, acquiring pathways and biases in unknown ways, hundreds of lev-
els deep (Le et al., 2013). Programmers did not tell the network what to find, but 
the network can now be used to find cat faces. These new unsupervised networks 
are not so dissimilar to Turing’s 1948 notion of a self-learning network. The main 
difference is the point at which the programmer interferes, during the training 
process to target a pre-specified pattern or after the network as detected a pattern 
that is of interest to the programmer.  In the latter case, the unit of selection is the 
entire network, not individual connections within the network. 
Animals most often learn in “unsupervised” situations, especially non-human 
animals, and are less often taught, intentionally rewarded and punished. It is the 
monkey see, monkey do approach. But interference, or selection, is still at work. 
Experiencing a procedure over and over, actually changes neuronal connections. 
Neurons that fire together wire together, as Donald Hebb (1949) so famously not-
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ed. Learning by rote, strengthening connections over time, is statistical in nature. 
What happens the most—whether it is “right” or not—gets selected and reinforced. 
Repetition is one way neurons develop connections, but not the only.  
Humans (and probably other animals too) can recall details better in contexts, 
if they are associated with things arbitrarily similar or arbitrarily nearby. Rhymes, 
rhythms, tones and other poetic devices, such as metaphor and metonymy tend 
to aid memory, even if the connections are not repeatedly reinforced. The semi-
otic habits of neuronal groups may be initiated by rare stochastic resonances (i.e., 
purely coincidental patterns) which lead to self-organization. A source of un-
predictability in human logic and language use, this poetic type of sign action 
in and among neuron cells dominates subconscious processes. Subjects under 
hypnosis experience cross-modal perception—they begin to hear colors, for ex-
ample—which indicates that when conscious perception is bypassed, the poetic 
workings of the subconscious are more observable (Alexander and Grimes 2017). 
People with synesthesia are better able to recall arbitrary facts because numbers 
or letters can be associated with unique colors, textures and shapes (Harvey 2013). 
Connections based on arbitrarily similar/proximate factors cannot be reduced to 
statistical description; the number of factors is not as relevant to outcomes as the 
qualities of the factors vis-a-vis other factors.
Formalizing Biosemiotics
Could a computer model the way nature organizes itself by linking things ar-
bitrarily similar/proximate? Turing discovered non-linear equations that can 
produce computer-generated zebra stripes, invagination, metachronal waves 
and other natural emergent patterns. Although for years Turing’s work went un-
proven and many believed the similarities between the patterns generated by his 
equations and those found in nature were merely coincidental, Sheth (2012) and 
Raspopovic (2014) have finally shown that a Turing mechanism does indeed de-
scribe the process whereby fingers are created in developing embryos. It has taken 
some time for biologists to identify the actual chemical signals that correspond to 
kinds of relationships Turing imagined would have to obtain if self-organization 
were a mechanism for differentiation and development. Turing’s equations are 
complex, but suffice it to say that they involve variables for diffusion rates, reac-
tion rates, and the ways in which these rates change. Reactions typically involve a 
number of morphogens, for example, X and Y react to produce Z; Z and A react to 
produce 2Y. The first reaction depletes Y; the second increases Y.  To put it differ-
ently, the process might involve an activator that can catalyze its own production 
and that of its own inhibitor, which, in some cases, might diffuse away rapidly, 
setting the stage for traveling wave patterns to emerge.  There is contradiction or 
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paradox in these processes, which are both self-creating and self-constraining, a 
bit like Turing’s syllogism introduced at the beginning of this paper.  
Let me try to elucidate the biosemiosic elements of these types of processes 
with a very simplified visual model with only two elements. To illustrate biological 
computation, I use shapes with material qualities as symbols because the binding 
of biological signals and receptors (sign readers) is often shape dependent. Let us 
say we have a molecule type ╚ and molecule type ╦. They can be turned in various 
directions, e.g., ╗ and ╩.  Neither ╚s or ╦s interact with themselves. So 
1. ╚ +╚ =╚╚  and 
2. ╦ + ╦ = ╦ ╦. 
╦s and ╚s together in certain orientations also result in no change: for example,
3. ╚ + ╦ =╚ ╦ and 
4.  ╗+ ╩ = ╗╩.  
But when ╦s and ╚s meet in other ways, they can interact and undergo change, 
e.g., a ╦ can turn into an╚ . Transformations depend on whether the open hor-
izontal part of the ╦ meets with the open or closed horizontal part of the ╚ . For 
example,
5. ╚ + ╩ =╚╚ 
6.  ╗+ ╦ = ╦ ╦ 
These are the simple local rules that limit interactions. In the contexts of [5] and 
[6], we may say that the ╩ is metaphorically like an ╚, and an ╗ is metaphorically 
like a ╦. 
Because the molecules are always in thermal motion, the way they happen to 
meet up is random. Statistically speaking, the production of new ╚s or new ╦s is 
equally likely. One might think that together these reaction scenarios would tend 
to average out, maintaining a random mixture, but, as Turing found in a simi-
lar experiment, instead, dif ferentiation can occur. In our experiment, a clump of, 
say,╚s happens to form in one area, as they might since randomness is not per-
fectly non-repetitive. No new ╦s will be produced in an╚ clump because a ╦ is 
required to produce more ╦s. Even more ╚s may be produced at the edges of the 
clump when ╚s happen to come in contact with ╩s in the appropriate orientation. 
The clump is self-increasing. No external interference is required. We may say 
that the material qualities of these ╩ and ╚ signs (i.e., the relative similarity and 
proximity of the signs) lead to the collective activity, an emergent spot pattern. ╚s 
can interpret (respond to, interact with, translate)  ╩s and produce more of them-
selves, more ╚s. 
A soup of this mixture would yield some╚ clumps and some ╦ clumps, f loating 
in random mix of both ╚s and ╦s. If ╚ = black and ╦ = white, black and white spots 
will appear on a gray background, as on the coat of an Australian cattle dog. The 
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actual process forming animal coat patterns is much more complicated, but this 
serves as a simple visual illustration of spontaneous self-organization that occurs 
throughout nature, especially in the brain. 
In “The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis” (Turing, 1952a) and “A Dif fusion 
Reaction Theory of Morphogenesis in Plants” (Turing & Wardlaw, 1952), Turing 
demonstrates that non-linear equations can describe the way patterns form spon-
taneously from unorganized material.  He shows that genes do not need to fully 
specify the complex structure of the organism. The coding genes mainly provide 
the templates for making the materials, in the right order and in the right amounts, 
but do not contain the instructions for how to put the materials together.1 They do 
not have to. The laws of physics and chemistry and the qualities of the materials 
(such as that of ╦s and╚s) act as the transformation rules and the constraints that 
help self-organize the gene-produced materials. As a computer programmer, Tur-
ing would have had great admiration for Nature’s ingenuity and economy. She did 
not have to physically record the procedure for development in the DNA. Instead, 
Nature availed herself of spontaneous self-organizing programs.
Biosemiotic adaptation is possible in this system if, for example, a ╩ happens 
to bind with a new molecule, L, as if it were an ╚.  (L thus functions as a mistaken 
sign of ╚.) All new signs discovered by biological systems must function to an al-
ready existing sign-reading system. They cannot be purely random as with neo-Dar-
winian theory. The outcome of an L and  ╩ binding might be a new molecule that 
will differentially trigger cells affected by this new combination.  
Waddington (1940) had provided Turing with the epigenetic landscape as a visu-
al metaphor for the physical forces that guide development (or cellular responses 
generally) which inspired Turing’s theory. Waddington had argued that before a 
cell has differentiated, it is in a state of instability, like a ball sitting atop a moun-
tain with various valley features down below. Turing realized that any slight f luc-
tuation might push it toward one valley pathway or another from this point of 
instability.  These ideas became known as the “catastrophe theory” of early biose-
miotician René Thom (see Favareau, 2009: 337-376). Waddington guessed that al-
ternative pathways might be “competing” autocatalytic reactions that used some 
of the same molecules for different processes. L might bind to ╩  and trigger one 
pathway or ╚ might bind with ╩ and trigger a different pathway. 
The selection process of self-organization is based on the formal properties of 
the elements, qualities, not just the number of the elements as with statistical se-
lection. Turing discovered the process whereby differentiating waves, morphoge-
netic fields, emerge spontaneously without external selection. This type of compu-
tation is truly self-learning.
1  See Keller (2002) for a history of the understanding of gene action.
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Emergent Brain Patterns
Throughout much of the twentieth century, brainwaves were believed to be su-
perf luous, like the sound an engine makes without contributing to the operation 
of the engine. Now we must consider that these waves may be a type of emergent 
program for organizing the actions of neurons. In thorough reviews of the lit-
erature, Kelso et al. (1991), Uhlhaas et al. (2009) and De Assis (2015) report that 
many neuroscientists understand the mechanisms underlying working memory 
and attention in terms of emergent brain waves that synchronize distant neurons, 
creating virtual neuronal assemblies (De Assis, 2015; Postle, 2006). It appears that 
waves may provide “the ‘contexts’ for the ‘content’ carried by networks of princi-
pal cells” and “the precise temporal structure necessary for ensembles of neurons 
to perform specific functions, including sensory binding and memory formation” 
(Buzsáki & Chrobak, 1995).  In addition, emergent wave patterns may also define 
what data gets attention, that is, consciousness (see Thompson & Varela, 2001), 
which, in turn, affects further sensory processing.
This signal propagation theory of learning, using self-organizing signs (not 
codes), may help explain how people are able to form and use f luid adaptable cat-
egories and deal with complex changing environments. Local f luctuations allow 
stochastic resonance (as with the Ls and ╚s), the similarity and proximity of possi-
ble states, which in turn allows sameness to spread, instant organization. Natural 
selection cannot “see” to select these local interactions (it does not need to since 
these interactions just f low spontaneously to the lowest energy state). What can 
be selected for fitness are the effects of the global patterns that emerge from the 
local interactions (Cf. Rocha, 1998).2
No Artificial Neural Networks or Deep Learning networks are designed to im-
itate the f luid interplay between self-organization and natural selection. AI de-
signers are more committed to strictly selectionist, aka connectionist, approaches. 
Although learning can be accomplished this way, it produces automatons, as does 
standardized curriculums and relentless testing, reward and punishment.  
Even with the latest celebrated update (Levis-Kraus, 2016), Google Translate 
is still bad with puns, jokes and poetry. Psychologists Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) 
suggest that insight—understanding literary themes and metaphors and getting 
jokes—requires synchronizing distant brain areas instantly via gamma waves. 
To design computers that can get allusive language, that understand people, one 
might need a more f luid medium for traveling waves to emerge. Atomic switch 
networks as per Stieg et al. (2014) seem promising; they have been used to create 
emergent patterns that imitate simple natural systems. Experimental chemical 
2  Likewise, contrary to the selfish gene hypothesis, natural selection cannot “see” the genes per se 
only their products.
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reaction-diffusion computers have been around for more than a decade (Ad-
amatsky et al., 2005), but although they create emergent patterns, they do away 
with more permanent connections. Our brains seem to use both.
Maybe we will eventually use reaction-diffusion to create more humanoid AI, 
but we already have eight billion human computers coupled together on the Inter-
net, like so many neurons ready to organize. The potential for spectacular evolu-
tion of knowledge is at our finger tips, if only we were in control of AI algorithms 
rather than controlled by them. With more information about the nature of AI 
compared to BI, we could make better choices with regard to how little or much 
we are willing to let AI think for us.
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Productive Sounds 
Touch-Tone Dialing, the Rise of the Call Center Industry 
and the Politics of Virtual Voice Assistants
Axel Volmar
The growing dissemination of virtual voice assistants in smartphones, smart 
speakers and vehicle onboard systems, such as Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s Siri, Goo-
gle’s Assistant, Microsoft’s Cortana or Samsung’s Viv, represent a democratiza-
tion of artificial intelligence by sheer mass exposure.1 Voice assistants, generally 
referred to as intelligent virtual assistants (IVAs) or intelligent personal assistants 
(IPAs), belong to a class of software agents that can answer queries and perform 
tasks for users based on verbal commands and inquiries when equipped with a 
voice user interface (VUI). Tech corporations promote their voice-centered smart 
assistants as pinnacles of contemporary artificial intelligence and as new forms 
of seamless cooperation between man and machine, built to offer more intuitive 
ways of controlling and navigating digitally networked and cloud-based technol-
ogy. The imminent ubiquity of conversational AI, however, raises a number of 
fundamental questions regarding algorithmic control as well as the nature and 
history of sound-based human–machine interaction. How are these emergent 
forms of voice-based cooperation structured and how does voice control change 
our relationship with and critical assessment of software technology? What ram-
ifications result from AI technologies being based largely on cloud computing and 
thus from user data being sent to cloud servers to be processed? 
Given the black-box character of most commercially available AI technologies, 
it is naturally rather difficult to obtain detailed information about how the AI al-
gorithms of particular voice assistants exactly function. However, it is not neces-
sary to understand how they work algorithmically in every detail to understand 
their politics; it is sufficient to study what they are used for and how they are mar-
keted to different stakeholders and actors. I therefore conceptualize intelligent 
personal assistants—on mobile phones, operating systems, and especially smart 
1  A recent report by market analyst firm Canalys (2019) predicts that the worldwide smart speaker 
install base is set to grow 82.4 per cent from 114 million sold units to over 200 million by the end 
of 2019.
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speakers—as platforms in the sense of media scholar Tarleton Gillespie. In his 
well-received paper, Gillespie argues that the politics of platforms can be traced 
by examining how
online content providers such as YouTube are carefully positioning themselves to 
users, clients, advertisers and policymakers, making strategic claims for what they 
do and do not do, and how their place in the information landscape should be un-
derstood. One term in particular, ‘platform’, reveals the contours of this discursive 
work. (Gillespie 2010: 347)
Similarly, I will focus in this paper less on the inner workings of the machines 
themselves than on the various relations of voice interfaces to their immediate 
surrounding environment and on the purposes they serve for different actors, 
such as users, call center agents, businesses, major tech corporations, and surveil-
lance states. However, I will take a considerable historical detour in the effort to 
ground conversational AI in a broader history of sound- and voice-based human–
machine interaction and to emphasize continuities and caesuras between con-
temporary voice assistants and previous sound- and voice-based user interfaces 
for networked services. Another reason for this approach is that despite the cur-
rent hype around voice assistants, auditory and speech-based human–machine 
interfaces are far from being recent developments. Ever since the psychologically 
troubled board computer HAL from Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968), 
speech interfaces for human–computer interaction have had a permanent place in 
the cultural imaginary of industrialized societies. 
Although sophisticated artificial intelligence systems like HAL still remain 
science fiction, sound and speech indeed represent one of the oldest interfaces 
for interacting with remote systems. However, early applications did not emerge 
in the computer industry but in the telecommunications sector. Shortly after the 
release of 2001, AT&T promoted its Touch-Tone telephones for queries in digi-
tal-inquiry/voice-answer (DIVA) systems, which allowed for information retriev-
al in the form of computer-controlled voice messages through and triggered by 
Touch-Tone commands. Telephonic practices of interacting with distributed ser-
vices via sound and speech date back to even the 1940s and 1950s, before they were 
further developed in the growing call center industry. Contemporary practices of 
speaking to machines therefore reinterpret forgotten or discarded user experi-
ences connected to the telephone. To this effect, I second media scholar Jonathan 
Sterne’s (2012) emphasis on the centrality of telephony and sound technologies to 
the history of digitality:
Telephony is of ten considered anaesthetic matter in comparison with the usual, 
more aestheticized subjects of twentieth-century media history such as cinema, 
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television, sound recording, radio, print, and computers. But telephony and the 
peculiar characteristics of its infrastructure are central to the sound of most audio 
technologies over the past 130-odd years. The institutional and technical protocols 
of telephony also helped frame the definitions of communication that we still use, 
the basic idea of information that subtends the whole swath of “algorithmic cul-
ture” from packet switching to dvds and games, and the protocols and routines of 
digital technologies we use every day. (2-3)
While Sterne used the history of the telephone system, and especially develop-
ments in signal compression methods and perceptual coding to unpack the mp3 
format as a “cultural artifact” (Sterne 2006), I discuss speech-related artificial 
intelligence applications against the backdrop of a longer history of remote tele-
phone services and processes of (semi-)automation in the telecommunications and 
customer service industry, with particular attention to call centers. Automation 
has been a driving force, if not the condition of possibility, of call centers from the 
very beginning. Most of these attempts are based on what I want to call productive 
sounds, i.e., sounds that serve specific purposes within a (semi-)automated system 
or even literally perform work, such as triggering switching or algorithmic pro-
cesses.2 Productive sounds such as Touch-Tone signals, hold music and recorded 
voice messages lie at the center of a transformational process in which telephone 
companies aimed to extend the telephone system from a special-purpose applica-
tion for voice transmission into a general-purpose information network (cf. Lipar-
tito 2003). Taking the form of synthesized voices in conversational AI and digital 
personal assistants, sounds became productive as special-purpose substitutes for 
general-purpose manual tasks previously performed by computer users. 
In media theoretical terms, we can understand this transition by conceptu-
alizing productive sound media not as media of communication but, in the words 
of German media theorist Erhard Schüttpelz, as potentially powerful media of 
cooperation (Schüttpelz 2017: 14; cf. Volmar 2017). For instance, to speak of the tele-
phone as a cooperative medium means to conceive it not as a mere conversational 
medium but as a more universal means to facilitate logistical, bureaucratic, prob-
lem-solving, and other quotidian personal tasks of work-related “infrastructur-
ing” (Star/Bowker 2002). At a time when we casually associate such logistical tasks 
with the internet, online platforms, mobile apps or smart speakers, it seems worth 
a reminder that the underlying narrative of inter-networked information services 
is actually older than the internet itself and that it once was deeply entangled with 
2  While I use the term “productive sounds” in this specific sense, I take the general notion from 
Alix Hui and Joeri Bruyninckx who introduced the term at their workshop “Productive Sounds in 
Everyday Spaces: Sounds at Work in Science, Art, and Industry, 1920–Present” at the Max Planck 
Institute for the History of Science on April 27-28, 2018.
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circuit-switched telecommunications infrastructure. I argue that voice-centered 
AI applications in call centers (now usually referred to as ‘contact centers’) and 
domestic environments can be regarded as a current escalation within the history 
of cooperative sound media and the various attempts to automate the practices 
that revolve around them.
Cooperation always entails practices performed by and between different ac-
tors and groups. To highlight developments in cooperative practices within the 
history of voice automation, I pay particular attention to forms of phone- and 
voice-related work and labor practices. While scholars in the history of media and 
technology have extensively studied the work of telephone operators (e.g., Green 
1995; Lipartito 1994), I follow media and sound scholar Sumanth Gopinath’s work 
on the ringtone industry (Gopinath 2013) by focusing on the significance of sonic 
and telephonic labor within the infrastructural frameworks of the customer ser-
vice industry to trace the formation of networked, speech-based human–machine 
interactions. To this end I examine how changing distributions and delegations 
of work between call center agents and customers as well as between humans and 
machines constitute infrastructures of tele cooperation, parts of which we also find 
in current digital assistants.
In section 1, I take a step back to revisit the ramifications of AT&T’s introduc-
tion of the push-button telephone in the early 1960s. Initially sought to replace 
operators by further automating the initiation and switching of telephone calls, 
push-button telephones featured the new dialing method of dual-tone multi-fre-
quency (DTMF) signaling, which operated on the basis of “in-band”, i.e., audible 
control signals—the dial tones we still hear in landline and mobile phones when 
pushing buttons on the keypad. Sometimes the tones are even simulated on 
smartphones, for instance within messenger apps. I argue that while multi-fre-
quency signaling rendered telephone switching more automatic and efficient, it 
also led to practices of delegating and outsourcing phone work from operators to 
both automatic systems and customers.
More importantly, MF signaling enabled the transmission of sonically coded 
alpha-numerical information over the telephone network and thus formed a fun-
damental condition of possibility for the emergence of automatic phone-based 
information systems in modern call centers. In section 2, I recall some of these 
technological innovations, especially automatic call distributors (ACDs) and inter-
active voice response systems (IVRs), both of which were foundational for the rise 
of the call center industry. I then examine how these contributed to the semi-au-
tomation of telephone calls and the further redistribution of voice and sound work 
by breaking down telephone conversations into common inquiries and sequences 
and how both call center agents and callers had to adjust themselves to these stan-
dardized “boundary objects” (Star/Griesemer 1989) in order to make the automat-
ed systems work.
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In section 3, then, I show how artificial intelligence entered the stage in the 
contact center, as it had come to be called, in the form of speech recognition, un-
derstanding, and synthesis. I argue that decades of semi-automating phone calls 
and adjusting agents and customers to automated systems made the contact cen-
ter particularly receptive to artificial intelligence technology within the industry. 
The implementation of conversational AI is based on a similar logic as IVRs, as it 
mainly breaks down phone conversations into a limited number of categories or 
entities, such as certain key words or presumed emotional states. The same logics 
are present in contemporary voice assistants for the home. By situating contem-
porary voice assistants within the broader history of semi-automation and co-
operative telephonic practices based on productive sounds and voice work in the 
call center industry, I ultimately seek to expand existing histories of the internet 
and digital culture (e.g., Haigh et al. 2015) by considering the evolution of tele-
phone-based telecommunications as an important area for the conception, test-
ing, and mainstreaming of digitally networked media and cooperative practices.
1. Push-button Telephones and Touch-Tone Dialing:   
 Innovation in General-Purpose Infrastructural Technologies
In the first half of the twentieth century, the handling of telephone calls in the Bell 
System largely remained in the hands of human telephone operators, even though 
a number of solutions for automatic switching, such as the Strowger switch, were 
at hand. Whereas technical issues and a reluctance of Bell System managers to 
license external patents on automatic switching formed the major reasons for 
clinging to manual switching (Green 1995; Lipartito 1994), opponents of automatic 
switching argued that establishing the connection represented a form of technical 
work that should be offered as part of the telephone service and hence done by 
operators. Harris F. Hopkins, the author of an article in the Bell Laboratories Record, 
put it this way: “Oppositionists felt that automatic switching was wrong from the 
customer’s viewpoint. ‘The public will not tolerate doing its own operating,’ they 
said” (Hopkins 1960: 83). After the Second World War, however, rotary-dial tele-
phones to automate the initiation of local phone calls became increasingly com-
mon. This transition to self-operating shows that the central logic of automation 
extended beyond the simple substitution of work by machines to the delegation 
or redistribution of work in general, in this case from service providers to their 
customers. The outsourcing of labor to both machines and customers in order to 
save labor cost, which forms a signature of today’s digital culture, was already an 
economic driving force in the postwar telecommunications sector. 
On November 18, 1963, Bell introduced yet another innovation in dialing au-
tomation: the push-button telephone, which featured not just a different way of 
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manual dialing but an entirely new way of creating dialing signals. Dialing on a 
rotary phone produced a train of electrical impulses, the number of which corre-
sponded to the indicated digit on the rotary dial. Pressing a button on a push-but-
ton telephone, however, created a distinct pair of two audible sine tones generated 
by electronic oscillators. This so-called dual-tone multi-frequency (DTMF) dialing 
method was based on a four-by-four frequency scheme proposed by L. A. Mea-
cham of Bell’s Station Development Department, although initially only seven fre-
quencies (four in the low end of the spectrum and three in the higher range of the 
spectrum) would generate ten unique pairs of tones (Meacham et al. 1958).3
Fig. 1: Four-by-four frequency scheme for the generation of DTMF dialing signals. 
Image source: Noweck 1961: 314. Courtesy of AT&T Archives and History Center.
The method made use of state-of-the-art solid-state technology and was grounded 
in a number of field trials conducted between 1948 and 1960 (Dahlbom et al. 1949; 
Hopkins 1960). When dialing a number, the dual-tones provided a helpful acoustic 
feedback for the caller. Nevertheless, the sounds were not addressed to human 
ears to hear in the first place but to electronic filter banks, which were installed at 
the local switching stations, the so-called “call centers,” for decoding. To prevent 
3  The pairing of tones followed a simple rule of construction. Each vertical column has a dif ferent 
tone in the low frequency range assigned (FA = 697 Hz, FD = 770 Hz, FC = 852 Hz und FD = 941 Hz), 
while each horizontal row has a dif ferent higher frequency tone assigned (FE = 1209 Hz, FF = 1336 
Hz, FG = 1447 Hz und FH = 1633 Hz). This way, each key is assigned to a dif ferent combination of a 
high and a low frequency tone. The necessary hardware comprised a keypad encoder and tone 
generator.
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spoken language, noises and other sounds from interfering with the transmission 
of DTMF tones, the microphone was disconnected when pressing down a button. 
Further, because the dialing signals were audible “in-band” frequencies, the Bell 
technicians chose combinations of frequencies that were unlikely to occur in ev-
eryday life so as to prevent false positives and false negatives from occurring in 
the receivers of the switching equipment: “The frequencies that are used mini-
mize interference from harmonics. This permits instantaneous limiting in both 
frequency bands, and satisfactorily guards against possible voice interference” 
(Hopkins 1960: 86). If you ever wondered why push-button tones sound more like 
the otherworldly noises of electronic music than the harmonious sounds of musi-
cal instruments, this is why.
At the 1964 World’s Fair in New York, Bell presented DTMF signaling to the 
public under the brand name Touch-Tone. By means of Touch-Tone calling, sub-
scribers were enabled to initiate, for the first time, long-distance calls directly 
without the need of a human operator as an intermediary. The introduction of 
the push-button telephone was therefore closely related to the more or less si-
multaneous introduction of electronic switching systems (ESSs) to the central 
switching stations. ESSs were based on digital “stored program control” (SPC), an 
automated and computerized method of monitoring telephone switching devel-
oped around 1954 by Bell Labs mathematician Erna Schneider Hoover (Harr et al. 
1964). Electronic switching proved to be more stable and reliable than mechani-
cal methods and eliminated almost entirely the need for human operators. Since 
tone-based dialing was vital for the introduction of digital switching, the use of 
sound was also part of a foundational step in the history of digitization. The main 
advantage of DMTF dialing was the fact that tones could be both generated and 
detected much faster than the pulse signals generated by rotary phones. The in-
creased speed was particularly helpful for long-distance calls and calls to individ-
ual extensions, for instance within larger organizations, since this could greatly 
increase the number of digits to dial and hence demanded time and patience on 
the part of the caller. While Bell promoted Touch-Tone dialing to its customers as 
a more convenient way of initiating calls, the method was particularly tailored to 
unburden the switching centers, where the old step-by-step switches that could 
become serious bottlenecks in the connection process, especially during peak 
calling times. With Touch-Tone signaling, switching centers were able to handle 
many more calls within a much smaller time span.
The adoption of in-band signaling, however, was not intended to improve the 
dialing process and the handling of calls alone but to enable new ways of inter-
acting with electronic, and possibly digital, systems connected to the telephone 
network. As Hopkins (1960) points out, Bell had confidence in offering this “pos-
sible future service” because Touch-Tone dialing would provide “the customer 
with a potential (slow-speed) data transmitter” (87). The first widely distributed 
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push-button telephone was Western Electric’s Model 1500, which came with 10 
buttons corresponding to the digits 0 through 9 (see fig. 1). On later models, but-
tons with the now ubiquitous number (#) and star (*) signs were added to enable 
and control the transmission of symbolic data. Transmogrified into a potential 
remote control or terminal device, the telephone receiver could be used to provide 
alpha-numerical information, such as credit card numbers, or place commands, 
such as vertical service codes (VSCs). VSCs are sequences of digits in combina-
tion with the signals star (*) and, less frequently, number sign (#). Dialled on a 
telephone keypad or rotary dial, a VSC could be used to enable or disable certain 
telephony service features, such as call hold, call forwarding, continuous redial or 
call blocking. The term “vertical” refers to commands pointing to higher-level in-
structions within the local telephone infrastructure rather than regular telephone 
numbers, which point out “horizontally” to another geographic location or switch-
ing center. AT&T began to introduce VSCs under the name “Custom Local Area 
Signaling Services” (CLASS or LASS) codes to subscribers in the 1960s and 1970s.
With Touch-Tone, sound thus became an acoustic interface for interactions with 
automated electronic and digital systems. 
Seen from the perspective of speech act theory (Austin 1975), the DTMF tones 
can be conceptualized as “sonic acts” or “sound acts,” i.e., as sounds that not only 
represent something or contain information but also act and have consequences. 
As audible control signals, designed to communicate with automated electronic 
systems over the network, DTMF tones literally became productive sounds with-
in the telephone system as they triggered switches, transmitted information and 
remote-controlled automatic processes. It was on the basis of productive sounds, 
then, that Bell engineers aimed to prepare the telephone system for the informa-
tion age. Or put another way, Bell engineers realized that a technology conceived 
for optimizing their own infrastructure could also be used to develop and offer 
new information services to both their business and domestic customers. In re-
gard to practice, the growing habit of dialing telephone numbers and using other 
services, such as VSCs, contributed to training subscribers to perform different 
forms of data work. As noted above, Touch-Tone dialing enabled end-to-end sig-
naling, the transmission of control signals not only to the nearest switching cen-
ter but also to switching systems anywhere in the network. Therefore, the DTMF 
method needs to be regarded as an infrastructural medium that played a funda-
mental role in the transformation of the telephone from a special-purpose tech-
nology for talking over distances to a general-purpose technology for speech, data 
transmission and remote control.
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Fig. 2: Dif ferent potential applications for banking, retail, or domestic use interconnect 
customers and digital systems via Touch-Tone telephones. The original caption reads: 
“Many businesses are using the double-duty TOUCH-TONE® telephone and a computer 
to speed customer services and develop new ones as well. Banks use the Touch-Tone 
phone in an information retrieval system known as DIVA (for Digital Inquiry-Voice 
Answer). With this system, for example, a teller can query the bank ‘s central computer 
for a customer’s up-to-elate balance before cashing a check (upper lef t). He dials the 
computer, taps a few buttons to identify the account number (or, if his phone is a 
card-dialer model as shown, inserts a DIVA account card) and the code for current 
balance. The computer responds with a voice answer. Data systems using the Touch-
Tone telephone are being used by clerks in retail stores as well. As shown (upper right), 
the clerk telephones a computer to record each sale she makes. In this case, she sends 
the account number (for credit sales), the price, merchandise code, and her own clerk 
number. Billing and accounting are then handled automatically. Eventually, even a 
house wife (lef t [image not reproduced here]) may use the Touch-Tone telephone to “shop 
by phone,” pay bills, or check her bank balance.” Image source: Soderberg 1969: 203. 
Courtesy of AT&T Archives and History Center.
2. Speaking to Machines, Speaking in Code: The Rise of the Call  
 Center Industry and the Semi-automation of Phone Conversations
AT&T began to offer new custom calling services based on Touch-Tone dialing in 
the mid 1960s. These featured new functionalities, such as call waiting, call for-
warding, and three-way service or conference calls. Moreover, automatic data col-
lection and information retrieval systems, such as the digital-inquiry/voice-an-
swer (DIVA) system (see the textbox in fig. 2), were sought to bring new forms 
of distributed cooperation to the business world and domestic subscribers. Bell 
engineers envisioned diverse workf lows of quotidian “infrastructuring” (Star/
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Bowker 2002) in a number of different domains, such as banking, retail, and per-
sonal use (see fig. 2). For J. H. Soderberg, who summarized some of the potential 
commercial applications of Touch-Tone-based services in 1969, the switched tele-
phone network pointed the way into the digital future of networked devices and 
distributed services:
The possibilities for using the Touch-Tone telephone for control purposes are vir-
tually unlimited. Not only can the Touch-Tone telephone bring the computer revo-
lution into every living room or of fice across the nation, but it can perform many 
other simpler control functions. It is even conceivable that future systems will per-
mit you to turn on your home air conditioner so that your home will be comfortable 
when you return from a trip, or let you “shop by phone”—merely by pushing a few 
buttons on your telephone. The result could be a dramatic simplification of every- 
day tasks. (Soderberg 1969: 203)
As Soderberg’s vision shows, Bell engineers and marketers had surprisingly clear 
ideas about the potential of digitally networked, semi-automated services in tele-
phone banking, distributed accounting, home shopping and smart home applica-
tions. Not least due to antitrust laws, which banned cross-subsidizing “enhanced” 
telecommunications services and largely prevented AT&T from venturing into 
computer businesses, many of these possible applications remained for more 
than another decade just that, a technological potential and good publicity for the 
Touch-Tone service. It took well until the 1980s before push button phones reached 
a considerable saturation.4 But watch any Hollywood film from the time featuring 
1980s yuppie culture and you will see Touch-Tone services everywhere and realize: 
the telephone system was the internet of services before the internet of services.
Touch-Tone-based services, however, proved tremendously successful in the 
customer service sector and were deeply connected to the rise of call centers. In 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, call centers began to form in the offices of telephone 
companies for their own customer and operator support. Two technical innova-
tions fostered the spread of premise-based call centers. First, the introduction of 
private automated branch exchanges (PABX), later also referred to as private au-
tomated business exchanges, allowed automatic routing to an extension number 
in a larger organization and hence replaced the work of phone receptionists or 
attendants (see Bodin 2002: 20). Shortly after, automatic call distributors (ACD) 
extended PABX capability to collect incoming calls—for instance, to the central 
4  The technology was still considered a “premium” feature until well into the 1990s, when personal 
computers connected to the internet via modems began to challenge the use of the telephone as 
the go-to interface for interacting with distributed online-services.
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office of an organization—and route them to a group of customer service agents.5 
In case all agents were busy, the ACD placed the incoming call in a waiting line 
until an agent became available. The functionality of ACDs is based on sophisti-
cated algorithms, such as Erlang calculations, for predicting how many agents are 
needed and how to best queue and assign large numbers of simultaneous calls. 
ACDs can therefore be seen as the foundation of call centers and represent the first 
kind of artificial intelligence (in the larger sense of the word), because they intro-
duce automatic decision making to the management of calls. However, ACDs are 
not artificial intelligence in the narrow sense of the term but rather “conditional 
call routing solutions, based on if-then conditions, or rules pre-defined by the or-
ganization” (Stanley 2018). Nevertheless, ACDs assure to this day that callers are 
answered as quickly as possible and that the time of all agents is used evenly and 
effectively. 
Both PABXs and ACDs reduced the need for human operators and reception-
ists in central telephone offices and even rendered their work entirely obsolete. 
Moreover, sophisticated ACDs provided reports on various aspects of the call 
transaction (Bodin 2002: 22-23). Automatic call distributors proved particularly 
valuable for organizations that faced large call volumes. However, automatic in-
house routing had the obvious disadvantage, due to algorithmic procedures, of 
not allowing callers to contact an agent directly. Since callers were unlikely to get 
assigned to the same agent twice, it prevented them from forming relationships 
with particular agents and hence resulted in a much less personal calling experi-
ence. AT&T’s introduction of toll-free 1-800 numbers in 1967 basically established 
automatic call distribution on a nationwide scale—the service would first redirect 
calls to a national or local call center, where on-premise ACDs would further route 
the call to available agents.6 Toll-free numbers led to an unprecedented increase 
in customer service call volume and cemented the anonymous user experience 
as a de facto standard. ACDs became the foundation of large-scale, decentralized 
and geographically distributed call centers. Among the early ACD solutions that 
proved economically successful, the US-manufacturer Rockwell is one of the most 
credited. The company’s Galaxy ACD, as the device was called, enabled Continen-
tal Airlines to start offering phone-based f light reservation in 1973.
In the 1970s, the potential of DTMF signaling was recognized by manufac-
turers of call center equipment. So-called interactive voice response (IVR) sys-
tems automated not only the routing of calls but also specific parts of the actual 
phone conversations themselves. ACDs could play welcome messages, but they 
5  The job of automatic call distributors, or ACDs, is to filter, order and assign incoming calls to the 
best available agent.
6  The inventor of the toll-free number once stated that all he had invented was in fact a pointer in 
a digital directory.
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featured no further functionality other than putting the caller on hold. In IVRs, 
prerecorded messages would inquire about the caller’s needs, acoustically guide 
them through a menu structure and present them with choices for different ser-
vices, which the caller would then be able to select by pressing the corresponding 
buttons on a push-button phone. Typically, these systems were semi-automat-
ed human–machine systems with IVRs at the front end and human agents who 
took over at predefined points or whenever an automated system would come up 
against limits. The division of labor between humans and machines was achieved 
by breaking down phone conversations into parts with greater or lesser degrees 
of redundancy and automating the former. Fixed sets of categories and options 
addressed most customer queries, delivered through prerecorded messages that 
caller callers could respond to using DTMF tones. We can therefore regard the 
relation between the customer and a respective organization, which unfolds with-
in an IVR system, as what Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer have called 
a “cooperation without consensus” based on a common techno-conversational 
“boundary object” (1989).
The self-service functionality of IVRs allowed for substituting, at least in part, 
not only operator work but also the actual voice and transactional work performed 
by customer service agents. Other than the obvious saving of labor cost, automat-
ic call center systems had the advantage of enabling expanded service hours. The 
f lipside, however, was that since callers were not even talking to human agents 
anymore—at least not until the system connected them to one—IVRs rendered 
the phone experience even more anonymous than the seemingly random selection 
process done by automatic call distributors. Over the years, vendors added voice 
recognition to Touch-Tone as an alternative input language. The primary goal of 
introducing voice control had been to extend IVR services to owners of rotary-di-
al telephones but the result was that with voice recognition, whoever preferred 
speaking to typing was now able to interact with the IVR system via spoken lan-
guage. This is the point where AI techniques first enter the stage. 
Most of these circuit-switched telephonic systems have since been replaced by 
packet-switched, IP-based technology. Their story is therefore, at least to some ex-
tent, also an archaeology or reconstruction of media-cultural visions of a semi-au-
tomated future, consisting of human operators and interactive systems. They also 
refer to a hybrid future of cooperative systems that were both analog and digital 
at the same time. George Lucas’ first feature film, THX 1138 (1971), is exemplary of 
the future visions in this period of telephonic information networks. Lucas paints 
a picture of a futuristic underground society permeated by communication and 
surveillance technologies, reminiscent of George Orwell’s novel 1984. He there-
by extrapolates contemporaneous advancements in touch-button telephones and 
semi-automatic systems into a dystopia of total audiovisual mediatization and 
surveillance. The impression of the omnipresence of media-technological media-
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tion and observation is further reinforced by frequently staging technically medi-
ated communication situations in the form of telephone and intercom conversa-
tions, tape announcements, video transmissions, and CCTV images. 
As a response to its cultural moment, THX 1138 forms an artistic ref lection on 
the then-incipient transformation of acoustic media into what Jonathan Sterne 
has termed a “speaker culture” (Sterne 2015: 113). The film’s soundscape of techni-
cal communications and automated announcements, interwoven through mon-
tage, raises the question of whether the characters actually interact with human 
interlocutors or merely with automatically triggered answers stored on tape. Its 
references to telephone technology are inscribed  further in its very scene design, 
with a Pacific Bell circuit switch room serving as a filming location, according to 
the IMDB trivia section: 
The seemingly endless Control Room where the android police try to corner THX 
and SRT, who find out LUH has been consumed for organ reclamation, was the cir-
cuit switch room of the San Francisco location of the Pacific Bell Telephone Com-
pany. Pacific Bell allowed George Lucas to shoot the film there, because the entire 
room and the hardware found there were about to be dismantled, as the phone 
company was switching to touchtone phone technology (IMDB 2019).
Lucas even named the title of the film after his San Francisco telephone number, 
849-1138, where the letters THX correspond to letters found on the buttons for the 
digits 8, 4, and 9. Moreover, many of the electro-acoustic sound effects that popu-
late the soundscape of the film are distilled from telephone dial tones, which edi-
tor and sound editor Walter Murch manipulated by applying compositional meth-
ods derived from musique concrete. The depiction of automatic speech systems as 
inhumane and anonymous is achieved largely by recreating or mimicking the user 
experience of early IVR systems: the messages and public announcements that are 
automatically triggered throughout the movie are repetitive and monotonous and 
leave no room for doubt that the citizens of the future society have to adjust to the 
system and not the other way around. Rewatching the movie almost half a centu-
ry after its initial release, one cannot help but associate it with current AI-based 
public surveillance systems, such as China’s Social Credit System. 
3. “Speech is an Untapped Goldmine”: The Adoption of AI   
 in the Contact Center and Virtual Voice Assistants
Despite their still apparent limitations, recent speech recognition and synthesis 
systems, such as those used for voice assistants, sound more familiar and less ro-
botic and anonymous than the mantra-like reminders and announcements that 
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populate the soundtrack in THX 1138. Early examples of automatic speech rec-
ognition (ASR) include pattern-based models for detecting a limited ensemble of 
spoken sounds such as digits and words, where the recognition of an uttered digit 
or word is determined by its correlation with a set of stored reference patterns 
(Davis et al. 1952: 194). Among the well-known early examples of such applications, 
Bell Laboratories’ “Audrey” (Pieraccini 2012: 55-59) and IBM’s “Shoebox” (Dersch 
1962) were able to recognize spoken digits and, in the case of Shoebox, even a lim-
ited number of commands if spoken by a familiar voice.7 “HARPY,” a speech recog-
nizer developed in the mid 1970s at Carnegie Mellon University as part of the first 
ARPA project on speech understanding research, was already able to recognize a 
vocabulary of 1,011 words (Lowerre 1976). In the late 1970s, IBM’s Dragon system 
heralded a new era of ASR systems based on hidden Markov models, the descen-
dants of which were used in most IVR systems from the 1990s onward (Pieraccini 
2012). 
As noted in the previous section, speech recognition research yielded the po-
tential use of the human voice to control automated systems and to transmit in-
formation to them. Spoken language thus represented an alternative type of pro-
ductive sound alongside DTMF tones in automated telephone systems. Moreover, 
the integration of voice control into major computer operating systems such as 
Windows or MacOS, not least in order to increase accessibility for visually im-
paired users, points toward the conversational systems that we now see used in 
current applications and platforms for smartphones and smart home devices. To-
day, the combination of automatic speech recognition, understanding and syn-
thesis—now largely based on artificial intelligence approaches—is referred to as 
natural language processing. A crucial step toward this stage of extended voice 
agent interaction has been the application of machine learning and deep learn-
ing techniques, which mostly rely on learning algorithms based on deep neural 
networks (DNN). Compared with previous methods, following from the historical 
precursors in speech recognition and synthesis described above, DNNs allow for 
the analysis and processing of voice audio with a much higher level of accuracy 
and naturalness (cf. Mary 2018: 50). The improvements are primarily due to the 
general increase in processing power, the use of cloud computing, and the ac-
cess to vast amounts of training data. This is also the reason why big tech com-
panies have in recent years increasingly developed natural language processing 
and offered AI solutions for call centers and voice assistants for smartphone or 
home use.8 Special apps and platforms, such as Amazon’s Lex, Google’s Dialog-
7  The name “Audrey” is a loose acronym of “automatic digit recognition.” 
8  These systems are increasingly based on a centralized internet infrastructure dominated by 
cloud-based services provided by a few major market leaders, Amazon (AWS), Google (Google 
Cloud), and Microsof t (Azure). The speech recognition models, the emotion analysis metrics, and 
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f low, Facebook’s Wit.ai, IBM’s Watson, and Microsoft’s LUIS, offer considerably 
straight-forward solutions for creating conversational bots. Not surprisingly, one 
of the major professional domains of AI application is the contact center indus-
try. Google, for instance, boasts that its cloud services provide “AI-powered vir-
tual agents for the contact center, including phone-based conversational agents 
known as interactive voice response (IVR)” (Google 2019).
Call centers offer ideal conditions for the introduction of voice-centered AI 
technologies because they constitute, as shown in section 2, highly compart-
mentalized, process-oriented and automated conversational environments with 
a long history of human–machine integration. From the beginning, developers 
and vendors of IVRs have conceived systems to which both customers and agents 
must adapt. Now with the most recent examples of virtual assistants, we can ob-
serve this logic upheld and transformed into new semi-automated conversational 
settings: to ensure that the systems “understand” them, users need to adapt the 
way they talk and the words they use. Therefore, the processes of automating tele-
phone work through IVRs and conversational AI can be better described in terms 
of what Hamid R. Ekbia and Bonnie A. Nardi (2017) have termed “heteromation,” 
the “extraction of economic value from low-cost or free labor in computer-me-
diated networks”—in this case, labor performed by both call center agents and 
customers.
The contemporary contact center’s core function does not fundamentally dif-
fer from its original, historical task of handling inquiries and improving customer 
satisfaction. However, the increase in online shopping and other forms of e-com-
merce has brought along a huge demand for virtual customer services, which co-
incides with the significant advancement in natural language processing capabil-
ities and synthetic speech models over the past decade (Kopparapu 2015: 5). The 
use of these optimized systems promises the automation of not only call distribu-
tion and routing but also more individual customer interactions, such as complex 
three-factor account authentification, with the effect of further reducing the need 
for direct contact with human service agents—possibly until eventually conversa-
tions between humans will have shifted from the norm to the exception.9 Since 
their emergence, IVR systems, which require long automated spoken menus for 
their extensive decision trees, have incurred criticism for being impersonal and 
annoying (cf. Smith 2016). A second reason for integrating intelligent personal as-
the design of synthetic voices that lie at the core of contemporary and future autonomous con-
versational agents are, thus, all dependent on the protocols and regulations determined by these 
corporates. 
9  A parallel development has happened in the field of text-based chatbots, the performance of 
which is now convincing in standard use cases (Sheth et al. 2019), although as of now, most cus-
tomer interactions still happen over the phone.
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sistants is therefore to offer the customer the experience of a “personal,” seeming-
ly individual conversational behavior, with the goal of overcoming the perceived 
shortcomings of IVR systems, by hiding the underlying hierarchical structure 
from the perception of the customer. Apple’s Siri, for example, has been branded 
from the start as a witty and fun-to-use application with personality to dissociate 
it from anonymous automated systems, such as IVRs.10 
The use of automatic speech recognition to augment traditional IVR systems 
and replace human agents, however, is not the main purpose for introducing AI 
technology in the contact center. Rather, it is the tip of the AI iceberg that is gen-
erally visible or perceivable to the customer. In the contemporary contact center, 
we are very likely to find not only one but a growing number of different types of 
artificial intelligence solutions at work simultaneously. According to one of the 
industry’s leading trade magazines, Call Center Helper, artificial intelligence solu-
tions are used not only for the handling of calls but increasingly for the production 
of new insights about customers and call center agents by capturing data from 
customer interactions, applying big data analytics, predicting customer behavior 
or monitoring advisor performance (Call Center Helper 2018). An industry repre-
sentative hence predicts that “our future with machines is going to be (and needs 
to be) one of partnership and enhancement, not sweeping replacement” (Call Cen-
ter Helper 2019). Call centers usually have vast amounts of stored voice recordings 
at their disposal, which make them particularly suited for analytic AI applications, 
especially predictive analytics and speech analytics. As an industry white paper 
frames it, “Speech is an untapped goldmine.” (CallMiner 2019: 5) 
Predictive analytics allows call centers to generate valuable insights in real- 
time, such as a customer’s willingness to pay off a debt, a customer service agent’s 
effectiveness at addressing particular concerns, and a caller’s overall sentiment 
and the actions likely to satisfy them given their history. Speech analytics, in turn, 
goes beyond recognition, interpreting not just the words a caller speaks but also 
the manner in which those words are spoken. [Also known as voice analytics, this 
technology] detects factors such as tone, sentiment, vocabulary, silent pauses, and 
even the caller’s age, analyzing these factors to route callers to the ideal agent ba-
sed on agents’ success rates, specialized knowledge and strengths, as well as the 
customer’s personality and other behavioral characteristics. (Stanley 2018, n.p.) 
In particular, this concerns the backtracking of all available voice recordings for 
all sorts of analyses and the ambition to detect and analyze not only the seman-
tic but also the emotional aspects of the human voice by exploiting methods of 
affective computing (Picard 1997; Jeon 2017). The bottom line of the current shift 
10  “Siri” stands for “speech interpretation and recognition interface.”
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toward the integration of AI technology into the contact center is that it works 
only in part for the customer and primarily for the enterprise using it. What I 
want to argue is that the same goes for virtual voice assistants for the home, for 
which contact centers served as a testing ground for early adoption (Davis 2019). 
To this effect, the various uses of AI in the customer service industry point to a 
number of potentially invisible or concealed uses of AI for domestic voice assis-
tants. Smart speakers with voice interfaces are branded as convenient interfaces 
to both local and cloud-based digital services. They are thus designed to simulate 
personality in order to be more fun to use. We should, however, not trick ourselves 
into thinking we are dealing with one and only one artificial intelligence alone—
the workings of which are represented and condensed in the form of the artificial 
voice. Rather, we should realize that there are probably a dozen other AI systems 
listening in and analyzing the information of our voice data being transmitted to 
the providers’ cloud servers. In the end, intelligent personal assistants work not 
merely for the users but on them. Domestic users and office workers embrace voice 
assistants for their convenience and efficiency in performing repetitive tasks such 
as web searches and daily routines. Businesses, tech corporations, surveillance 
states, and other actors, however, are competing to gain access to the users’ voice 
itself, which is seen as a highly valuable data source—a “goldmine”—for AI-based 
analytics.
4. Conclusion
With the introduction of DTMF signaling in the 1960s, special-purpose telephone 
receivers were repurposed into general-purpose remote controls, resulting in a 
fundamental first step toward a long-ranging transformation of the telephone 
system from a mere medium of communication into a versatile medium of co- 
operation. Over the course of roughly two to three decades, Touch-Tone calling 
in conjunction with IVR systems slowly trained users in how to interact with re-
mote automatic and semi-automatic information systems over the telephone net-
work. Given that these technologies almost exclusively relied on all-acoustic inter- 
faces and a small keypad, we can consider the mobilization of productive sounds 
to have ultimately paved the way for what could retroactively be called the first 
generation of everyday “online practices.” Different iterations of productive 
sounds, as I have argued, in this way formed the basis of a slow transition from 
telecommunication to telecooperation: at first, in an essential and operational 
sense in the form of multifrequency signals; later, as voice work performed by 
call center agents, prerecorded messages, hold music and other design elements, 
which formed part of telephonic waiting loops and acoustic interfaces in automat-
Axel Volmar72
ed interactive voice response systems; and finally, as conversational AI systems 
based on natural language processing. 
As the introduction of Touch-Tone calling has shown, already the “old” media 
industries, especially the telecommunications sector, worked toward realizing 
a future based on networked information technologies and services. The auto-
mation of customer service calls revealed how infrastructural innovations laid 
the foundation for the emergence of new services based on both electronic and 
embodied “data practices” and how these transformations occurred in circuit- 
switched telephone networks before the growth of personal computers and the 
internet and well outside the computer industry. By tracing the relations between 
different technological agents and forms of labor within the cooperative assem-
blages of call centers, I have shown that the development of voice-related artificial 
intelligence systems should be seen as part of a larger history of human–machine 
interaction, the practices of which continue to shape the relations between users 
and contemporary voice assistants. This transformation occured not so much in 
the form of a disruptive revolution but in terms of historical continuities based on 
successive combinations and recombinations of (semi-)automatic man–machine 
systems and the sedulous infrastructuring, networking, and delegation of co-
operative practices, ultimately leading to virtual call center agents and domestic 
voice assistants.
The use of voice assistants and smart speakers is reminiscent of the principles 
and practices of using a self-service call center system. Therefore, I tentatively like 
to frame them as call centers for the home. Moreover, in the coming years, voice 
control, especially in hands-free environments such as moving vehicles, is likely 
to become a ubiquitous and naturalized interface practice. In the contemporary 
contact center, managing and automating conversations to reduce labor cost and 
enhance efficiency is not the only motivation for embracing artificial intelligence 
solutions anymore; equally important is the analysis of user data for making pre-
dictions and producing new commercially exploitable insights. AI in virtual voice 
assistants is therefore used not only to create new ways of conveniently controlling 
our everyday tasks but also to data mine the control signals (i.e., the voice input) as 
exploitable customer data. Studying call center practices can therefore be a way to 
understand voice assistants, and their politics might thus best be explained by an 
uncanny pact of co-operation: One the one hand, voice assistants are devised to 
help us, and they do it well and will even get better as their skills improve. On the 
other hand, because virtual voice assistants transmit our digitized voice signals to 
remote cloud servers for processing, users are, metaphorically speaking, inviting 
into their homes and feeding nameless background AI routines with every conver-
sation. The most common prerecorded pronouncement in call center systems is 
equally valid for virtual voice assistants: “Your call will be monitored.”
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Algorithmic Trading, Artificial Intelligence   
and the Politics of Cognition
Armin Beverungen
In this chapter I focus on the changes in algorithmic trading in financial markets 
brought about by developments in machine learning and artificial intelligence 
(AI). Financial trading has for a long time been dominated by highly sophisticated 
forms of data processing and computation in the dominance of the “quants”. Yet 
over the last two decades high-frequency trading (HFT), as a form of automat-
ed, algorithmic trading focused on speed and volume rather than smartness, has 
dominated the arms race in financial markets. I want to suggest that machine 
learning and AI are today changing the cognitive parameters of this arms race, 
shifting the boundaries between “dumb” algorithms in high-frequency trading 
(HFT) and “smart” algorithms in other forms of algorithmic trading. Whereas 
HFT is largely focused on data internal and dynamics endemic to financial mar-
kets, new forms of algorithmic trading enabled by AI are enlarging the ecology 
of financial markets through ways in which automated trading draws on a wider 
set of data such as social data for analytics such as sentiment analysis. I want to 
suggest that to understand the politics of these shifts it is insightful to focus on 
cognition as a battleground in financial markets, with AI and machine learning 
leading to a further redistribution and new temporalities of cognition. A politics 
of cognition must grapple with the opacities and temporalities of algorithmic 
trading in financial markets, which constitute limits to the democratization of 
finance as well as its social regulation.
Consciousness and Capitalism
Financial markets arguably are at the forefront of a battle around cognition in 
contemporary capitalism. If capitalism today is marked both by the way in which 
finance serves as a primary means to exert violence on and to extract value from 
life, and by the way in which capital amasses and appropriates cognitive capaci-
ties to sustain this extraction (Fumagalli/Mezzadra 2010), then financial markets 
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are bound to play a key role in this financial and cognitive capitalism (Beverun-
gen 2018). Financial markets might appear then as a “collective capitalist brain” 
through which capital cognitively organizes the extraction of value, only ham-
pered by “occasional and random catastrophe” associated with high-frequency 
trading (HFT) (Terranova 2013: 66). And HFT might be understood as the “high 
frontier of cybernetic innovation” in a war of capital against its enemies and the 
working class in which computers are “weapons wielded by advanced capital” (Dy-
er-Witheford 2016: 51, 35). While a closer look at artificial intelligence (AI) and al-
gorithmic trading will yield a complex picture in which a collective capitalist brain 
is far from perceptible, and class war is perhaps less visible than competition be-
tween individual capitals, this is an important frame of analysis to be kept in mind 
as my analysis proceeds.
That finance is concerned with the extraction of value can however be taken 
for granted. That premise is also apparent from the perspective of the financial 
trader, where the question of how to extract value from financial markets be-
comes one of making the right trade. As Beunza and Stark argue, “What counts?” 
is the question which “expresses most succinctly the challenge facing securities 
traders in the era of quantitative finance” (2008: 253), and presumably all other 
financial traders as well, including high-frequency traders. The task is primari-
ly one of information, with traders “immersed in a virtual f lood of information”, 
where “the challenge for traders is not faster, higher, stronger—as if the problem 
of the volume of data could be solved by gathering yet more—but selecting what 
counts and making sense of the selection” (Beunza/Stark 2008: 253). The “calcula-
tive practices” that traders deploy to respond to the question of “what counts?” are 
“distributed across persons and instruments” (Beunza/Stark 2008: 254). Beunza 
and Stark here presume a certain problem of information, where the task is to 
select relevant information that can be made to count in financial trading which 
yields a surplus. We can see already how AI and its key advance today—artificial 
neural networks—may be very helpful.1 Below I will explore how different types 
of AI have been deployed in financial trading, and note how these have shifted the 
parameters of the challenge Beunza and Stark describe.
Before I proceed, though, I would like to historicize Beunza and Stark’s prem-
ises and expand on their analysis, which will also allow me later to come back to 
the more abstract political analysis of financial and cognitive capitalism. First of 
all, it is important to note that Beunza and Stark’s market characterize as being 
characterized by information f lows and by the cognitive challenge of filtering 
1  Somewhat amusingly, the futurist and “world leader in pattern recognition techniques” Ray Kur-
zweil has since 1999 operated a company called “FatKat” which builds “industry-leading tools for 
quantitatively based investing”. Little is known about this company, and its website (www.fatkat.
com) is still dated 2001. See Patterson 2012: 306.
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information in order to yield information useful for a successful trade, is not a 
historical given. It took a while for the market to be understood as an information 
processor and for it to be designed to that end. Mirowski and Nik-Khah (2017) have 
extensively explored the inf luence of Hayek’s evolving conceptions of markets on 
the discipline of economics and the practice of market design. They identify at 
least three stages in Hayek’s work in which markets, knowledge and information 
are understood differently (Nik-Khah/Mirowski 2019: 38-44). First, knowledge is 
understood as something hard to amass, a task only markets can achieve. Then 
knowledge becomes something tacit, and therefore something only markets can 
bring to the fore. Finally, knowledge becomes information, something supraper-
sonal, residing within the market: “a new virtual kind of information” (Nik-Khah/
Mirowski 2019: 43; emphasis in original).
Nik-Khah and Mirowski demonstrate that these conceptions of markets have 
inf luenced different schools of market design, in which economists act as engi-
neers of markets, such as financial markets. I will note below how market design-
ers such as Alvin Roth and others are involved in designing the financial markets 
in which algorithmic trading takes place and AI is deployed. The important aspect 
to note, coinciding with the way market design “constitutes the precepts of neolib-
eralism taken to their logical conclusion” (Nik-Khah/Mirowski 2019: 63), is the way 
in which human consciousness and cognition become increasingly irrelevant to 
markets and are ultimately discounted, with a market conceived as a “person-ma-
chine system”, a “hybrid computational device”, “with the thinking off loaded 
onto things” (Nik-Khah/Mirowski 2019: 53, 61). As Mirowski and Nik-Khah put it: 
“Agents would be folded into the person-machine system, no longer deemed ca-
pable of understanding why they made the decisions that they do. Think of their 
predicament as Artificial Ignorance.” (2017: 238-239). It might seem ironic that this 
“artificial ignorance” also of financial traders is to be complemented by the artifi-
cial intelligence of machines. But as I will show below, the deployment of AI in 
algorithmic trading exactly follows the premises of the economists and market 
designers: information resides in the market, and the task of AI is to extract it—
the “alpha”—in order to augment trading.
To get a handle on how markets are constituted both as human and as machin-
ic and computational, and on how thinking is “off loaded onto things”,  I want to 
draw on Hayles’ recent work around nonconscious cognition (Amoore 2019), as it 
offers a helpful way of making sense of how cognition is distributed in financial 
markets (see also Beverungen/Lange 2018). Hayles distinguishes between “think-
ing” and “cognition”, suggesting that thinking is human, conscious cognition 
whereas cognition “is a much broader faculty present to some degree in all biolog-
ical life-forms and many technical systems” (2017: 14). She defines cognition as “a 
process that interprets information within contexts that connect it with meaning” 
(Hayles 2017: 22), one that can also take place nonconsciously. She offers to replace 
Armin Beverungen80
the distinction between human and nonhuman with the distinction “cognizers” 
and “noncognizers”, where humans, biological life but also technical systems such 
as those deploying AI are part of the first category (Hayles 2017: 30). Importantly, 
this allows us to understand the make-up of financial markets as constituted by 
a number of cognizers (both human and machinic), to consider how cognition is 
distributed between these cognizers (both as conscious and nonconscious cogni-
tion), and to explore what kinds of autonomy is given to machines in algorithmic 
trading in “pockets within which technical systems operate autonomously” in a 
“punctuated agency” (Hayles 2017: 32).
Hayles (2017: 142-177) offers her own analysis of finance and HFT, and suggests 
that HFT may be “regarded as an evolutionary milieu in which speed, rather than 
consciousness, has become a weapon in the nonconscious cognitive arms race—a 
weapon that threatens to proceed along an autonomous trajectory in a temporal 
regime inaccessible to direct conscious intervention” (2017: 165). In the following 
sections, I want to build on Hayles and on earlier work with Lange (Beverungen/
Lange 2017; 2018) to explore how this “nonconscious cognitive arms race” is shaped 
by AI. I will suggest that AI offers a different weapon—smartness—in a trade-off 
with speed in this race, one which shifts the temporal and cognitive parameters 
of financial markets, which can be made further sense of if discussions around 
financial and cognitive capitalism are kept in mind.
High-Frequency and Quantitative Trading
Prior to the automation of trading platforms of financial markets, the “cacophony 
of the marketplace and apparent randomness of trade” was coordinated mostly 
through human sociality; today, that is a matter of “managing the punctuated 
electronic signals that encode the orders from masses of anonymous investors”, 
achieved by “toying with the nimble algorithms, sophisticated computer proces-
sors, hacked routers, and specialized telecommunication systems that are the ma-
terial foundations of the contemporary stock exchange” (Pardo-Guerra 2019: 23). 
Manual trading still exists, although all orders have to be executed via automated 
platforms, and algorithmic trading constitutes the large majority of trading in fi-
nancial markets. Kirilenko and Lo define algorithmic trading as “the use of math-
ematical models, computers, and telecommunications networks to automate the 
buying and selling of financial securities” (2013: 52). Over the last two and a half 
decades, its rise has been facilitated by the ways in which the financial system has 
become more complex, by “a set of breakthroughs in the quantitative modeling of 
financial markets”, and by the “almost parallel set of breakthroughs in computer 
technology” (Kirilenko/Lo 2013: 53). Markets have been automated, trading strate-
gies are computer-driven, and trade is executed largely by algorithms.
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Financial markets, even before the introduction of automated trading plat-
forms, offered opportunities for trading strategies based both on speed and on 
smartness, and implied certain forms of cognition. The introduction of the tick-
er tape, as discussed by Preda (2006), for example, changed the temporal regime 
of the stock market, offering a continuous data f low of price variations, for all 
means and purposes in real time: the “ragged time structure of paper slips was 
replaced by the smooth, uninterrupted, unique time of the ticker tape” (Preda 
2006: 767). The ticker tape also came with charts and other forms of visualisation, 
as well as “discursive modes” which “supported the chart as a cognitive instru-
ment, which in its turn conferred authority upon the stock analyst as the only one 
skilled enough to discover the truth of the market in the dotted lines” (Preda 2006: 
770). The speed of the ticker tape alone did not lead to a competitive advantage; 
the smartness of the stock analyst was required to access the truth of the market 
and to act on it. This economy of speed and smartness would develop further, for 
example with the introduction of the Reuters Stockmaster price retrieval service 
in 1964 or the launch of the first automatic quotation system NASDAQ in 1972 (see 
Mirowski 2007: 216),  and would result in a differentiation of strategies in algo-
rithmic trading.
The ticker tape, and the development of market infrastructures such as tele-
graph lines spanning the globe,  already foreshadows the kinds of infrastructural 
investments required for HFT, as a form of algorithmic trading characterized by 
high speed and high volume trading. HFT played a key role in the automation of 
financial markets since the late 1980s. For example, Mackenzie and Pardo-Guerra 
(2014) recount the role of Island, a new electronic trading platform launched in 
1995, how it challenged existing trading platforms which had not fully automated, 
and how it already introduced key aspects of automated trading platforms such as 
ultrafast matching engines, fine-grained pricing or co-location. They also recount 
how symbiotic the relationship was between Island and Automated Trading Desk, 
one of the first HFT companies which commenced trading in 1989, and quickly 
became its biggest client. MacKenzie details how, through bricolage, Automated 
Trading Desk succeeded in becoming a HFT company, among other things playing 
a “causal role” in the introduction of all-to-all markets, pushing the computeriza-
tion of trading, and developing the business model of HFT based on high volume 
and special market rates (MacKenzie 2016: 175, 180). MacKenzie summarizes: “The 
use of algorithms helped create markets materially better suited to algorithms” 
(2016: 190). The ensuing HFT “arms race” has become a “constant of the market 
design” of financial markets today (Budish et al. 2015: 1553). 
Through infrastructural investments in things such as fiber-optic or micro-
wave connections between trading venues, co-location centers and even comput-
er architecture optimized for HFT (Zook/Grote 2017; MacKenzie et al. 2012), the 
design and temporal regime of markets has come to produce information asym-
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metries that enable trading strategies based on high speed, operating in in milli-, 
micro- and even nanoseconds (Markoff 2018) and on “gaming the plumbing” of 
financial markets (Toscano 2013). In HFT, speed ultimately trumps smartness. As 
a consequence, trading algorithms are rather “dumb”: speed requires low latency, 
and all information processing takes time. HFT algorithms therefore need to be 
kept as simple as possible in order to respond quickly to information changes and 
to automatically enact a trade, and therefore require constant human supervision 
(Beverungen/Lange 2018: 86-91). As Arnoldi (2016: 46) puts it, leaving “trading to 
‘naïve’ algos may […] be a choice of economic necessity for high frequency traders 
[…]. Crudely put, algos get faster but not smarter.” HFT, in exploiting the plumb-
ing of financial markets, is focused on internal market dynamics and information 
asymmetries, and it operates on temporal advantages of micro- or by now nano-
seconds, and can therefore not afford to give time to complex computation such 
as that necessary for AI. The “punctuated agency” of algorithms, i.e. the space in 
which they “draw inferences, analyze contexts, and make decisions in millisec-
onds” (Hayles 2017: 142) simply doesn’t leave time for AI.
That is not to say that AI could not inform HFT strategies. For example, at Au-
tomated Trading Desk, basic AI such as linear regression equations were used 
to predict prices: its machine would calculate an “‘adjusted theoretical value’ of 
the stock in question, a prediction of its price 30 seconds in the future”, based on 
market data such as “‘the size of the [best] bid relative to the size of the [best] of-
fer’, along with ‘a short-term trend variable in the transaction prices of the stock’” 
(MacKenzie 2017: 182-186). That would hardly count as AI today, but it provides an 
early example of what kinds of models and calculations went into the design of 
HFT algorithms. In fieldwork conducted by Ann-Christina Lange, high-frequency 
traders reported that it would take years before AI would become relevant for HFT, 
with its use only at an experimental stage (Beverungen/Lange 2018: 89). Recent 
academic work developing approaches to HFT based on reinforcement learning, 
deep neural networks or convoluted neural networks (e.g. Kearns/Nevmyvaka 
2013; Arévalo et al. 2016; Ganesh/Rakheja 2018) similarly suggests that there is a 
lot of experimentation but little implementation. A recent industry report argues 
that whereas HFT is “about speed, machine learning is about depth and breadth 
of insight”, and while speed still matters, “it’s a different kind of speed” than HFT 
(McCauley 2016: 4, 7).
Even though the title of Scott Patterson’s book Dark Pools: The Rise of A.I. Trad-
ing Machines and the Looming Threat to Wall Street (2012) would suggest that HFT is 
largely based on AI, it is not always clear what is considered AI, and his examples 
either deal with trading strategies more associated with quantitative finance or 
with examples such as Trading Machines, which in the late 2000s operated an 
automated trading strategy built on expert systems but which was “a lumber-
ing turtle compared with the rising new breed of speed Bots in the stock market” 
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(Patterson 2012: 38). In quantitative finance more broadly, developments such as 
portfolio optimization theory, the capital asset pricing model, and—perhaps most 
importantly—the Black-Scholes option pricing formula (Kirilenko/Lo 2013: 53-55), 
have offered calculative devices for deciding which financial assets to invest in, 
how to devise risk strategies and how to price financial assets such as options. 
This has allowed the “quants” to conquer Wall Street (Patterson 2010), mostly as 
part of hedge funds, from the 1980s onwards, and to shape financial markets in 
the image of their financial models (MacKenzie 2006). Quantitative trading is buy 
now also algorithmic, i.e. order execution is automatic and much of the trading 
decisions are also made by algorithms. While many hedge funds also specialize in 
fast trading in microseconds, in contrast to HFT the focus is on smartness rath-
er than merely speed, and on exploiting not so much the plumbing of financial 
markets in high volume, high speed trading as on exploiting information asym-
metries in trade that operates with holding times of hours, days or weeks rather 
than seconds.
Although hedge funds and their quantitative traders are extremely secretive, 
some instances of the deployment of AI are known and point to more recent wide-
spread use. For example, Renaissance Technologies, one of the largest and “con-
sidered by many to be the most successful hedge fund in the world” (Patterson 
2012: 107), also called “finance’s blackest box” (Burton 2016), heavily recruited its 
staff from cryptographers from the US government and the speech recognition 
program at IBM (Patterson 2012: 107-117). One of their experts was Robert Mercer, 
who had worked on Brown clustering as part of Frederick Jelinek’s speech rec-
ognition team in the 1970s.2 Or take Haim Bodek, who worked at Hull Trading, 
a quantitative algorithmic trading firm, from 1997 until it was bought by Gold-
man Sachs in 1999 (Patterson 2012: 28-30). Bodek had previously worked in fraud 
detection, and used his machine learning skills at Hull (Patterson 2012: 28), lat-
er setting up Trading Machines, which operated from 2007 to 2011 as one of the 
first fully automated and higher frequency trading outfits (Patterson 2012: 32-60).3 
There are also more recent examples in Patterson’s Dark Pools, for example Apama, 
a “complex event processing” engine founded in 1999 and taken over by Software 
AG in 2013 (Patterson 2012: 62), which already points to the ways in which quan-
titative trading is embracing a wider set of “alternative” data beyond market and 
2  Robert Mercer is now notorious for his engagement in right-wing politics, such as his support for 
Donald Trump and for Brexit, and for his involvement in the Cambridge Analytica scandal. He 
resigned from Renaissance in 2017 following political pressure. See Cadwalladr 2017.
3  Haim Bodek is perhaps the most famous whistleblower of Wall Street, because he revealed a 
secret order type used by high-frequency traders, which was destroying Bodek’s own trading 
strategies at Trading Machines. Bodek is the main character of the documentary The Wall Street 
Code (2013).
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trading data—in particular news and social data—for analysis and feedback into 
trading strategies. 
There are three broad current developments related to AI in algorithmic trad-
ing relevant to my discussion. First, there is a movement towards automating 
quantitative trading, that is using computation both for placing orders and for 
calculating strategies, much like HFT is already automated. Some companies 
seem to support this strategy by purchasing HFT outfits, such as Citadel buy-
ing Automated Trading Desk in 2016. Rebellion Research was perhaps the first 
fully automated hedge fund, with its “Star” algorithm based on Bayesian net-
works trading autonomously since 2005 and the updated “Star 2.0” launched in 
December 2016 (Patterson 2012: 323-335; Metz 2016). Another recent example is 
Aidyia, another fully automated AI hedge fund that draws “on multiple forms of 
AI, including one inspired by genetic evolution and another based on probabilis-
tic logic” (Metz 2016). To what extent trading here is really automated remains 
questionable, however, and the industry seems to have recognized the danger of 
an over-reliance on and “misplaced confidence” in AI and the need for humans-in-
the-loop (McCauley 2016: 14, 16). As in the case of HFT, where traders are unlikely 
to leave their algorithms unsupervised (Beverungen/Lange 2018), the cases here 
might be similar to that of Trading Machines, where Bodek also constantly super-
vised his algorithms operating in a volatile market: “Bodek preferred to trust his 
own brain. While he used AI methods such as expert systems to build his algos, he 
preferred to maintain control throughout the trading day. That’s why he never left 
his seat, not even for a bathroom break.” (Patterson 2012: 38; see also Satariano/
Kumar 2017). Nonetheless, this automation points to a further shift towards a ma-
chine-machine ecology in financial markets.
Second, while Aidyia and Rebellion Research are comparatively small, the 
large majority also of the large hedge funds today claim to work with AI (see e.g. 
Satariano/Kumar 2017 on Man Group), and there is a significant amount of ex-
change between companies and research institutes currently developing AI and 
hedge funds. David Ferruci, developer of IBM’s Watson, moved from IBM to be-
come Senior Technologist at Bridgewater Associates in 2012 (Vardi 2016). Li Deng 
moved from his position as Chief Scientist of Artificial Intelligence at Microsoft 
to Citadel in 2017 to become Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer. Pedro Domingos, 
author of The Master Algorithm (2015) and expert in markov logic networks, joined 
D.E. Shaw in 2018 to lead its Machine Learning Research Group. These high-pro-
file movements suggest that hedge funds will play a key role in the development 
and politics of AI in the coming decades, also through institutions such as the Ox-
ford-Man Institute of Quantitative Finance, and it suggests that the various kinds 
of AI for which these researchers have expertise will be deployed extensively in 
algorithmic trading. That is not to say, however, that the application of AI in algo-
rithmic trading will be simple or straight-forward. For example, Li Deng suggests 
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that there are at least three challenges: low signal-to-noise ratios in the informa-
tion analyzed to recognize patterns; strong non-stationary with a lot of fake data 
that needs to be eliminated; and a diversity of data, from speech to text to images, 
which needs to be amalgamated and analyzed (Deng 2018; see also Frontiers A.I. 
2018). Still, this constitutes a significant shift in the cognitive ecology of financial 
markets, with AI used to make trade both faster and smarter.
Third, there is a significant expansion of the data sources with which algorith-
mic trading operates and from which it seeks to extract patterns offering trading 
opportunities, leading to a differentiation of trading strategies (McCauley 2016: 
4). In HFT data sources are limited to a clear set of market data mostly related 
to the order books of the trading platforms in which high-frequency traders op-
erate, and other algorithmic trading relies on a relatively limited set of market 
and economic data supplied by companies such as Reuters or Bloomberg. Today, 
however, data sources are multiplying, and so are the companies which offer data 
streaming and analytics services to algorithmic trading, in particular in relation 
to social media. Hedge funds such as BlackRock peruse social media and monitor 
search engines to assist in their investment decisions (De Aenlle 2018), and there 
are companies such as EquBot which work with proprietary AI and IBM’s Watson 
to parse “millions of articles and news sources to uncover catalysts and events to 
maximize the probability of market appreciation” (‘Artificial Intelligence (AI) and 
the Technology behind EquBot’), including market sentiment analysis (De Aenlle 
2018; McCauley 2016: 8). There are also companies such as Quandl, RavenPack, Ea-
gle Alpha or DataMinr which offer data analytics services for algorithmic trading. 
DataMinr, for example, specialises in “alternative data” such as “social media, sat-
ellite imagery, weather data, and more” (‘Alt Data Tips for Traders | Dataminr’) 
and suggests that nearly 80% of traders now use such “alternative” data (‘Report: 
Investors Embrace Alternative Data | Dataminr’).4 This expansion of the data ecol-
ogy of algorithmic trading calls for AI for pattern recognition, and it would be 
impossible for a human cognizer to take all of this information into account.5 
4  The big data analytics company Palantir Technologies, notorious for its involvement in the Cam-
bridge Analytica scandal, also of fers services to finance via Palantir Foundry, which however is 
largely used for fraud detection. On how Palantir operates, see Munn 2018: 27-56.
5  Critical art projects such as Rybn’s ADM Trading Bot (see http://www.rybn.org/ANTI/ADM8/) and 
Derek Curry’s hacktivist, tactical media project Public Dissentiment (see http://www.publicdissen 
timent.org/) seek to disrupt financial markets and to raise “awareness of how social media is now 
interconnected with stock trading” (Curry 2018: 108).
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Shifting Cognitive Ecologies
It is perhaps no surprise that AI has been a central aspect of algorithmic trading, 
and that more recent developments in AI, such as varieties of deep learning, are 
being adapted in algorithmic trading. If markets have been designed to not put a 
premium on human cognition, and to assume that the truth lies in the informa-
tion processor that is the market itself, then it is no surprise that human cogni-
tion is further sidestepped by the nonconscious cognition exercised by artificially 
intelligent machines. What is perhaps more surprising is that conscious, human 
cognition still plays a central role in situ for all algorithmic trading except its 
most automated variants. In HFT the “nonconscious cognitive arms race” (Hayles 
2017: 165) meant that human conscious cognition was superseded by the speed of 
machinic nonconscious cognition, yet the “costs of consciousness” (Hayles 2017: 
41-45)—slow response times, the bounded rationality of humans, and so on—had 
to be balanced against the “costs of nonconscious cognition” (Beverungen/Lange 
2018: 80) which could prove financially disastrous. Investments in AI and ma-
chine learning have decidedly shifted the cognitive ecology of financial markets 
towards a premium put not only on speed, with HFT still exploiting the plumbing 
of financial markets, but also on smartness—an artificial smartness which further 
challenges human cognition. Now human consciousness can keep up neither with 
the speed in which high-frequency algorithms trade, nor with the smartness by 
which artificially intelligent machines interpret data and find patterns benefitting 
trading strategies. The costs of this different kind of nonconscious cognition—
that of the various AIs at play in algorithmic trade—remain to be enumerated.
It seems a safe bet to assume that one of the costs of the cognitive ecology 
produced by algorithmic trading is market volatility. There are already plenty of 
examples of the ways in which both quantitative and HFT have produced crashes 
(see Kirilenko/Lo 2013: 60-67 for an incomplete list). For quantitative trading, the 
most serious event was the “quant quake” of August 2007, in the middle of the 
then emerging financial crisis. Despite seemingly little market pressure, hedge 
funds were involved in concerted forced liquidations and subsequent de-leverag-
ing, which lead to huge losses for the hedge funds (Kirilenko/Lo 2013: 61-62). For 
HFT, the most famous example is the f lash crash of 6 May 2010, in which the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average “experienced its biggest one-day point decline on an in-
traday basis in its entire history and the stock prices of some of the world’s largest 
companies traded at incomprehensible prices”, all largely due to high-frequen-
cy algorithms negatively interacting with one another (Kirilenko/Lo 2013: 62-63; 
Borch 2016). The f lash crash was not a singular event though: Johnson et al. identi-
fied more than 18.000 “ultrafast extreme events” within a five-year period, which 
they see as consistent with the observation of an “emerging ecology of competitive 
machines featuring ‘crowds’ of predatory algorithms” (2013: 1). Furthermore, one 
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example of the volatility caused by the expanded data ecology of financial markets 
has been described by Karppi and Crawford (2016) as the “hack crash”, in which a 
false news announcement on Twitter led to a jitter in financial markets caused by 
automated trading algorithms fed by DataMinr. These examples suggest that the 
“enigma of exceptional situations, rare events, and black swans”—already associ-
ated with derivatives and other aspects of financial markets—remains, and that 
the “terrain of a dark and confused empiricism” (Vogl 2015: 15) that characterizes 
financial markets is only exacerbated by AI. 
All of these examples furthermore demonstrate that much of the volatility 
stems from the interaction of (both “dumb” and “smart”) automated trading al-
gorithms in financial markets. These automated agents significantly contribute 
to the ways in which financial markets are marked by interactive dynamics such 
as imitation (e.g. Borch 2016; Lange 2016). Yet we are “still far from having a ro-
bust understanding of how trading algorithms interact”, even though how an al-
gorithm “materially acts is shaped by interaction” so that algorithms “need to be 
understood relationally” (MacKenzie 2019a: 55). The “machine-machine ecology of 
automated trading” (Hayles 2017: 175) escapes both the understanding and con-
trol of humans as it ultimately escapes that of artificially intelligent agents. One 
could perhaps imagine a fruitful, symbiotic interaction between “smart” trading 
algorithms, and within the market design field there is certainly still the ambition 
and hope that multi-agent AI systems including their rules of interaction could 
be designed from scratch and bring forth a kind of machina economicus (Parkes/
Wellmann 2015: 272). However, despite market design the AI trading algorithms 
largely operate independently, and, in that regard, financial markets also do not 
constitute a “collective capitalist brain” (Terranova 2013: 66); rather, the smart 
agents compose a sum of small capitalist brains in competition with each other.
This state of affairs is exacerbated by the multiple opacities that are perva-
sive in financial markets. Burrell suggests that some of the opacities of machine 
learning algorithms are unsurmountable and a fundamental part of how machine 
learning operates in terms of its architectures and scales (Burrell 2016: 4-5). Strat-
egies such as explainable AI also currently do not deliver on reducing opacities 
(Sudmann 2018: 187-191). Yet these opacities of AI are only the latest addition to 
the other opacities of financial markets, and they are exacerbated by the secretive 
strategies of algorithmic traders already mentioned above. I already noted how 
high-frequency traders exploit the plumbing and the information asymmetries of 
financial markets. Since these constitute a competitive advantage they are as far 
as possible kept secret; only revelations such as those by Bodek mentioned above 
or those of Michael Lewis in Flash Boys (2014) have led to the microstructure of 
financial markets becoming more publicly known. There are also the dark pools 
(MacKenzie 2019b) which largely operate—as their name suggests—in the dark, 
with order books and many other features of their platforms largely inaccessible 
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to the public. Lange (2016) also recounts how the setup of HFT prop-shops pro-
duces a kind of organizational ignorance, wherein barriers between traders and 
coders are established which are meant to avoid imitation but can also lead to det-
rimental side-effects.
To politically challenge the opacities and black boxes of algorithmic trade 
would therefore require a serious upheaval in financial markets. Attempts at reg-
ulation have only addressed these opacities in a limited way, for example by de-
manding that HFT algorithms be identifiable (e.g. Coombs 2016). Other attempts 
at changing the design of markets in order to decrease opacities also exist. For 
example, the Investors Exchange (IEX) is a trading platform celebrated by Lewis 
(2014) as fighting HFT: a coil of a 61 km long cable around the data center adds 
around 7 milliseconds to the “round trip” of the algorithms and effectively ex-
cludes HFT from being operable on the platform. IEX also has a much more trans-
parent fee structure and offers “fairer” trading conditions. Another suggestion 
comes from Budish et al. (2015), who suggest to replace continuous limit order 
books—currently the way trading platforms organize order matching—with 
batch auctions, which could take place every second and would thereby also large-
ly deny high-frequency traders their temporal advantages (see also Hayles 2017: 
165-169). Roth, a key proponent of market design and a teacher of Budish, supports 
these suggestions (2015: 81-100). Mirowski and Nik-Khah (2008), in a different 
context, warn against taking on this constructivist perspective of market design, 
with its neoliberal tint. While there are other nuanced considerations of the pol-
itics of algorithmic trading (see e.g. Lange et al. 2016), none of these suggestions 
address the opacities of AI in algorithmic trading.
It would also be unclear to what extend these changes would lead to a democ-
ratization of algorithmic trading and AI. As MacKenzie and Pardo-Guerra ref lect 
in relation to Island, whose order book was open, “allowing anyone real-time sight 
of its order book”, in contrast to all current trading venues: “information might 
have wanted to be free, but capitalism had other priorities” (2014: 171). Particu-
larly the developments around the expanding data ecologies of financial markets 
discussed above suggest that rather than democratization, these developments in 
algorithmic trading and AI lead to a further financialization of daily life (Martin 
2002). The social life recorded on social media and elsewhere can now feed into 
“financial Social Machines, which integrate the innovative high-speed network, 
social media information, and trading decisions of individuals to provide more 
accurate price predictions leading to improved financial market integration” (Ma/
McGroarty 2017: 245). Here the “great promise” of deep learning, which is “not 
only to make machines understand the world, but to make it predictable in ever so 
many ways: how the stock market develops, what people want to buy, if a person is 
going to die or not, and so on” (Sudmann 2018: 193), is enrolled in what Hayles calls 
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“vampiric capitalism” (2017: 159) and what I discussed above in terms of financial 
and cognitive capitalism. 
A focus on “the infra-medial conditions of modern AI technology and their po-
litical dimension” (Sudmann 2018: 185), as they present themselves in relation to 
financial markets, and the “shifting our analytical focus toward infrastructures” 
of financial markets (Pardo-Guerra 2019: 31), as attempted in this contribution, 
reveals how thoroughly algorithmic trading and the more recent deployment of 
AI as part of it are enthralled to financial and cognitive capitalism. To get to grips 
with the politics of AI in algorithmic trading requires an analysis of how AI is en-
rolled in the service of the extraction of value, most recently from social life as it 
is recorded on social media and elsewhere. The outline above demonstrates that 
the politics of AI are increasingly closely entangled with finance and the cogni-
tive ecologies in which it operates. As part of an expanded understanding of the 
politics of operations (Mezzadra and Neilson 2019), AI deployed as part of finance 
reveals how it partakes, through financialization, in an extraction of value which 
it would take more than some tweaks of market design to break out of. Most im-
mediately, the politics of AI in financial markets appears as a politics of cognition, 
one in which currently the “nonconscious cognitive arms race” (Hayles 2017: 165) 
is decidedly shifting towards a terrain in which AI is complicit with neoliberal 
finance capital. This calls for a politics of cognition which thinks through the ways 
in which AI maybe be extracted from this complicity and be put to other ends not 
necessarily so congruent with financial and cognitive capitalism. 
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The Quest for Workable Data 
Building Machine Learning Algorithms   
from Public Sector Archives
Lisa Reutter/Hendrik Storstein Spilker
This chapter analyzes one of the early efforts within the Norwegian Government 
to improve public services with data from public sector archives. It explores an 
initiative to develop AI-based services within the Labor and Welfare Administra-
tion (NAV). The Norwegian public sector is in a pioneering mood. A new wave of 
digitalization is drawing attention to platforms, clouds and algorithms. Artifi-
cial intelligence holds the potential and promise to revolutionize the public sec-
tor. Supervised machine learning, especially, has become the method of choice to 
achieve the ultimate and somehow diffuse goal of becoming data-driven.1 There is 
a lot of excitement about how machine learning algorithms might be used to pro-
vide better and more personalized services, changing the way we do bureaucracy 
and empower citizens. Recording, storing and processing information on citizens 
has long been a key element of the modern state; however, the calculative systems 
and techniques to do so have become ever faster, more comprehensive and more 
autonomous (Beer 2017).
In comparison to private tech-enterprises, public sector organizations possess 
one obvious advantage—at least “on paper”. They possess massive datasets about 
citizens, of a personal character, often recorded through a long historical span, 
and continually updated. As Redden notes, “this makes them incredibly valuable 
from a data analytics perspective” (2018:1). Our informants are very well aware 
of this potential advantage—some refer to big government data as “our gold”. 
The gold is described as rich, comprehensive, exciting and unique by its miners. 
Machine learning presents itself as an opportunity to mine the gold lying within 
the archives, providing the administrators with new and surprising insights into 
their own work and the citizens they govern. 
However, as with real-world mining, extracting gold from its ores is not neces-
sarily a straightforward affair. Someone must dig it out, distinguish it from other 
1  The employment of techniques associated with artificial neural networks (ANN) is not allowed in 
public service, since it is non-transparent and decisions cannot be explained.
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items, wash and clean it, to make it suitable for the production of public goods. 
In NAV, the answer to this has been to establish a new data science environment. 
This chapter is a story of the unexpected challenges that the AI-division has had 
to face—and the mundane work that underlies the practices of doing machine 
learning. Thus, our research question is twofold: What are the challenges connected 
to developing AI-based services from public sector archives? How do these early challenges 
ref lect the uncertainties that lie behind the hype of AI in public service?
These are important perspectives, because the responsibility to realize the 
supposed empowering and democratizing potential of AI in government-citizen 
relations ultimately hinges on the ones preparing the data and tinkering with the 
algorithms. Within the public sector, there has so far been a remarkable amount 
of optimism and hype related to the development of AI-based services (Vivento 
AS/Kaupan AS 2015; Teknologirådet 2017). At the same time, there is a growing 
awareness of the concerns that dominate much of the social science discourse 
on AI. Ever more aspects of our everyday life are affected by datafication, where 
human activity and behavior is converted into an analyzable form of digital data 
and put to multiple uses (Mayer-Schönberg/Cukier 2013). The utilization of big 
data raises serious questions of privacy, data security and ethics. These questions 
are, of course, even more critical when AI is employed in the public sector com-
pared to the private sector (cf. Sudmann 2018). There is a significant potential for 
surveillance as well as a risk of automating unjust practices (cf. Pasquale 2015; 
Cheney-Lippold 2017; Crawford/boyd 2012).
Of course, these concerns also represent an impetus for research to investigate 
and develop a deeper understanding of the processes whereby (traditional) public 
sector archives are transformed into (modern) machine learning algorithms. In 
order to enable and safeguard democratic inf luence and control, it is important 
not only to study the effects of ready-made algorithms but also to investigate al-
gorithms as they are constructed (to paraphrase Latour 1987). Theoretically, we 
are informed by the work done within the new field of “critical algorithm studies” 
(Beer 2017; Kitchin 2017; Gillespie 2014). Algorithm studies represent a move be-
yond the study of digital content and interactions to look at infrastructures that 
condition the visibility of digital content and the patterns of interaction. The cen-
tral task for the critical algorithm studies has been to uncover the structures and 
dynamics and consequences of algorithm-based infrastructures, as these infra-
structures often come across as technical and neutral, opaque and impenetrable 
(Burrell 2016).
However, as algorithm-based infrastructures form the basis for more and 
more decisions and recommendations in social, political and economic fields, it 
becomes urgent to address their role and functioning. Pasquale (2015) has fa-
mously invoked the metaphor of “the black box” to designate how vital societal 
decisions are formed beyond visibility and control. Pasquale sketches a scenario 
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with an inside consisting of technology firms, data scientists and their secret and 
opaque algorithms, in power and control, and a disenfranchised outside, where 
the rest of us reside, citizens, costumers, the whole old society.
Critical algorithm studies have contributed with valuable insights into the ac-
tors and organizations behind or underneath data structuring practices and how 
they contribute to social ordering. However, according to Flyverbom and Murray, 
they have so far had “little to say about the actual, inside processes whereby data 
get organized and structured” (2018: 5-6). Also, boyd and Elish highlight the im-
portance of the mundane work of collecting, cleaning and curating data, because 
“it is through this mundane work [that] cultural values are embedded into systems” 
(2018: 69). Despite repeated calls for more ethnographic studies, few have so far 
been conducted (Kitchin 2017). Thus, an important motivation for our decision to 
carry out a “laboratory study” of the NAV data science environment was based on 
the recognition of the absence of such studies and the desire to investigate the 
minutiae of the processes of algorithm construction. The ultimate goal was to ex-
amine the actual practices involved in doing machine learning and the uncertain-
ties and methodological challenges that lie behind the hype of AI in public service 
(boyd/Elish 2018). 
Case Study: The Labor and Welfare Administration
NAV, one of the biggest Norwegian public agencies, is in the forefront of an ongo-
ing nationwide digital transformation. NAV is a public welfare agency that deliv-
ers more than 60 different benefits and services, such as unemployment benefits 
and pensions. The public agency manages approximately one third of the overall 
Norwegian state budget and operates under the ministry of labor. NAV has about 
19.000 employees, of whom approximately 14.000 are employed by the central 
government, with an additional 5000 at the local level.
The NAV data science environment is part of a newly established division in 
the IT department. This division intends to concern itself with all environments 
developing and managing data products in the Labor and Welfare Administra-
tion. Hence, its assignment is to arrange for the datafication of citizens. The data 
science environment was founded in 2017 and consisted, at that point, of obser-
vation on the part of a few data scientists and a team leader. The members of this 
team are key elements of the imagined data-driven public agency. 
The urge to become data-driven has its origins both within and outside the 
organization. Within the organization, individuals have started experimenting 
with big data for a while. Outside the organization, societal and economic trends, 
such as downswings in the oil sector, higher immigration rates and the automa-
tion of industries present new challenges to the administration and the welfare 
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state in general. The solution proposed? A data-driven welfare state. Political di-
rectives have thus requested an investigation of machine learning and big data:
It is natural to assume that big data, alongside technologies such as automation 
and artificial intelligence, will be able to change how the government operates 
service production in the future (Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet 
2016: 109).
In this first phase of the data-driven digital transformation, machine learning al-
gorithms are developed mainly as decision support tools. This can for example be 
illustrated through a project which wants to bring together municipal and govern-
mental data to improve user follow-up. One of the ambitions of the project is to 
identify vulnerability in new unemployment cases. The projected end-product is a 
classification tool, categorizing newly unemployed citizens into two groups, those 
who are likely in need of intensive follow-up from NAV, and those who are likely to 
become employed within a short period of time with little intervention required. 
This assessment has been previously done by the human user support. 
The first assessments of the user’s needs should to the furthest extent be automa-
ted and based on knowledge of which factors that af fects the user’s possibilities of 
entering the workforce. (NAV-ekspertgruppen 2015: 13)
The fieldwork was conducted in January 2018 and included a three-week observa-
tion of the data science environment, 11 in-depth interviews with key employees 
within and outside of the team and a document analysis of internal documents, 
discussing and presenting the work on big data utilization through machine 
learning.
Mining the public archive gold mine: The quest for workable data
The modern state and data are inseparably woven together, insofar as the avail-
ability of statistical information to the public is a condition and necessity for any 
democracy (Desrosières 1998: 324). The amount, granularity, immediacy, and va-
riety of digital data about subjects to be governed are unique to contemporary 
governments (Ruppert/Isin/Bigo 2017). NAV is the second biggest producer of 
data in the Norwegian public sector. Data have always played an important role in 
the administration, as it produces official statistics and reports for political deci-
sion-making for example on sick leave and unemployment. 
The Labor and Welfare Administration practices a culture of archiving, col-
lecting, and storing vast amounts of information on citizens and their own work. 
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Surprisingly, government agencies tend to forget about the data they possess, un-
less a crisis or inquiry leads them to deal with the data they forgot or misfiled, or 
the dots they failed to connect (Prince 2017: 236). Data have so far been used in the 
production of statistics and then transferred to a public archive or database. The 
archive changes its role within the organization with the emergence of machine 
learning—from passive receiver and collector of data, to active provider of data. 
Rather than gathering dust, the data are projected to drive the day-to-day work of 
the administration. The administration assumes a yet undiscovered value with-
in public archives which may be key to the administration’s survival. The archive 
hence becomes a source of value and power. The information stored within, be-
comes an active target of exploration.
Gold mining, however, is a messy business. Companies, such as, for exam-
ple, Google/Alphabet, Facebook, and Amazon seem to effortlessly feed data back 
into practice and mine the gold as they create it. By contrast, the creation of ma-
chine learning algorithms within the public sector can and has to rely on already 
existing data and infrastructures. In addition, it has to align with long-existing 
practices and sets of values. The vast public archives carry the promise of being 
an invaluable and limitless data source for the creation of machine learning algo-
rithms. However, in practice there exists a broad range of challenges connected to 
their utilization.
The Labor and Welfare Administration has to build a data-utilization infra-
structure on top of the already existing digital infrastructure, which both limits 
and renders possible the work on machine learning. Which data and how data are 
used will inf luence predictions made by algorithms. To produce machine learning 
algorithms, one needs large amounts of data, against which algorithms can be 
refined and tested. One of our informants summarizes the overall importance of 
data work by describing it as a foundation for the data-driven future of the public 
administration on which the failure or success of initiatives depends:
So, knowing what data you have and the quality of data, what you are allowed to 
use it for, I think you have to count on spending a lot of time on that. I think that will 
be the foundation. And what you are building on top of that will not be better than 
the foundation.2
Much of the work done in the data science environment is described as far from 
confined to the practice of data analysis and computer science. Before any algo-
2  Due to a disclosure agreement with the administration, none of the informants is identified by 
any meta-information or pseudonym. All unmarked quotes are thus obtained from any of the 11 
interviews. Although this compromises the transparency of the analysis, it was necessary due to 
the size of the team during observation. 
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rithm can be constructed, the data scientists themselves need to assemble data, 
which can be fed to algorithms. The team needs to negotiate the access to training 
and test data, understand legal frameworks supporting the ethical utilization of 
data and assess the quality of data. The AI staff needs to make the data machine 
learnable. This leads to a certain degree of frustration and uncertainty among 
data scientists, which is however regarded as necessary to ensure the proper use 
and production of machine learning. So, let’s take a closer look at the processes of 
assembling the data, the organization and structuring of data in practice.
Access
The overall change of the public archive’s role requires that the data scientists 
actively engage with the dusted archive, hence accessing its inner workings. The 
public agency has standardized and good routines for accumulated data used in 
public statistics. The data can be accessed and found in a data warehouse. These 
data are cleaned and adjusted for traditional analysis. 
But what we are concerned with now is the 95 percent of data that are not in the 
data warehouse, but which are in the raw databases.
The data required are a different from what are used in traditional statistics and 
described as raw. The latter are a kind of natural, unprocessed and unlimited re-
source. So how to access this resource and what kind of data does the organization 
actually have? The supposedly raw data are far from easy to access. Previous re-
organizations have led to a distributed data storage system in the administration. 
Data therefore have a huge variety of owners and are placed all over the organi-
zation. Our datafied selves are far from centralized, united entities. The amount, 
content and whereabouts of the bits and pieces of information on citizens are of-
ten uncertain. 
And the practical, technical access to the data seems delayed to say the least. We 
could have had the time to do so much more if it had not taken so much time for 
the data scientists to figure out for themselves which data we have and where they 
are and which unit in the organization you need to consult in order to gain access. 
An organizational and administrative divide between municipal offices and the 
central government does in addition complicate data recirculation. Data stored 
in different organizational units have not yet been allowed to be assembled or 
been set up to be put together. Access to data is for example granted on specifi-
cally formatted computers, but not necessarily on computers with the right tools 
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to analyze those data. In addition, putting municipal data and government data 
together has not yet been possible. 
Again, there is a clear sense of old and new. This is not only about a historical 
perspective on data, but also about the role data are expected to play. New data are 
projected to be agile and dynamic, f lawlessly migrating through the whole of the 
organization. Accessing the gold mine is about bringing together data from dif-
ferent sources and formatting these data or—metaphorically speaking—building 
tunnels and shafts to access and transport the gold, so that it can be processed. 
It is about connecting the dots, building an infrastructure on an already exist-
ing infrastructure to direct a data f low towards machine learning algorithms. As 
previous attempts of assembling data have often failed and few people seem to 
feel responsible for the overall management of data access and what data in which 
format are available, the data scientists use a significant amount of time seeking 
allies in the distributed public archives. These archives, however, show distinct 
signs of never being intended to be mined, with gatekeepers who are not yet aware 
of their role as gatekeepers. 
Quality
After gaining access to data, the data are often visualized and examined to deter-
mine their quality. Quality is here measured in both the amount and completeness 
of data and the accuracy of information stored in the data. There is a significant 
amount of uncertainty connected with data quality, as the owners of data know 
little about their data sets. Machine learning algorithms do not only depend on 
huge amounts of data, they also depend on data with a certain degree of quality to 
produce any kind of classification or prediction. 
But it is important we understand how the data are af fected and what those data 
might tell us and how they also will af fect the models we are building. Because our 
models are despite everything not more than what we feed into them and train 
them to do.
It is in this stage of the gold mining process, that the overall gold metaphor cracks. 
Data, unlike gold, do not naturally appear in the wild (Cheney-Lippold 2017). Sev-
eral informants highlight the importance of understanding that most of the data 
stored in the administration have been produced by human beings collaborating 
with machines. There is no such thing as raw data. The concept of raw data is, as 
Bowker (2005) points out, an oxymoron. 
Before being stored in a database or archive there are many selection and ma-
nipulation opportunities. Even if data sets appear more or less complete, an addi-
tional complexity arises connected to the interpretation of the data entries: what 
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are exactly measured, and how were the measurements made? Data are situated 
knowledge, socially constructed, historically contingent and context dependent. 
A sufficient understanding of how data have been registered and stored is regard-
ed as key to the overall goal of becoming data-driven. Data found in the public 
archive are a result of the work practices in the administration. Without context, 
the data will appear meaningless to their users. When, for example, visualizing 
easy register data on the employment/unemployment status of citizens, the team 
soon discovered blank spaces. What then are these blank spaces? Is it an employer, 
who forgot to register an employee, or is it an unemployed person, who did not 
register his or her unemployment? Maybe there has been a misspelling along the 
way, or maybe there was an error in one of the registration infrastructures? It is 
simply not easy to tell what happened, and therefore challenging to deal with. A 
user support employee has therefore been consulted to contextualize the data reg-
istered, discussing work practices with the data science environment. The desired 
quantification of error had however not been achieved at the point of observation. 
Machine learning is often accused of legitimizing its social power in that it 
appears to be mathematical, logical, impartial, consistent, and hence objective 
(Gillespie 2014). Surprisingly, objectivity is not an element of the team’s articula-
tion work. Here participants stress that their prototype itself, the public agency 
user support, is not objective. Their methods do therefore not need to produce 
hard facts. Accuracy is more important to the team than objectivity. There are no 
perfect data or raw data available. Still, the informants think they will be able to 
extract some applicable meaning from the data sets that extend the knowledge 
derived from traditional statistics. 
Data protection
A third complexity for the data scientists in preparing the data is related to secu-
rity issues. Who can use data? What data can be used? What data cannot be ana-
lyzed together? How to safely transport the gold from the mine to the algorithm? 
This is an interdisciplinary and wide-ranging challenge. Several informants re-
gard the work on data privacy and information security as the most important, 
and at the same time most demanding part of their work. As there is no specific 
framework on how data can and should be utilized and what data can be used, the 
participants need to negotiate new frameworks for the ethical and legal utiliza-
tion of data in the public agency. The utilization of big data is new to the organiza-
tion, as well as the Norwegian public sector. Several official reports do point out 
the lack of legal guidelines within big data utilization through machine learning 
(Teknologirådet 2018). Although often mentioned in political speeches, the da-
ta-driven welfare state is a future imaginary without practical present guidelines.
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The non-existing legal framework leads to uncertainty among the data scien-
tists. Just because data are accessible, it is not automatically ethical to process 
these data. Machine learning is touching not only the field of privacy, but also 
justice. Although the administration has long been responsible for handling huge 
amounts of highly sensitive data, the recirculation of data in its own practice has 
not yet been explored. The 95% of data previously ignored are not sufficiently reg-
ulated. Depending on common sense and gut feelings when working on highly 
sensitive data is regarded as demanding and unwanted. The consequences of er-
rors are imagined to be significant.
We cannot let that happen. Everything would stop. We have an incredible amount 
of information about the whole population of Norway for the most part. And a lot 
of information about the most vulnerable and dif ficult situations in people’s lives.
Data protection is about assessing the ethical and safe use of data. It is about 
implementing good HSE in your gold mining project. Several informants com-
pare the work performed in the administration with work on machine learning 
algorithms done in the private sector. Although the private sector has come a long 
way in the field of machine learning, participants do not necessarily want to adopt 
practices and models produced by private sector agents. To produce and facilitate 
trust among their users in a proper way is important to them. Citizens do expect 
them to manage data safely. The non-existence of legal guidelines here is tanta-
mount to a free space for experimentation. Several informants highlight that it is 
important to act not only legally, but also morally and ethically. To quantify and 
apply moral and ethical behavior in the work on data is however far from straight-
forward. So far, rather than making mistakes that may affect the trust of citizens, 
the administration refrains from the use of data. 
Discussion and conclusion
We will start this discussion and conclusion part by returning to the metaphor of 
algorithmic infrastructures as “black boxes”. The metaphor invokes an imaginary 
of a corporate inside in power and control and disempowered and unknowing 
outside. Of course, as more and more decisions are informed by machine learning 
models such a lack of transparency and inf luence constitutes a serious democrat-
ic threat. Thus, a central task for critical algorithm studies has been to unpack and 
examine the constitutive elements of such “black boxes”.
Here, transparency cannot be achieved simply with a publishing code, which 
has been suggested by some in the public sector. We believe that an important 
contribution from ethnographic studies of the minutiae of algorithm construc-
Lisa Reutter/Hendrik Storstein Spilker 104
tion is a more nuanced notion of the degree of control that prevails on the inside. 
Seaver’s (2017) fieldwork depicts the complexity and messiness of programming 
and the uncertainty among data scientists about the connection between the in-
put to and the outcome of algorithmic processing. Our study dismantles another 
part of the control imaginary, by demonstrating the uncertain basis for the algo-
rithms. Decisions on the data to feed into algorithms are rarely unambiguous and 
forthright, but involve dealing with missing values, textual contingencies, context 
dependencies and interpretative gaps. The process of making data machine learn-
able is often rendered invisible. 
Some of these challenges are generalizable to all types of data preparation, 
also within private enterprises and applications of deep-learning and neural net-
works. There is after all no AI without data. Others are more specific to the ex-
ploitation of public sector archives. The massive datasets that reside within public 
bodies have been described—also by our informants—as a “gold mine” for the 
development of machine learning algorithms that can be used to provide citizens 
with better and more personalized services. A lot of hope and excitement has been 
placed on the data gold mine by politicians and decision makers. However, our 
case study shows that the challenges related to utilizing such archives are, if not 
insurmountable, at least far larger and more demanding than expected. There is a 
sense of magic tied to machine learning that minimizes attention to the methods 
and resources required to produce results (boyd/Elish 2018). 
Our first research question was about the challenges related to developing 
AI-based public services from public sector archives. In this chapter, we chose to 
present three types of challenges that confronted the data scientists in the early 
stages of their work. First, there are major obstacles related to getting access to 
data, both organizationally and technically. These obstacles result from the fact 
that government data have a huge variety of owners and are placed all over the or-
ganization, since previous reorganizations have led to a distributed data storage 
system. Furthermore, the gatekeepers of specific data sets within the adminis-
tration are often not easy to find or are unaware of their role as gatekeepers. Also, 
due to information security risks, data are difficult to f lawlessly migrate through 
the organization. Another challenge relates to the quality of the data in the data 
sets and the interpretation of their meaning. The data scientists soon discovered 
that many of the data sets were filled with missing values and approximations 
and that the numbers were difficult to interpret without knowledge of the aim 
and context of their registration. What exactly has been measured? How were the 
measurements made? Finally, the data science environment has to deal with a lot 
of complex legal and security issues, which makes the progress of its work cum-
bersome. Who can use the data? What data can be used? Which data sets can be 
linked together? As there is no existing formal legal framework on how to work 
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with data in conjunction with machine learning, the data scientists have to devel-
op guidelines along the way—with extra safety margins added.
Interestingly we can find many similarities between the negotiated challenges 
of the data science environment and critical questions raised by social scientists 
(Crawford/boyd 2012). The data scientists working on machine learning algo-
rithms are well-aware of the complexity and f laws of the field they are operating 
in. In addition, we can find similarities of methodological challenges between the 
social sciences and the doing of machine learning. Like boyd and Elish (2018), we 
therefore want to point machine learners to an exchange of expertise between 
data scientist and social scientists. Involving a broader set of expertise is one way 
forward to increase societal inf luence on the shaping of digital infrastructures 
(Ananny/Crawford 2018).
The amount and complexity of the preparation work has to some degree come 
as a surprise to the administration– the data scientist having had to spend count-
less days wandering up and down corridors and in and out of offices, searching 
dusty archives, looking into and interpreting old data sets, and familiarizing him-
self with unclear legal frameworks and confusing organizational security guide-
lines. Thus, his days got filled up with tasks that supposedly lay outside his area of 
expertise, while he hardly got started with the tasks for which he was employed—
to create and tinker with machine learning algorithms. The fieldwork was con-
ducted in a phase of exploration and uncertainty. The newly established data sci-
ence environment had not yet reached what is called the smash point. The data 
science environment was still working on paving the way toward machine-learn-
ing algorithms, making data machine learnable. The future data-driven imagery 
was diffuse and had no present guidelines. The challenges encountered thus rep-
resent a break with the data-driven myth of seamless and impressive functional-
ity and raised serious questions of what is possible and what is actually realistic 
(boyd/Elish 2018). Rather than describing their work as working toward becoming 
data-driven, the data scientists perceived it as initiating a more conscious rela-
tionship with data.
Ultimately, it appears that the data science environment was set on a quest to 
reconfigure the organization’s overall data practices. This was however not limit-
ed to the sheer automation of data practice. The team was intended to change the 
relationship between data stored in the administration and the administration 
itself. Data are here imagined to be assigned more power and trust to achieve an 
overall goal of personalization, enhancement of efficiency, and empowerment. 
However, those who attributed the most power to the public archive were not 
the people directly working on machine learning algorithms. For the data scien-
tists, there was a constant struggle between the grand myth of the data-driven 
welfare state and the real-world experiences with machine learning. This is also 
reinforced by our own struggle to align the gold mine metaphor given to us by in-
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formants with findings in our empirical evidence. The supposed gold mine might 
not even contain any gold. The very foundation of the data-driven imagery seemed 
uncertain. 
There is no standard solution on how one can and should approach the da-
ta-driven imagery yet. This also means that there is still room for reconstructions 
and configurations of data practices related to the development of AI-based public 
services. As Cheney-Lippold (2017: 13) argues: “Who speaks for data, […] wields the 
extraordinary power to frame how we come to explain a phenomenon.” The call for 
democratization of machine learning itself is diffuse and f luid, and so is the over-
all goal of becoming data-driven within the public sector (cf. Sudmann 2018). Re-
alizing the empowering and democratizing potential of AI in government-citizen 
relations ultimately hinges on the ones preparing the data and constructing the 
algorithms. It depends on how data scientists and organizations meet the uncer-
tainties and methodological challenges encountered. To avoid being carried away 
by the myths and hypes surrounding AI, we need to research mundane negoti-
ations and decisions and turning our attention towards methods and resources 
required to produce machine learning. Only with insight into the real-world expe-
riences with this kind of work, will we be able to start asking the right questions 
and be in charge of our data-driven future.
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Many current critical standpoints on information technologies from the field of 
artificial intelligence (AI) focus on a difference between human subjects and tech-
nology. Such standpoints come in two variants. The first variant is the idea of tech-
nical neutrality. Most fortunately, the old argument that technology is neutral, 
that its social impact “just depends on what you do with it”, is losing inf luence. 
However, this argument is often debunked by saying: algorithms are not neu-
tral because they are made by humans. Similarly, on a more abstract level it is 
often claimed that data sets that are used to train machine learning algorithms 
mirror human society and thus import its injustices and prejudices (Campolo et al. 
2017; O’Neil 2017). That implies that algorithms could be neutral, if humans would 
not constantly spoil them with their biases. This is a very determinist, platonic 
story, where human ideas and actions are decisive, which are then put into code 
and executed by machines (Chun 2008). 
Thus, it is important to turn to the second variant of critique. It comprises the 
positions that show that human subjectivity is not something external to infor-
mation technology—which is then represented by that technology in a biased or 
unbiased fashion.1 Rather, they argue, digital technology does something to hu-
man subjectivity itself. 
However, most of these approaches form a general verdict on data-based or 
algorithmic subjectivity, which is usually described as a kind of loss of features 
that are endorsed. In the following, I will engage with such theories and show 
using a few cases why such general verdicts harbor the danger to miss the import-
ant factor that specific applications of AI connect in quite different manners to 
pre-existing socio-technical situations and the respective forms of subjectivity. I 
will use the work of postcolonial theorist Linda Martín Alcoff in order to provide a 
1  Such approaches that hinge on an epistemic critique of representation are discussed in detail in 
(Matzner 2016).
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concept of subjectivity that can grasp the impact of recent technological changes 
but at the same time highlights differences between particularly situated subjects 
as its resource of normativity—rather than a general feature or lack of algorithmic 
forms of subjectivity. 
2. Applications of AI and two Forms of Critique
Technologies from the field of AI increasingly structure digital communication 
and interaction, but also what is perceived as “off line” spaces. Especially pre-
dictive technologies from machine learning are central to the current services of 
digital platforms. They are used to personalize search results, to filter posts on 
social media, to suggest which content we should watch and with whom we should 
interact. Such predictive technologies also have permeated various institutional 
and commercial processes. Famously, decisions on credit, insurance and hiring 
are inf luenced by scores provided through machine learning algorithms. Security 
agencies and polices all over the world use AI-enhanced surveillance technologies, 
in border controls, the processing of visa and asylum applications, the automat-
ed evaluation of CCTV footage or—the posterchild of algorithmic bias—recidi-
vism prediction (Angwin and Larson 2016).2  Predictive uses of machine learning 
also drive targeted advertising and the creation of other “prediction products” as 
Shoshanna Zuboff calls them (Zuboff 2019). However, the exact relation of algo-
rithmic technologies, labor, and value creation in the digital economy has yet to be 
clarified (Heilmann 2015; Srnicek 2016).
A lot of critical work has been done regarding the information that can be de-
rived from such algorithmic predictions, their epistemic status and their tendency 
to veil biases in the aura of machinic objectivity (Aradau and Blanke 2015; Kitchin 
2014, 2017; Pasquale 2015). Elsewhere I have argued that these important inquiries 
must be amended with critical scrutiny regarding what these algorithmic practic-
es do to subjects (Matzner 2016). For example, the use of daily interaction on social 
media for surveillance purposes imports meanings and practices of suspicion and 
mistrust into these interactions. 
Following this intuition, it is important to ask which new forms of subjectivity, 
or which shifts in forms of subjectivity, the increasing impact of AI-based technol-
ogies engenders. Many critical accounts, including those from activist positions, 
implicitly presuppose the model of subjectivity predominant in liberal political 
2  The research on each of the applications of AI I have mentioned here is growing almost daily. 
Cathy O’ Neil’s (2017) book is a good starting point for references on the applications I have men-
tioned here—even if her criticism falls within the line of defending autonomous subjects against 
technology that I criticize. 
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thought: a rational, self-ref lexive and autonomous subject. Algorithmic process-
es that apply machine learning technologies are seen as an imposition on each of 
these aspects. For example, discourses on the so called “filter bubble” focus on the 
prevalence of emotional rather than rational discourse through algorithmic filter-
ing, the lack of transparency of the algorithms so that the self-ref lective thinking 
necessary for autonomous judgements is impaired and thus an autonomous use 
of technology is no longer possible (Pariser 2011; Zuiderveen et al. 2016).  However, 
the clear opposition between liberal subjects and technological impositions is too 
simple. The entire story of cybernetics, which led up to current connectionist AI 
(Sudmann 2018), has been structured by a deeply ambivalent relation to liberal 
ideas. On the one hand, cybernetics was driven by the idea to develop new and 
powerful tools for free and more effective human actions. On the other hand, the 
ensuing idea of the human, the animal and the machine as essentially matters 
of control and communication is a deep threat to ideas of autonomy and self-re-
f lexivity (Hayles 1999: 87). Also the recent applications of AI can in many regards 
be considered as a liberal project (Matzner 2019). Furthermore, the concrete chal-
lenges that current applications of AI pose cannot be easily solved on an individ-
ual level. For example, issues of privacy and data protection, if solved within the 
liberal paradigm, presuppose a partition of data into personal data, which each 
respective individual can control (Matzner 2014). However, the attractivity of cur-
rent AI-driven data analysis is to use data on an aggregate level, which finds pat-
terns and associations that cannot be reduced to single users’ contributions. Even 
personalized systems like recommender systems or timeline filtering algorithms 
usually do not store a digital model of the user, as the use of “data doubles” and 
other concepts might suggest (Lyon 2014). Rather, the decision is taken for each 
individual item, regarding which an approximation of the user’s interest is de-
rived from the current stream of data and state of the user’s connections.3 Thus, 
such problems need to be addressed on the aggregate level of data usage rather 
than only individualized parts. Finally, liberal theory has come under scrutiny 
from feminist and other critical theories for engaging what Hayles calls the “prac-
tices that have given liberalism a bad name” (Hayles 1999: 87).
For these reasons, critical theories of applications of AI that take recourse to 
other sources of normativity are preferable. A prominent and elaborated example 
is Antoinette Rouvroy’s concept of algorithmic governance. She derives her nor-
3  As usual, it is hard to know exactly how prominent applications like Twitter’s timeline or Face-
book’s newsfeed are filtered. Thus, I derive my observation from the published research. Already 
early research done at Yahoo (De Francisci, Morales et al. 2012) that has spearheaded a lot of re-
search on personalized content, did not use persistent models of the user. The approach uses 
support vector machines for classification. In the meantime, personalization, like most other 
machine learning tasks, has switched to neural networks, and thus to even more data driven and 
dynamic approaches. See for example a recent paper by Microsof t Research (Zheng et al. 2018). 
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mative stance from an idea of humanity that is precisely based on the absence of 
full autonomy and rationality. Rouvroy follows theories of Judith Butler and Louis 
Althusser (Rouvroy 2013: 158). Both describe subjects as never in control of them-
selves, because they are essentially dependent on others. However, these others 
are not simply determining. The inf luence of others on us happens in social inter-
action which neither we nor the others fully control. It is particularly that excess 
and openness of human action that enables critique and meaningful interaction. 
Albeit, this very excess is threatened by algorithms: 
[W]hat has to be preserved as a resource antecedent to both the ‘subject’ and so-
ciality, as excess of the world over the algorithmic reality, is ‘the common’; this ‘in 
between’, this space of common appearance (comparution) within which we are 
mutually addressed to each other. (Ibid.: 159-60) 
Thus, Rouvroy sees human interaction yielding a potential for novelty and spon-
taneity that computing never can grasp. In her account, algorithmic governance, 
much in line with the description above, is not focused on individual subjects. 
Rather, algorithmic governance is “[e]ffected through the reconfiguration of in-
formational and physical architectures and/or environments within which certain 
things become impossible or unthinkable, and throwing alerts or stimuli produc-
ing ref lex responses rather than interpretation and ref lection.” (Ibid.: 155)  This 
description clearly echoes cybernetic worries of the loss of the subject. Algorithms, 
in Rouvroy’s words, reduce the virtual to the actual, the possible to the statistically 
probable, the living to the computational (Rouvroy 2017). Thus, the main line of 
critique Rouvroy harnesses has against algorithmic governance is again a certain 
loss of subjectivity, in this case a form of relational subjectivity that can contribute 
to the creation of politics and resistance. 
3. Critique on a general level and the importance of situated subjects
Such analyses provide important insights into the consequences of the application 
of AI. In particular, Rouvroy’s account does justice to the specifics of many recent 
forms of AI-based verdicts and activities, which work on the supra-individual level 
and which provide incentives for action rather than information. It is important 
to note that there are some applications of AI that can be seen very much in line 
with more Foucauldian forms of disciplinary power (Matzner 2017). In particular, 
these can be found at the borders of the Western, capitalist societies that Rouvroy 
and most other critics of AI take into focus. Yet, within these societies, such anal-
yses are pertinent. However, in their attempt to find a general verdict on a specific 
loss of subjectivity through applications of AI, they miss important qualifications. 
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This is not only a matter of descriptive accuracy but also means that AI is not per 
se such an anti-political technology as which it appears in these analyses. Its an-
ti-political effects do not fall on subjects as such but on particular subjects—and 
on each in a different manner.
The problems of such general verdicts can e.g. be seen in Wendy Hoi Kyong 
Chun’s analysis of filter bubbles. She shows that the theory of the filter bubble is 
based on the concept of homophily: The idea that human beings tend to orient 
themselves towards others who are or think similarly. Critics of the filter-bubble 
argue that algorithmic content creation tends to enforce that human tendency in a 
dangerous manner, which can lead to all kinds of extreme and racist communities. 
However, the problem of the algorithmic selection is not seen in the content itself, 
but in the concept of similarity that applies to all content in the same manner. That 
way, homophily
serves as an alibi for the inequality it maps, while also obviating politics: homophi-
ly (of ten allegedly of those discriminated against)not racism, sexism, and inequa-
litybecomes the source of inequality, making injustice ‘natural’ and ‘ecological.’ 
(Chun 2018: 76)
Algorithmic filtering, which is an exemplary case of what Rouvroy calls the “re-
configuration of informational […] architectures” (Rouvroy 2013: 155), is criticized 
regarding a universal trait of human subject formation. Chun shows that it is nec-
essary to take the social situation of subjects, which enable racism, sexism, in-
equality into account. Another case in point would be the infamous analysis by 
ProPublica, which has shown that a recidivism prediction software was biased 
against blacks (Angwin and Larson 2016). This case has been discussed almost too 
much, so I just want to highlight that the software did not use any racial features 
as input. Thus, even if the efficacy of algorithms does not work in terms of race, it 
still addresses and produces race.
In order to overcome the line of critique mentioned in the beginning, which 
implies a neutral technology spoilt by biased data, it is necessary to show how any 
kind of media and AI in particular engage with socially and culturally situated 
subjects—including race. 
4. Situated subjects
In her book on what she calls “habitual new media,” Chun describes data analytics 
and their turn away from individuals quite similar to Rouvroy. Her analysis cen-
ters on the concept of habit: rather than focusing on an individual subject, data 
analytics try to grasp habits, established ways of acting, and consequently tries 
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to form and inf luence these habits. In order to achieve this, they focus on the cor-
relation between habits rather than individual acts or even individual patterns. 
“Through this, individual actions become indications of collective patterns rath-
er than exceptions.” (Chun 2016: 57) These patterns are the object of optimization, 
quite similar to Rouvroy’s description of the reconfiguration of architectures and 
environments in order to achieve certain behaviors. 
Here, I cannot follow the detailed conceptual work in which Chun engages 
with the notion of habit. However, I want to follow her suggestion to connect this 
take on habit from media theory with thoughts on habit that relate to alterity: 
habit is publicity: it is the experience, the scar, of others that linger in the self. Ha-
bits are remnants of the past—past goals/selves, past experiences—that live on in 
our reactions to the environment today, as we anticipate tomorrow. Through habit 
we inhabit and are inhabited by alterity. (Ibid.: 95)
Chun encourages us to ask how such habits are changed through recent develop-
ments in digital media and how they can change again in order to change society 
(ibid.: 8). This implies that not habit per se is the problem, but differences among 
habits. However, Chun herself does not take these differences serious enough. 
Her main preoccupation are liberal injunctions to protect the subject from alterity 
and technological impositions. By fusing both, she urges to find ways to “inhabit” 
our habitualized relations to others, which includes to “warily embrace” the many 
new f lows of data, connections, configurations of subjectivity. Here she has a 
much more positive outlook on technology than Rouvroy. Yet, she underestimates 
how any form of exchange and ensuing subjectivity is formed by power—not just 
the private, liberal space. Some socio-technical positions are quite hurtful to in-
habit. Thus, in the following I want to suggest a middle ground, which however 
shares the outlook that changes in the ways we perceive and the ways we (can) act 
in a given situation are not only the aim of algorithmic means of governing. They 
are a fundamental way how subjectivity works. This is analyzed in detail by Linda 
Martín Alcoff in her book visible identities. 
Alcoff starts from the Foucauldian insight that power is not just an imposition 
from the outside. Rather, being a thinking and acting subject also means to be 
situated in power. However, contrary to Foucauldian analysis which focuses on 
the disciplinary subjection under norms, Alcoff shows via a theory of alterity and 
habitualization that our perceptions and actions are formed by the practices we 
perform and by the situations we have found ourselves in. Our past experiences 
leave traces that Alcoff describes in line with central insights from what is com-
monly discussed as theory of social practices (Reckwitz 2002): “[T]he interpretive 
horizon that constitutes our identity is undoubtedly constituted […] by a wealth of 
tacit knowledge located in the body.” (Alcoff 2006: 106) Such tacit knowledge and 
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habitualizations have their location in practices. They are not necessarily imposed 
on us, rather they are the growing residue of the way we act—or are forced to 
act. The latter of course remains important, but is not the only way how habitu-
alization comes about. It is an integral part of the way we make meaning of our 
situation and how we structure our actions. A lot of these ways of perceiving and 
acting come from others—via education, the various contexts we live, work, play, 
learn, etc. All of these contexts or situations are structured by collective practic-
es. Practices in which we do something but at the same time attain a subjectivity. 
Others tell us—more or less implicitly—who we are, what we become or should 
become by doing certain things, what is apt or usual for “someone like you” etc. As 
Alcoff states:
Part of what the collective praxis creates are aspects of the self. Our preferences, 
our dispositions toward certain kinds of feelings in certain kinds of situations, 
what typically causes fear, anxiety, calmness, anger, and so on, are af fected by 
our cultural and historical location. Sometimes people take such internal feelings 
as proof of a natural origin, as when a homosexual kiss elicits feelings of disgust. 
The feelings may well be quite real, but this is not proof that homosexuality is un-
natural; physical reactions can be altered by knowledge and acquaintance. This 
example suggests the most powerful role that the other plays in self-formation: 
the character of the other determines in no small part the self. (Ibid.: 115)
Regarding theories of the subject, it is often important to highlight this inf luence 
against ideas of innate characteristics or the demand to become as self-ref lexive 
as possible. Then it suffices that “the situation” of the subject is important—but 
not so much what that situation actually is. Alcoff highlights that the practices we 
become habituated in are structured by all kinds of social difference. She mainly 
analyses race and gender, but points at social strata, education and financial re-
sources as others. Thus, apparently quotidian practices are different for subjects 
inhabiting different social positions. E.g. she lists all kinds of things that are par-
ticular for women, with regard to the work of Simone de Beauvoir and Iris Marion 
Young: 
There is not only throwing and sitting, but standing, walking, running, patterns of 
conversation involving interruptions and dominating the topics, perceptual orien-
tations that can encompass sideline issues so as to notice household dirt, distres-
sed children, bored interlocutors, and so forth, as well as the very interior expe-
rience of one’s own emotional subjectivity. (Ibid.: 106)
She has similar lists for race and cross cultural and intersectional indices (ibid.: 
106 et. seqq.). Alcoff describes that we perceive situations, spaces and persons dif-
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ferently, depending on our preceding experiences, the cultures and meanings in 
which we have moved. We enter a subway differently as man or a woman, as per-
son with white skin or person of color. Here, cultures and meanings should not be 
understood as externalizable structures. They only persist in collective practices 
and particularly in what Alcoff calls “perceptual practice” (ibid.: 115).
It is of course possible to ref lect and to engage with one’s own habitualiza-
tion and the practices in which this happens—but not by rendering them fully 
transparent to oneself. We can act very consciously of the fact that our perception 
and the possible forms of action are deeply intertwined with contingent practic-
es. Nevertheless, these practices are the very context in which meaning and per-
ception emerge. Furthermore, experiencing something means to be somewhere 
and thus does not only enable knowledge, but also the possibility to be changed 
in one’s subjectivity: “Knowing is a kind of immanent engagement, in which one’s 
own self is engaged by the world […] rather than standing apart and above.”(Ibid.: 
111) Thus, when we attempt to engage with our own situation, practices form both 
the context and the site of this engagement. In consequence, habitualization can 
only yield to another form of habitualization: 
The phenomenal world constantly folds back on itself, adding to what has come 
before and what remains still in the background of the present moment; the past is 
that which has been surpassed, yet remains within. There are no complete breaks 
or total separations, only folds within a continuous cloth, pregnant with latent 
meaning. (Ibid.: 110) 
This also entails that a lasting change of subjectivities cannot be based on individ-
ual attempts. Rather, the practices, the ensuing social relations need to be changed 
in order to bring about different forms of habitualization and subjectivities: 
Experiences matter, but their meaning for us is both ambiguous and dynamic. We 
are embodied, yet not reduced to physical determinations imagined as existing 
outside of our place in culture and history. This account helps to capture the dialec-
tics of social identities, in which we are both interpellated into existing categories 
as well as making them our own. (Ibid.: 111) 
This analysis of situatedness, also the situatedness of social change has conse-
quences for the kind of politics that Rouvroy advocates. Alcoff denies the neces-
sity for an account of (human) beings as always in excess, or a “pure capacity of 
negation or of f light” (ibid.: 112). Even if such ideas of politics are deeply inspired 
by critiques of the subject, Alcoff contends that they still contain remnants of the 
“dualism” that inspires liberal accounts, which try to somehow separate the indi-
vidual from others or society. However, the habitual situatedness within practices 
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is not just part of oppressive and determining identities—although these are in 
the foreground of Alcoff’s discussion. They are part of any subjectivity, includ-
ing those with which we identify, in which we find pleasure, friendship, solidarity, 
luck. In consequence, to attain these we do not need to exceed situatedness, we 
just need to change the situation. In Alcoff’s words: “Moral agency, subjectivi-
ty, and reasoning capacities are made possible within social networks of certain 
types. There is no amorphous substance or pure capacity lying pristine below the 
layer at which social constructions of identity take hold.” (Ibid.)
5. Situated Subjects, AI and Politics
Alcoff herself does not discuss media and technologies. However, her thinking 
is deeply inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, which contains the medi-
atized structure of experience at its core—represented by the infamous example 
of a blind person’s stick (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 152, see also Alcoff 2006: 188). Thus, 
Alcoff’s thought can be easily amended with the necessary ref lections on media 
technology. 
In his discussion of interfaces, Christoph Ernst shows that interaction with 
digital technology via interfaces implies a situated subject, including the body 
(Ernst 2017: 100). Interfaces only work because they can address implicit knowl-
edge which is rooted in practices and thus is structured by social rules (ibid.: 102). 
Interface research and design even tries to consciously address that using what 
Ernst calls in reference to cognitive science a “conceptual model” (ibid.). While this 
bears the potential of manipulative attempts, it is not manipulation per se but a 
necessity for an interface to work, i.e. to do justice to the fact that interfaces do not 
just interact with generic human beings but concretely situated subjects. 
Ernst discusses interfaces, not the more abstract adjustment of architectures 
or environments that Rouvroy emphasizes, which work through “stimuli and sig-
nals that produce ref lex responses”. However, if this efficacy is precisely the de-
fining factor of technologies in algorithmic governance, they need to connect to 
the habitualized subjectivities not unlike interfaces (see also Distelmeyer 2017). 
Thus, even if these technologies do not aim at a set of norms and ensuing subjec-
tivity, they are still entangled with situated subjects. 
This also is confirmed by Chun’s observation that predictive analytics is tied to 
habitual practices, which I have cited above. Using Alcoff’s theory, we now return 
to the point that habitualization itself is not the problem. That a lot happens on a 
pre-conscious and habitual level, does not mean that the applications of AI work 
deterministically on us. Rather they interact with structures of perception and 
action that can certainly be inf luenced by algorithms, but that are also character-
ized by a pre-formed depth that results from prior experiences. This can change 
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the previsioned result of algorithmic governance in many ways, ensuing in fric-
tionless, almost unnoticed inf luence, as well potentials to inhabit and embrace 
and potentially evolve one’s situation as Chun suggests—but also many kinds of 
tensions, hurt and resistances. This is the main point here. Subjects are concretely 
situated subjects and algorithmic governance, particularly because it acts one su-
pra-subjective level connects quite differently to the various forms of subjectivity.
This already starts on the level of perception: For example, EU citizens that are 
not recognized by automated border control terminals that use AI based face rec-
ognition will immediately see this as malfunction of technology. Migrants might 
perceive this as a threatening decision. Also, the even less tangible adaptations of 
environments connect to situated subjects. This is precisely the reason why appli-
cations of AI are not neutral. Not just because they are based on biased training 
data; but because they connect differently to different forms of subjectivity. The 
algorithmic filtering of news is problematic because it connects better to certain 
subjects and communities structured by hate and othering than to other forms. 
Recidivism prediction enlarges and continues a security system that is based on 
race discrimination. John Chenney-Lippold has shown that the algorithmic selec-
tion of merchandise based on a machine learning system that tries to predict the 
users gender connects better to heterosexual, commodified forms of gender than 
others (Cheney-Lippold 2011). 
AI has yielded many technologies that have enhanced the efficacy of technolo-
gies in the sense that they directly impact the way we perceive and act in the world. 
This impact, however, does not amount to a loss of subjectivity in general. Rather 
it reconfigures different forms of subjectivity in different manners. The norma-
tive source of critique then does not lie in a difference between a new form of 
subjectivity under algorithmic governance and one that is somehow beyond that. 
Rather, the source of critique lies in the differences that already exist between 
subject positions, and the many ways in which they are shifted through technol-
ogy. Chun’s suggestion to “warily embrace” this situation can be one way of try-
ing to achieve a change for the better in such a situated manner. However, other 
ways lie in the refusal to accept a situated subject position, which might include 
demands for privacy protection as well as ceasing to use particular technologies 
altogether. These demands will need a socio-technical index. That is, they are not 
the demand to return to an independent subject position like the liberal strands 
that both Chun and Rouvroy criticize would have it. Still, privacy, cloaking of data, 
refusing to be implicated in automated analysis might be a necessary resource to 
find better and viable situations for persons whose subject position becomes en-
tangled with applications of AI in hurtful, abusive, disempowering ways.
To repeat, the challenge of critique is not to escape situatedness but to change 
the situation. Alcoff’s ref lection shows that this will always be a situatedness with 
others; and as my amendment of her theoretical outlook illustrates, it will always 
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be a situatedness with technology.  Thus, in the end this amounts to a political and 
democratic challenge. Our situation is always already related to others. Applica-
tions of AI make that very clear: they focus on relational data and as data driven 
technologies only make sense at the aggregate level. 
At the same time, as Alcoff shows, is it impossible to fully ref lect that situat-
edness and relationality. It is not a system or environment but an encroachment 
of many different “past goals/past selves—past experiences” as Chun writes. This 
creates many differences in perception and possibilities for actions for each sub-
ject. Thus, issues of epistemology and of power are fused.  In this sense, the polit-
ical challenges are first to get to get to know the situation of others, the way that 
technologies connect to their subject position. In a second step these positions 
need to be reconciled to achieve a new and better configuration of technology. This 
needs to be a democratic solution, not in the sense of finding a compromise be-
tween pre-existing interests, but in the sense that subjects always already form a 
related, socio-technically situated plurality.
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Deep Learning’s Governmentality 
The Other Black Box
Jonathan Roberge/Kevin Morin/Marius Senneville
Introduction
Frank Pasquale’s 2016 book The Black Box Society is now considered a landmark 
study in law-related disciplines, in the social sciences and beyond. The topic in 
itself, digitalization and the invasiveness of the internet, is of the utmost impor-
tance. The book reveals the inversion of operational secrecy by digital platforms 
and the extensive access to users’ private data. Facebook, Google and the like 
collect and aggregate bits and bytes of information to create massive profiling 
schemes, the modus operandi of which little is known. Problematically, as private 
actors, they acquire massive data and “knowledge” about the society and our in-
dividual behaviors that we don’t. To that complex and most certainly unpleasant 
reality, Pasquale’s analytical rigor and finesse contribute valuable insights on po-
tential regulations and on the possibility of developing a smarter citizenry. How-
ever, we want to argue that there is another, broader and maybe more cultural 
reason why The Black Box Society draw so much attention—thus further explaining 
the success of the book. The image of a concealed, networked entity is evocative of 
some common fears. It captures a sense of “loss of control” vis-à-vis the latest au-
tomation processes. Such an algorithmic black box, in other words, taps into a dif-
fused anxiety regarding what is to be called a “known-unknown”, i.e. something 
we recognize to be a mostly hidden form of knowledge production. The image of a 
black box is a disenchanted one; here lies its strength as well as its weakness. 
While mostly in line with Pasquale’s effort to decipher the opaqueness of our 
data-driven world, it also appears significant to question the limits of the black 
box as a heuristic if not holistic image. Scholars such as Geiger (2017), Sudmann 
(2018), Burrell (2016) or Bucher (2016) have explored this territory. The latter, for 
instance, has argued that “the widespread notion of algorithms as black boxes 
may prevent research more than encouraging it”, noting that the notion is “too 
readily used” (84). She then calls for critical scrutiny of algorithms and algorith-
mic systems using a three-step method: i) “do not fear the black box”; ii) “do not 
expect the solution to be inside” and iii) “consider the boxing of the box”. Whereas 
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the first step could be understood as encompassing the entire process, the others 
could be conceived as forming a complementary pair, together examining the in-
side and outside of the box. Moreover, such an approach is particularly suited to 
analyzing the recent shift towards deep learning algorithms, but also to machine 
learning techniques of different sorts, and everything nowadays labelled artificial 
intelligence. How and to what extent these algorithms are practically and symbol-
ically different from the previous so-called ‘generations’. What would they entail 
in terms of opacity, ambiguity and vagueness? Where, what, and whom should we 
look at to develop critical insight and robust interpretation? These questions, once 
docked to Bucher’s steps, could serve as guide to this chapter.
Examined closely, the idea of “not expecting the solution to be inside” match-
es perfectly with the ingrained logic and historical development of deep learning 
algorithms. “Open sesame!” is a task that cannot be programmed, or “learned” 
for that matter.  Despite its biological inspiration and the romantic-teleolog-
ical accounts of the field’s historical development (Rosenblatt, 1958; Hinton & 
al. 2006), the fact remains that what stands for “learning” is in fact adaptation and 
self-tweaking. The mathematical structure modifies itself while interacting and 
coping with the data stream coming from the outside world (Litvinski 2018; L’heu-
reux & al. 2017). Backpropagation, recursive loops and other subtleties thus not 
only ref lect but also enact a reality in f lux. Another way of looking at such uncer-
tainty is with the discrepancy between the more classical symbolic approach to AI 
and today’s connectionist or neo-connectionist shift (Cardon & al. 2018). Whereas 
the first relied on deduction, explicit modeling, abstract rules and programmable 
languages to create a logical and formal mode of reasoning, the second is based 
on induction, whereby connected hypotheses and approximations produce “opti-
mized” perceptions and predictions about what is going on in the data, inasmuch 
as data translates into improved rates of predictability (Mackenzie 2017, Sudmann 
2018). Layers of non-linear calculus thus inform something of a “deep” but shallow 
architecture which does not necessarily form an inexplicable AI, but which pushes 
the limits of its explicability further away. If not fully black, the box of current 
AI is very grey, to say the least. This can also be seen in the problems scholars are 
now facing concerning the reproducibility of small-scale theories, where current 
practices of publication generally prevent them from sharing both source code 
and training database, or to address the hazards related to the arbitrary setting 
of hyperparameters, or even the unavoidable randomness inherent in the process 
of generating training values (Hutson 2018). Managing and massaging that much 
data is never an easy task, especially not in an experimental environment, and 
even less in the real world where the saying “garbage in, garbage out” remains 
thoroughly valid. The multiple problems nowadays with bias fall under the same 
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category, and could serve as one last example here, namely that the box cannot by 
its very definition be the solution to something bigger than itself.1 
The internal problems sketched above might not even compare to what is at 
stake with Bucher’s insight probing to “consider the boxing of the box”. In fact, 
there is a long history of social sciences in general and in STS in particular to de-
vote a great deal of attention to everything surrounding a given piece of technol-
ogy (Bijker & al. 2012). In the specific case of deep learning algorithms, it is all the 
more important to remember that “they are embedded in larger, far more complex 
assemblages” that never cease to inf luence their shape and content (Gillespie 2014: 
3). The question, then, is how to make sense of such molding pressures and the 
kind of opacity they produce. It is about the complexity of a given context or a 
given “ecology”, yet we want to argue that the best way to consider such boxing is 
through a networked approach. As stated elsewhere, “[…] there is not one box, but 
multiple boxes. The opacity of algorithms is more precisely expressed in different 
forms of opacity, all of which, in specific ways, are contingent on the in-betweenness 
of a plethora of actors, both human and non-human” (Roberge & Seyfert 2018: 2; 
Latour 1987). First, it is difficult not to acknowledge an intense division of labor 
within this domain of innovation—a situation that often translates into develop-
ers working on a dataset without fully knowing for whom, to which end and why. 
Here agency is divided amongst many little hands. Second, a networked approach 
would consider the actual implementation of deep learning tools and techniques 
as more in f lock than in a row, adjusting to one another more than collaborat-
ing. This has been well documented in the literature on algorithmic finance, for 
instance, where competing stakeholders deploy “algotrading” tools to bolster at-
tack or defense maneuvers (Seyfert 2018; Knorr-Cetina & Preda 2011; Castelle & al. 
2016). Whether social sciences will be more attentive in the future to the combined, 
butterf ly-like effects of all these actors’ efforts into “boxing the box” remains to 
be seen. However, considering the understudied state of this phenomenon we 
urgently need to give more attention to the management, ordering and decision 
processes that shape what deep learning algorithms come to be about in the real 
world. More straightforwardly, the political economy of AI is one of our biggest 
and most opaque boxes today. In this chapter, we intend to contribute to the on-
going debate by analyzing what is at stake in this new form of socio-technical gov-
ernmentality, i.e. what are the tensions, struggles, efforts at coopting knowledge, 
power, etc. Taking the Montreal AI hub as a case study, and following a 2016-2018 
1  Of late, IBM has announced that it would allow access to a library comprising over two million 
images for facial recognition training with the hope that enhanced accuracy would help curb bias. 
The position of NGOs such as the American Civil Liberty Union in that case and in other similar ones 
is that better facial recognition is still bad news for minorities facing discrimination across a vari-
ety of social settings. See Browne 2019.
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ethnographical investigation2, we will focus on how stakeholders deploy multiple 
strategies and resources, including the building of legitimacy through symboli-
cally-laden media operations. Our is thus empirical, while also network approach 
being theoretically informed; in that sense we hope to answer calls by preeminent 
scholars to develop critical thinking through studies which are in situ (Kitchin 
2014; Mackenzie 2018). 
I. Governmentality—What about it, and what Does it Change  
 to the Study of Deep Learning? 
Debates surrounding the increasing complexification of today’s political economy 
and how it should translate into new understandings of power gain a great deal 
of intelligibility once one adheres to Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentali-
ty (2004a, 2004b). This practice-oriented analysis of the ‘problem of government’ 
has allowed scholars to re-orient their focus on “the ceaseless transactions which, 
variably, modify, displace, upset, or insidiously shift the funding, the investment 
modalities, the centers of decision, the forms and types of control, the relations 
between local and central authorities, etc.” (Foucault, quoted in Lascoumes 2004: 
3; our translation.) Indeed, the French philosopher has had a pivotal role in iden-
tifying—at least—these three logics: i) how power and knowledge are inseparable, 
ii) how these introduce mobile and networked dynamics, and iii) how all of this 
allows to think about authority as enacted by and as a set of technologies. That 
said, the difficulty with Foucault is that he never properly wrote about the digital. 
Of late, it is Mackenzie who has endeavored to apply the concept to the study of 
what he calls ‘machine learners’, i.e. naive Bayes classifiers, decision trees, neu-
ral networks, and a range of others that fall under the broad category of AI (2013; 
2017; 2018). All of this, according to him, corresponds to a “data practice that re-
configures local centers of power and knowledge by redrawing human-machine 
relations” (2017: 9). How research, development and implementation is organized; 
by whom, for what purposes, and through which means and discourses, is dif-
ferent from London to the Silicon Valley, or China and Canada for that matter. 
Likewise, how power relations and the distribution of authority are shaped spe-
cifically by the structure of its organizations and institutions varies from subfield 
to subfield—finance, military, transport, etc. Mackenzie is thus very helpful by 
providing such ecosystemic, if not ecological views. At the same time, in his book, 
he runs the risk of over-emphasizing an internal examination of the technology, 
2  We totalized 12 interviews with machine learning specialists, 4 additional ones with scientific 
journalists, and over 400 articles from local francophone and anglophone newspapers and 
monthly publications.
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and thus is only partially able to ‘consider the boxing of the box’—to refer to Bu-
cher once again.   
What would it take to be able to provide insights that would be both local and 
‘architectural’—that is, able to demonstrate how particular constructions and 
transformations occur from the outside in? One such way is by looking at the dis-
tance between governmentality and what is deemed today as ‘governance’, and 
how, in fact, the latter is the topic of the former. In Montreal and probably else-
where, the discourse related to governance enjoys great momentum, as the idea 
itself serves as a sort of empty-signifier that can tactically be given meaning. Gov-
ernance, like progress or innovation, readily means “good governance” and many 
stakeholders involved in the construction of the Montreal hub conf late the two 
in order to bolster the institutional-public support for market-oriented develop-
ments in deep learning, the details of which will be presented shortly. For now, 
suffice to say that the very idea of a deep learning governance in Quebec’s metrop-
olis seeks to implicate pretty much everyone as “partners” in a game of collective 
self-management and purposive social change. In play is what scholars such as 
Walters have identified as “[an] emphasis on self-governing networks” drawing 
heavily on “the imagery of cybernetics and complexity theory” (2004: 29-30; see 
also Simard 1979 for a similar theoretical approach applied to Québec). Power and 
authority here are conceived as enablers: they allow for the circulation of resourc-
es, not for their constraint or restriction. As will be made clear below, everything 
related to ethics—the industry-backed Partnership on AI or the Montreal Decla-
ration for a Responsible Development of AI—is tainted by an idea of self-regula-
tion and its distinctive way of translating into a loose, sickly effort to not legislate. 
Power and politics have not disappeared for that matter; while governance might 
present itself in the best light, as lightweight government at a distance, the point is 
that it represents itself as an efficient, if understudied form of governmentality. 
What is it about the Montreal deep learning hub that makes it worthy of sci-
entific analysis? Part of the answer relates to the fact that Quebec is a rather small 
society, well developed but still marked by the concentration of its elites—so-
cial, political, economic, cultural, etc. As for the historical context in which the 
province has addressed the most recent “AI awakening”, it is important to recall 
the role of Canada’s CIFAR in subsidizing deep learning research, even when the 
technique was highly unfashionable (Hernandez 2014; Cardon & al. 2018; Enge-
mann and Sudmann 2018). Star scientists such as Hinton (University of Toronto), 
former students Bengio (Université de Montréal) and to a lesser extent3, LeCun 
(NYU and now Facebook) are both the inheritors and the best promoters of what 
is now a C$125 million pan-Canadian AI strategy. When, for instance, the talk of 
3  LeCun has worked less in Canada and more in France and USA in recent years, although he still 
enjoys important media coverage.
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an ongoing “AI revolution” emerged in Quebec’s francophone mediascape, Bengio 
himself came to be introduced as one of the leaders of Montreal’s AI ecosystem, 
itself presented as one of the most world-renowned hubs of cutting-edge AI inno-
vation (See Bourgault 2017). This peculiar dynamic can be further demonstrated 
by the fact that its name appears in 126 of 161 articles focusing on AI developments 
published by Montreal newspaper La Presse between May of 2016 and July of 2017 
(Bourgault 2017). The point here is that, when considering the Quebec’s AI field, 
two correlations appear clearly: firstly, between the emergent rhetoric of a revolu-
tion and the rise of a charismatic leader; and secondly, between the accentuated 
hype surrounding deep learning and AI and the capacity of local actors to rapid-
ly set in motion the relevant institutions. “Hype is low on informative content,” 
scholar Guice rightly observes, “but directly states the relevance of the informa-
tion to a social context” (1999: 85). In order to bolster the Montreal hub, former 
Quebec’s Economy and Innovation Minister Anglade noted that her government 
would not “sprinkle” public investment (Rettino-Parazelli 2017). That led first to 
the creation of an advisory committee and, subsequently, of an AI Cluster initially 
equipped with a budget of C$100  million. The two most interesting facts about 
the cluster is that it devoted 80% of its funds to Bengio-directed, Université de 
Montréal-led MILA (Montreal Institute for Learning Algorithms) all while being 
officiated by Breton—Université de Montréal’s dean—and well-known business-
man Boivin, who several months later also became the head of MILA’s board (see 
IA.Québec 2018). This suggests that in this particular context, and in this rath-
er short period of time, what good governance meant was delivering efficiency; 
whereas a broader, more ref lexive and critical perspective would instead have 
interrogated what it means in terms of circulating elites, and why the effort to 
maximize efficiency still needs to justify and legitimate itself through at least the 
appearance of duly-conducted administrative processes.      
Another way of considering ‘the boxing of the box’ in the Montreal case is to 
have a look at the conjunction between efforts geared towards the launch of the 
aforementioned Montreal Declaration for a Responsible Development of AI and 
the creation, in late 2018, of the International Observatory on the Societal Impacts 
of AI. Fully endorsed by the government and its main scientific institutions, both 
make claims to an epistemological posture of “knowledge co-construction” with 
the public, the different stake-holders, etc., that in practice serves as a malleable, 
if not shallow, signifier. The Declaration, for instance, proposes a list of ten princi-
ples that are all more general and abstract than the other, with some overly naive 
or in contradiction with the current economic reality of deep learning—Principle 
6.2 for instance states that “AI development must help eliminate relationships of 
domination between groups and people based on differences of power, wealth, 
or knowledge” (IA responsible 2017). For its part, the Observatory is still nascent, 
but in its very constitution already signals a poor understanding of social sci-
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ences’ role in studying social impacts, with for instance more members coming 
from computer sciences than sociology and communication studies altogether. 
Importantly, what the Observatory and the Declaration have in common is the 
cybernetic view of governance introduced above. On the one hand, the manage-
ment of knowledge production obliterates any notion of checks and balances or 
arms-length regulatory principles, notions central to the very idea of modernity. 
On the other hand, it appears that all current virtue signaling efforts, including 
the Declaration, the Partnership for AI and the like, emerge as what Wagner calls 
“an escape from regulation” (2018).4 All in all, the Quebec government’s involve-
ment in the development of its Montreal hub is one not of creating barriers and 
obstacles, but rather one to usher and foster the circulation of whatever is deemed 
‘positive’, namely any twists and turns that exhibit a form of action from the gov-
ernment or the stakeholders, knowing that the legitimacy of who gives ref lects on 
who receives and vice versa.
II. The ‘Triple Helix’ Remix and the Role of Open Science 
At this point, it would be tempting to declare that, in spite of the initiatives of nu-
merous actors, including significant gestures by the government of Quebec, it still 
is “business as usual”. This, however, would be misleading in at least two separate 
ways. First, while it is accurate to say that the Cluster, the Declaration and the 
Observatory all participate in building a certain public perception of everything 
AI, it is not possible to adequate it to an ideology that would hide any sort of naked 
truth.5 In other words, to be critical is to question how the box is made, not to put 
it on fire. Second, the expression ‘business as usual’ undercuts how much the ad-
vent of deep learning and related AI techniques is changing the power-knowledge 
topography of the province, notably the pivotal role universities are called upon to 
play. A governmentality approach must therefore be attentive to the structuration 
as well as the tensions involved here—which is also to say the historical and geo-
graphical subtleties that make higher education in Quebec something both North 
American but also profoundly inf luenced by the French universalistic approach, 
4  Many have indeed noticed how increasingly frequent calls for “ethical AI” from industry figures 
of ten correlate with ongoing campaigns against “overly coercive” government regulation; see 
both Wagner, 2018 and Greene & al., 2019. A recent variation on this theme seems to be indus-
try-backed regulations (Simonite, 2019); already, accusations of “regulatory capture” have been 
expressed (Biddle, 2019).
5  Such a tradition finds an emblematic figure in the early Habermas while he was for instance say-
ing that “[…] [ideologies] replace traditional legitimations of power by appearing in the mantle of 
modern science and by deriving their justification from the critique of ideology. Ideologies are 
coeval with the critique of ideology” (Habermas 1971, 99). 
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and how, starting in the 60s and 70s, it made a substantial push towards a democ-
ratization of access.6 Interestingly, Université de Montréal and McGill University, 
both at the forefront of MILA, are historically considered more ‘elite’ schools while 
still enjoying a great deal of public support. The MILA itself is important not only 
because it attracted most of the government-backed Cluster’s money, but also as 
it comes to embody the displacement and, really, the refinement of what the lit-
erature calls the triple helix—a schematic model of innovation where corporate 
actors come to mesh with university and government ones (Etzkowitz & Leides-
dorff 2000)—to now a “quadruple helix” where start-ups, too, are considered key 
strategic partners. Confusing small and large, it is not rare in Montreal to see in-
ternational corporations such as Microsoft being equated with the local Maluuba, 
Facebook being considered as the emerging FAIR-MTL or Google as an embryonic 
DeepMind—with media celebrating even the smallest of investments.7 All of this 
participates in what we argue is an ecological mentality that blurs the symbolic—a 
hub is positive by its very nature—and the practical, by the virtue of the latest 
trend in what Hoffman and others have called “academic capitalism” (2017; see 
also Slaughter and Rhodes 2010). In turn, the reality corresponds less to the early 
French inf luence on Quebec’s higher education system than to a mode of “Silicon 
Valley-isation” or “Stanford-isation”, terms borrowed from Salter (2018). 
Common to all AI developments is the fact that they are guided by and insep-
arable from a specific ethos or model of “open science” (Leonelli 2013; Mirowski 
2018). Researchers see the sharing of information as, prima facie, progress in and 
of itself; discovery and innovation are meant to be picked up by and benefit the 
entire “community” in what is thus an ecological as well as cybernetic mentali-
ty which, again, has roots in a certain Californian “rebelliousness”.8 Today, these 
norms prove to be very efficient, especially with regards to the following three di-
mensions. First, the obligation to choose to pursue either an academic career or a 
career in private R&D becomes less of an issue when one can publish freely, which 
is now allowed, if not encouraged in most basic research-inclined industrial labs—
in fact, it is not rare to see papers co-authored by scientist at Facebook or Deep-
Mind along with university-affiliated researchers. Knowing the shortage of quali-
fied personnel in AI, such open science practices are thus instrumentally adopted 
6  The ten institutions networked across the territory under the umbrella of Université du Québec 
is emblematic in that regard. 
7  See for instance the summary of investments made to the local ecosystem in 2017 in Mathys 2017.
8  Here, we want to refer to what Saxenian (1994) and others have described as the characteristical-
ly innovative way Silicon Valley academic and industry actors had to produce new organizational 
forms at an impressive rate. On many accounts, this distinctive way of establishing collaborative 
ties between actors pertaining to dif ferent professional categories but to a common cultural 
background has spearheaded the privileged understanding of how to lead technological innova-
tion these days—see also Storper & al. 2015.
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as part of the repertoire necessary to navigate the “war to attract talent” (Hernan-
dez & King 2016; Metz 2016a; 2017). Second, unrestricted circulation of people and 
ideas should allow for companies to track the best of university research. Intern-
ships, grants, and philanthropic donations large or small, contribute to secure ac-
cess to computer science labs and to reach researchers where they are. For a city 
such as Montreal, this has proven very helpful, even if, from this decentralization 
and openness, it is impossible to conclude that its hub is a “plaque-tournante”—
after all, others like Paris, Singapore, Pittsburg, etc., have benefited too. Thirdly, 
this openness is not only geographical, but temporal, as the adaptation between 
the different helixes, companies and university labs in particular, is intended to 
happen more or less in real-time. The pace of research here is as important as the 
commercial turnover rate that transforms an algorithmic architecture into an 
API, an innovation in a recommendation system, etc. While openness translates 
into windows of opportunity and good timing into fierce competition between 
companies, it is especially important to understand that the logic sustaining the 
entire model really is one of “strategic openness” (Ananny & Crawford 2018). The 
knowledge being produced in universities turns out to be “open for business” in a 
new and understudied sense, especially with regards to its wider implications in 
contexts such as Quebec.  
The fact that deep learning and associated AI technologies signal a substan-
tial displacement of wealth, prestige and power finds numerous and all the more 
empirical examples to which we will come in a few moments. For now, however, it 
appears that a necessary transition implies to question the broader significance 
of the “exploitable epistemology” (Levy & Johns 2016) set in motion through the 
quadruple-helix and open science nexus. As part of this research, a series of in-
terviews with individuals involved in AI in Montreal were conducted, with most 
expressing largely consensual views, except for two or three more critical figures. 
The first one came from a computer scientist working in healthcare. Her critique 
points to structural elements in the transformation of research financing in Que-
bec and Canada: 
It’s a concentration of millions of dollars, it’s as if you’re betting on a single number 
at the casino roulette. There’s a variety of dif ferent types of research done, not all 
from the deep learning or big data strain [in AI] but that are also innovative—but 
you’re not betting on them, you’re only betting on deep learning. You’re pushing 
everyone in the same direction and you forget that innovation is not necessarily 
of all going in the same direction. You also need to leave some to be sure that re-
search in its totality is somewhat diversified. That, I see as a threat. It’s going to 
siphon everything in the same direction […]. In fact, everyone is rushing into it.
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This comment could serve as a proxy or hint as to how and why even scientific 
institutions partake in the kind of self-fulfilling prophecy that makes deep learn-
ing a reality. Again, institutions, hype and the pressure towards “Stanfordized” 
research go hand in hand. Another key example would be the attribution of 29 CI-
FAR Research Chairs late in 2018, some to prominent Facebook associates such as 
Pineault (McGill) or Vincent (Université de Montréal) (CIFAR 2018). For less trendy 
research streams, of course, this draws a path in which difficult access to fund-
ing would blend with its equivalent in terms of strenuous access to students—at 
least two other computer scientists in public universities from our samples talked 
about how they barely have any grad students nowadays. Looking at the longer 
term, chances are that the situation will become only more cyclical and detrimen-
tal.
Another related issue emerging with respect to the meaning of the “exploit-
able”, even weaponized, epistemology implicated here, concerns the handling of 
databases: who owns them, how are they released, and for what purposes. For 
Big Tech companies as Google, who just open-sourced GPipe, or Microsoft, who 
acquired and now runs Github, gigantic libraries of data are acting in both per-
formative and legitimating ways. Their f laws and limitations are scarcely if ever 
exposed—the fact for instance that such companies still pursue patents aggres-
sively (Simonite 2018)—especially when compared to the ecological and cybernet-
ic benefits attributed to these platforms and widely praised in the media. It is then 
at a more mezzo or local level that things get more challenging. The problem is that 
open data for training is not exactly the same as “real-deal” data or value-added 
data. For instance, our interviewee who works with deep learning applications 
in healthcare insisted that a dangerous dynamic is developing, where start-up 
businesses search for any sizeable bases to access in exchange for deep learning 
services, or at least, make a contract allowing them to share data with a third par-
ty. In places such as Montreal, to make a profit means finding clients—insurance, 
banks, clinics, biotech, etc.—not yet accustomed to deep learning techniques, in a 
legal environment still unsure about the best way to defend privacy or to regulate 
any potential wrongdoing.9 Yet, it is probably at the micro level of the different 
university labs that the difference between the data “haves” and “have nots” is the 
most striking. Star researchers such as Bengio in Montreal—or, for that matter, 
Hinton in Toronto—attract funding and students because of their close connec-
9  An important parallel should be established with the way failed unicorn Theranos capitalized 
on the biotech industry’s important regulatory leeway to position itself as one of the biggest (if 
short-lived) success stories of this emergent field. Its ability to rely on the reputability of ear-
ly-backers such as Gen. James Mattis, Oracle founder Larry Ellison, media mogul Rupert Mur-
doch or present-day Secretary of Education Betsy Devos to sustain increasing investment rounds 
should be understood precisely as the result of the field’s relative newness and its lack of proper 
regulations (O’Brien 2018).
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tion with Google and the like. But what about the other, lesser-known researchers 
in the field? The conundrum is that they almost never gain access to the data ac-
tually prone to broad commercial applications. To give one final example in this 
section, our team met with another scientist in the summer of 2017 and talked 
about the general sense of community, and what it meant that open science was 
a way for private and public actors in the field to communicate. His answer was 
laconic: “It’s just fake. It’s just fake. They share the algorithm but not the data, you 
can do nothing with this. [As for the meaning of “open”], it’s just a word because 
I cannot use it”.
III. Deep Learning is Redefining the Private-Public Partnership
To say that today’s developments in the AI field’s political economy blur the preex-
isting distinctions between what is deemed private and public—or, for that mat-
ter, that it amounts to a “Stanfordisation” of higher education in places such as 
Quebec—is not to succumb to any nostalgia for a utopian past. A descriptive and 
agnostic approach is indeed needed to account for, as Hoffman stated, “the com-
plicated, subtle, and sometimes contradictory ways that commercial logics have 
diffused across academic culture” (2017: 727). The point is that, in Montreal and 
most probably elsewhere, ambiguity is in itself a form of governmentality. Weak-
ened institutional autonomy is translated into more collaboration; buzzwords in 
the semantic region of “hub”, “clustering”, “ecosystem” and the likes are repeated 
and celebrated in what is then hard to decipher from public relations endeavours 
(see Turkina 2018, for instance). A turning point of this development was the Jan-
uary 2019 relocation of the MILA to Mile-Ex, a post-industrial inner-city in Mon-
treal. The relocation of the lab occurred as it got elevated to the status of “Quebec 
Artificial Intelligence Institute” and came to be positioned at the forefront of the 
Mile-Ex’s Cité de l’IA, with multiple small and big companies establishing their 
new facilities either in the same building or in its immediate surroundings. O 
Mile-Ex, the converted textile-manufacture the lab moved in, already accommo-
dated the offices of up-and-coming startup Element AI, Royal Bank of Canada’s 
AI branch Borealis, French military contractor Thales’ AI research division and the 
para-public Institute for Data Valorization (IVADO), with Microsoft’s Maluuba 
also a close neighbour (Bachand 2018; Dubuc 2018). Importantly, the idea to create 
the Cité represents the fourth pillar of the government’s strategy in everything 
AI—along with the Industrial Cluster, the Declaration and the Observatory—yet, 
because of its weight in terms of jobs, investments, square feet of office space and 
the like, it is possible to argue that it is the most important. The people in charge 
there understand rather well the leverage associated with their interstitial posi-
tion. Indeed, in interviews with media about the relocation, they were keen to ask 
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for additional public funding: “Attracting researchers to Montreal by telling them 
we only have two years of funding left, that won’t work. We need to be part of a 
broader, longer-term vision. We’re in the order of tens and hundreds of millions” 
(Pisano quoted in Rettino-Parazelli 2019).
In terms of practical, yet non-official public-private blending, there might be 
no equivalent in Quebec to Element AI, the fast-growing company co-founded 
by MILA’s director Bengio. As rightly expressed by one media commentator, “the 
business model is not easy to understand” (quoted in Mercure 2016); not only did 
it attracted historic amounts of venture capital without a proper product on the 
market, but it continually operates under an ethics-oriented discourse of public 
good and social benefits while also positioning itself as an active player in the 
rather traditional and profit-savvy fields of logistics, insurance and banking (The 
Economist 2017). Bengio himself appears willing to play on both levels as he ded-
icates genuine efforts to promote an ethical and socially-minded development of 
his field while lionizing the commercial success of his company, one apparent-
ly set to become one of the first Canadian AI Unicorn (George-Cosh 2018; Vara 
2018). In addition, he sometimes confuses his own numerous public and private 
affiliations in talks, Power Points and elsewhere, in what is now emblematic of a 
bigger issue, namely how the value and wealth created in the public domain tends 
to move away from it. The very nature of Element AI—and part of the reason for its 
initial valuation—is to capitalize on its access to star academics to develop ‘busi-
ness solutions’ for its private-sector clients. As acclaimed in the Journal of Small 
Business & Entrepreneur, the company has “a faculty fellow network composed 
of over 20 world-renowned AI scientists from the top academic labs across Can-
ada. These professors not only do research-related work for the company but […] 
provide valuable advice […]. This unique arrangement gives Element AI access to 
cutting-edge research” (Turkina 2018: 2). Again, what there is in this quotation re-
lates to everything cybernetic about the new model being implemented discussed 
above. Helixes rotate, openness signals access, pace equals circulation and inno-
vation, etc., in a movement that is certainly difficult, yet not impossible, to track. 
While Element AI is cybernetic by essence, it is as well ecological in a very 
practical way. Proximity to the MILA shapes the urban space around it, and could 
be measured in meters. Of course, such proximity is not something to be found 
only in the Cité de l’IA; numerous incubators in North America, Europe and else-
where use the model with the justification that it contributes to the cross-polli-
nation of ideas and resources. The problem, however, is slightly different when it 
comes to the blurring of public and private assets. Emblematic in that regard is a 
Facebook post by Element AI saluting the arrival of MILA “to the neighborhood”, 
which showcased a picture of Bengio while emphatically adding, “see you in the 
stairwell” (Element AI 2018). Such metaphor usually refers to a more or less licit 
space; one with more or less fuzzy codes and boundaries. Who goes up, what goes 
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down, when, and how? In the case particularly of students-becoming-interns-be-
coming-students, the lack of explicit limitations never cease to be problematic 
both on an individual and on a cohort basis. Once aggregated, these public and 
private part-time or twofold affiliations reinforce a model that is poorly checked 
and balanced, especially in the face of its long-lasting socio-political and econom-
ic impacts and how these could be discussed and amended in the public sphere.       
At current, it is such public-private intermingling that comes to colonize the 
many layers of the AI Montreal hub—despite certain pleas from Bengio against 
a reality he actually contributes to.10 The recent wave of investments made by 
foreign corporations in the Montreal hub has been going hand-in-hand with the 
increasing adoption by the newly ‘partnered’ scientists of this new organization-
al arrangement, namely, the dual affiliation model. This university-to-industry 
collaborative form, imported from the fields of law, management and medicine—
and probably at its strongest in the biotechnology industry; see Mirowski 2012—
allows scholars to keep their university professorship appointment while adding 
to it a commitment, on at least a part-time basis, to their new corporate employer 
(Serebrin 2017a; 2017b). To the list parsed throughout this chapter, we should still 
be adding the many names of MILA-affiliated scientists such as Larochelle at Uni-
versité de Montréal and Google Brain, Precup at McGill and DeepMind or Pal at 
Element AI and Université de Montréal. Dual affiliation is justified by actors of 
the field as a novel solution where scientists are able to continue teaching and con-
duct basic research while also participating in industrial R&D, whereas previously, 
such participation would entail a complete retreat from their university teaching 
and basic research activities (Plamondon Emond 2017). The growing dissemina-
tion of the model thus operates at the junction of two distinct but concomitant 
dynamics. On the one hand, corporate actors are increasingly aware of the neces-
sity, for their business model, to achieve an all-essential balancing-act between 
the preservation of the “ecosystem sustainability”—i.e., to ensure the continued 
formation of future generations of AI researchers and the further advancement of 
basic research endeavours (LeCun 2018)—and, as described in section II, the con-
f licting urge of immediate appropriation of specialized human resources (Metz 
2016a; 2017). On the other hand, scientists are responding to constraints which 
are mostly presented as incentives: besides the alluring possibility of alternative 
sources of private funding, researchers also have to deal with the fact that access 
to state-of-the-art corporate computational infrastructures and some of the wid-
est proprietary databases are indeed technological means increasingly needed for 
the pursuit of cutting-edge deep learning research. In turn, this new public-pri-
10  See Shead 2018. On his criticizing the increasing concentration by major tech corporations of 
both technological means and specialized human resources while scarcely rejecting opportuni-
ties to collaborate with them—see Mathys 2017 and Vara 2018.
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vate assemblage and its peculiar way of providing many solutions at once is pre-
sented, justified and legitimized as a form of necessity, and not as a cascade of 
contingent choices and principles. In that sense, however, it is nonetheless highly 
political and a form of governmentality. 
Conclusion
This chapter started by acknowledging how the black box is a powerful, yet dis-
enchanted figure to ref lect on technologies in the making such as deep learning, 
and AI more broadly. While there is an urgency that should spur social sciences 
inquiry, it is nonetheless important to do things right, with a certain dose of ag-
nostic and critical ref lexivity. In this light, we attempted to follow Bucher’s triple 
advice to ‘not fear the black box’; ‘not expect the solution to be inside’ and ‘con-
sider the boxing of the box’. So how did it go? How did the theoretical concepts 
apply to the practical reality and how, in turn, can better understanding of a case 
such as the Montreal hub inform broader and more critical ref lection? Parts of the 
answer came in section I, where the argument was made that what is mostly at 
stake is the present and future political economy of AI, i.e. how the automation of 
knowledge production transforms power relations and how the different actors 
involved in deep learning are engaged in what Crandall names a particular form of 
“cooperative struggles” (2010). Substantial resources including money, state sup-
port, media coverage, etc. are f lowing and aggregating, the details of which are 
precisely what must be understood about this dense and tense regime of govern-
mentality. The new normal brought about by deep learning and AI-related tech-
nologies will be messy and ambivalent, if this is not already the case. We insisted 
throughout the chapter that power is more than ever a transaction and that what 
“control” means in these circumstances relates to a new sense of cybernetics and 
ecology that shall account for all types of mutualism and parasitism. In section II, 
we described this by digging into the Montreal example, especially how it exhibits 
a peculiar form of rotary motion between the helixes that are the governmental, 
university, established and upcoming corporate actors. Whereas actors repeated-
ly proclaim there is a “community” and that the Cluster, the Observatory, the Dec-
laration and the Cité de l’IA make for an integrated whole, we propose a somewhat 
less optimistic, more realistic analysis. Open science is a case in point, as “open” 
translates into aggregation and as it signals an important shift in the educational 
model in vogue. There is such thing as a privatisation of higher education in place 
like Quebec, in which deep learning and AI related technologies are instrumental. 
This was the principal conclusion of section III. Whether you call it the “double 
affiliation” or the “see you in the staircase” model, what is clear is that the benefits 
are not equally redistributed at current and have very poor chance—at least the-
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oretically—of being so in the future. In the end, it might then be such unfolding, 
in its many twists and turns, that constitutes the proper object of another, still-in-
the-making ecology, one which could be called Critical AI Studies.
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Reduction and Participation
Stefan Rieger
Three years ago, researchers at the secretive Google X lab in Mountain View, Cali-
fornia, extracted some 10 million still images from YouTube videos and fed them 
into Google Brain—a network of 1,000 computers programmed to soak up the 
world much as a human toddler does. Af ter three days looking for recurring pat-
terns, Google Brain decided, all on its own, that there were certain repeating cate-
gories it could identify: human faces, human bodies and … cats. (Jones 2014: 146)
1. Deep Learning
By this point, talk of the omnipotence of algorithms is everywhere. This discourse 
proceeds without interruption and is seemingly impossible to stop—not least be-
cause algorithms operate quietly and inconspicuously in the background (cf. Bunz 
2012; Seyfert/Roberge 2017). Many of the discussions about their inf luence con-
cern the status of their opacity and, by concentrating on the refusal of firms to 
make them transparent, bring arguments into play that seem like relics from an-
other era. Whereas then the focus of critics rested on the activities of a discredited 
culture industry, today it is the economization of hitherto unimaginable volumes 
of data that is considered a violation. The economic valence of data has become the 
object of a media critique that lost one of its favorite subjects from the previous 
century: the critical and autonomous media user (or that which was once regarded 
as such). The algorithms of large corporations such as Google, Amazon, or Face-
book rightly seem to have subsumed the latter subject’s potential for action, au-
tonomy, resistance, and subversion (cf. Sudmann 2017). This process has been so 
successful that it has even led to counter-movements that do not casually lament 
the end of the private sphere as collateral damage of digitalization but have rather 
adopted agendas that enthusiastically promote its undoing (cf. Rieger 2018). For 
the internet exhibitionists of the so-called Post-Privacy Spackeria, data protection 
is nothing more than a historically datable remnant, a vestige from the last mil-
lennium: “The private sphere is so 1980s.” (Reißmann 2019, n. pag.)
The areas of application for the use of algorithms, which, for their part, have been 
the object of a brief evolution and whose optimization has been oriented not least 
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toward meeting the specifications of nature, are ubiquitous and so varied that they 
cannot be surveyed in full:1 whether recognizing faces in everyday life for reasons of 
delayed surveillance or future-oriented forensics, identifying sequences of behavior 
or engaging in biopolitics, clarifying the authorship of images and texts (cf. Rodri-
guez et al. 2019; Rehman et al. 2019), classifying works of art according to the style 
of a given epoch or comparing signatures supposedly written by the same hand, in-
tervening in the business of science and confronting apparently non-computable ob-
jects of knowledge with big data and algorithmization (cf. Rieger 2019), affecting the 
self-perception and self-assessment of certain disciplines over the course of the “com-
putational turn” and “humanities computing,” associating the latter disciplines with 
different forms of ref lection and thereby contributing fundamental changes within 
the humanities itself (cf. Hall 2013), or otherwise intervening in the order of things—
such activity typically draws upon processes of artificial intelligence, artificial neural 
networks, and deep learning. Their manner of dealing with large volumes of data 
has become a knowledge-promoting game and has even opened up new possibilities 
for Foucauldian discourse analysis, which is seldom applicable to technological de-
velopments (cf. Engemann/Sudmann 2018). The possibilities of artificial intelligence 
play right into the hands of Foucault’s basic intuition that “empirical knowledge, at a 
given time and in a given culture, did possess a well-defined regularity” and that “the 
history of non-formal knowledge had itself a system.” (Foucault 2002 [1966]: x) Over 
the course of his book The Order of Things, Foucault sought to reveal an epistemologi-
cally stringent (but, in technical terms, hardly realizable) positive unconscious of knowl-
edge and thus to give expression to the supposition that there is a “well-defined reg-
ularity”—a formal code behind non-formal knowledge as well. It would therefore be 
possible to process the science of this knowledge in a different way: it could become 
the object of an algorithmic discourse analysis and remain removed from individu-
al understanding and comprehension. In the modes of access employed by cultural 
analytics, such a positive unconscious of knowledge is brought up to technical speed 
and made visible in the form of regularities and repetitions. Data mining and text 
mining make patterns and thus forms of knowledge visible that are not necessarily 
exhausted in intentional questions. Here, everything that human intelligence, in its 
scientific narcissism, regards as its genuine field of activity—ordering and classify-
ing things, identifying similarities, and creating genealogies—is relegated to algo-
rithms. In this case, the business of science is therefore not at the mercy of chance 
in its efforts to produce knowledge; rather, identities and differences are processed 
automatically—with algorithmic and not anthropogenic support.
Yet this concerns not only the sciences, with their broad subject areas and the 
claim to complexity associated with them. The activity of algorithms even extends to 
1  The keywords in question would be evolutionary algorithms, evolutionary or genetic program-
ming. 
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the lower senses, which, for long stretches, received hardly any attention in cultural 
history but have since come into the spotlight thanks to the efforts of various natu-
ralization movements (cf. Kortum 2008). Like almost everything else, the detection 
of smells can also be delegated to algorithms—with the effect that, where olfactory 
data can be processed automatically in large quantities and at high speeds (in real 
time, to use one of the favorite terms of several protagonists), a familiar danger looms. 
In the case of smells, this danger has been called “odorveillance.” In addition to see-
ing everything, Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon can now smell everything as well (cf. 
Stark et al. 2018a). The consensus over this seems to be that such a regime of odors 
should be regarded as an outgrowth of other biometric activities and should accord-
ingly be opposed. Of course, the following is just a rhetorical question: Is this sort of 
odorveillance really what we want? (Stark et al. 2018b: 18) And there also seems to be 
a consensus over the fact that automated activities of this sort should be the object of 
fundamental ref lection concerning the nature of “veillance” in all of its varieties (the 
latter now include “sousveillance” and “metaveillance”) (cf. Kammerer/Waitz 2015). 
Indeed, this idea has even been spelled out in a programmatic way—in works with 
titles such as “Declaration of Veillance (Surveillance is a Half-Truth)” (Mann 2015).
Fig. 1: Surveillance versus Sousveillance (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
File:SurSousVeillanceByStephanieMannAge6.png, accessed June 4, 2019)
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Protagonists such as Steve Mann (2016) or José van Dijck (2014) should be men-
tioned here, the former for introducing concepts of veillance beyond surveillance, 
the latter for his concept of datafication, which describes the normalization of 
data politics and its ambit as a new sort of currency. With datafication and its 
basic suspicion concerning the opaque modus operandi of such data processing, 
the media-critical impetus of earlier days seems to have survived and not to have 
capitulated to the demands for a total relinquishment of the private sphere. In his 
book Post-Privacy: Prima leben ohne Privatsphäre, for instance, the internet activist 
Christian Heller comes to appreciate the latter, even though there are arguments 
in favor of its complete abandonment. He cites an example of algorithms being 
able to determine the sexual orientation of individuals from their social behav-
ior—without any regard, of course, for the safety of the people in question:
His sexual orientation is private, and so it should remain. However, he creat-
ed his account without considering the inventors at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT). There a process was developed for identifying, with a high 
probability, the homosexuality of men on the basis of their Facebook profile, even 
if they posted no photos or listed no preferences of any sort. All that is needed is 
to analyze their social environment on Facebook, which is used above all to stay in 
touch with friends, relatives, and acquaintances. Often enough, profiles include a 
list of friends that is visible to anyone in the whole world (it is possible to make this 
information private, but few bother to do so). The researchers at MIT discovered 
that it is possible to make approximate predictions about whether a male student 
is gay on the basis of the portion of men among his Facebook friends who have 
outed themselves as gay on their own profiles (Heller 2011: 12).
2. Strategies of Participation
Artificial intelligence is at work everywhere, regardless of whether we know it, 
whether we can know it, or whether we even want to know it. The concerns of sur-
veillance studies or critical code studies aside, moreover, everyday user behavior 
is often defined by a fundamental and reckless indifference to the activities of 
algorithms and issues of security. As is clear not only from people’s access codes 
and passwords (the use of easily decipherable sequences of numbers, birthdays, 
the nicknames relatives and pets) but also from their willingness to disclose their 
consumer preferences and other habits, this behavior exemplifies f lippant and 
careless negligence. Yet there is another aspect that defines what is going on and 
increasingly determines how we engage with artificial intelligence, one that is 
perhaps less visible and at first glance far removed from concrete political action. 
Whereas algorithms are monopolizing autonomy everywhere, whereas they op-
erate in a self-determined or partly self-determined way, whereas they are exe-
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cuting the grand scheme of automated knowledge with greater and greater effi-
ciency and on hardware that is ever increasing in capacity, and whereas—as one 
repeatedly reads—they conduct their business without notice and in the mode 
of operative latency, a peculiar counter-movement is taking place on the level of 
use and participation, social engagement, and the campaign for acceptance. This 
process is peculiar because it seemingly overturns the order of the grand narrative 
that surrounds technology in general and digitalization in particular. The grand 
narrative about the technology around us and the associated politics of the inter-
net is typically bound to a principle of quantitative growth. This can be narrated 
in the form of large numbers and is written as the history of progress of an utterly 
relentless triumph of increasing complexity. 
It is thus all the more striking to see tendencies in dealing with technical (or 
perhaps it would be better to say socio-technical) infrastructures that move in a 
different direction and are based on the opposite of growth—that is, on what will 
be discussed here under the title “Reduction and Participation.” This interruption 
of the customary success story and the intentional reduction of technically possi-
ble complexity are noteworthy—and in various ways they revolve around aspects 
of internet politics, democratization, and the question of who should have access 
at all (and in what way). What is especially remarkable is a fundamental expan-
sion of that which is considered fit for participating on the internet and thus for 
being addressed. Over the course of this expansion, as will be shown, different 
and additional agents have been put in position to participate—agents who are 
situated outside of the dominant concerns of human-computer interaction (HCI) 
and who endorse the argument for reduction or at least provide some indication of 
the gestures associated with it. Those who have somewhat systematically become 
part of the plan include users who, with their specific profiles, veritably embody 
the issue of reduction. These particular users are phenotypically diverse and thus, 
not least, children and people with challenges have attracted increasing attention 
as extreme cases of those with special user profiles: “Alterations of HCI meth-
ods is common when interaction design is planned for ‘extreme’ human users.” 
(Hirskyj-Douglas et al. 2016, n. pag.) 
Yet this is not just a matter of differentiating human beings according to their 
stages of development (children) or according to their particular challenges (deaf, 
blind, autistic, elderly people; people with cognitive or other challenges). Beyond 
human beings, the aspired reduction of complexity also brings new agents into 
play. Noteworthy in this regard are such things as “animal-computer interaction” 
(ACI). Clara Mancini, one of the leaders of this movement, is quick to point out that 
there is more than just casuistry behind such approaches and that there is more 
to them than mere anecdotes about Skyping dogs and chatting cats (cf. Ritvo/Alli-
son 2014; Pongrácz et al. 2016; Golbeck/Neustaedter 2012). Rather, Mancini’s pro-
gram stands for a system that is fundamentally related to the field of altered social 
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forms (“interspecies communities”) and is dedicated to promoting “multi-species 
awareness” (cf. Mankoff et al. 2005). She combines her endeavor with the promise 
of an overarching systematic approach and with the self-confidence of a newly 
emerging discipline, as is impressively clear from her manifesto and its positive 
reception (cf. Mancini 2011; Hirskyj-Douglas et al. 2018).
Not least, this obligation is a matter of social responsibility. As with over-
stepping the boundaries between species, this is due to more expansive ideas of 
participation (cf. Kelty 2016; Stahl 2014). This attentiveness is accompanied by a 
deeper consideration for the particular features of semiotic systems and by re-
considerations of one’s own ethical positions (cf. Mancini 2011, 2017). By encour-
aging the intermingling of species and a political awakening, approaches such 
as ACI are part of a larger intellectual movement known as transhumanism or 
posthumanism. The latter is defined by figures that programmatically renounce 
differentiation. This renunciation is exemplified in Donna Haraway’s book Stay-
ing with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene—especially in her use of the word 
critter, which stands at the center of her thinking. As she notes, this term serves 
as a placeholder for a peculiarly broad range of beings (and machines): “In this 
book, ‘critters’ refers promiscuously to microbes, plants, animals, humans and 
non-humans, and sometimes even to machines.” (Haraway 2016: 169n1) A similar 
argument has been put forth by the philosopher Rosi Braidotti (2013), who con-
siders all species to be equally vulnerable to the threats of anthropogenic climate 
change and thus urges interspecies collaboration, which, as she vigorously pleads, 
should be part of the political agenda.2 It is high time, according to Braidotti, for 
humans to create new social bonds—not only with other species but also with the 
techno-others that we tend to keep at a distance and reduce to their operational 
functionality. Only in such a way does she think it will be possible to ensure our 
common survival as a community facing the same threat.3 What Braidotti pro-
poses is a fundamental dedifferentiation of the social, which is comparable to the 
dedifferentiation of the ontological in Haraway’s definition (or non-definition) of 
critters.
Such figures of dedifferentiation, which are central to the theoretical posi-
tion of post- and transhumanism and thus seek to avoid the habitual accusation of 
anthropocentrism, are necessarily associated with intuitive gestures—a finding 
that unites the numerous movements in favor of openness and expansion against 
the dominance of human-computer interaction. After long phases of political ab-
stinence, this expansion was joined on the agenda by categories such as respon-
2  This collaboration should not, moreover, be dictated by a logic of precariousness (cf. Bennke et 
al. 2018).
3  Such an attitude toward the techno-other is being fostered by a number of anthropophilic ges-
tures being made on the part of machines (cf. Seaman 2011).
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sibility, ethics, and participation. The tone of all this is demanding, immodest, 
and programmatic; as Braidotti herself concedes, it is impatient and hardly free 
of pathos. The way in which the concerns of individual participation offensives 
interrelate with those of certain theoretical formulations can be seen, for instance, 
in the work of Fredrik Aspling. The Swedish sociologist is a committed critic of 
anthropocentrism and considers himself a close ally of post- and transhumanism:
The increased involvement of nonhuman species in interactive contexts supported 
by digital technology, which could be framed as multispecies-computer interac-
tion, leads to new possibilities and forms of interactions, and consequently, a need 
to reconsider what this is and can be in terms of interaction. (Aspling 2015: 1)
Multispecies interaction thus becomes the operational basis for a new concept of 
interaction. On this basis, Aspling places a concept of inclusion on the agenda and 
encourages people to consider the particular needs and features of different spe-
cies:
The addition of nonhuman species challenges conventional interaction approa-
ches and theoretical frameworks in HCI. There is a need to think beyond the hu-
man and confront the challenges associated with the inclusion of other species 
with dissimilar cognitions, experiences, senses, abilities, timescales, wants and 
needs. For further advancement we need appropriate approaches and theoreti-
cal foundations to better understand the emerging dynamics of these new forms 
of interactions. The attention given to nonhuman species in HCI (e.g., animal as 
legitimate users to design for and with) is in analogy with posthumanism and its 
critique of anthropocentrism. (Ibid; Aspling et al. 2018)
The issue of going beyond human-computer interaction and integrating new 
agents and processes is part of what is being negotiated by way of concepts such 
as post- and transhumanism and by way of new epochal designations such as 
the Anthropocene or the Chthulucene (cf. Haraway 2016). Alongside gestures of 
ontological opening, which feature prominently in Haraway’s work, there are 
thus also gestures of opening up social interaction. The development of ACI (an-
imal-computer interaction), PCI (plant-computer interaction), CCI (child-com-
puter interaction) or RCI (robot-computer interaction) stand for this. The logic of 
subdividing forms of interaction into appropriate departments is just as striking 
as the aspect of promoting all sorts of interspecies collaboration. Interactive re-
lationships prevail between the knowledge about various individual user groups. 
These relationships make it possible for such groups to learn and profit from one 
another: “The aim is to strengthen connected thinking whilst highlighting the ex-
changeable connecting methods from both ACI and HCI and their subfields in-
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cluding Child Computer Interaction (CCI) and Human Robot Interaction (HRI).” 
(Hirskyj-Douglas et al. 2016: n. pag.; cf. Hourcade/Bullock-Rest 2011; Hourcade et 
al. 2018) These interactive relationships and this act of learning from one another 
(“discussing what these fields learn from each other with their similarities and 
differences mapped”) lead to common design criteria. And the latter criteria keep 
the special or extreme user in mind—as children, as people with cognitive or sen-
sory limitations, as autistic people, and so on (cf. Gennari et al. 2017; Eisapour et 
al. 2018; Lindsay et al. 2012; Satterfield et al. 2016).
Several of the maxims expressed by proponents “participatory design” are 
syntactical peculiarities. Now it is common to encounter expressions with dual 
prepositions; in order to include special users in advance, for instance, program-
mers are now encouraged to work for and with them. This double use of preposi-
tions is important to the movement and therefore often seen. Noteworthy, too, is 
the unusual use of the preposition with. In this context, it is often attached to the 
word becoming, which was one of post-structuralism’s objects of fascination. This 
mode of “becoming-with” (with animals, plants, stones), which concerns both the 
molecular as well as the technical and artificial, is believed to be a key element in 
the struggle for global survival (“the necessity to become-with animals and tech-
no-objects as a matter of survival” (Davis 2016: 210).
Cats and children—but also people with challenges, disabilities, or highly 
individual needs—have become the respected target groups of special interfac-
es made particularly for them (cf. Maaß/Buchmüller 2018; Westerlaken/Gualeni 
2016). Their participation takes place via the reduction of complexity—and this, 
as I have already remarked, in a field that is otherwise defined by gestures of in-
creasing complexity. Not least, it is defined by a further gesture that involves the 
systematic integration of playfulness; in fact, the impression left is that playful-
ness is the order of the day and that play itself has a central role in eliminating the 
barriers between species (cf. Nijholt 2015).4 Such measures almost make it seem 
as though the professionalization of algorithms is being accompanied by an in-
fantilization movement—as a sort of counter-movement. This is tied to gestures 
of reduction or can at least be understood under that formula. The programmatic 
nature of the formula owes itself to the discovery that wherever there is talk of 
technology, another narrative is being expressed as well. For such an argument 
in favor of reduction, which is conceived in functional terms and not meant dis-
respectfully, one should look toward venues that break up and diversify the pri-
macy of HCI. The recent concentration on children and the efforts—referred to 
by Aspling—to blend child-computer interactions with those of ACI are therefore 
more than mere symptoms: They modulate a praxis of their own. Atypical allianc-
4  This applies not only to the design of interfaces but also to the design of data and the practices 
associated with it (cf. Anderson et al. 2017).
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es are now becoming visible and possible, as is evident from the following title of 
an article about ACI: “Of Kittens and Kiddies: Ref lections on Participatory Design 
with Small Animals and Small Humans.” (Chisik/Mancini 2017) This organized 
focus on children and cats as representatives of a desired form of intuition ex-
emplifies some of the concerns of participatory design. The goal is to produce a 
user-friendly interface design that does not have to be laboriously explained but is 
rather intuitive, self-explanatory, and based on tacit knowledge. Participatory de-
sign is negotiated both with as well as between humans, animals, and machines. 
With its focus on small animals and people, it makes reduction tangible. What is 
more, it makes reduction the keystone of participation. 
3. Asymmetries
The naturalization of designs meant for interaction, collaboration, or commu-
nication requires the use of surfaces and has operative dimensions (cf. Norman 
2010). Thus it is not exhausted by gestures of dedifferentiation but rather goes 
hand in hand with strategic considerations. One of these is the discovery of the 
multisensory—or, as Caon et al. (2018) have called it, “multisensory storming.” 
Storming the senses has been able to take place, first of all, through the increasing 
discovery of the tactile and the haptic—a discovery over whose course the man-
ners of speaking about computers and algorithms have themselves been changing. 
Gestures of naturalization, which have been described as well as criticized within 
the discussion about interfaces, concern not only the problems of dealing with 
hardware but also manners of programming (cf. Bruns 1993; Hornecker 2008). Not 
only does the computer require massive strategies for accommodating the sens-
es; the activity of programming is also under pressure to recreate itself in a new 
image. It has to abandon its cognitive solipsism and, beyond merely working with 
symbols, become a tactile undertaking. Thus, yet again, the body will become the 
natural guarantee of a form of comprehensive participation that can or should 
be able to take place without effort, intuitively, and in the transparent mode of 
self-evidence.
The issue is not only computer use and literacy but also a life world that al-
lows technology to exist in any given ambient form. By now there are abundant 
examples of this and, on a systematic level, they tend to have certain features in 
common, most notably the development of new channels, the integration of dif-
ferent senses, and the emergence of new forms of communication. The latter free 
up scenes of asymmetrical communication—scenes that invalidate the common 
conceptions of communication theory. The abundance of examples extends from 
applications for remotely caring for pets to interacting with plants, which are of-
ten grown in artificial environments (cf. Lee et al. 2006; Kuribayashi et al. 2007). 
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They alter forms of sociality. One of the most theoretically ambitious protago-
nists in this field is the Japanese researcher Hill Hiroki Kobayashi.5 His goal is to 
transcend a paradigm of communication and interaction that is measured solely 
on the basis of human beings (in full possession of their mental faculties) and a 
particular form of linguistic communication. Kobayashi’s notion of “human-com-
puter-biosphere interaction” (HCBI) has a virtually unlimited field of operation. It 
not only changes the sphere of actors but also, and necessarily, the ways in which 
communication takes place: “HCBI extends the subject of Human Computer In-
teraction (HCI) from countable people, objects, pets, and plants into an audito-
ry biosphere that is uncountable, complex, and non-linguistic.” (Kobayashi 2010: 
n. pag.) This abandonment of the anthropocentric standpoint is as much a pro-
gram as it is a collaboration with agents that elude the principle of countability 
(cf. Kobayashi 2014). In this way, possible forms of expression beyond articulated 
speech are assigned a central role. Regarding the use of wearables that are meant 
to bring people closer to nature (“Wearable Forest-Feeling of Belonging to Nature” 
is the title of his article), Kobayashi writes: “Thus, wearable computer systems 
have become an inter-medium to express the telepresence of various species in 
the biosphere in such a way that their non-linguistic expression is perceived and 
understood by each participant, which violates all the rules of linguistic science.” 
(Kobayashi 2008: 1133)
The locus for such applications is thus close to life and by no means limited to 
art installations. An indication of how lifelike they can be is provided by a device 
called LumiTouch. At first glance, LumiTouch looks like a regular pair of picture 
frames. One inconspicuous frame is connected to an equivalent through the in-
ternet, and it is able to trigger signals that correspond to someone’s mere touch. 
Depending on the type of touch (its intensity, frequency, duration), various light 
patterns and color constellations are released that can be associated with an indi-
vidualized code. According to its designers, the latter is suitable for implementing 
a special form of expression and thus encourages the development of a private 
emotional language (cf. Kaye/Goulding 2004). LumiTouch changes the simplified 
(because idealized) models of communication theory, and the act of touching the 
picture frame has useful advantages for people with impairments. What its de-
signers envision are forms of asymmetrical exchange for which one of the com-
munication partners does not need to be in full command of his or her cognitive 
or physical abilities: “People who are unable to actively communicate for long pe-
riods of time (e.g. sick or elderly) might be able to use the passive transmission of 
LumiTouch.” (Chang et al. 2001: 314) The potential of overtaxing motor skills or 
cognitive faculties in certain situations, such as when someone is bed-ridden, can 
be counteracted with communicative systems that are less demanding: “Similar-
5  See his homepage at http://hhkobayashi.com (accessed June 2, 2019) and Nijholt 2015.
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ly users who lack the required dexterity or concentration for pushing numerous 
buttons might appreciate this system due to its small number of simple grasping 
inputs.” (Ibid.)
Fig. 2: LumiTouch (Chang et al. 2001: 314)
Another system that is based on reduction is a product called Tsunagari-kan’ Com-
munication, which is devoted to the goal of ensuring communication between 
distant family members (cf. Miyajima et al. 2005). Here, too, what is favored is 
a non-linguistic form of intimate communication (“‘Tsunagari’ communication 
aims to foster a feeling of connection between people living apart by exchang-
ing and sharing the cue information via network everyday.” (Itoh et al. 2002: 810) 
Expanding upon LumiTouch’s model, it also allows communication to take place 
in the mode of the unconscious and passive. Using a so called “Family Planter” as 
a communicative tool, it is meant to enable firm social bonds to form through 
exchanges of “cue information” (ibid.: 811). By means of infrared and ultrasound 
sensors, Tsunagari’s interconnected terminals react to a person’s presence and 
movement. This information is transmitted and converted on the receiving end 
into a non-linguistic signal: 
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Optical fibers at the top of the terminal will gleam to indicate the remote human 
presence and will rotate to indicate the remote human motion. This is intended to 
exchange presence and movement information implicitly (without explicit inter-
vention from users) and constantly. (Ibid.)
Fig. 3: Family Planter (Itoh et al. 2002: 810)
The design of this planter-based sensory device contains several important as-
pects that also happen to be central to interspecies communication and interac-
tion. In the mode of implicit and thus unconscious participation, the system al-
lows people to partake in the everyday lives of remote family members seamlessly 
and in a way that is not felt as an imposition or disruption: “These exchanges are 
designed to blend into the everyday life of a user.” (Ibid.) By means of three sen-
sors, it can transmit various audio signals, and thus the system can also be used to 
convey explicit messages. More important than this explicit mode, however, is the 
implicit nature of its use, which, with its unobtrusive participation, submits to the 
logic of media and the way in which they increasingly blend inconspicuously into 
our environments. They now do so seamlessly, unobtrusively, quietly, smoothly, 
and ubiquitously, and these qualities are redefining the ways that theorists should 
think about media in general. This would be a media theory that, freed from the 
paradigmatic idea that media are extensions or organic projections of humans, 
could instead be described with adjectives such as ubiquitous, seamless, and calm 
(cf. Weiser/Brown 1996). It would be a media theory that directs its focus toward 
the issues involved with making communication more intimate and embraces its 
own intimately charged objects. This trend toward developing things that can be 
laden with affect is only growing. It is driven by an identifiable agenda and not 
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by casuistry (cf. Choi et al. 2014; Kaye/Goulding 2004). Its basis—reduction—has 
become a program whose results will become a part of everyday life.
Fig. 4: Lamp (Angelini/Caon. 2015: n.p.) 
4. Finis (hominis)
Children and cats aside, what all of this brings to light are the needs and venues 
of a sort of communication and collaboration that is designed to be asymmetri-
cal and yet non-discriminatory. The applications presented above do not aim to 
optimize ways of dealing with technical environments but rather hope to provide 
alternative and less complex ways of using them (cf. Rieger 2019). Thus the view 
has also shifted away from the previous stubborn orientation toward a particular 
type of user (cf. Satchell/Dourish 2009). Two things remain to be said in closing: 
First, the children and cats, which I have introduced here as representatives of a 
broader phenomenon, are being put to functional use. What this comes down to is 
not an offer of minimization, such as that which defines rampant cat content, but 
rather the functional equivalent of a strategically pursued reduction of complexi-
ty. Among these pursuits are campaigns for acceptance that include special users 
and shift the focus of designs toward all possible forms of participation. One of 
the latter is the gesture of naturalization (cf. Andreas et al. 2018).
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The second point concerns the question of who rules the network. To this ques-
tion there is, at first glance, a simple answer, and it has nothing to do with the 
power of inconspicuous algorithms but rather with online content. It was none 
other than the deep-learning processes of Google Brain that brought to light the 
fact that it is cats that have, in quantitative terms, been dominating what is going 
on there (cf. Guerin/Vasconcelos 2008). Much to the amusement of those work-
ing on the project, their algorithms revealed that, indeed, the cat is the lord of 
the internet—a supposition that Alexander Pschera (2016) also plays with, though 
somewhat less jokingly, in an article devoted to the “internet of animals.” For some 
time now, the internet has not belonged to people alone. This situation is now even 
ref lected in puns that, as silly as they may be, nevertheless support the ethical 
arguments of participatory design: “Our work focuses on canine companions, and 
includes, pawticipatory design, labradory tests, and canid camera monitoring.” 
(Mankoff et al. 2005: 253; cf. Trindade et al. 2015) Or, regarding cats in particular: 
“In the modern era of digital media, it is hard to deny that cats have clawed their 
way into the zeitgeist of the Internet.” (Myrick 2015: 175)
The title that I have chosen for this essay—“Reduction and Participation”—
takes the demands for including other species and forms of existence at their 
word. The aim of such demands is to expand the circle of those with agency and 
epistemic relevance. Multispecies communities will be home to new actors, new 
forms of communication and collaboration, new types of design and participation, 
new responsibilities and social forms: between humans and animals, plants and 
stones, artefacts and biofacts, machines and media, the living and the non-living, 
the real and the virtual, the augmented and un-augmented, the simulated and 
the modelled, the increased and the reduced (cf. Leistert 2017). It is therefore only 
consistent that, in this sphere of actors, algorithms might not find their peace but 
will certainly find their place.
Translated by Valentine A. Pakis
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The Political Affinities of AI
Dan McQuillan
Introduction
We need a radical politics of AI, that is, a politics of artificial neural networks. AI 
acts as political technology, but current efforts to characterise it take the form of 
liberal statements about ethics. Issues of bias in AI are treated as questions of fair-
ness, as if society is already a level playing field that just needs to be maintained. 
Transparency and accountability are seen as sufficient to correct AI problematics 
(ACM FAT 2019), as if it is being introduced into well-functioning and genuinely 
democratic polities. The apparent refusal to see AI as political f lies in the face of its 
promotion as a solution to austerity. In the UK, for example, discussions about the 
under-funded public healthcare system are peppered by senior level statements 
that “AI may be the thing that saves the NHS” (Ghosh 2018). Austerity is not a natu-
ral disaster but a political decision to prop up financial institutions at the expense 
of public spending. The hope of those decision makers is that machinic reasoning 
can solve the riddle of dealing with rising needs using sharply reduced resources. 
Meanwhile the operating characteristics of actual AI have other political impacts, 
such as the deracination of due process. The vast parallel iterations carried out by 
backpropagation cast an opacity over AI by making its optimisations very hard 
to reverse to human reasoning (Lipton 2016). Algorithmic judgements that affect 
important social and political decisions are thus removed from discourse.
The political dimensions of artificial intelligence cannot be divined in the ab-
stract nor solved by philosophical ethics. They result from concrete technical op-
erations, such as sums over vectors, in the context of specific social conditions. 
The idea of ethical AI is an information operation designed to calm public fears 
about algorithmic impacts, and to position it for market advantage (Hern 2018). 
The real hazards of AI emerge as it intermingles with the political currents of our 
time. A figure for the political entanglement of AI is a photograph taken at the 
recent World Economic Forum showing the populist and extreme right Brazilian 
politician Jair Bolsonaro seated at lunch between Apple CEO Tim Cook and Micro-
soft CEO Satya Nadella (Slobodian 2019). Artificial neural networks are in demand 
because the conf luence of big data and processing power, in the form of GPUs, has 
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enabled them to produce uncanny results in fields like image recognition. How-
ever, the years in which AI is coming of age are also the years of neoliberal crisis 
and a global rise in far right politics. The urgent question is, how do the concrete 
technical operations of neural networks reinforce, enforce or extend these politi-
cal currents, and how (if at all) they might instead serve the goals of social justice.
Boundaries
The attraction of deep learning is its ability to produce predictions from overf lows 
of data. The weights in the layers are optimised by iterations that drive the loss 
function into a minima, while activation functions like ReLU act ruthlessly at 
each neuron to remove weaker signals (3Blue1Brown. n.d). The overall effect is 
the production of statistical certainty; a net of weights that will transform messy 
input data into unambiguous classifications. This is done by substituting correla-
tions for any attempt to establish causal mechanism, and is not constrained by 
any wider framework of consistency. There is no element of ‘common sense’ in the 
mechanism that differentiates between guesses based on embodied experience 
of the world. Neural networks are neoplatonic; they claim a hidden mathemati-
cal order in the world that is superior to direct experience (McQuillan 2017). The 
politics enters in the way these orderings are entrained in wider mechanisms. In-
stead of constraining statistical authority based on a broader care for the human 
consequences, the current race to adopt AI is driven by the way its single-minded 
optimisation resonates with institutional goals of maximising efficiency or share-
holder value. The operations of AI act in harmony with a neoliberalism that per-
ceives the world as an atomised set of inputs into a market mechanism that will 
necessarily produce the optimum result.
The purpose of AI’s mathematical regressions is to draw decision boundaries, 
such that an input is cleanly categorised as on one side or the other. Connecting 
this to matters of risk in the external world, even where the ends are supposedly 
benign, propels AI into being a system of control. Its calculative categorisations 
trigger chains of machine and human decisions with real consequences, involving 
the allocation or removal of resources or opportunities. Embedded in deep learn-
ing, obfuscated from due process or discourse, these numerical judgements have 
a law-like force without being of the law. Thus, the predictive boundaries of AI 
map outwards as continuous partial states of exception (Agamben 2005). The ex-
pertise to contest the calculations of machinic reason in their own terms is highly 
centralised in a few corporations and universities. For the rest of us, the calcula-
tive authority of machine learning leads to situations where personal testimony is 
devalued with respect to computational insights. AI becomes an engine for epis-
temic injustice, claiming insights that override lived experience (Fricker 2007).
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Bureaucracy
Like bureaucracy in the twentieth century, AI is poised to become the unifying 
logic of legitimation across corporations and government. At the current time, the 
performance of deep learning is proportional to the amount of computing pow-
er used: between the AlexNet image recognition breakthrough of 2012 and the 
Google DeepMind system that beat the Go grandmaster, the required processing 
power grew by a factor of 300,000 to around 2000 Petaf lops/s-day (Amodei/Her-
nandez 2018). The hardware and software pipelines of deep learning are becom-
ing strategically important, and existing instances like Amazon Web Services are 
increasingly indistinguishable from critical national infrastructure (Konkel 2016). 
But although AI is materialised in the fenced-off anonymity of server farms, its 
leverage lies between thought and action. Deep learning applied to social decisions 
becomes the concrete manifestation of Bourdieu’s habitus; structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures (Bourdieu 1990). It is not that 
key decisions are delegated to machines with no human in the loop; rather, that 
people making pressured decisions are presented with empirical rankings of risk, 
who’s derivation they have no way of questioning. AI encourages thoughtlessness 
in the sense described by Hannah Arendt; the inability to critique instructions, 
the lack of ref lection on consequences, a commitment to the belief that a correct 
ordering is being carried out (Arendt 2006).
Through prediction, this ordering extends bureaucratic governmentality to 
the domain of intent or tendency, which it strives to preempt as a service or as an 
intervention. As well as classifications of pre-crime and the proliferation of forms 
of ’pre-extremism’, as prototyped by the UK’s Prevent Strategy (Sian 2017), there 
will also be classifications that claim benevolence and efficient resource allocation, 
such as pre-diabetes or pre-dementia (LaMattina 2016). The drive for preemption 
enfolds social fears and market interests with the aim of eliminating that which 
is undesirable. The problem is that AI is reductionist. It can only learn from those 
aspects of the context that can be mathematised, and it is given a singular goal 
to optimise on. Therefore attempt by AI to explain what is going on reduces the 
entire system to certain constituent elements and their interactions. Moreover, 
predictive deep learning applied to social questions implies that attributes are 
individualised and innate, while obfuscating the background of common social 




AI should not be applied to any part of complex social and cultural problems, out-
side of extremely narrow and restricted aspects. This is not only because its mode 
of operation encourages thoughtlessness and reductionism, but because deep 
learning is literally out of its depth when it comes to social and political complex-
ity. It is, in essence, simply a pattern finding technique which works surprising-
ly well at perceptual classification and in some other well-bounded applications 
such as game playing. However, even in these heartlands of AI there are signs 
of systematic problems. There are many adversarial examples where the addition 
of carefully chosen noise to an image, which appears to human perception as no 
more than a scattering of insignificant white dots, can force a neural network to 
wrongly classify an obvious image (Goswami et al. 2018). Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, a recent paper shows that deep learning’s image recognition often falls 
apart when confronted with common stimuli rotated in three dimensional space 
into unusual positions. In one of the examples, the network correctly recognises a 
school truck, but when it sees a real picture of one on it’s side it mis-classifies it as 
a snow plough. The authors conclude that, while deep neural networks work well 
at image classification, they are still far from true object recognition, and their 
understanding of objects is quite naive. Their conclusion is that “deep neural net-
works (DNNs) can fail to generalize to out-of-distribution (OoD) inputs, including 
natural, non-adversarial ones, which are common in real-world settings” (Alcorn 
et al. 2018). This is an important but hardly surprising observation. No neural 
network has any understanding of anything, in the form of an abstract model or 
ontology that can be freely applied to novel situations. That is, neural networks 
are incapable of exactly the kind of adaptive and analogical thinking that char-
acterises even young children. Statements from leading AI engineers that neural 
networks would either “now or in the near future” be able to do “any mental task” a 
person could do “with less than one second of thought” (Ng 2016) is not only laugh-
able but actually dangerous. If deep learning can’t recognize objects in non-ca-
nonical poses, we should not expect it to do everyday, common sense reasoning, 
a task for which it has never shown any facility whatsoever. Still less should we 
apply it in messy socio-political contexts and expect it to draw out insights that 
have previously been delegated to discourse.
However, being out of its depth is not the only reason we should keep deep 
learning clear of socially sensitive situations. The single-minded optimisation 
that makes AI resonate so well with a neoliberal perspective brings with it a fatal 
ethical payload. Utility functions, like deep learning’s backpropagation, get in to 
ethical deep water when there are independent, irreducible objectives that need to 
be pursued at the same time. Ethicists have theorems that suggest it’s impossible 
for an optimisation to produce a good outcome for a population without violating 
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our ethical intentions. For example, the mere addition paradox shows that, if opti-
mising on a social welfare function over any population of happy people, there ex-
ists a much larger population with miserable lives that is ‘better’ (more optimised 
for total wellbeing) than the happy population (Eckersley 2018). Not surprisingly 
this paradox is also known as the repugnant conclusion. While this may seem to 
derive from an abstract, analytical logic of moral philosophy, let us remember that 
that is the point: through institutionalised neural networks we are applying an 
abstract and calculative logic to the social world. Similar ethical reasoning has 
produced a whole set of unappealing paradoxes such as the ‘sadistic conclusion’ 
and the ‘very anti-egalitarian conclusion’. These suggest a basic incompatibility 
between different utilitarian objectives such as maximizing total wellbeing, max-
imizing average wellbeing, and avoiding suffering. Thoughtless pursuit of an ob-
jective function, as instrumentalised in AI, leads to ethically toxic consequences 
even when the initial function is apparently benign, let alone when it serves the 
capitalist goal of profit.
The possible
Thoughtlessness also enters at the start of the road to an AI solution. AI is always 
in the service of solving what Bergson called ‘ready-made problems’. That is, ma-
chine learning is applied to problems which are based on unexamined assump-
tions, such as cultural biases and institutional goals, and those deeper prejudices 
which are embedded in language itself. The problem with a ready-made problem 
is that it presupposes a range of possible solutions which are coterminous with 
that particular expression of the problem. Bergson argued that if one accepts a 
ready-made problem “one might just as well say that all truth is already virtually 
known, that its model is patented in the administrative offices of the state, and 
that philosophy is a jig-saw puzzle where the problem is to construct with the 
pieces society gives us the design it is unwilling to show us.” (Henri Bergson, La 
pensée et le mouvant, cited in Solhjdu 2015). To have agency, to be able to change 
a given reality, is instead a question of finding the problem and of positing it. This 
is different because “stating the problem is not simply uncovering, it is inventing.” 
According to Solhdju, Isabelle Stengers expresses this as “the difference between 
the possible and the probable” where the probable is “that which with respect to 
the real only lacks one single thing, existence” (Solhdju 2015). It can already be 
constructed using the same conceptual scaffolding that was used to build the 
problem, and figuring it out is simply a matter of probabilistic deduction. The 
possible, on the other hand, is of something unpredictable and non-calculable; a 
creative act that is not merely rearrangement of existing truths. What’s at stake is 
not the probable of current AI but the possible of political thought and action. We 
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need to approach AI in a way that enables us to take sides with the possible against 
probabilities.
Recreating the possibilities of machine learning means working with pro-
gramming and politics as non-divisibles, solving engineering problems while 
sustaining a focus on social impacts. It requires both precision at a mathematical 
level and and openness towards the different possible realities that might be ar-
ticulated. One approach to such a discipline might be offered by a feminist model 
of science, such as that described by Roy, Harding and Spanier (Roy 2004). That is, 
an expanded form of scientific methodology that includes the origination of the 
problem and the purpose of the inquiry. Those wishing to develop non-oppressive 
machine learning should not accept a problem as given, but should start by locat-
ing its origins, in other words the structural forces which have posited it and pri-
oritised it. Uncovering the purposes of an inquiry with deep learning means going 
beyond accurately predicting the validation data by optimising hyperparameters. 
It means understanding this narrow technical purpose as part of a broader set of 
impacts, asking who’s ends it will serve, who it might exclude, and how it would 
effect the wider wellbeing of society. Perhaps most radically for AI, a feminist ap-
proach establishes a relationship between the inquirer and their subject of inquiry, 
requiring us to purposefully put aside the onlooker consciousness that fuels AI’s 
hubris. The most direct way to put this feminist method into practice with ma-
chine learning is through collective structures of research that include the ‘target 
group’ in the process of inquiry, through structures such as people’s councils (Mc-
Quillan 2018). Such situated collectives of inquiry are well placed to re-invent the 
problem as lines of f light from the tyranny of the probable.
Political action
We must establish this alternative against the political currents that resonate with 
thoughtless AI. This will not be an easy task. AI being implemented as ‘AI under 
austerity’, that is, as neoliberalism’s response to its own crisis. Everyday cruelties 
such as welfare cuts to the disabled are being increasingly obfuscated by machinic 
classifications (Alston n.d.). Neural networks could become engines of epistemic 
injustice and partial states of exception. Even more dangerously, the simplifica-
tion of social problems to optimisation based on reductionist reasoning and in-
nate characteristics echoes exactly the politics of the populist far right. Pointing 
out the inconsistencies in the claims of AI has no traction with this political ten-
dency. Stupidity and hate don’t require philosophical consistency, only an opera-
tional effectiveness that performs their ideological theatre of cruelty. The practice 
of AI must develop a politics that resists authoritarianism and asserts a care for 
our common humanity.
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Thus the necessity of collective practices of AI is not only an epistemological 
necessity but a political one. The political forms of the people’s council and the 
general assembly can return the questions of due process and justice to their 
proper place in discourse. Where algorithmic authority comes from privileging 
generalised abstractions, direct democracy can be reasserted by the mobilisation 
of situated knowledges. These need to be channelled into forms applicable to com-
putational technologies. Ivan Illich, in his call for convivial technology, proposed 
‘counterfoil research’ whose goal is to detect “the incipient stages of murderous 
logic in a tool” (Illich 1975) where a tool, for Illich, means a specific combination 
of technologies and institutions. Counterfoil research lays out a plausible pro-
gramme for AI people’s councils; that they should “clarify and dramatize the rela-
tionship of people to their tools”, “hold constantly before the public the resources 
that are available and the consequences of their use in various ways” and identify 
“those classes of people most immediately hurt by such trends”. This is not a neg-
ative programme but a positive one, to create conditions where people have the 
capacity for autonomous action by means of tools least controlled by others. The 
goals is to find appropriate limits for our tools. Limiting tools through the mech-
anism of assemblies also creates what Hannah Arendt identified as spaces for ac-
tion, which only arises from face-to-face encounters and is that which happens 
“against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability” (Arendt 
1998).
However, such spaces will not be freely given. Forms of resistance will be 
necessary to create them. One potential form of resistance is in worker self-or-
ganisation, both in the heart of AI engineering and in the other places of work 
which will be affected by it. There are small signs of the former in way employees 
of corporations like Google, Microsoft and Amazon have expressed dissent at the 
adoption of their technical creations by the military and security apparatus (Alba 
2018, Conger 2018, Lee 2019) whereas the latter has so far been limited to those 
precarious workers, like Uber and Deliveroo drivers, who are already “below the 
algorithm” (Möhlmann/Henfridsson 2017). In workers self-organisation, too, the 
collective forms of the assembly and council have a key role to play, especially in 
advancing the ambition of workers to know that “by organizing industrially we 
are forming the structure of the new society within the shell of the old.” In the 
mid-1970s workers in a major arms company used grassroots assemblies to gen-
erate a plan for restructuring their factories. Their programme, the ‘Lucas Plan’, 
would have not only converted the activity of the machinery away from arms 
production but included newly invented possibilities for products which, in ret-
rospect, seem ahead of their time in terms of environmental impact (Open Uni-
versity 1978). Another potential form of resistance that may emerge by necessity is 
Luddism, where people oppose the predations of hegemonic technology through 
direct action. The historical Luddites’ opposition to steam-powered machines of 
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production was based on the new social relations of subjection that they produced. 
Rather than some atavistic dislike of technology, the resistance of the Luddites 
was motivated by their alternative social vision (Binfield 2004). Their call was to 
‘put down all Machinery hurtful to Commonality’. A new Luddism is one way to 
characterise attacks on self-driving vans by residents in Arizona, fed up of the 
way Waymo is testing its autonomous AI in their communities and on the streets 
where their children are playing. Deep learning has proved again what the radi-
cals of the 1970s claimed, that the domain of production has extended to everyday 
life, and that we live in the ‘social factory’ (Cuninghame 2015).
Historical Luddism was part of a wider uprising of workers and communities 
that deeply rattled the emerging industrial elites of its time. AI as it stands is the 
tool of a new technocratic elite. Whatever the strategies for restructuring AI, they 
clearly won’t come about without engagement with the wider field of progressive 
politics. AI, in the form of neural networks, is an inherently political technology 
which must be acknowledged as such. Adopted without constraints it will tend to 
amplify the injustices of the status quo, or even become part of a shift to a darker 
normativity under the hostile environment of the far right. There is, however, the 
possibility of an AI that consciously aligns itself with ideals of social justice and 
egalitarianism. Not as autonomous decision making, but as part of a movement 
for social autonomy. This is AI as part of a wider structural renewal, supporting 
the withdrawal of power from hegemonic institutions and the creation of alter-
native structures of social organisation based on mutual aid (Landauer/Richard 
2010). Reclaiming our own agency is not to attack AI as such but to challenge the 
system that produces AI in its own image. This is what it means to take sides with 
the possible against the probable. Retrieving our capacity to think collectively, 
learning from and with each other rather than relying on machine learning, we 
can counter thoughtlessness with practices of solidarity and collective care.
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Invisible Agencies in the Folds of Technological Cultures
Yvonne Förster
1. Introduction
Democracy is all about transparency, visibility, and public engagement. In the 
Greek polis, political decisions were discussed in the agora, a public place where 
all citizens (in that case only free men older than 30) could listen and engage. Rep-
resentational democracy today is less public, but transparency of decision pro-
cesses is of the utmost importance. If a government cannot make its decisions 
transparent enough, it runs the risk of losing the people’s trust. Transparency in 
a political sense implies rules, visibility, and the readiness to argue and give rea-
sons. With the emergence of AI applications not only in the political sphere but 
in basically every aspect of social and private life, we are faced with new forms 
of opacity and nonconscious cognition, which strongly impact human decision 
making, behavior, movement, and communication. The central problem is that AI 
applications act without being able to give an account of the underlying reasons 
and even the underlying causal processes remain opaque (black box). If an AI used 
for analyzing credit rating denies credit, this decision can ruin a private life. If 
then reasons are not given or possibilities explained, this alone might shake peo-
ple’s trust in civil society. Agency based in nonconscious cognition is becoming a 
ubiquitous phenomenon and thus calls for ethical and phenomenological ref lec-
tion. In this essay, I aim at understanding the way in which AI is experienced in 
terms of visibility and transparency. Toward this end I will combine phenomeno-
logical considerations with Martin Heidegger’s ref lections on the nature of tech-
nology.  
One of the features that elicits speculation about artificial intelligence at stake 
here is the fact that at least for the user it is nearly impossible to understand how 
AI arrives at its outputs. AI applications are often characterized as black boxes 
(cf. Sudmann 2018a). Even if the math behind self-learning algorithms is quite 
straightforward, the causal processes leading from input to output are not really 
transparent (cf. Sudmann 2018b: 63). Obscurity is usually conceived of as a threat 
and potential danger. This leads to the central question of this article: Should AI 
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be regarded as a threat to democracy because of its invisibility? As I will argue, 
this is true at the surface, but I will also show that technology always comes with 
a certain form of invisibility. The question is whether this reaches a new level with 
AI. In a first step, I will define what I mean by visibility/invisibility from a phe-
nomenological perspective. I introduce this view because it relates perception, ex-
perience to technology. Then I will clarify how this applies to the relation of human 
and artificial intelligence. The last part of the paper discusses the issues of the 
disappearance of technology and the complex relation of transparency and opac-
ity with regard to technology. My aim is to show how AI systems introduce a new 
kind of invisibility or opacity to the ecological structures of the life-world. 
There are at least three different layers in the interplay of visibility and invisi-
bility involved: One goes for every object of perception: Perception is perspectival 
and thus invisibility is a necessary part of it. Invisibility therefore is a constitu-
tive part of every form of perception and cognition. In the case of technology, I 
follow Heidegger in the diagnosis that there is a higher order form of invisibility. 
This is the essence of technology, which is itself not technological, but a funda-
mental style of thinking or revealing. This analysis of technology has a parallel in 
the analysis of consciousness, which is in its constitution also opaque to the con-
scious subject. To this extent there is nothing groundbreaking or new in terms of 
technology. With AI a third layer of opacity enters the stage: This is nonconscious 
agency—an agency that cannot give reasons but shapes lives in a very profound 
way. Although nonconscious agency is present also in humans and animals, tech-
nological nonconscious agency is new because it essentially shapes social and po-
litical life now and in the future. The combination of these aspects of invisibility 
and opacity makes up for the widespread uneasiness with AI. My aim is to give an 
idea how the different forms of visibility, transparency, and opacity inf luence the 
potential of AI to endanger or enable democracy.
2. Conditions of Appearance: Visibility and Invisibility
In his essay, The Question Concerning Technology, Martin Heidegger describes tech-
nology as a way of revealing, of bringing the concealed into unconcealment (cf. 
11f.). This view is more profound than the usual instrumental view of technology 
as a means to an end. The character of technological artifacts is not understood 
adequately according to Heidegger, if this is conceived of as a tool that simply 
helps humans achieve particular ends. Furthermore, Heidegger also claims that 
seeing technology as a human doing does not capture it fully. Both notions of 
technology as instrumental or anthropological are not wrong. They capture tech-
nology in terms of how it is usually experienced and used. Nevertheless, they do 
not get to the essence of what technology is. But what is the essence of something? 
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Is it the thingness of a thing, that through which a thing is a thing? Is it something 
that does not change, while other parts or aspects may do so? In fact, it is hard to 
specify conceptually what the essence of something actually means. 
In Heidegger’s writings, at least two notions of the concept are at stake: First, 
the ancient Greek notion what something is (Heidegger 1977: 4); and, second, that 
of “enduring as presence” (Heidegger 1961: 59). Both aspects are relevant in his 
essay. The quest to understand what technology is determines the whole text. 
Heidegger is convinced that the answer to this question will not point towards an 
entity that is of a technological character. The essence of technology is not itself 
technological (cf. Heidegger 1977: 4). That means that the essence of technology is 
not a thing; it itself is not a physical entity. Furthermore, he holds that the essence 
of technology is an activity: revealing or bringing something into unconcealment. 
His claim is that it is only as a basic process or activity that technology endures. 
The current discussion around AI is characterized by a similar tension. On 
the one hand side, intelligent technologies are conceived of simple means to ends. 
Processes in automation, robotics or speech recognition, to name only a few, are 
AI-based. These complex tasks require the ability to learn. Self-learning programs 
seem uncanny from the outside, but maybe not so much from the inside. Creators 
of such AI’s usually hold that there is not much intelligence hidden in the pro-
grams. Rather it is a technological agency that reaches quite a level of sophistica-
tion, but is far from being creative beyond the limits of its training. This task-ori-
ented functional intelligence is to be sure continually evolving, but as of now only 
within certain limits and on the basis of the input the AI is trained with (cf. Pontin 
2018). 
Public discourse, on the other hand, is fueled by threatening scenarios of a 
singularity transcending human powers or, less futuristically put, threats of AI 
erasing jobs and manipulating human behavior (e.g., targeted personalized mar-
keting). These issues arise from AI being generally opaque (ibid.), even if it is pos-
sible to develop applications to observe AI learning processes (Sudmann 2018a). 
Also, the envisioned ubiquity of AI applications elicits broad discussions of the 
consequences for labor cultures (AI for optimizing work processes and automa-
tion) and social environments (sensor-based observation systems). 
These preoccupations are related to Heidegger’s discussion of the essence of 
technology. What might be lying at the core of our preoccupations with AI is the 
fact that they are (or at least are envisaged) as world-making technologies. Technol-
ogy according to Heidegger is not the sum of physical devices but above all a style 
of thinking and revealing entities. This aspect is made more and more explicit 
within the realm of future technologies. 
When we take a closer look at Heidegger’s words to describe the essence of 
technology, the relation to visibility and invisibility is undeniable. Describing the 
essence of technology as something that is itself not technological gestures toward 
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an invisibility. The transcendental conditions of technology are themselves not of 
a technological or objective character. Heidegger arrives at the idea that technol-
ogy is essentially a way of world-making. The logic of enframing (Gestell) conceives 
of the world as standing-reserve (Bestand), i.e., a constellation of resources that is at 
disposal at all times. He finds this logic at work already long before modern tech-
nology even emerged. While history tends to view modern physics as the enabler 
of modern technology, Heidegger holds that the structure or logic of technology 
already governs the development of modern physics (ibid.: 22 f.). The reason he 
gives for this claim is that modern physics as such is based on the belief that the 
world must be observable, measurable, and rendered predictable (ibid.: 172). Pre-
dictability is necessary in order to treat the environment as standing-reserve. The 
interplay of needs and resources is a future- and hence prediction-based endeavor. 
Modern physics was already driven by the goal to tame the physical world through 
prediction and calculability, which is most explicit in the use of AI (e.g. for facial 
recognition used in border control or urban CCTV applications, and predictions 
of consumer behavior or optimizations of workf lows through management AI). 
This means current usages of AI expand the potential to uncover standing-reserves 
beyond the exploitation of natural resources and thereby far into the depths of 
human behavior. The extent of this process is not yet clear, much less its conse-
quences and ethical challenges.
When technology constitutes the intelligibility of the world that reveals it as 
standing-reserve, as being always at disposal for our use, it also at the same time 
hides or conceals something. The way technology (or rather its essence, the pro-
cess of enframing) insidiously compels humans to conceive the world as intelligible 
generally in terms of technology is tainted by the logic of instrumental thinking, 
of means and ends. It thus hides the character of objects as what stands over 
against subjects: “Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer 
stands over and against us as object.” (Heidegger 1977: 17) The process of revealing 
or making visible as described by Heidegger is perspectival, and a perspective also 
necessarily hides other or background aspects of the perceived objects. 
Visibility and invisibility condition each other in more than one aspect: In the 
case of technology, this interrelatedness or, to speak with Merleau-Ponty (1969), 
the chiasm (entanglement or intertwining) of visibility and invisibility goes deeper 
than in the case of perception. Perception is always situated and hence perspec-
tival. There is no perception without a perspective. And that means there is no vis-
ibility without the invisible. The dialectic of visibility and invisibility constitutes 
perception in general. 
Beyond the perception of technology as material objects/devices, which is an 
important topic in its own right (cf. Verbeek 2005), Heidegger sees a causality at 
work that is not exhausted by the instrumental definition of technology. Through 
technology we see the world as standing-reserve. Thus, technology produces visi-
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bilities (the life-world as standing-reserve) rather than just adding (visible) objects 
to the world. As mentioned above these visibilities, or rather the all-encompassing 
style in which technology compels the world to appear as technological in general, 
also hides something, i.e., makes something invisible: namely, the objective char-
acter of things as Gegenstände. This opens up another aspect within the broad topic 
of visibility. What is a thing when its thingness or Gegenständlichkeit is hidden? 
This is what happens when a tool like a hammer is used: The skilled user is not 
aware of the hammer as an object. Rather, the hammer becomes a prolongation 
of the body during usage. As long as the use remains frictionless, the hammer 
as object will not draw attention. It remains unthematic and its character as an 
object transparent. Such a use of things as tools is what Heidegger calls through-
out his works “readiness-to-hand” or availability (Zuhandenheit): a description of a 
certain comportment toward things as being ready to use, being at our disposal. 
The instrumental attitude of technology makes things appear as means and hides 
their being as objects. 
3. Transparency and Opacity in Technological Objects
If we translate this Heideggerian view of technology into a more common termi-
nology, we arrive at a different form of visibility: namely, transparency. A tool or 
a technological device can be transparent in the sense that the user experience 
is smooth. Such a smooth user experience (or so-called “frictionless UX”) has be-
come the gold standard in technology design and AI is one of the means to achieve 
this goal. A self-learning software can ideally learn from the user what it means 
to function smoothly. Any disruptions within the use of applications can further 
serve as materials from which it can learn and then create smoother functional 
processes that f low without disruptions. 
From a phenomenological perspective disruptions break the everyday attitude 
of smooth functioning and reveal the thingness and the character of objects as 
that which stands over against us (Gegen-stände). Only then will users have or find 
a reason to actually ref lect on the technology. This also opens up the following 
possibility: In order to develop a critical attitude, disruption or friction is a nec-
essary component. In neuroscience and philosophy of mind disruption or predic-
tion errors is integrated in the model of neural activity as prediction processing: “In 
predictive coding schemes, sensory data are replaced by prediction error, because 
that is the only sensory information that has yet to be explained. (Feldmann & 
Friston 2010, p. 2).” (Cited by Clark 2015: 4)
Conversely, this also reveals that functional transparency is at the same time 
associated with being opaque. The constitutive processes of a functioning technol-
ogy and hence a smooth user experience has to stay hidden in order to perform 
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this job. In that sense, technological processes are supposed to be opaque: They 
remain hidden throughout the process of usage when they function smoothly. 
Transparency and opacity are manifest themselves like visibility and invisibility. 
The difference between the two pairs of concepts is that the case of visibility/in-
visibility is a more neutral way to describe the givenness of objects in perception.1 
Transparency and opacity tend to have a meaning that includes a normative aspect. 
At least this is the case when we broaden the perspective toward questions of de-
mocratization or the potential of AI to foster democracy. 
To explain this train of thought in more detail, let me draw a line from the 
phenomenological use of the concept of transparency to its application in technol-
ogy. Jean-Paul Sartre uses the concept of transparency in order to describe con-
sciousness or, more narrowly, the imaginary, i.e., modes of consciousness related 
to images and phantasy. Consciousness constitutes perceptions in various modes 
without making the constitutive process itself perceptible. It remains transparent 
in its functionality, meaning that it does not become part of the object presented 
as perceived, remembered, or anticipated. By analogy, an AI application does not 
itself become an item of awareness when it functions smoothly.
This becomes clear, when comparing different forms of givenness. For exam-
ple, just now there is a cup of tea sitting on my desk. My act of seeing the cup 
of tea is an act of consciousness, an act of visual perception. This is one mode of 
how consciousness can present a thing: as given to vision, physically being there, 
within my reach. But the act of perceiving itself is not thematic, is not part of 
the intentional consciousness of the cup. The workings of consciousness remain 
transparent and they should do so, because otherwise something could be wrong 
with our eyesight or the overall state of health. If I remember the cup of tea later 
on, I will reproduce the visual characteristics of the cup through memory. The 
correlate of my memory is one produced by my imagination, which gives the cup 
to my consciousness as if I saw it. Again, the intentional act is perceived as an act 
of memory, but how this memory is constituted is not thematic in the memory 
itself. The workings of consciousness remain transparent. They are not thematic 
1  Edmund Husserl describes perception in his lectures on Thing and Space [1907] as being necessar-
ily inadequate in the sense of necessarily involving aspects that are not directly perceived. Per-
ception of a thing in space is always partial, being enriched step-by-step by changes in perspec-
tive and the simultaneous quasi-perception (adumbration) of the hidden sides of the thing: “We 
see that the continuity of the corporeal thing presupposes ‘inadequate’ perception, perception 
through adumbrations that are always capable of enrichment and more precise determination.” 
(Husserl 1997: 101 [121]) This notion of perception necessarily includes perception of the non-per-
ceived. That means human perception does not only conceive of things through adding perspec-
tives consecutively to each other. Rather we are acquainted with spatial and temporal things in 
such a way that the hidden sides are perceived implicitly. This is what Husserl and Merleau-Ponty 
call “apperceptions”: The perception of the non-perceived.
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in the process of cognition. In that sense, these processes are also opaque for the 
exploring mind. We have no conscious access to the inner workings of the mind. 
And this usually poses no problem. 
In the case of AI, however, it is different: Not knowing how an algorithm ar-
rived at a solution can be highly problematic. If, for example, medical data are 
analyzed through an AI in order to identify a disposition for cancer, it is neces-
sary to know on which grounds a diagnosis has been generated. Only on these 
grounds can a decision for preventive treatment be made. The problem is that an 
AI can generate predictions without being able to give a reason for the outcome, 
the choice of samples, or the method used. There is a categorical difference be-
tween the causal processes leading to a mental state or an output of a program, 
and the ability to give reasons and ref lect on mental states, as it is discussed with-
in philosophy of mind.
One can, for example, analyze the modes of consciousness through methods 
of phenomenological analysis and ref lect on the different modes of intentionality 
in a given situation. Then consciousness as a process loses its transparency. The 
unthematic act of remembering or imagining becomes itself object of a higher or-
der ref lection. But then also a higher order of transparency emerges, namely the 
focus on constitutive processes of mental states becomes itself an object of per-
ception and hence must itself be constituted. The infinite regress looms large here. 
The lesson to be learned from Edmund Husserl’s analysis of intentionality is that 
there is always a layer of consciousness that cannot itself be conscious because it 
itself constitutes a lower level or aspect of consciousness. Consciousness of tem-
poral change, for example, cannot itself be temporal, at least not in the same way 
as the experience of time is: 
But we should seriously consider whether we must assume such an ultimate con-
sciousness, which would be necessarily an ‘unconscious’ consciousness; that is to 
say, as ultimate intentionality it cannot be an object of attention [...], and therefore 
it can never become conscious in this particular sense. (Husserl 2008: 394) 
Consciousness, therefore, is not only transparent as a medium of perception, it 
must also in some constitutive aspects remain opaque. We cannot understand 
consciousness simply by being conscious. 
Human consciousness is deeply inf luenced by technology and today in par-
ticular by AI (cf. Hansen 2012, Hayles 2012, Stiegler 1998). The technogenesis of hu-
man consciousness, as Katherine Hayles puts it, opens up another dimension of 
transparency/opacity. AI is a form of nonconscious cognition (cf. Hayles 2014) that 
becomes more and more ubiquitous. There is no online-shopping without sugges-
tions generated by an AI; every social media news feed is individualized by algo-
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rithms and even airfares are adapted to time, location, and devices. The virtual 
world is highly personalized through more or less sophisticated AI applications. 
Not only are the workings of the devices opaque in the sense that the user does 
not perceive the actual computational processes and even less so the data gather-
ing that goes along with these processes. Even more so the output generated by AI 
applications does not necessarily reveal the underlying personalization processes. 
The Internet is only to a very limited extent a shared world. Most of the contents 
are shaped through user-AI interactions, though the user is not consciously aware 
of these interactions. Regarding technology in general, one can observe chang-
es in human behavior and cognition with every new invention. The invention of 
writing, for example, has deeply altered how people memorize contents and how 
cultures preserve their traditions. The rise of smartphones has altered completely 
human ways of communicating. One simple example is communication through 
messaging devices and social networks: “tele-communication [...] entails a hid-
denness of the face, a disappearance of the voice with its tonalities, the assum-
ing of quasi-identities that do not authentically emanate from the concreteness 
of our being-in-the-world-in-the-f lesh.” (El Bizri 2018: 130) One could find count-
less examples of how new visibilities and at the same time opacities are generated 
through emerging technologies.
The eerie twist comes with AI. Two factors are relevant: The temporal mi-
croscale of computational processes and the predictive coding. The first factor, 
namely, the speed of computational processes that makes them inaccessible for 
human cognition, generates a scenario in which the second factor, namely, how 
the predictive coding turns into a preemptive force on human perception. As 
Mark Hansen writes in considering how computational processes that become a 
central element in the tissue of the life-world function on temporal microscales 
beyond our awareness: 
through the distribution of computation into the environment by means of now 
typical technologies including smart phones and RFID tags, space becomes anima-
ted with some agency of its own. One crucial feature of this animation is its oc-
currence largely outside—or beside—the focal attention of actants within smart 
environments. For this reason, the intelligent space of contemporary life of fers a 
kind of af fordance—an unperceived or directly sensed af fordance—that dif fers 
fundamentally from af fordances as they have been theorized, following upon the 
work by James Gibson, in relation to media. When “we” act within such smart en-
vironments, our action is coupled with computational agents whose action is not 
only (at least in part) beyond our control, but also largely beyond our awareness. 
(Hansen 2012: 33)
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This description rests on the assumption that human cognition is constituted in 
relation with or by means of embeddedness in an environment. Hansen coins 
this as our “environmental condition” (ibid.), which describes the coupling of the 
individual and its environment. This coupling is not a static relationship, but a 
very dynamic one—a constant process of becoming. This refers to process on-
tologies, which either hold that consciousness emerges from being embedded in 
an environment (cf. Merleau-Ponty 1969, Thompson 2013), or that consciousness 
even extends into the environment (a version of panpsychism, cf. Chalmers 2013, 
Whitehead 1929). Without delving into the environmental/ecology debate, I want 
now to transpose these thoughts into the context of smart environments and AI 
driven ecologies.
Let me brief ly summarize the train of thought leading up to this current 
juncture. I started out with Heidegger’s notion of the essence of technology as 
enabling condition of visibility or, more concretely, rendering the world percepti-
ble as standing-reserve. This aspect of technology is itself not technological; rather 
it is the constitutive structure of technological thinking and thus underlies and 
makes possible the visible materiality of technological device. From there I took a 
detour into how human perception is constituted and showed that visual percep-
tion is always situated and hence perspectival. That means aspects of invisibility 
are a constitutive part of vision or perception in general. The next step of my argu-
mentation transposed the relation of visibility and invisibility into technological 
artifacts, where we speak of transparency and opacity, rather than of visibility 
and invisibility. Technological devices become transparent during use just as hu-
man consciousness is transparent in perception (the process of the constitution of 
perception, for example, is not itself object of perception). Technological device 
function smoothly if there is no disruption and thus no ref lection on process of 
usage required. This transparency is always accompanied by opacity. Although 
the mechanisms produce functionality, the computational processes remain hid-
den, which is why digital technologies is often described as black boxes. This gets 
even more poignant with self-learning algorithms, which are not even fully un-
derstood by their programmers. 
My aim is to show in the remaining sections how transparency/visibility and 
opacity/invisibility intertwine and establish new affordances. At this point I will 
go on with a ref lection on smart environments. Smart environments or houses 
that are turned into an Internet of Things (IoT) exemplify a technology that is gov-
erned by self-learning AI, whose main function is prediction. Prediction is neces-
sary because the IoT within a household, for example, is a highly dynamic com-
pound of interlinked processes that has to be adaptive for all kinds of situations 
and changes. Ultimately, I will argue that AI-driven smart environments differ 
strongly from low-tech environments for two reasons: (1) predictive responsive-
ness has not been a common feature of environments before and (2) the prediction 
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and hence preemptive functionality is modelled around a conception of the ideal 
human/human behavior. It is here that the political discussion needs to start.
4. Smart Environments: Technologies in the Tissue of the Life-World
Intelligent technologies are being woven into the tissue or the f lesh (Merleau-Pon-
ty 1969, Rabari, Storper 2015, Förster 2018a) of the life-world, and it is important to 
understand that this is decidedly not a metaphor: Urban spaces consist of count-
less sensors, cameras, and monitors. Especially megacities like Seoul, Tokyo, Lon-
don, or New York City have CCTV in literally every corner of the city. Displays are 
present wherever you look and sensors measuring air quality, light intensity, or 
listening into the noise of the city go unnoticed, even if you start looking for them. 
The growing density of connected devices within smart environments creates a 
growing demand for very small hardware, integrated devices, and high-speed 
data nets.
While urban spaces, work, and private spaces become more and more tech-
nological, hardware in turn becomes less visible. Sensors see without being seen, 
and hear without being heard. This peculiar phenomenon makes up for the nar-
ratives of future life-worlds, especially in contemporary science fiction movies. 
What is currently advertised or else emerging under the label of IoT or Internet of 
Everything (IoE) extends AI and thus nonconscious cognition into the last corners 
of the life-world. The topos of the vanishing of the hardware adds to the functional 
opacity of AI applications. Users have barely any chance to understand how AI is 
incorporated in devices when it is actually at work or how it shapes the process or 
experience of use. On top of this the physical implementation is no longer easy to 
locate. This means that technological environments are turned into a sensory, re-
sponsive surface with nonconscious cognition. Dealing with responsive AI driven 
environments requires, therefore, new forms of knowledge and behavior, such as 
an understanding of technological agency. Nonconscious cognition and agency 
make up for fairly new affordances in daily life. On the one hand side, human 
behavior and movement needs to be adapted to the technological systems in or-
der for them to work properly. On the other hand side, humans need to ref lect on 
how they want these new technologies to be integrated in their life-worlds. This is 
precisely the point where an active engagement with new affordances and hence 
novel cultural structures needs to take place.
The AI’s integrated in smart environments actively shape perception, move-
ments, emotions, and rational choices (e.g., elections, ethical choices, etc.). One 
of the central problems is that AI’s exert their inf luence predominantly on the lev-
el of affects (cf. Parisi 2018). This adds a third level of opacity or invisibility: the 
nudges generated by AI applications are not always perceivable as such. Recom-
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mendations in shopping apps are quite straightforwardly nudges. The underlying 
structures of newsfeed generation are much less obvious. The way we retrieve in-
formation from the Internet is always tainted through predictions of underlying 
learning algorithms. Thus, the world presented through a news feed is a person-
alized world, generated by an AI that seems to know the user, while the user does 
not know how the program generates its output. The opacity of nonconscious cog-
nition and agency, as it is operative in AI applications, creates uncertainties con-
cerning current and future social life. Current science fiction movies are symp-
tomatic for a more nervous human condition (cf. Förster 2016). There technology 
tends to be portrayed as a hidden force that goes through a cognitive evolution 
and eventually overpowers or leave humanity behind as an outdated life form (e.g. 
the movies Her (USA, 2013) and Transcendence [USA, 2014]).
It is an undeniable fact that technology is becoming more and more invisible 
or at least smaller and more integrated within everyday objects and urban sur-
faces. Even the skin as a limit is slowly breaking down. Sensors integrated in the 
body become increasingly more normal, even though the ethical dimension of this 
is debated. In Sweden, for example, some 3000 people already had such sensors 
implanted under their skin to replace keys, credit cards, or train tickets. There are 
two salient characteristics of distributed AI systems today: they become part of 
the environment (merging in tendency with everyday objects and surfaces, such 
as refrigerators, surveillance cameras, or Alexa voice assistant), or else parts of 
devices that function in close proximity to the body or become integrated within 
the body (clothes with smart fabrics, jewelry, or smart implants). One could say 
that technology becomes naturalized, if there ever was a clear-cut distinction be-
tween the artificial and the natural to begin with. 
Smart environments are largely governed by AI because the sheer amount of 
data generated by the distributed net of devices needs to be digested and made 
useful. At this stage, we are faced with a complex structure of visibilities and their 
counterparts. Technology as hardware starts to disappear while its function-po-
tential increases evermore exponentially. This tendency toward invisibility gener-
ates a second- (or even third-)order transparency: Not only is technology in its us-
age transparent, but it becomes transparent as an object. If technology had lost or 
hidden is object-character already according to Heidegger’s consideration, we are 
now reaching a higher level of enframing or Gestell. In Heidegger’s view technol-
ogy obstructs our view of the world as object because it compels us to conceive of 
the world as standing-reserve. This basic characteristic also holds for technology: It 
does not appear as an object that stands over against a subject and, in this respect, 
transcends human aims. It is a means to an end that makes the environment ap-
pear as a predictable, calculable reservoir of potentialities. This new layer of trans-
parency comes into play through the disappearance of technological devices and 
the emergence of distributed AI. This makes a difference because most of what AI 
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today has accomplished is predictive and shapes functional processes according 
to those predictions. For the users, the unknown factors are huge: Users cannot 
know how exactly the system (e.g., IoT) or even one single device works. Moreover, 
they cannot know or actively experience better which, when, and how much data 
are gathered from the usage and behavior relating to these devices. Much less can 
be known of the use that is made of the collected data. The Big Data problem is be-
coming discussed ever more widely, and the complexity grows with the increasing 
use of devices by the hour.
From a phenomenological perspective, the decreasing visibility (and opacity) 
of smart technologies and their increased potential for agency is problematic for a 
democratization of AI. And the problem is not AI itself, whose actual intelligence 
is amazing but also constantly overrated. AI does not have the intention to build 
a better self, a better society, or a better future. Human beings aim for that. Phi-
losophy is not a stranger to such mostly exaggerated goals. One of the obstacles 
to a transparent use of AI is this striving towards perfectibility, which is more or 
less an economic vehicle. Smart technologies have the potential to be useful and 
maybe even create a better future, but only if a culture of critique and open dis-
course can be established and sustained. How does this point relate to the topic of 
visibility? Let me refer to Heidegger one last time. He argues that technology lets 
the world appear as standing-reserve. Today we should ask how human lives appear 
through technology. How do humans paint an image of human life by creating an 
environment that is machine-friendly? Do we have the means to make the hidden 
ratio of what it means to be human f lourish in smart environments? How can we 
create enough freedom and potential for creative agency that allows for an ac-
tive and critical engagement with existing technologies? That would imply exper-
imenting, tampering, and first and foremost, conducting a critical discourse with 
industries relying heavily on predictions like retail and insurance businesses. The 
image of a “good” human life should be scrutinized (also with regard to the con-
cept of the anthropocene). We need, therefore, a close observation of how nudges, 
prediction, and preemption inf luences everyday behavior—how we speak, move, 
and, indeed, smile or love. To do this successfully, humans in their whole range of 
diversity need to become visible and present as voices in public and in the indus-
tries that rely heavily on AI. The political dimension of AI is very much a human 
one. The human image built into intelligent technologies needs to be made visible. 
Only then can an ethical discussion properly take place.
Artificial Intelligance 187
References
Binfield, Kevin, ed. (2004): Writings of the Luddites. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press.
Chalmers, David J. (2013): “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism.” In: The Amherst 
Lecture in Philosophy 8 (2013): 1-35 (www.amherstlecture.org/chalmers2013/).
Clark, Andy (2015): “Embodied Prediction.” In: Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer 
M. Windt (Eds), Open MIND: 7(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 
10.15502/9783958570115
El-Bizri, Nader (2018), “Phenomenology of Place and Space in our Epoch: Thinking 
along Heideggerian Pathways.” In: Erik Champion (ed.), Phenomenology of Real 
and Virtual Places, London: Routledge, 123-143.
Förster, Yvonne (2016): “Singularities and Superintelligence: Transcending the 
Human in Contemporary Cinema.” In: Trans-Humanities, Seoul: Ewha Insti-
tute for the Humanities (EIH), 33-50. 
Förster, Yvonne (2018a): “From Digital Skins to Digital Flesh: Understanding 
Technology through Fashion.” In: Popular Inquiry (2), Aalto University Hel-
sinki (www.popularinquiry.com/blog/2018/8/30/yvonne-foerster-from-digi 
tal-skins-to-digital-f lesh-understading-technolgy-trough-fashion).
Förster, Yvonne (2018b): “Wenn künstliche Intelligenz laufen lernt. Verkörpe-
rungsstrategien im Machine Learning.” In: Christoph Engemann und Andreas 
Sudmann (Eds.), Machine Learning. Medien, Infrastrukturen und Technologien 
der Künstlichen Intelligenz, Bielefeld: transcript, 325-340.
Hansen, Mark B. N. (2012): “Engineering Pre-Individual Potentiality. Technics, 
Transindividuation, and 20th-Century Media”. In: SubStance 41/3 (Issue 129), 
32-59. 
Hayles, Katherine (2012): How we Think. Digital Media and Contemporary Technogene- 
sis, Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press.
Hayles, N. K. (2014): “Cognition Everywhere: The Rise of the Cognitive Noncon-
scious and the Costs of Consciousness”. New Literary History 45(2), 199-220. 
Heidegger, Martin (1961): An Introduction to Metaphysics, New York: Doubleday.
Heidegger, Martin (1967): Being and Time. Oxford, Cambridge MA.: Blackwell.
Heidegger, Martin (1977): “The Question Concerning Technology”. In: Essays, New 
York, London: Garland, 3-35. 
Husserl, Edmund (2008): “On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Inter-
nal Time (1893-1917)”. In: Rudolf Bernet (ed.), Edmund Husserl. Collected Works 
IV, Dordrecht: Springer.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1969): The Visible and the Invisible, Evanston: Northwes- 
tern University Studies.
Yvonne Förster188
Parisi, Luciana (2018): “Automated Cognition and Capital”. In: Warren Neidich 
(Ed.). The Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism: Part Three, Berlin: Archive 
Books.
Pontin, Jason (2018): “Greedy, Brittle, Opaque, and Shallow: The Downsides to 
Deep Learning”. In: Wired.com: www.wired.com/story/greedy-brittle-opaque-
and-shallow-the-downsides-to-deep-learning/ (26.03.2019).
Rabari, Chirag, Storper, Michael (2015): “The digital skin of cities: urban theory 
and research in the age of the sensored and metered city, ubiquitous com-
puting and big data.” In: Cambridge J Regions Econ Soc 8 (1), 27-42. https://doi.
org/10.1093/cjres/rsu021
Stiegler, Bernard (1998): Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Sudmann, Andreas (2018a): “On the Media-political Dimension of Artificial In-
telligence. Deep Learning as a Black Box and Open AI.” In: Mathias Fuchs, 
Ramón Reichert (eds.): Digital Culture & Society (DCS), Vol.4/1, Rethinking AI: 
Neural Networks, Biometrics and the New Artificial Intelligence, Bielefeld: trans-
cript, 181-200.
Sudmann, Andreas (2018b): “Szenarien des Postdigitalen. Deep Learning als Me-
dienRevolution”. In: Christoph Engemann, Andreas Sudmann (eds.): Machine 
Learing. Medien, Infrastrukturen und Technologien der künstlichen Intelligenz, 
Bielefeld: transcript, 53-73.
Thompson, Evan (2007): Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of 
Mind, Cambridge MA, London: Harvard University Press.
Verbeek, Peter-Paul (2005): What Things Do: Philosophical Ref lections on Technology, 
Agency, and Design, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Whitehead, Alfred North (1929): Process and Reality an Essay in Cosmology; Gif ford 
Lectures Delivered in the University of Edinburgh During the Session 1927-28, New 
York: Free Press.
Race and Computer Vision
Alexander Monea
Introduction
Any analysis of the intersection of democracy with AI must first and foremost en-
gage the intersection of AI with pre-existing practices of marginalization. In the 
United States, perhaps no intersection is more salient than that of AI and race. 
As AI is increasingly positioned as the future of the economy, the military, state 
bureaucracy, communication and transportation across time and space, in short, 
as the bedrock of humanity’s future, questions of how AI intersects with pre-ex-
isting practices of racial marginalization become central. These questions are par-
ticularly difficult to answer given the black boxed nature of most contemporary AI 
systems. While it is certainly a worthwhile endeavor to push for increasing trans-
parency into the datasets and algorithms powering AI systems, that transparency 
lies in an anticipated future and cannot help us now to analyze the operations of 
current AI systems. This picture is only complicated by the fact that AI systems, 
particularly those operating at web scale, are difficult for even their engineers to 
understand at later stages in their operation. For instance, a programmer may be 
able to easily describe the seed data and the machine learning algorithm that she 
started with, but may be completely unable to explain the rationale behind the 
subsequent classifications that the system learns to make. Again, it is certainly 
worthwhile to call for AI explicability—namely, requiring AI programmers and 
engineers to develop systems that can explain their decision-making processes or, 
in the most extreme case, only make decisions that can be explained clearly to a human—
this again is an anticipated future that is of little use to answering the immediate 
question of race and AI which already has dire consequences at this very moment.
So how can an outsider go about critically analyzing the intersection of race 
and AI in the contemporary moment? This paper will utilize an interdisciplinary 
methodology that I am calling ‘speculative code studies’, which combines archi-
val research into press releases, company blog posts, science and technology jour-
nalism, and reported instances of technological irregularities with critical code 
studies research into the available datasets that machine learning algorithms are 
trained on, analyses of open-sourced variants of black boxed code, and empirical 
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studies of the outputs of black boxed systems. The goal of such a study is to pro-
duce a rigorous, but speculative, analysis of black boxed code. This analysis must 
always remain speculative, as the actual systems are obfuscated from direct anal-
ysis, but the methodology ensures that the analysis is as rigorous as possible given 
the peripheral materials, segments of code, and inputs/outputs that are available. 
In this chapter I use this method to probe the myriad ways in which racial biases 
that are present both in the boardrooms and research and development wings of 
technology companies and in the broader socio-cultural milieu get hardcoded into 
the datasets and, subsequently, the machine learning algorithms built atop them. 
It will be my argument that many of these algorithms constitute a material man-
ifestation of racial bias.
This paper will primarily be concerned with visual or optical media, and com-
puter vision algorithms in particular. I will argue that within this context black-
ness falls into the notorious dialectic of hypervisibility and invisibility—black-
ness is too often rendered in stereotypes, at times even visually cartoonish, or it is 
rendered as systemically invisible. However, it is important to note that while the 
context of my analysis is systemic racism against predominantly African Amer-
icans, these systems have global impacts for people of color—or, to speak more 
precisely, those darker-skinned individuals who fall within types V or VI of the 
Fitzpatrick scale (cf. Fitzpatrick 1975, 1988). When I use terms like ‘black,’ ‘person 
of color,’ or ‘dark skin,’ it is meant to indicate that the problems I am identifying 
are of global concern and have high stakes impact on people at the darker end of 
the Fitzpatrick scale across the planet, even though my analysis is contextualized 
within the history and culture of the United States. It is outside the purview of this 
chapter to extend this analysis to other conjunctures, but I sincerely hope others 
will help me to do so by extending, revising, and challenging this work. In the 
first section of this chapter I will draw on critical race theory to demonstrate how 
this dialectic is problematic from the perspective of egalitarian democracy. In the 
next section I will offer a brief overview of the history of racial bias in visual media 
within the context of the United States that perfectly illustrates this hypervisi-
ble/invisible dialectic of blackness. In the following two sections I will look at the 
hypervisibility and invisibility of blackness in contemporary AI systems and will 
try to demonstrate the enormity of the stakes of this conjuncture. In conclusion I 
offer some preliminary thoughts about where we can go from here.
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The Hypervisibility and Invisibility Dialectic of Racial Difference
“Black is … ‘an black aint.”
Ellison 1989, p. 9
In their theory of racial formations, Michael Omi and Howard Winant (2015) have 
argued that humans essentially use stereotypes to make sense of the world, even 
though these stereotypes are constantly changing. People make use of fundamen-
tal categories of difference, like race, gender, class, age, nationality, and culture 
to navigate society, all of which imply a certain politics of “othering” that pro-
duces structural marginalization, inequality, exploitation, and oppression. We 
might productively understand machine learning as engaging in a very similar 
behavior with similar political stakes. As I have argued elsewhere in the context 
of machine learned semantic labels, these algorithms engage in an iterative pro-
cess of learning stereotypical differentiations to categorize the various data that 
they encounter (Monea 2016, 2019). However, race functions differently than these 
other stereotypical categorizations because, as Omi and Winant explain, race is 
crucially ‘corporeal’ and ‘ocular’. What they mean by this is that racial distinc-
tions take hold of a set of phenotypic differences—most noticeably morphologi-
cal differences like skin tone, lip size, and hair texture in the case of blackness in 
the United States—and essentializes them, as if they were physical markers of an 
essential difference of kind (2015: p. 13). It is thus othering, as it establishes the 
border between an ‘us’ and a ‘them,’ and reifies that border by making it appear as 
a fundamental law of nature, a scientific fact, a marker of a different kind of being. 
There are two unique aspects of this process, which Omi and Winant refer to as 
‘racialization’. First, these phenotypic differences are arbitrarily selected, are not 
understood as having the same denotations and connotations across space and 
time, and often were previously unconnected to any racial classification. Second, 
they are written on to the body through morphological distinctions in such a way 
that racial difference is legible on sight alone.
This latter aspect of racialization has been a core component of critical race 
theory for decades, and was perhaps most notably articulated by Frantz Fanon 
(1967) in his concept of ‘epidermalization’. For Fanon, epidermalization is a pro-
cess by which black people realize their identification as the Other for white peo-
ple as they encounter the white gaze that dissects and analyzes their body, without 
permission, to classify them. Fanon writes:
I am overdetermined from the outside. I am a slave not to the “idea” others have of 
me, but to my appearance. […] The white gaze, the only valid one, is already dissec-
ting me. I am fixed. Once their microtomes are sharpened, the Whites objectively 
cut sections of my reality. (1967: p. 95)
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Stuart Hall succinctly defines Fanon’s idea of epidermalization as “literally the in-
scription of race on the skin” (1996: p. 16). Hortense Spillers similarly writes about 
the ‘hieroglyphics of the f lesh’, wherein black subjects are transformed into f lesh 
through “the calculated work of iron, whips, chains, knives, the canine patrol, the 
bullet” (2003: p. 207). For Spillers, Western humanism is built atop these hiero-
glyphics, as the liberated Man requires definitionally that an other be designated 
as not fully human. This legacy is passed down through the generations even after 
black subjects were granted possession of their own bodies and continues to struc-
ture our social lives. As Alexander Weheliye describes it, racial categories “carve 
from the swamps of slavery and colonialism the very f lesh and bones of modern 
Man” (2014: p. 30). Sylvia Wynter (2001) has similarly shown how this happens in 
her arguments about sociogeny, where a focus on phenotypical differences is just 
a ruse to essentialize racial difference and divide the Homo sapiens species into 
humans and nonhuman beings.
We can understand this corporeality, ocularity, epidermalization, and f lesh-
iness of race as a fundamentally visual component, and one that makes race hy-
pervisible by stressing phenotypes—especially morphological features like skin 
tone, lip size, and hair texture—and connoting racial stereotypes that help bolster 
racial marginalization. Lisa Nakamura (2007) has shown how this hypervisibility 
of race is perpetuated today by computation and digital visual culture, leading to 
the production of ‘digital racial formations’. John Cheney-Lippold (2017) has sim-
ilarly shown how algorithms have digitized race into ‘measurable types’, or sta-
tistical probabilities based on user data. Here I’d like to introduce the term ‘users 
of color’ to replace the term ‘people of color’ for this digital context. Users of color 
are digitally racialized based on algorithmic analysis of big data, which is reifying 
some old phenotypic stereotypes of racial difference at the same time that it is 
producing new ones. We might also follow Simone Browne (2015) and think of this 
process as a ‘digital epidermalization’.
Now, we can easily see that even for technology companies that may have lit-
tle ethical commitment to egalitarian democracy, the public relations nightmare 
alone of being seen as reifying racial stereotypes in digital culture is a huge deter-
rent. As we’ll see throughout this piece, the most frequent response to criticism of 
algorithmic racialization is to make race invisible. Rendering blackness invisible 
is always the f lipside of the coin, in dialectical tension with racial hypervisibil-
ity. Both options are unsatisfactory, as they both provide safe haven for racism, 
albeit in different ways. The most recent and visible example of rendering race 
invisible is the ‘color blind’ policies that have been pursued in the United States 
since the 1960s. These policies have been near universally condemned by scholars 
in critical race studies and related disciplines (e.g. Bonilla-Silva 2017; Brown et 
al. 2003; Omi/Winant 2015). Color blindness delegitimates affirmative action and 
similar programs striving for racial equality, allows racism to operate unchecked 
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provided it uses dog whistles and other careful language to obscure racial malice, 
and obscures important racial data trails that might otherwise have been used to 
uncover statistical trends of racism (e.g. in policing, court sentencing, allocation 
of welfare benefits, etc.). In addition, it has made speaking about race so taboo 
that the term ‘white fragility’ was coined to describe contemporary white people’s 
inability to openly talk about race and racism (Dyson 2018). Thus, rather than deal 
with racialization’s roots in colonialism and slavery and doing the hard work of 
moving towards actual egalitarian democracy, blackness is alternately rendered 
as hypervisible or invisible, both of which leave much to be desired. In short, as 
Ralph Ellison put it, “Black is … ‘an black ain’t” (1989, p. 9).
Accounting for the Visibility of Race in Visual Media
“Photography is a weapon” 
–Oliver Chanarin (PhotoQ 2015)
The United States has a long history of embedding racial stereotypes in its visu-
al media and communications technologies (cf. Dyer 1997, hooks 1992, Nakamura 
2007). This legacy spans from analog to digital photography and, as we’ll see, con-
tinues to impact a number of computer vision applications. For example, Lorna 
Roth (2009) has shown in detail that Kodak optimized its entire suite of prod-
ucts for white skin. Kodak produced a long series of “Shirley cards”, named after 
Shirley Page, the first studio model for the photos Kodak sent out with its new 
products. These Shirley cards were marked “normal” and used as test cards for 
color balancing film stock and printers. The optimization for white skin was to 
the detriment of people of color, whose features increasingly disappeared in di-
rect correlation with how dark their skin was. One legendary result was French 
film auteur Jean-Luc Godard’s refusal to shoot on Kodak film for an assignment in 
Mozambique because of the racial bias hardcoded into the film—it literally would 
not work in Africa. It was not until complaints were made by companies trying to 
photograph dark objects for advertisements that Kodak developed film that could 
capture the details of black f lesh, a project that was kept quiet at Kodak and re-
ferred to via the coded phrase “To Photograph the Details of a Dark Horse in Low 
Light” (Broomberg & Chanarin n.d.).
Even when film was made with the explicit intent of rendering black skin visible—
rather than for rendering chocolate bars and wooden furniture visible in advertise-
ments—deeply rooted racial problems cropped up. Take, for instance, Eric Morgan’s 
(2006) story of the Polaroid ID-2 camera. The ID-2 was designed to take two photos 
per self-developing print, one portrait and one profile image, of a subject 1.2m from 
the lens. This was, in essence, a streamlining of Alphonse Bertillon’s anthropomet-
ric identification system for state policing, which has always intersected in complex 
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ways with existing practices of racial and gendered marginalization (Browne 2015; 
Fair 2017; Lyon 2008; Wevers 2018). In the case of the ID-2, this was manifested in a 
special “boost” button for the f lash that would make it around 40 percent brighter, 
the same amount of light that darker skin absorbs. In and of itself, this feature is 
rather innocuous. It is actually a step forward in the sense that it allowed the camera 
to capture the features of dark-skinned people more clearly, although still made it 
problematic to capture both black and white skin in the same picture. However, in 
1970, a Polaroid chemist named Caroline Hunter uncovered evidence that Polaroid 
was making a lot of money selling ID-2 cameras to the South African government, 
which used them to make the passbook’s that black citizens were forced to carry with 
them at all times within white areas (see Savage 1986). 
In their exhibit titled after Kodak’s coded phrase “To Photograph the Details 
of a Dark Horse in Low Light,” South African artists Adam Broomberg and Alex 
Chanarin argue that the ID-2 was designed for the purpose of supporting apart-
heid (PhotoQ 2015; Smith 2013).1 It is unlikely that this is the case, but it is cer-
tainly true that a certain number of Polaroid executives had a damning amount 
of knowledge of the trafficking of ID-2s in South Africa and worked to intervene 
too late and with too little energy to actually prevent the use of their new technol-
ogies for the support of Apartheid. Neither of these stories is meant to minimize 
the technical difficulties of capturing darker features and objects on film. These 
difficulties are inherent to optical media and would likely exist no matter the so-
ciocultural context within which photographic technologies arose. What they do 
expose, however, is how absent and unimportant the dialectic of black invisibil-
ity and hypervisibility was to these companies, a fact that was made materially 
manifest in their research and development paradigms, the products they took to 
market, the discourse they used to position these products, and their responses 
to criticism from the public. It is not that these devices themselves are racist, but 
instead that racial biases from the context in which they are developed inf lect how 
the companies approach research and development, imagine certain products 
and not others, prioritize some more highly than others, assess some potential 
bad applications of their technology as negative press coverage to be accounted for 
in the design process, etc. All of this is materially manifest in the technology itself, 
the way it is positioned discursively, and the myriad uses it gets put to in society.
It wasn’t until the ‘90s that American companies really began to take seriously 
the need to better capture black features on film. Kodak released ‘black’, ‘Asian’, and 
‘Latina’ Shirley cards and began marketing Kodak Gold Max film, which had an ‘im-
proved dynamic range’—it could finally ‘photograph the details of a dark horse in low 
light’. These achievements were made by new innovations in the chemical composi-
tion of film negatives to make them more reactive with darker pigments and modi-
1  For more on Broomberg and Chanarin’s exhibit, see O’toole 2014.
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fications to color balancing techniques to optimize for different skin tones. They all 
required an increasing focus on the visibility of people of color that spanned from 
the consumer base to the research and development teams at companies like Kodak. 
This change in priorities also quickly manifested in digital camera and camcorder 
technologies. For example, in 1994 the U.S. Philips Corporation filed for a patent on 
a new ‘tint detection circuit’ that could automatically adjust the tint in a digital im-
age to white balance for both light and dark skin tones at once. In this instance (see 
Figure 1 below), there are literally two components soldered onto the board, one for 
‘SKINR’ and one for ‘SKINB’ that lead to an ‘AND CIRCUIT’ that combines their out-
puts to optimize for both. While this solution is not ideal, as the color balancing will 
be off for both light-skinned and dark-skinned people if they are in the same shot, it 
is a step in the right direction. It will work equally well for any skin type in isolation 
and when in the same frame will average towards the middle, rendering both poles 
of the Fitzpatrick scale equally less visible. We might also take this historical arc as 
emblematic of the level of intervention necessary if we are to make any given tech-
nology democratic as it pertains to racial marginalization. Just as we need to literally 
hardcode anti-racism measures into the circuit board to get an egalitarian camera, 
we will need to literally hardcode anti-racism measures into our machine learning 
algorithms to get egalitarian AI.
Fig. 1: U.S. Patent No. 5,428,402 (1995)
The Hypervisibility of Race in AI Systems
In a ‘humorous’ story read for This American Life, David Sedaris describes the 
strange cultural differences surrounding Christmas between the United States 
and the Netherlands, noting to refined laughter that in the Netherlands, Saint 
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Nicholas is accompanied by six to eight black men who prior to the mid-1950s were 
characterized as his personal slaves (Sedaris 2001; cf. Sedaris 2004). In Dutch tra-
dition, these black helpers eventually stabilized into the image of Zwarte Piet, or 
‘Black Pete’, with Dutch men and women dressing up in black face—black face 
paint, red lipstick, curly black-haired wigs, a golden hoop ear ring, and colorful 
Spanish/Moorish outfits—to lead Sinterklaas, or Saint Nicholas, in parades, dis-
tributing candy and kicks to good and bad children respectively. The majority of 
Dutch citizens have very positive attitudes about Zwarte Piet, and often downplay 
the connections between him and black face by noting alternately either that his 
face is colored such because he is a chimney sweep that now crawls through chim-
neys to deliver candies to good children who leave their shoes out or because he is 
a Moor that was adopted by Sinterklaas, who lives in Spain in the offseason rather 
than at the North Pole, as in American traditions. As Allison Blakely notes, both of 
these explanations are rather unconvincing (2001: pp. 47-48). 
This desperate attempt to preserve a deeply problematic tradition are only com-
plicated by the fact that Zwarte Piet is the name for the Devil in Dutch folklore, who 
is caught and chained for the celebration every year, and by the Netherland’s compli-
cated history with colonialism, the slave trade, and slavery—for example, the term 
‘apartheid’ comes from the Dutch and arose particularly in the context of their colo-
nial occupation of Surinam (Blakely 1980: p. 27). While the Dutch position themselves 
as a nation apart from colonial and racial marginalization, this has never been the 
case, especially since a number of Surinamers relocated to the Netherlands after the 
1950s and have faced systemic marginalization based on race (Blakely 1980). It is no 
wonder that these same Surinamers are increasingly unenthused with the Zwarte 
Piet tradition and argue that it is insulting, and especially damaging to children of 
color who subsequently face bullying at school (Blakely 2001: p. 48).
David Leonard has argued that a more appropriate metric for determining 
culpability in instances of blackface is not whether the person dressing in black-
face meant to offend people, but whether that person is causing harm, either to 
individuals or to society (Desmond-Harris 2014). This is a much smarter way of 
analyzing the situation, as it not only rids us of complex interrogations of inten-
tionality, but also opens up the analysis of how photographic or videographic me-
dia might extend the range of impact of that harm. For instance, barring for the 
moment the issue of blackface in the Netherlands, it is certainly the case that it is 
extremely damaging in the context of the United States. As C. Vann Woodward 
(2001) has shown the campaign of pseudo-scientifically legitimated racism, dehu-
manization, segregation, disenfranchisement, and terror waged against African 
Americans that we know as “Jim Crow” was named after a blackface minstrel rou-
tine. Blackface thus encapsulates rather neatly the logic of American racism, in 
that it literally denotes and makes hypervisible phenotypes—and in still images 
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these are primarily morphological traits—while at the same time always preserv-
ing their connotation of inferiority in connection with white supremacy.
If we look at the case of ImageNet, we can clearly see how these Zwarte Piet imag-
es escape their context and cause social harm. ImageNet is a large dataset of labeled 
images first launched out of Princeton University in 2009. The dataset originally 
drew 80,000 labels from the semantic database WordNet—each label is referred to 
as a ‘synset’ which is a set of synonymous terms—with the goal of populating each 
of these labels with 500-1,000 clean and full resolution images (Deng et al. 2009). 
In 2010, ImageNet launched its annual ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition 
Challenge (ILSVRC), which has since served as an industry benchmark for success in 
computer vision applications (Russakovsky et al. 2015). This centrality was cement-
ed by Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever and Geoffrey Hinton’s (2012) groundbreaking 
success in using neural networks to win the competition to produce an algorithm 
that could learn to classify images in the ILSVRC (cf. Sudmann 2016, 2018). What is 
important to know is that ImageNet not only serves as the performance benchmark 
for nearly all computer vision systems, but that because those systems are trained on 
and optimized for the ImageNet dataset, any biases in the ImageNet dataset have 
wide-ranging repercussions since they subsequently become hardcoded through 
machine learning into a large portion of computer vision systems.
Fig. 2: Zwarte Piets and Sinterklaas (Splinter 20102)
2  N.b. I could not establish the licensing for any of the Zwarte Piet images contained in ImageNet, 
but any search on Flickr for the term returns images like this one which are illustrative. 
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ImageNet gathers images for a synset that contains the terms “Black”, “Black per-
son”, “blackamoor”, “Negro”, and “Negroid”, which it defines as “a person with dark 
skin who comes from Africa (or whose ancestors came from Africa)”. This synset 
is interesting for a number of reasons. First, just from browsing it, one can tell 
that it contains many fewer images as a percentage of the total images than other 
synsets that would contain useful visual details for building out a classifier. What 
I mean by this is that an inordinate number of photos are low resolution, don’t 
show facial details, have black people’s bodies positioned further away from the 
camera, and inordinately feature celebrities (about 1 per cent of the entire dataset 
is pictures of Barack Obama) and memes. While this certainly isn’t a smoking gun 
for racial bias, let alone intentional racial bias, it does reveal that the capacity to 
accurately identify black facial features is not prioritized by default for any com-
puter vision algorithms trained on ImageNet’s data. What is perhaps closer to a 
smoking gun is that of the 1,286 images for this synset that are still available on-
line, a full 79 of them are of people in blackface.3 All but one of these images are 
of people dressed as Zwarte Piet. Thus, this odd Dutch phenomenon has the exact 
consequences that are feared in critiques of blackface: regardless of the intentions 
of those wearing blackface, when it enters public discourse, this signifier of black-
ness quickly escapes any contextualization and instead reifies racism through its 
connotations of white supremacy and its denotations of blackness being reducible 
to phenotypical difference. We can see this quite literally in the case of ImageNet, 
where blackface images have escaped their context to compose just over 6 per cent 
of the entire dataset, a dataset developed on a continent where the vast majority 
have never even heard of Zwarte Piet. Even if we allow the extremely dubious ar-
gument that these images are harmless in the Netherlands, a tradition beloved by 
fewer than 20 million has helped to bias a fundamental piece of infrastructure for 
computer vision.
Take, for example, Google’s use of the ImageNet dataset. In 2014, Google re-
searchers won the ILSVRC challenge with their ‘Inception’ algorithm (also known 
as ‘GoogLeNet’), a 22-layered convolutional neural network (Syzegedy et al. 2015). 
This CNN was trained on the ImageNet dataset, and thus internalized any biases 
present in that data.4  At Google I/O 2015, Google announced the launch of its new 
3  At this time, I can only work from the publicly accessible list of links to images for given synsets. 
This means that I cannot access images that have since been taken down from the web, which 
makes it impossible to access the full set of 1,404 images that make up the dataset for that synset. 
I have repeatedly submitted requests to register for an account with ImageNet so that I might 
access the full dataset and have sent multiple emails to ImageNet’s contact address, but have yet 
to get either access or a response.
4  While there is no comparable data for racial biases, it has been demonstrated that in the case of 
gender biases, neural networks not only internalize the biases in their datasets, but amplify them 
(Zhao et al. 2017).
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Google Photos software. Google argued that humans were now taking over a tril-
lion images a year and at this rate would need a second lifetime to label, organize, 
and revisit their photos. Google Photos was the solution we had all been waiting 
for:
Google Photos automatically organizes your memories by the people, places, and 
things that matter. You don’t have to tag or label any of them, and you don’t need 
to laboriously create albums. When you want to find a particular shot, with a simp-
le search you can instantly find any photo—whether it’s your dog, your daughter’s 
birthday party, or your favorite beach in Santa Barbara. And all of this auto-grou-
ping is private, for your eyes only. (Google 2015)
The new Google Photos software was primarily powered by the Inception/Goo-
gLeNet algorithm that was trained on ImageNet data, though it supplemented 
the image patterns it learned from ImageNet with a huge database of photos and 
nearby text from websites it had crawled and a few other indicators, like looking 
at the place and time stamps of both the user during the search and the images 
via their metadata (Brewster 2015). The centrality of ImageNet is no wonder, as it 
not only serves as the benchmark for computer vision algorithms and is standard 
across a large portion of the industry, but Google Photos was developed under 
Bradley Horowitz, Google’s Vice President of Streams, Photos, and Sharing, who 
previously saw the value in Flickr’s Creative Commons licensed images when he 
helped purchase the company as an executive at Yahoo (Levy 2015).
The point to be taken from all this is that Google Photos was designed by peo-
ple who viewed ImageNet as an unquestioned industry standard and who placed 
strong faith in the utility of Flickr images. They thus were ill positioned to fore-
see the racial biases inherent in the visual data that their machine learning al-
gorithms had used to develop their classifiers. This problem came to the fore just 
a month after Google Photos was released when in June 2015 a black software 
engineer named Jacky Alcine posted a set of images run through Google’s photo 
tagging software to Twitter in which images of him and his girlfriend were labeled 
as photos of ‘gorillas’ (Alcine 2015).5 The case clearly hit a nerve, as dozens of arti-
cles were published calling Google’s algorithms racist within days and it has since 
been one of the most frequently cited examples of algorithmic bias in technology 
journalism. This comparison is only possible based on an arbitrary definition of 
certain phenotypical differences as the sole markers of an essentialized differ-
5  It is worth noting that while Google is the highest profile instance of this happening, it is by no 
means the sole incident. Just a month prior to the Alcine incident Flickr made news for mislabel-
ing a black man (and a white woman) as “animal” and “ape”, and also labeled photos of Dachau 
concentration camp as “jungle gym”, “sport”, and “trellis” (Hern 2015).
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ence. In short, when we think of skin tone, lips, and hair as the cornerstone of ra-
cial difference, this slippage between classifiers is opened up. And further, when 
we essentialize these differences and connect them to racist stereotypes, the con-
notation of this slippage becomes unbearable. It calls into question not only peo-
ple’s intelligence, but their very humanity. This is a problem of the highest stakes 
for all users of color.
As can be seen from Google’s response, the company similarly understood 
this instance to be a serious problem and one that might threaten the future of 
their computer vision platforms. Within hours, a Google engineer named Yonatan 
Zunger was responding to Alcine’s tweet asking for permission to examine his 
Google Photos account to figure out what had gone wrong. The next day, Zunger 
tweeted that Google had not recognized a face in the images of Alcine and his 
girlfriend at all and noted, “We’re also working on longer-term fixes around both 
linguistics (words to be careful about in photos of people [lang-dependent]” and 
in “image recognition itself. (e.g., better recognition of dark-skinned faces) (Zu-
nger 2015). Zunger promised that Google would continue to work on these issues, 
which included developing systems that could better process the different con-
trasts for different skin tones and lighting. A few days later a Google spokesperson 
told the BBC that, “We’re appalled and genuinely sorry that this happened. We 
are taking immediate action to prevent this type of result from appearing” (BBC 
2015). Yet, as we’ll see in the next section, Google has yet to discover a solution for 
this problem. The datasets its algorithms are trained on make it so that race must 
be rendered either as a hypervisible emphasis on phenotypes, which, without a 
heavily curated new dataset will continue to produce slippage between users of 
color and apes, or as invisible. 
The Invisibility of Race in AI Systems
While the speed and sincerity of Google’s initial response seemed promising, af-
ter more than two years WIRED reported that all Google had managed to do was 
remove potentially offensive auto-tags for terms from its Photos software (Si-
monite 2018). In that same report, WIRED noted the results of a series of exper-
iments they had done with Google Photos. First, they ran a collection of 40,000 
images well-stocked with animals through the system and found that it did not 
locate any results for the terms “gorilla”, “chimp”, “chimpanzee”, and “monkey”. 
In a second experiment they tried uploading pictures solely of chimpanzees and 
gorillas and found that it still would not recognize the offending set of terms. In 
a third and more damning test, WIRED uploaded a collection of over 10,000 im-
ages used for facial-recognition research. Searching these photos for auto-tags 
of “black man”, “black woman”, or “black person” only delivered photos that were 
in black-and-white, which did correspond to the gender specified, but did not sort 
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people by race. In short, in response to this public relations disaster, blackness has 
become invisible in Google Photos.6 This color blindness also extends to Google’s 
Open Images dataset, which contains “30.1M image-level labels for 19.8k concepts, 
15.4M bounding boxes for 600 object classes, and 375k visual relationship anno-
tations involving 57 classes” (Kuznetsova et a. 2018). None of these millions of la-
bels, thousands of concepts, or hundreds of classes, from what I can gather after 
examining the database, explicitly label race. Users of color are only identified by 
their absence.
The issue of black invisibility has a long history in systems that process visual 
data for applications like facial recognition and motion-sensing. Take, for exam-
ple, the viral 2009 YouTube video of an HP laptop designed to use facial recog-
nition to track users’ faces and follow them as they move with the webcam that 
failed to register the movements of ‘Black Desi’ at all, despite easily following the 
motions of his white coworker (wzamen01 2012). Consumer Reports (2009) tried to 
debunk the argument that this was a racial bias by arguing that it instead is a 
factor of lighting conditions, and while they present their results as if the system 
would work the same for lighter and darker skin tones in the same lighting, in their 
video it is clear that this is not the case, as they have to better light their user of 
color’s face before the system starts to track him. For another example, take Xbox 
Kinect, which in 2010 was reported to have trouble recognizing the faces of users 
of color (Ionescu 2010). This primarily effected their ability to automatically log in 
to their avatars, as Kinect gameplay largely functions on skeletal movement. In 
other words, Kinect is capable of seeing black bodies but not black faces, and can 
facilitate their gameplay so long as it doesn’t need to recognize their face, which 
some games do. Consumer Reports (2010) similarly argued that this was merely a 
lighting issue and claimed to have ‘debunked’ the idea that Kinect is ‘racist’. 
It is certainly the case that these machines themselves are not intentional 
agents engaged in prejudicial thinking, but to merely wave away the claims of 
racism as ‘debunked’ after demonstrating that failure to function appropriately 
when utilized by people of color requires an uncomfortable amount of hubris and 
near total lack of empathy. There is something clearly going on here and it has a 
felt impact on racialized bodies so clear in the videos of people attempting and 
failing to utilize facial recognition and motion-sensing technologies. At the very 
least, these instances are material embodiments of some combination of the lack 
of forethought in the research and development phase and a lack of concern over 
6  Interestingly, this invisibility plays out dif ferently in Google’s less publicly visible computer vision 
projects. Google’s Cloud Vision API launched in 2016 as a new tool to make its computer vision 
algorithms available particularly to developers (Google 2016). Cloud Vision API still uses labels 
like “chimpanzee” and “gorilla”, though I’ve found no studies to date of whether the same racial 
hypervisibility of Google Photos persists on Google’s Cloud Vision API.
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going to market with a product that would fail to operate for a large and protected 
minority class of citizens. And further, the common arguments that all technolo-
gies fail, that these technical constraints are unavoidable, and that it is common 
sense to design products based on your majority market (and in most instances 
this is code for ‘white’ people) are all inadequate at best, and deeply offensive at 
worst.
Take, for another example, the frequent instances of motion-activated devices 
like soap dispensers in public restrooms failing to recognize users of color (e.g. 
Fussell; Plenke 2015). Bharat Vasan, the COO of Basis Science, explained to CNET 
that there are systems that can avoid this problem by detecting the darkness of ob-
jects beneath their sensors and adjusting a spotlight to match, but these systems 
are too expensive for many of these lower-end motion-activated devices (Profis 
2014). It is here that chronic lack of consideration for users of color becomes most 
apparent. These systems are designed for public use, and thus by default require 
consideration of users of color. Further, many aspects of the lighting conditions 
can be predicted in advance (e.g. f luorescent overhead lighting, often with the 
shadow of the motion-sensing object itself falling over the object to be detected). 
This picture only gets more complicated when we consider that the principle site 
of research and development for automated restroom innovation is in prisons, 
which are disproportionately comprised of people of color in the United States 
(Edwards 2015).
This is a much more significant problem than simply having automated public 
utilities that fail to operate for users of color. These same problems extend to med-
ical technologies and limit the effectiveness of new wearable technologies tout-
ed as breakthrough technologies for everyday medical monitoring. For instance, 
Pulse Oximetry, which optically measures arterial hemoglobin oxygen saturation 
is demonstrably less effective in people with darker skin tones (Bickler/Feiner/
Severinghaus 2005). While the FDA requires these devices to meet certain accu-
racy thresholds before they can go to market, they do not specify where on the 
Fitzpatrick scale the test subjects must fall. There is thus a financial incentive to 
use lighter-skinned test subjects, as utilizing and designing for darker skin types 
slows their path to market.  New non-invasive neuroimaging techniques like func-
tional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) are being used to study and potentially 
treat medical issues like Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, epilepsy, trau-
matic brain injury, schizophrenia, mood disorders, and anxiety disorders (Irani et 
al. 2007). fNIRS measures brain activity through blood oxygenation and volume 
in the pre-frontal cortext and is similarly less effective with darker pigmentation 
and darker, thicker hair (Saikia/Besio/Mankodiya 2019). These same problems of 
black invisibility extend to the optical heart trackers installed in many contempo-
rary wearable technologies, like FitBit and the Apple Watch (Kim 2017; Profis 2014).
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Perhaps the ultimate example of the algorithmic invisibility of users of col-
or though can be found in lidar-based state-of-the-art object detection systems 
like those used in autonomous vehicles or ‘self-driving cars’. Autonomous vehicles 
have to engage in grisly cost-benefit calculations in crash scenarios to determine 
how to kill or injure the fewest people (e.g. Roff 2018). New research has come 
out demonstrating that such systems are statistically less likely to identify dark-
er-skinned pedestrians as humans to be factored into these calculations (Wilson/
Hoffman/Morgenstern 2019). The researchers found that this remained true even 
when you factor in time of day (i.e., lighting, the go-to excuse for any technolog-
ical failure to recognize black faces and bodies) and visual occlusion. This could 
have been predicted, as the training data used for the system they analyzed con-
tained nearly 3.5 times as many images of light-skinned people as dark-skinned 
people (ibid.: p. 1). Black invisibility is thus not merely a matter of identity politics, 
but instead can literally have life or death stakes for users of color in our increas-
ingly AI-driven future. 
Conclusion
The hypervisibility/invisibility dialectic has historically sheltered the worst forms 
of racism in the United States and abroad. It has been endemic to visual media 
since their inception and is currently being cemented into the AI paradigms that 
we increasingly believe our going to usher in the next stage of human civiliza-
tion. The approach that AI design takes to this dialectic thus ought to be a central 
battleground for anyone working towards the democratization of AI. We cannot 
have egalitarian or democratic technology if we hardcode pre-existing regimes of 
marginalization into our AI systems. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to fully articulate an alternative to the hypervisibility/invisibility dialectic in AI 
systems, I think we look to some of the repeated refrains that have still yet to be 
initiated in Silicon Valley as a way to at least open the space where we might imag-
ine a better alternative. In her WIRED article “How to Keep Your AI from Turn-
ing into a Racist Monster,” Megan Carcia (2017) offers some common-sense ap-
proaches that might be advocated for and instituted broadly to great effect. These 
systems ought to better empower users to analyze, debug, and f lag problematic 
components of AI systems. This process not only crowdsources the labor, mak-
ing it much more appealing to tech companies beholden to their shareholders, but 
also in the process educates users about the importance of this labor as well as the 
technological functioning of the systems they are helping to analyze. Second, Sil-
icon Valley needs to hire more diverse computer programmers immediately and 
without making any more excuses. More diverse development teams are much 
more likely to recognize hardcoded marginalization prior to release and are sta-
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tistically likely to generate greater profits. Third, empower more third-parties to 
engage in high-tech auditing of AI systems. Even if trade secrecy and fear of spam 
prevent the open sourcing of all code, certain trusted third parties more dedi-
cated to advancing democracy and eradicating marginalization ought to be al-
lowed access to these systems to help monitor hardcoded biases. Lastly, we ought 
to further develop a public discourse that demands egalitarian AI and institute 
an inter-company set of tools and standards to help better motivate companies 
and hold them accountable. While these are Carcia’s ideas, they are also ours, writ 
large, as they somehow echo across internet discourse ad nauseum without ever 
really being instituted in Silicon Valley. We might need to supplement this with 
more traditional grass-roots organizing and activism tactics to turn this polite 
request into a demand. Democracy often requires revolutionaries. 
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Mapping the Democratization of AI on GitHub 
A First Approach
Marcus Burkhardt
Over the course of the past 80 years the digital computer has radically changed the 
world we inhabit and the ways in which we relate to it and to each other. Likewise, 
computing has radically changed as well. At first, practical computing machines1 
carried individual names, but in the early 1950s proper names were quickly re-
placed by series designators which are emblematic for the era of mainframe com-
puters and time-sharing systems. The 1970s and 1980s gave rise to micro, home 
and personal computers as well as graphical user interfaces that became prevalent 
in the 1990s. With the rise of the World Wide Web (WWW) during this decade 
networked computing and networking changed the face of computing again. Re-
gardless of the burst of the dot-com bubble the Web f lourished throughout the 
early 2000s by being reframed as Web 2.0 and social web. During this period com-
puting devices became increasingly mobile and desktop computers were super-
seded by notebooks, smartphones and tablets, software gradually morphed into 
services and apps that rely on cloud infrastructures for distributed processing 
and storage. 
In June 2017 Sundar Pichai, CEO of Google Inc., declared yet another para-
digm shift in the history of computing. Innovation should neither be driven by 
approaching problems as first and foremost digital nor mobile, but instead by tak-
ing an AI first approach that is fueled by recent advances in the field of machine 
learning: “We believe smartphones should be smarter; they should learn from you 
and they should adapt to you. Technologies such as on-device machine learning 
can learn your usage patterns and automatically anticipate your next action sav-
ing you time” (Pichai 2018). This statement ref lects a central promise of machine 
learning applications, namely the ability to adapt to unforeseen futures without 
prior programming of a particular event: visual recognition of specific objects or 
persons that the program did neither “see” nor was trained on before, self-driving 
cars that can deal with new situations safely or chatbots that conduct conversa-
1  For the concept of practical computing machines see Turing (1992).
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tions with humans in an engaging manner. Conversely, the more such technol-
ogies are built into the fabric of everyday life the more concerns are raised about 
their potential risks, e.g. biases and inequalities inherent in training data sets. 
As a result, machine learning models often produce (social) structures instead 
of adapting to them. Drawing on debates in critical algorithm studies this paper 
asks how machine learning and artificial intelligence as fields of technological de-
velopment and innovation are in themselves structured. By providing an initial 
mapping of the coding cultures of machine learning and artificial intelligence on 
GitHub the paper argues for the importance to attend more closely to the hith-
erto largely neglected infrastructural layers of code libraries and programming 
frameworks for the development of critical perspectives on the social and cultural 
implications of machine learning technologies to come.
Democratization of AI
In recent years the interest in artificial intelligence (AI) in general and in machine 
learning (ML) in particular skyrocketed once again. This ongoing development is 
to some extend driven by leading technology companies such as Google and its 
parent company Alphabet, Amazon Web Services (AWS), Facebook, IBM, Micro-
soft etc. It rests upon the massive accumulation of data by these companies on 
the one hand and the establishment of large-scale cloud infrastructures as well 
as infrastructural services on the other hand. However, these companies do not 
simply contribute to the rapid technological developments in AI and ML, they also 
take part in shaping the imaginaries of smart, intelligent and autonomous tech-
nologies as cornerstones of technological progress and enablers of social progress 
as well as economic prosperity for the years to come. 
Central to this is the recent push towards the democratization of artificial 
intelligence. Google (IANS 2017), IBM (Moore 2018), Apple (Simonite 2017) and 
Microsoft (n.d.) alike mobilize the notion of democratic AI to promote the shift 
towards ML driven technological innovation. In this context democratization 
can be understood “as the action/development of making something accessible 
to everyone, to the ‘common masses’” (Schmarzo 2017). For Microsoft this entails 
allowing “every person and every organization” (n.d.) to partake in the anticipat-
ed benefits of AI whose effects will supposedly be as far-reaching as that of the 
printing press: 
With the advent of the printing press in the 1400s we have an explosion of infor-
mation—the first democratizing event around access that made it possible for 
humans everywhere to start learning. Access to information has only spread from 
there. [...] The question is, how can we use all we have in terms of computational 
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power to solve this fundamental constraint? To make better sense of the world? 
That’s the essence of what AI is. It’s not about having AI that beats humans in 
games, it’s about helping everyone achieve more — humans and machines wor-
king together to make the world a better place. (Ibid.)
In view of the long history of exaggerated expectations of artificial intelligence, a 
certain skepticism regarding such a claim of a revolutionary caesura is warranted. 
What is more important, nevertheless, is the question how AI is actually made 
accessible, i.e. how democratization is enacted. Once again, the case of Microsoft 
can serve as a paradigmatic example. The company pursues a four-fold strategy: 
(1) utilize AI to develop new modes of interaction with ambient computing tech-
nologies; (2) build intelligence into every application; (3) allow developers to make 
use of these “intelligent capabilities”; (4) make computing infrastructure available 
as a service (ibid.). 
The promise of democratization is directed towards both technology devel-
opers and their users. For developers this democratization entails the possibility 
to make use of AI in their own products and to partake in shaping the future of 
AI by having open or paid access to resources and services such as software li-
braries, pre-trained machine learning models, frameworks, platforms and infra-
structures. Users on the other hand are enlisted in the democratization of AI as 
beneficiaries of technologies that are “infused” (ibid.) with artificial intelligence 
and machine learning. In such technologies, intelligence is typically enacted as a 
wide range of limited scope capabilities and features: software applications that 
play chess or the game of go, cameras that recognize faces and take pictures when 
people are smiling, speakers that are capable to recognize, interpret and execute 
voice-based commands, cars that drive autonomously, chatbots that engage in en-
tertaining, helpful or informative conversations with human beings etc. 
Practices of Machine Learning
The capacities of ML technologies are designed as well as staged to astonish its us-
ers. Among many researchers in the fields of science and technology studies and 
media studies Kate Crawford and Ryan Calo have argued for the “need to assess 
the impact of technologies on their social, cultural and political settings” (2016: 
311). It is, thus, important to gain a critical understanding of machine learning 
technologies in general and the current drive towards democratic AI in particular. 
Such a critical understanding is all the more significant since modern day deep 
neural networks as well as other ML approaches supposedly evade human com-
prehension in principle. 
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Despite the secrecy imposed on algorithmic systems by corporations and the 
intrinsic opacity of machine learning systems (cp. Burrell 2016), there is much to 
know about ML technologies as Adrian Mackenzie eloquently argued: 
Machine learning is hardly obscure or arcane knowledge today. These techniques 
are heavily documented in textbooks […], in how-to books […], and numerous video 
and website tutorials, lectures and demonstrations […]. We can more or less read 
about and indeed play about with implementations in sof tware […]. (2015: 431p.)
Drawing on such diverse resources Mackenzie himself became a critical student, 
practitioner and investigator of multiple situated, hybrid machine learning prac-
tices. In Machine Learners Mackenzie presents a hands-on inquiry of “machine 
learning as a form of knowledge production and a strategy of power” (ibid.: 9). 
Following Foucault’s notion of archaeology Mackenzie unfolds an archaeology of 
six operational formations that are central to ML: 
vectorization, optimization, probabilization, pattern recognition, regularization, 
and propagation. These generic operations intersect in a diagram of machine le-
arning spanning hardware and sof tware architectures, organizations of data and 
datasets, practices of designing and testing models, intersections between scien-
tific and engineering disciplines, and professional and popular pedagogies. (Ibid.: 
18)
The approach to inquire machine learning not from afar, but by “learning to ma-
chine learn” (ibid.: 18) resonates well with Wendy Chuns claim “that software can 
only be understood in media res” (Chun 2008: 323). In the middle of things that 
constitute ML today Mackenzie engages not only with textbooks, tutorials, math-
ematical formulae, algorithms, and data sets, but also with numerous software 
libraries. While code libraries and programming frameworks are often refer-
enced as crucial infrastructural elements of today’s software culture they are 
hardly studied closely in critical research (cp. Berry 2011; Marino 2014). Machine 
Learners, too, acknowledges the importance of code libraries frequently, but does 
not research them in detail. In passing, however, Mackenzie offers some valu-
able insights into how code libraries and programming frameworks shape ma-
chine learning practices by crystallizing “a repertoire of standard operations, 
patterns, and functions for reshaping data and constructing models that classify 
and predict events and associations among things, people, processes, and so on” 
(Mackenzie 2017: 23). Their architecture “classifies and orders” (ibid.: 77) machine 
learning as a field of interrelated practices as much as a domain of knowledge pro-
duction. They constitute the “accumulating sediment of coding and related data 
practices […] in which machine learners take root” (ibid.: 23). For Mackenzie the 
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implementation and widespread use of code libraries are, thus, articulations of 
contemporary coding cultures.
Code libraries provide resources that developers can draw from and build 
upon. By offering predefined functions and functionalities they relieve develop-
ers from building software from the ground up. At the same time code libraries 
impose their functional logics and practical affordances on developers. In this re-
gard code libraries can be considered as media of “co-operative action” consisting 
of accumulative resources that can be laminated into operational software (Good-
win 2018: 129). However, code libraries are sites of cooperation as well. They are 
created, contributed to, maintained, updated and deprecated in the “recursive 
publics” (Kelty 2008: 28) of code-sharing platforms such as GitHub.2 
As the “Facebook of coding” (Wulf 2017) GitHub today hosts more than 96 mil-
lion repositories (GitHub 2019), most of them contain codes or coding related re-
sources. For today’s coding culture GitHub serves as a center of gravity for hosting 
open and closed source software projects as well as for finding, contributing and 
debating code resources including libraries and frameworks (Mackenzie 2018). 
This applies in particular to current developments in ML. Yet, how exactly does ML 
as a practice and field take shape on GitHub? How do algorithmic techniques for 
ML, data sets, machine learned models and other resources circulate on GitHub? 
Which actors are involved in shaping this space of cooperation, exchange and ne-
gotiation and which strategies of power are deployed? Or to put it differently: How 
is the democratization of AI enacted on the infrastructural level of code and cod-
ing sharing practices?
Mapping the Democratization of AI in Code
For mapping the numerous heterogenous articulations and manifestations of 
machine learning and artificial intelligence on GitHub researchers can make use 
of the application programming interface (API) provided by the platform which 
allows for the retrieval of repository metadata that match certain search criteria, 
like specific keywords contained in the repositories description or topics assigned 
to the repository by its creator.3 However, the GitHub search API poses certain 
restrictions: it allows only for a limited number of keywords per query and returns 
only a maximum of 1.000 results for each query. While this might be sufficient 
to explore the most visible projects on GitHub for a specific keyword in regard to 
2  For a discussion of the relevance of version control systems and GitHub for contemporary coding 
cultures see Burkhardt (2019) and Mackenzie (2017, 2018).
3  A similar mapping of cultures of coding and sharing has been undertaken by Kollanyi (2016) in 
respect to Bots.
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the number of forks or stars a repository received, this limitation disregards the 
variety of keywords associated with ML and AI as well as the long tail of software 
development and code sharing practices in the field of ML. In order to map the 
enactments and materializations of machine learning more comprehensively a 
search tactic must be deployed that charts the space of ML and AI related repos-
itories iteratively by identifying and working through an extensive list of search 
terms and by restricting the search parameters (programming languages, num-
bers of forks, received stars and size) step by step: 
 search terms
 search terms + programming language
 search terms + programming language + fork count
 search terms + programming language + fork count + star count
 search terms + programming language + fork count + star count + size
This search tactic provides a snapshot view of a dynamically changing environ-
ment. The results remain incomplete, but are more comprehensive than the de-
fault limit of 1.000 results per query.4 What is left out and remains invisible in 
principle are all the private repositories hosted on GitHub.
Assembling a dataset is all but the first step in mapping the enactments of 
machine learning in contemporary coding culture. The dataset contains 211.802 
unique repositories.5 Among those 41.818 contain artificial intelligence6 as a key-
word and 103.344 machine learning7. Remarkably only 3.064 repositories refer-
ence both conceptual fields although in public discourse the current summer of AI 
is largely attributed to developments in the area of machine learning. 
4  Certain gaps in the result sets can be pinned down precisely: The result limit is exceeded for 
programming languages like Python that have neither been forked nor received a star and are 
relatively small (in the case of Python it is 0, 1, 2, 3 …, 11 KB). However, in other cases gaps emerge 
as inconsistencies between the supposed number of results returned by the GitHub API and the 
actual number of results retrieved.
5  Search terms: ai, dl, nn, ml, artificial-intelligence, artificialintelligence, artificial intelligence, 
machine learning, machinelearning, machine-learning, machine intelligence, deep learning, 
deep-learning, deeplearning, neural nets, neuralnets, neural-nets, neural net, neuralnet, neu-
ral-net, neural networks, neuralnetworks, neural-networks, neural network, neuralnetwork, 
neural-network, neural, bigdl, caf fe, caf fe2, cntk, coreml, deeplearning4j, keras, lasagne, mlib, 
mlpack, moa, mocha.jl, mxnet, neon, Paddle Paddle, pylearn, pylearn2, pytorch, scikit-learn, sho-
gun, singa, tensorflow, tflearn, theano.
6  Variations considered: artificial intelligence, artificial-intelligence, artificialintelligence, ai.
7  Variations considered: machine learning, machine-learning, machinelearning, ml.















Fig. 1: Distribution of top 10 programming languages used in the retrieve repositories.
Machine learning and artificial intelligence materializes in a range of program-
ming languages. Python (together with Python-based Juypter Notebooks) is by far 
the most often used programming language for ML. Remarkably this is followed 
by eleven percent HTML repositories. As will be discussed later this is because not 
all repositories on GitHub contain code as a resource. Many contain informational 
and educational resources such as tutorials, book manuscripts, research papers, 
course materials or collections of links. 
The popularity or relevance of repositories can be inferred from the number of 
forks as well as stars they received. In the context of GitHub in particular and the 
Git version control system in general forks are copies of a repository. Forking con-
stitutes a central practice in Git-based collaboration: “Most commonly, forks are 
used to either propose changes to someone else’s project or to use someone else’s 
project as a starting point for your own idea” (GitHub a). Stars on the other hand 
are platform specific indicators of some kind of interest of users in a repository: 
“You can star repositories and topics to keep track of projects you find interesting 
and discover related content in your news feed” (GitHub b).
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Fig. 2: Distribution of forks by repository
The distribution of stars and forks across repositories adheres to the power law. 
Only few repositories gain high visibility, while the largest number of reposito-
ries has no forks and received little to no stars. The long tail of machine learning 
is a space of testing out, experimenting with and learning by doing. This space, 
however, is also populated with course assignments, original research in progress, 
personal collections of resources on machine learning, and new, emerging, failed 
or abandoned code libraries. Among the more than 200.000 unique repositories 
that were retrieved for this article less than 0.8 percent have more than 100 or 
more forks and only 1.8 percent received 100 or more stars.
Total number ≥100 forks ≥100 stars
Artificial intelligence repositories 41.818 284 593
Machine learning repositories 103.344 799 1.677
Deep learning repositories 33.749 857 1.842
Neural network repositories 46.681 558 1.365
All repositories 211.802 1.751 3.951
High level observations on the use of programming languages or the distribution 
of popularity offer some initial insights into how artificial intelligence and ma-
chine learning is articulated on GitHub. A more detailed analysis of the 200 most 
often forked and starred repositories, however, reveals the heterogeneity and 
diversity of resources developed, published, collaborated, maintained, debated, 
updated and downloaded. Among those top 200 repositories are 42 that can be 
categorized as code libraries or programming frameworks. However, more than 
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fifty percent contain informational and educational resources. About 15 percent 
of the repositories provide reference implementations for algorithms, machine 
learned models for specific application domains or software applications based on 
machine learning. And only few provide infrastructural resources, programming 











The informational and educational resources address a range of distinct audienc-
es like machine learning beginners, learners of a framework, machine learning 
professionals as well as researchers. As a result, some repositories provide re-
sources on the fundamentals of machine learning, materials for online courses, 
tutorials for different code libraries or introductory book publications. Others are 
framed as collections, comprehensive lists or curated lists on machine learning in gen-
eral, state of the art research or more specific topics like infrastructures. In part 
these resources are created, assembled and provided by individual developers, re-
searchers or authors. Yet, many informational and educational repositories are 
created and maintained by corporations to educate users about and recruite them 
for their products. The repository amazon-sagemaker-examples8 released by Amazon 
Web Services Labs for example contains basic information and training materials 
on using the companies SageMaker platform for the training, optimization and 
deployment of machine learning models. Here the infrastructural complexities 
of machine learning practices become visible. Understood as a mode of databased 
programming machine learning relies on large scale processing capacities that 
today are provided as cloud computing services—a market dominated by global 
technology corporations like Amazon, Microsoft, Google, IBM etc. (Flexera 2019). 
What is more, engaging with the rich diversity of educational and informational 
resources reveals the central role of programming libraries for coding cultures. 
Learning to machine learn is deeply intertwined with learning to make use of code 
8  https://aws.amazon.com/de/sagemaker/
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libraries and frameworks. While there are repositories dedicated to do “Machine 
Learning From Scratch”9, educational resources promising information on how to 
do machine learning with library x or framework y are more common. 
The variety of repositories with informational resources is ref lected in the het-
erogeneity of code repositories. Today, by far the most popular repository in ma-
chine learning and artificial intelligence is the TensorFlow framework.10 Initially 
developed by Google Brain for internal use the framework has been released in 
2015 as open source by Google and is since maintained by the company, but it has 
attracted a large number of external contributors as well. TensorFlow is a frame-
work for deep learning that mainly supports the training and deployment of neu-
ral networks and is, thus, dedicated to a specific paradigm of machine learning 
that has become dominant throughout the past decade. Other popular libraries 
such as scikit-learn11 focus on other areas of machine learning and in consequence 
support a broader range of approaches.12 While it is possible to implement basic 
neural networks with scikit-learn they play a somewhat marginal role in this li-
brary. This is underlined by the missing support for deep and reinforcement learn-
ing as well as the use of GPU hardware (scikit-learn 2019, 5 and 7). TensorFlow and 
scikit-learn, thus, are different articulations and materializations of machine 
learning. Yet, they are similar in that they can both be considered as general-pur-
pose frameworks, i.e. they are not explicitly focused on specific application do-
mains. 
A number of special-purpose machine learning libraries have gained a relative-
ly high popularity as well. Among them are the Unity ML-Agents Toolkit13, OpenCV14, 
and the ChatterBot15 and Rasa16 frameworks. The ML-Agents Toolkit allows the im-
plementation of so-called machine learning agents in the Unity game engine. As 
a plugin for a development environment for games the toolkit is of course aimed 
at this application area, but also allows for the development of algorithms for ro-
botics or the training of self-driving cars in virtual environments (cp. Unity n.d.). 
Chatterbot and Rasa are frameworks for the implementation of AI-based chatbots. 
Machine learning here articulates itself as the use of pretrained models for nat-
ural language understanding and dialogue management as well as the ongoing 
9  https://aws.amazon.com/eriklindernoren/ML-From-Scratch
10  https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow
11  https://github.com/scikit-learn/scikit-learn 
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improvement of such models based on training data gathered in beta tests and 
during real world deployment. By providing code resources for the development 
of domain specific software, such frameworks are not for machine learning in 
general, but have some element of machine learning build in. This raises the ques-
tion how special-purpose frameworks structure machine learning practices in 
specific ways as well as how they prescribe the operational logics and performanc-
es of applications created with them. In the case of chatbots that is to ask how 
conversationality and communicability is inscribed by such frameworks. 
In addition to general-purpose and special-purpose libraries at least a third 
type can be distinguished which could be called meta-libraries. A popular example 
for this kind of library is Keras17. It is built on top of the deep learning frameworks 
TensorFlow, Theano18 and CNTK19 and provides a unified interface to a multiplicity 
of different code libraries. Keras, thus adds an abstraction layer which serves as 
frontend to the backend of multiple deep learning libraries. Two of those libraries 
are developed by global corporations—Google in the case of TensorFlow and Mi-
crosoft in the case of CNTK (Cognitive Toolkit). The third framework was mainly 
developed in academic contexts and is maintained by the Montreal Institute for 
Learning Algorithms. The end of its active development has been announced in 
2017 citing among other reasons that “strong industrial players are backing dif-
ferent software stacks in a stimulating competition” (Bengio 2017). Indeed, large 
global digital technology companies compete in the space of open source machine 
learning libraries with respective frameworks. PyTorch20 (Facebook), Neo-AI-DLR21 
(Amazon), Aerosolve22 (AirBnB) as well as the already mentioned frameworks Ten-
sorFlow (Google) and CNTK (Microsoft) are just a few examples. The release of 
machine learning libraries in open source by Google, Facebook, Amazon, Micro-
soft etc. can be understood as an effort towards the democratization of AI. At 
the same time, the open source coding culture has become a space of corporate 
intervention and competition. How this affects the future of machine learning 
technologies as well as the ways in which machine learning will be built into the 
fabric of our technological world are questions that remain unanswered. Critical 
research, thus, needs to attend even more closely to the logics and politics of code 
libraries and programming frameworks.
17  https://github.com/keras-team/keras
18  https://github.com/Theano/Theano
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On the Media-political Dimension    
of Artificial Intelligence 
Deep Learning as a Black Box and OpenAI1
Andreas Sudmann
Neither machines nor programs are black boxes; they are artifacts that have been 
designed, both hardware and sof tware, and we can open them up and look inside. 
(Allen Newell/ Herbert A. Simon 1997 [1976], 82)
What does it mean to critically explore the media-political dimension of modern 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology? Rather than examining the political as-
pects of specific AI-driven applications like image or speech recognition systems, 
the main focus of this essay is on the political implications of AI’s technological 
infrastructure itself, especially with regard to the machine learning approach that 
since around 2006 has been called Deep Learning (in short: DL, also known as 
the simulation of neural networks or Artificial Neural Networks—ANNs). First, 
this essay discusses whether ANN/DL has to be perceived as a fundamentally 
opaque or ‘black box’ technology, perhaps inaccessible or only partially accessible 
to human understanding. Second, and in relation to the first question, the aim 
is to take a critical look at the agenda and activities of a research company called 
OpenAI that purpotedly promotes the democratization of AI and tries to make 
technologies like DL more accessible and transparent. Obviously, such idealistic 
claims should not simply be taken for granted, especially if one takes into account 
the large amount of capital invested in a company like OpenAI. For example, strat-
egies like open-sourcing AI seem more likely to serve the purpose of demonstrat-
ing those companies’ technological potential, to one-up each other, and/or to at-
tract rare talents. But perhaps even more important than simply questioning the 
authenticity or ideological implications of such claims, we have to address more 
fundamental problems here: How can one contribute to the transparency and ac-
1  This is a slightly revised and extended version of an essay that has been published under the 
same title in: Ramón Reichert, Mathias Fuchs (Ed.), Rethinking AI. Neural Networks, Biopolitics and 
the New Artificial Intelligence, Digital Culture & Society 4/1, 2018, pp.181-200.
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cessibility of a black box that—perhaps—cannot be opened at all? And can there be 
a democratization of AI without a democratization of data in general?
1. The so-called “AI revolution”
Before addressing these questions, it is important to recapitulate how DL recently 
managed to become the dominant paradigm of AI. An event of major importance 
in this respect happened in 2012. Back then, three scholars from the University of 
Toronto, Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey Hinton, for the first time 
effectively trained a so-called Convolutional Neural Network, which is a special 
variant of a traditional Artificial Neural Network (ANN) optimized for image and 
object recognition, on the basis of the now famous database ImageNet as well as 
on fast parallel-organized GPU processors (cf. Huang 2016). The substantial em-
ployment of GPUs made all the difference: The Toronto team was able to reduce 
the error rate of previous approaches in image recognition by more than the half.2 
While this increase may not sound very impressive, it was big enough to attract 
the attention of leading IT companies like Google and Facebook, which quickly 
hired leading scientists like Yann LeCun and Geoffrey Hinton and also acquired 
AI start-up companies such as DNNResearch and DeepMind. The strong interest 
of these companies in DL technology was no surprise since they were already har-
nessing big data, and now would have access to a powerful technology to process 
and harness it intelligently (cf. Reichert 2014). For example, thanks to DL it is pos-
sible to automatically tag images uploaded by users on social media-platforms, or 
to analyse consumer behaviour to generate individualized ads, or make person-
alized recommendations. Of course, there are many other application areas for 
which DL/ANN technology is currently used: e.g. to process the sensory data of 
self-driving cars, to analyse data for stock market predictions, or for optimised 
machine translations, etc. In general, DL algorithms are a universal instrument 
for pattern-recognition and prediction tasks, an effective tool to manage uncer-
tainty and fuzziness in data content (Goodfellow/Bengio/Courville 2016).
However, it took a while until modern machine learning algorithms were able 
to unfold their potential. Some of the technological essentials of DL were already 
developed in the 1940s and 1950s (cf. Sudmann 2016). Already back then, the basic 
idea of this AI paradigm was to develop a computer system that should be able 
to learn by observation and experience to solve specific problems or fulfil certain 
learning tasks, without having concrete rules or theories guiding the process 
2  Over a period of just seven years, the accuracy in classifying objects in the dataset rose from 
71.8% to 97.3%. Not least due to his high value, 2017 was the last year of this famous competition. 
Cf.  Gershgorn (2017) for the details.
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(Mitchell 1997). This is the basic approach of every existing machine learning sys-
tem, as opposed to so-called symbolic, rule-based forms of AI systems whose in-
telligent behaviour typically is more or less hand-coded in advance (Boden 2014). 
Even though there are many ML approaches out there, it recently turned out that 
DL methods are the most effective ones, at least with regard to key areas of AI 
research like natural language processing and computer vision.
Very broadly speaking, one of the key characteristics of DL is that it is a class 
of techniques that are loosely inspired by the structure and learning processes of 
biological neural networks (Alpaydin 2016). As with other machine learning tasks, 
DL algorithms learn by analysing thousands, if not millions of training data on 
the basis of thousands or even millions of iterations up until the very moment the 
system is able to predict unseen data correctly. Yet what distinguishes DL from 
other machine learning approaches is the hierarchical distribution of its learning 
process. DL technology simulates networks typically consisting of millions of ar-
tificial neurons that are organized on different layers—an input, an output and a 
f lexible number of intermediate hidden layers (Trask et al. 2015). If a network is 
called deep, it has at least two or more intermediate layers that process the infor-
mation through the network. On the lowest level of layers, the network analyses 
very simple forms of input (for example, lines and edges, in case of visual data) 
and forwards this information to the next level of layers, which processes more 
complicated forms (for example, parts of the object like a face or legs) and again 
forwards this information to the next highest level, all the way up to the final lay-
er, the output layer, which than can predict if a certain unknown input correctly 
matches with a certain output (does the image show a certain object or not?).  
2. The Media-politics of Deep Learning
It is also not very surprising that the current AI boom quickly started to attract the 
attention of the humanities and social sciences, whereas before 2016 many disci-
plines outside the hard sciences more or less ignored machine learning technolo-
gies like DL/ANN. Of course, there has been a long tradition of an inter- and trans-
disciplinary debate concerning the potentials and limits of AI (cf. Weizenbaum 
1976, Searle 1980), yet those discussions typically did not address the technology of 
ANN in any great detail. There are some important exceptions to highlight in this 
respect, especially the discourses of philosophy of mind as well as cognitive psy-
chology, which very early developed an interest in both the symbolic and connec-
tionist forms of AI (cf. Horgan/Tienson 1996, Haugeland 1997).  Furthermore, even 
in the field of media studies, one can find a few cases where scholars have been 
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discussing ANN technology.3 One example is the introduction of Computer als Me-
dium (1994), an anthology co-edited by Friedrich Kittler, Georg Christoph Tholen, 
and Norbert Bolz. Interestingly enough, the text (written by Bolz only) somehow 
captures the epistemic relevance of the connectionist paradigm of AI, yet does so 
without exploring the details of its media-theoretical or -historical implications. 
In the last two years or so (more or less after the success of DeepMind’s Alpha-
Go), the situation has changed significantly. More and more books and articles are 
published, for instance in the humanities that tackle the topic of AI in general and 
DL technology in particular (Sudmann 2016, Pasquinelli 2017, Finn 2017, McKenzie 
2017, Engemann/Sudmann 2018). For example, Pasquinelli (2017) recently wrote a 
short essay on ANN from a historical and philosophical perspective, arguing (with 
reference to Eco and Peirce) that the technology can only manage inductive rea-
soning, whereas it is incapable of what Peirce calls abductive reasoning. Further-
more, there are authors like Nick Bostrom (2014), Ed Finn (2017), or Luciano Floridi 
(2017) who are already very much engaged in the political and ethical discussion 
of current AI technologies. For example, Nick Bostrom’s book Superintelligence: 
Paths, Dangers, Strategies (2014) attracted much public attention, partly because of 
its alarmist thesis that the technological development of a super machine intelli-
gence is mankind’s greatest threat, which was later echoed by a twitter post from 
Elon Musk. Yet, not everyone concerned with the political and ethical aspects of 
AI shares these apocalyptical views. Luciano Floridi, for instance, is convinced 
that humankind is able to handle an AI-driven society as long as we instantiate a 
“system of design, control, transparency and accountability overseen by humans” 
(2017: online).
Yet, what is still widely missing in the intellectual debate is a discussion of 
AI/DL from a decidedly media-political perspective. But what does such a focus 
involve, and why do we need it in the first place?  To begin with, there are—of 
course—many different ways to think about the media-political dimension of AI 
in general and DL in particular. For example, one possible approach would be to 
claim that “media politics” as an analytical agenda is concerned with the media-
tion of politics and/or the historical relationship of media and politics (cf. Dahl-
berg/Phelan 2011). Based on such an account, one could ask, for instance, how AI/ 
DL technology inscribes itself in relations of media and politics, or how it partic-
ipates in the mediation of politics. In both cases, we might assume that a) media/
mediation and politics are basically distinct concepts, and that b) possible analyt-
ical perspectives are very much shaped and guided by our basic understanding 
of these terms in the first place (including to perceive AI technology itself as a 
medium).
3  Of course, there are some more publications from a media studies perspective that deal with AI 
technology in general, for example: Dotzler 2006.
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Yet another possible approach would be to claim that media have an inherently 
political dimension (and, similarly, one could claim that nothing political exists 
outside a medium or certain media). Still, the question remains if this is true for 
every concept of media or medium or just particular ones. But this is a rather the-
oretical discussion, since most concepts of media politics are more or less based 
on a traditional understanding of media as mass or popular media (cf. Zaller 1999, 
Dahlberg/Phelan 2011).4
In the context of this essay, my understanding of a media-political account, 
however, is a broader and in a certain light more basic one. Such a theoretical per-
spective, as I like to conceptualize it, is not so much concerned with the represen-
tations or visible interfaces of AI, but more interested in the political implications 
and effects of the medial infrastructure and entities that generate and shape the 
technology (also regardless of particular ‘use cases’).5 In other words, what I am 
interested in are—what I like to call—the infra-medial conditions of modern AI tech-
nology and their political dimension.6 For me, every entity involved in the process 
of generating and shaping AI technology can generally be perceived as a medi-
ator (cf. Latour 2005). And generally, every mediator of technology also matters 
in political terms. However, not every mediator can be equally conceptualized as 
a medium, at least not if one applies a more narrow understanding of the term, 
for example, to regard media as entities or dispositifs that enable communication 
or that store, process, or transmit information.7 For this very reason, it generally 
makes sense to differentiate between the concepts of mediator(s) and medium/
media. 
Yet while I argue that we need such a distinction, I am nevertheless quite scep-
tical about using a stabile concept of the term “medium” or “media” (even though 
it would make the task of differentiating both terms much easier). In my mind, in 
4  Accordingly, one possible approach would be to examine the politics of representation of dif fer-
ent AI technologies in popular media like film and television.
5  For a similar account, using the term “media infrastructures” as a critical concept, cf. Parks/ Sta-
rosielski (2015).
6  Such a perspective is not directly concerned with a specific theoretical framework. Generally, this 
focus is compatible with many analytical approaches like media archaeology, historical episte-
mology, or actor-network theory. The prefix “infra” highlights to look at media (operating) on a 
level that is generally invisible (for example on the level of code).
7  This is a dif ferent account of how media can be conceptualized with reference to Latour’s dif-
ferentiation between “mediators” and “intermediaries”. For Latour, an “intermediary [..] is what 
transports meaning or force without transformations” opposed to “mediators” that “transform, 
translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are opposed to carry” (2005: 39). 
Intermediaries function in a certain sense as black boxes,  since their input allows you to predict 
the respective output (without having knowledge of the object’s internal operations). In opposi-
tion to that, in case of mediators, despite the specific nature of a certain input, it is never easy to 
predict the respective output (ibid., cf. also Thielmann 2013).
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order to make sense of our empirical world’s entities (including the immaterial 
world of our thoughts), the terms media and/or medium are more productive in 
analytical terms if one regards them as f lexible epistemological-heuristic rather 
than fixed categories.8 Accordingly, media theory, as I advocate it, can be under-
stood as the general task to explore in what different ways the world is perceivable 
as a medium or as media (with certain characteristics, functions, inscriptions) 
rather than simply acknowledging that everything out there in the world depends 
on media or a medium in some ontologically stabile sense (as a precondition of 
entities to be visible, to be perceivable, or to have a certain form etc.). Hence, even 
though I opt for a concept of media politics that examines the constitutive role of 
mediators (and of specific media), I still advocate a rather open analytical focus that 
leaves room for very different perspectives.
The latter position seems also to be an instructive approach with regard to the 
political dimension of media politics. For example, we can quite easily claim that 
almost everything about AI is political, especially if one believes that AI/DL tech-
nology affects every aspect of our social and cultural existence. At the same time, 
the political challenges that AI and DL technology hold for us are very different 
in nature (the existential threat of AI-driven autonomous weapon systems, AI’s 
inf luence on the future of work, etc.), which is why we cannot simply refer to a 
master account of political theory suitable for each and every problem. To provide 
another example: When designing autonomous weapon systems, there is obvi-
ously a strong political interest involved in keeping hidden the mediators of the 
production of these technologies, as well as their functioning. On the other hand, 
with regard to the question of how AI affects the future of work, for example, it 
may be more important to make all mediators involved in this process as transpar-
ent and accessible as possible.
Such a plea does not mean that “anything goes” in terms of how we should 
address the politics of AI/DL.  Instead, I argue that one should—first of all—try to 
explore how contemporary AI technologies emerge as political phenomena (before 
we apply a certain political theory to AI). This focus entails many relevant aspects, 
including the analysis of ways in which computer scientists themselves conceptu-
alize AI technology as a political subject.
In this context, one should also keep mind that the subjects of machine learn-
ing in general and ANN/DL in particular are, again, still an unknown territory 
for most scholars working in the humanities or social sciences, even if they have 
already studied AI. What this basically means is that it might take a while until 
disciplines like media or cultural studies are really able to evaluate the relevant 
8  There are perhaps many approaches to justify such a concept of media-thinking. Obviously, we 
can again refer to Latour’s category of “mediators”. A similar theoretical reference in this context 
is also Vogl’s term of “becoming-media” (2008).  
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political and/or ethical aspects of DL’s technologies and infrastructures. Obvious-
ly, this problem is also a central factor in discussing AI/DL as a black box and in 
evaluating projects like OpenAI at some point. For many scholars in the field, it 
is one of media studies’ central tasks to focus on processes of knowledge transla-
tion or transformation and to analyse, from a kind of meta-perspective, how the 
knowledge of one discipline is used, adapted, and reconfigured by another disci-
pline (cf. for example Bergermann/Hanke 2017: 127). But how can media studies 
provide relevant insights into the black box problem of AI/DL if even computer 
or data scientists have profound trouble dealing with it? Obviously, media stud-
ies has nothing or little to contribute towards opening this black box in technical 
terms, yet it can perhaps shed light on different aspects: for example, exploring 
the problem’s complex network of socio-cultural conditions, implications, and 
effects. Furthermore, media studies can—of course—critically investigate how 
data scientists treat AI and its black box problem as a political concern. But in 
order to do so, let’s recapitulate what it means—or better—what it could mean to 
perceive certain entities of our empirical worlds as black boxes.
3. Deep Learning: A Black Box that Cannot be Opened?
There are some debates going on about the exact origins of the term black box. 
Philipp von Hilgers has explored the history of the concept and traced it back to 
the history of World War II, more precisely to the technology of the magnetron 
(Hilgers 2009). Since then, the concept has been applied and specified in very 
different contexts with opposed meanings. On the one hand, it can refer to the 
data-monitoring systems in planes or cars; on the other hand, it encompasses sys-
tems whose inner operations are opaque or inaccessible and thus only observable 
by their inputs and outputs (cf.  Pasquale 2015: 3). One early definition of the term 
black box has been provided by Norbert Wiener, in a footnote of the preface added 
to the 1961 edition of his famous book Cybernetics (1948): “I shall understand by a 
black box a piece of apparatus [...] which performs a definite operation [...] but 
for which we do no necessarily have any information of the structure by which 
this operation is performed” (p. xi).9 Last but not least, as Latour explains, one 
has to consider that the operations of science and technology always have a black 
boxing effect: “When a machine runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, 
one need focus only on its inputs and outputs and not on its internal complexity. 
Thus, paradoxically, the more science and technology succeed, the more opaque 
and obscure they become” (Latour 1999: 99). Prima facie, this also seems to be true 
9  Towards this definition, cf. W. Ross Ashby’s 1956 book An Introduction to Cybernetics.
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for DL systems. And yet, as opposed to other forms of technology, the case of DL 
technology seems to be different. 
Typically, independent of the black boxing effect just mentioned, many, if not 
most operations of technology used in practice are in one way or the other acces-
sible to human understanding and explanation. In contrast, DL algorithms seem 
to be a black box that cannot be opened. At least this is what several experts cur-
rently identify as one of AI’s biggest problems. But is it actually true that DL is a 
fundamental opaque technology and if so, to what degree? And even if this is the 
case, can’t we simply accept ANN to be an opaque technology as long as it works 
smoothly? The latter question may appear less complicated to answer than the first 
one. In fact, there already seems to be a large consensus among many scientists, 
politicians, and leading IT companies to develop a responsible or ethical AI, and 
making the technology more accountable is one essential part of this endeavor. 
This broad consensus is, of course, no surprise. It’s one thing if an AI/DL sys-
tem comes up with a disappointing movie recommendation, but if we use intelli-
gent machines for more serious matters concerning questions of life or death, the 
story is a completely different one. As Tommi Jaakkola, computer scientist at MIT, 
recently pointed out: “Whether it’s an investment decision, a medical decision, 
or maybe a military decision, you don’t want to just rely on a ‘black box’ method” 
(Knight 2017).
For this reason, it might not be enough knowing that the predictions of your 
AI/ DL system are sufficiently accurate. Furthermore, you want to understand 
why the system comes up with a certain prediction. Both aspects seem highly rel-
evant to secure trust in an AI-driven decision. Yet, to grasp the meaning of AI’s 
prediction models seems to be rather challenging. To illustrate this last point: Re-
cently, researchers at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai developed an 
AI program called “Deep Patient”. The system is able to identify different forms 
of diseases and even early indications of psychiatric disorders like schizophrenia 
astonishingly well, yet they still do not have a clue how this is possible. Of course, 
Deep Patient can be of great help for doctors, but they need the system to provide 
a rationale for its predictions, so that they have a solid reference for the medical 
treatment of their patients. “We can build these models,” as Joel Dudley, the direc-
tor of biomedical informatics at the Icahn School of Medicine, explains, “but we 
don’t know how they work” (Knight 2017).
In the following, I discuss in how far this assumption, which regularly appears 
in current AI discourses, is somehow misleading and in need of clarification. First, 
one should keep in mind that the math behind current DL technology is rather 
straight forward (cf. Goodfellow/Bengio/Courville 2016). Ultimately, it is a mat-
ter of statistics, albeit an advanced form of statistics. This aspect is important to 
highlight since we can observe a general tendency towards mystifying DL that is 
counterproductive and needs to be contained. Secondly, many experts stress that 
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ANN are in fact an accessible technology, especially if one compares them with bi-
ological neural networks. For example, Roland Memisevic, chief scientist of the 
Toronto-Berlin-based DL company TwentyBN, points out that “DL algorithms are 
at least way more accessible than the human brain, where the neuronal activity 
patterns as well as the transformations effected by learning are, even today, still 
very much opaque. In contrast, if one looks at an ANN model, you can record, ob-
serve, measure everything, down to the smallest detail. For example, it is easy to 
find out which features have falsely resulted in a dog being labelled as a cat, be-
cause certain ear shapes might again and again lead to certain misclassifications” 
(Memisevic 2018,  my own translation). However, what indeed is difficult to under-
stand is the interplay of the artificial neurons, as Memisevic agrees, “since having 
such a great number of neurons that are active in parallel, one is confronted with 
emergent phenomena, whereby the whole encompasses more than the sum of its 
parts” (ibid.).
Thus, while it is certainly true that computer scientists have to deal with what 
is commonly labelled the interpretability problem of DL, it is not as fundamental 
as it is often described in the current discourse (cf. Knight 2017). And, not sur-
prisingly, computer scientists inside and outside the tech industry are currently 
very busy trying to come to terms with this interpretability problem. In fact, re-
searchers have already developed a number of approaches to better understand 
and reverse-engineer DL’s prediction models.
4. Strategies of Explainable AI (XAI)
One example to make not only ANN but machine learning technologies in general 
more accessible is the program Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations 
(LIME), developed by Marco Tulio Riberio, Sameer Singh, and Carlos Guestrin. 
The authors describe it as “a technique to explain the predictions of any machine 
learning classifier, and evaluate its usefulness in various tasks related to trust” 
(Riberio/Singh/Guestrin 2016). The basic idea behind LIME is to change different 
forms of inputs (e.g. texts or images) to the AI system in such a way that one can 
observe if and how these variations of the input have an impact on the output. A 
recent article in the journal Science explains how LIME works in practice, with ref-
erence to an ANN that is fed with movie reviews:
[A neural network] ingests the words of movie reviews and flags those that are po- 
sitive. Ribeiro’s program, called Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations 
(LIME), would take a review flagged as positive and create subtle variations by de-
leting or replacing words. Those variants would then be run through the black box 
to see whether it still considered them to be positive. On the basis of thousands of 
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tests, LIME can identify the words—or parts of an image or molecular structure, or 
any other kind of data—most important in the AI’s original judgment. The tests 
might reveal that the word ‘horrible’ was vital to a panning or that ‘Daniel Day Le-
wis’ led to a positive review. (Voosen 2017)
As one already can deduce from this short description, it seems to be an exagger-
ation to claim that this model indeed provides an explanation in any profound 
sense. Basically, it is an ‘experimental system’ that simply highlights those ele-
ments that play an important role in the system’s decision-making process, with-
out actually revealing the reasoning implicit in the prediction model. Without 
access to the latter, however, it is difficult for XAI models to fulfill the great prom-
ises of a democratic AI: To provide full accessibility, transparency and, control.
Another interesting tool that—in a way—helped to make visible how ANNs 
work, is a now famous program called “DeepDream”, introduced by engineers and 
scientists at Google in 2015. DeepDream is a special DL-based image recognition 
algorithm, yet it operates a little bit differently than a typical CNN. First, the algo-
rithm is trained with millions of images that show a particular object (for example, 
a cat) so that, at some point, the NN is able to predict or classify those objects (for 
example, cats) in images which it hasn’t been trained for. After the initial training, 
the network can operate in reverse. Instead of adjusting the weights of a networks 
as would be the standard procedure with the back prop algorithm, the weights 
remain unchanged, and only the input (the original image of a cat) is minimally 
adjusted. This technique has very interesting results if you apply it to images that 
do not contain any cats but are labelled as if they would. In this case, the software 
begins to modify and enhance certain patterns of images so that they start to look 
more and more like a cat, yet not similar to any particular existing one in our em-
pirical world, but like a cat the way a neural network has learned to perceive, if not 
to say: dream it. As a result of this process, the system produces images that have 
a surreal and grotesque quality: for example, a photograph of a pizza can entail 
many little dog faces or you can also turn the Mona Lisa into a LSD-like halluci-
natory nightmare.10 The generated images reveal at least two interesting aspects: 
On the one hand, they show that DL is not an entirely mysterious technology in 
so far as the algorithm enhances familiar visual features. On the other hand, the 
images illustrate how differently the algorithm works in comparison to human 
perception, foregrounding, in other words, that it might focus on aspects of an 
image to which we usually, as humans, do not pay attention (cf. Knight 2017). But 
does DeepDream also contribute to the democratization of AI? There are certainly 
10  For a critical perspective on DeepDream from a media-theoretical and psychoanalytical per-
spective, cf. Apprich (2017). The following website shows some examples for the use of the Deep-
Dream algorithm: https://deepdreamgenerator.com/#gallery
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good reasons to be sceptical here, yet at least DeepDream offers an aesthetic ap-
proach to illustrate the functioning of artificial neural networks and in doing so 
enabling people to ref lect, for instance, on the opacity of DL technologies. And 
DeepDream has perhaps also inspired a number of artists who have been using 
DL techniques in their work for some time. For example, the Parisian artist collec-
tive “Obvious” has explicitly declared that they want to democratize AI with their 
art. The group recently has made headlines by selling, for a considerable sum, a 
portrait at the auction house Christies which they had produced using a so-called 
GAN algorithm.11 
A third potential approach to expose the working mechanisms of a DL system 
is the so-called “Pointing and Justification (PJ-X)” model developed at the Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, and the Max Planck Institute for Informatics (see Park 
et al. [2016]). The model is able to justify its prediction or classification tasks by 
highlighting and documenting the evidence for the algorithmic decision using an 
attention mechanism combined with a natural language explanation. A key ele-
ment of the system is that it is trained with two different data sets. The first one 
is meant to determine what an image shows, while the second one has the func-
tion to reveal why something (i.e., a certain human activity or object) appears in a 
particular image. Thus, the idea is to correlate images that show objects or human 
activities not only with their description (by labelling them), but also with their 
respective explanation. For the latter purpose, each image of the training data 
is associated with three questions as well as with ten answers for each of them. 
On this basis, the system can answer questions like “Is the person in the image 
f lying?” And the answer might be: “No, because the person’s feet are still standing 
on the ground” (cf. Gershgorn 2016). Again, this model—like all of the above—is 
still far away from being able to explain its own internal operations or those of 
different machine (or of another ANN, if you will). Perhaps, this specific capabil-
ity would require that machines develop some kind of self-consciousness, or even 
a meta-consciousness. Before this happens (if this is ever going to happen), DL 
technology needs to understand reasoning, planning, causal relationships, and so 
on. For the moment, the technology of DL or ANN only provides correlations, but 
no profound causal explanations. The latter would, however, be necessary in view 
of the claims to democratize AI, if one takes into account, for example, that laws 
and other forms of regulations and organization definitely require causal expla-
nations. However, as long as DL models cannot adaeuqately address problems of 
causality, it is misleading or simply an exaggeration to speak of these approaches 
as forms of XAI.
11  At the same time Obvious was criticized for their project because they did nothing but use a 
foreign algorithm to generate this and other of their portraits.
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5. The Politics of OpenAI
As I indicated earlier, providing models of an explainable and—more generally—a 
responsible AI has some obvious motivations. First and foremost, those who cur-
rently develop DL systems have a strong economic interest to counter the social 
fears and scepticism related to a profoundly opaque AI technology. Nonetheless, 
many scientists and industrial actors underscore the political and ethical impor-
tance of developing an explainable AI beyond the commercial aspects connect-
ed to the interpretability problem described above. One of the most visible and 
powerful actors among those highlighting this agenda is OpenAI that started as a 
“non-profit research company” (self-description)12, also specialized on DL technol-
ogy. Here is how the company outlined its mission goal, shortly after it has been 
founded in October 2015:
Our goal is to advance digital intelligence in the way that is most likely to benefit 
humanity as a whole, unconstrained by a need to generate financial return. Since 
our research is free from financial obligations, we can better focus on a positive 
human impact.
We believe AI should be an extension of individual human wills and, in the spirit 
of liberty, as broadly and evenly distributed as possible. The outcome of this ven-
ture is uncertain and the work is dif ficult, but we believe the goal and the structure 
are right. We hope this is what matters most to the best in the field. (“Introducing 
OpenAI”)
To make sure that OpenAI is “unconstrained by a need to generate financial re-
turn,” the founders of the company, among them, most prominently, Elon Musk 
and Sam Altman, invested more than US$1 billion in this venture. Interestingly 
enough, this initial launch posting does not explicitly or directly refer to what Elon 
Musk has named one of his key motivation for his initial investment in OpenAI, 
namely, that he regards (general) AI to be humanity’s biggest existential threat.13 
This apocalyptic view has been around since the very beginning of AI research and 
even existed before. In fact, as media scholar Bernhard Dotzler already pointed 
at the end of the 1980s, you can find most well-established projections of the fu-
ture of AI already in the work of Alan Turing (cf. Dotzler 1989). And yet, since very 
12  It is worth noting and also telling that OpenAI is now a “capped-profit“ company (cf. Coldewey 
2019: online).
13  In February 2018, Musk announced that he is leaving the board of OpenAI due to a potential 
conflict of interest with his (future) work at Tesla (Vincent 2018).
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recently, the development of AI has given us little reason to expect any dystopian 
‘Terminator’ reality to be just around the corner.  
For the first time in the history of mankind, the current situation might indeed 
be a different one vis-à-vis the undeniable fast progress of current DL technology. 
At least this is what many experts beyond Musk believe to be the case. OpenAI’s 
agenda acknowledges this new situation, but in a more nuanced, less dramatic 
manner:
AI systems today have impressive but narrow capabilities. It seems that we’ll keep 
whittling away at their constraints, and in the extreme case they will reach human 
performance on virtually every intellectual task. It’s hard to fathom how much hu-
man-level AI could benefit society, and it’s equally hard to imagine how much it 
could damage society if built or used incorrectly. (“About OpenAI”)
Indeed, no one is able to foresee the future of AI or can evaluate whether it will 
more likely have a positive or negative effect on society and culture. We might also 
tell ourselves that technology is never inherently good or bad, hence what matters 
only is its specific use. This argument, however, has always been a rather problem-
atic one, since, in fact, it makes a big difference if we deal with nuclear technology 
or, say, wind power. Furthermore, even though it is rather a truism that the future 
is uncertain, we should also not forget that we can never be sure at which concrete 
historical point we might take the wrong path towards harmful applications of AI. 
It is particularly this latter argument that seems to correspond with how OpenAI 
is linking its current agenda to the problem of an unforeseeable future: 
Because of AI’s surprising history, it’s hard to predict when human-level AI might 
come within reach. When it does, it’ll be important to have a leading research 
institution which can prioritize a good outcome for all over its own self-interest. 
(“About OpenAI”)
What is interesting about this passage is the implicit assumption that the whole 
question concerning the drastic negative or positive effects of AI is still a rather 
speculative matter and not so much one that concerns the current state of tech-
nology (“when the human-level AI might come within reach”). While OpenAI is 
right about avoiding any speculative discussion, it seems important to realize 
that DL already has both positive and problematic implications. The technology 
can do many astonishing good things, as it already has become a very powerful and 
also dangerous surveillance technology that expands the possibilities not only to 
(semi-automatically) observe the world (after being trained to do so), but to be able 
to make sense of it. 
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Very recently, it turned out that ANN/DL are not only able to identify objects, 
people, landscapes, and animals (again, after being trained to do so), but that they 
have started to understand quite complex actions and gestures. In other words: 
DL systems have begun to understand what could be called a basic form of com-
mon-sense knowledge of the world. In order to achieve this, the ANN has been 
trained, not with photos, but with hundreds of thousands of short video-clips 
(showing certain activities and hand gestures). Hence, the specificity of media, i.e. 
here the difference between still and moving images as a mediator of DL technol-
ogy, is an essential factor for developing advanced forms of AI.
Ed Finn has recently argued that today’s algorithmic culture is more than 
ever driven by the “the desire to make the world effectively calculable” (2017: 26). 
Without specifically distinguishing them from learning algorithms, he regards 
algorithms in general as “cultural machines” (54) whose operations are very much 
determined by an “ideology of universal computation” (23). Indeed, one could ar-
gue that especially modern DL technology fuels a phantasmatic version of instru-
mental reason, precisely because it reawakens the old dream Leibnizian dream of 
a mathesis universalis, capable of perfectly understanding every aspect of our world. 
But even more, the great promise of DL is not only to make machines understand 
the world, but to make it predictable in ever so many ways: how the stock market 
develops, what people want to buy, if a person is going to die or not, and so on. 
Already at this particular moment in history, we can regard DL as the very technol-
ogy that is capable of parsing complexities that humans aren’t able to cognitively 
process. The algorithmic power of DL lies in its potential to identify patterns by 
learning from the past to evaluate the present in order to master an uncertain 
future. And all of this happens in an ever-faster way. For example, DeepMind just 
presented a new version of its Go-program “AlphaGo Zero” that was able to learn 
the ancient board game in only three days from scratch (without implementing 
any rules how the game works or how it might be played successfully) and man-
aged to win against the older system of 2015/16 (that beat the human world cham-
pion Lee Sedol) by 100 to 0 (Perez 2017). 
The rapid speed of innovations in the field of DL should also remind us to be 
careful about quickly jumping to conclusions about what AI technology is or is not 
able to achieve. Hence, we should not only stop speculating about a distant future 
of AI, but we should also be careful about our sceptical views on what AI systems 
are capable of (or not). In general, we should acknowledge that there is still a lot of 
work for us to do if we are trying to come to terms with the current development of 
AI and machine learning technology. Maybe companies like OpenAI will succeed 
in making AI technology more accessible. But how exactly do they justify their 
central claim of democratizing AI? If we take another look at the company’s offi-
cial website, we will realize that it provides very little information: “We publish at 
top machine learning conferences, open-source software tools for accelerating AI 
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research, and release blog posts to communicate our research” (“About OpenAI”). 
This is basically all the company has to say about its agenda of democratizing AI, at 
least if we just consider the website’s official mission statement. One thing that is 
very remarkable about this passage is the fact that there is nothing special about it. 
Facebook, Microsoft, and many other IT companies basically have the same agen-
da (cf. Boyd 2017).
Of course, one could argue that OpenAI at least started the current wave of 
developing a responsible and safe AI. The more important question, however, is: 
How can OpenAI legitimate its brand image and former status as a non-profit (and 
now cropped-profit) research company when it essentially does what all other big 
players in the AI game are doing—i.e. improving existing technology and/or find-
ing the right path to develop an artificial general intelligence (AGI)? Concerning 
this matter, and very similar to the situation at DeepMind, OpenAI’s research is 
focused on strategies of reinforcement learning in connection with simulations 
(like games) instead of using the common approach of supervised learning that 
depends on correctly labelled data from the empirical world (cf. Rodriguez 2017). 
Within the specific limits of their approach, both OpenAI’s and DeepMind’s agen-
da have been quite successful. Yet, as of now, simulations are still not a suitable 
substitute for empirical learning data. If this turns out to be a permanent prob-
lem, it will have tremendous implications for how we conceive the epistemological 
status of simulations (in many theories and histories of digital and visual culture), 
but this remains to be seen. The reason why I have highlighted this point is a dif-
ferent one: As we just saw, there are many facets to the black box problem of DL. 
It is not my aim to get into every detail of how leading IT companies are currently 
trying to develop highly efficient AGI systems. Instead, what we can learn by tak-
ing a closer look at those different research agendas is the simple fact that DL is 
not a homogeneous approach, but an umbrella term for very different approaches 
to AI research and design.
Furthermore, referring to the heterogeneity of DL is not only important in 
terms of how we address the black box problem of AI, but also for how we can de-
velop a critical perspective on intelligent machines. To provide just one example: 
A few years ago, Alexander Galloway wrote a very interesting article in which he 
politicized the black box by arguing that it is no longer a cipher like the magnetron 
technology during the Second World War, but instead has become a function that 
is more or less completely defined by its inputs and outputs (cf. Galloway 2011: 273). 
By using the term, he does not exclusively mean technical devices but refers to all 
networks and infrastructures of humans, objects, etc. that may interact with each 
other, yet thereby only articulating their external functions. Obviously, Gallo-
way’s concept of the black box shares some similarities with how the term is used 
in the actor-network theory, though with an important difference: According 
to Galloway, the elements of a network that constitute a black box are no longer 
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able to reveal anything about themselves. In other words: He believes that those 
networks have become a black box that cannot be opened (this is also how Hilgers 
defines a black box—as system whose inner processes remain constantly inacces-
sible; cf. Hilgers 2009). Opposed to that, for example, Michel Callon has argued 
that any black box whose actor-network operations do not adequately model the 
working of a system not only can be, but must be cracked open, thereby producing 
a “swarm of new actors” (Callon 1986). At first glance, it seems that that Galloway’s 
concept of black box could be useful to describe the infrastructures and techno-
logical networks mediated by modern DL/ANN algorithms. But this is not as easy 
as it might seem in the first place. Galloway’s model is based on the existence of 
given inputs and outputs. Yet, ANN technology does not always operate with both 
inputs and outputs available. For example, in case of what is called unsupervised 
machine learning, the algorithm is trained without given outputs. Hence, as this 
simple example shows, if we want to understand the nuances of a DL/ML infra-
structure as a black box, Galloway’s intervention might be of limited use. At the 
same time—and this is the aspect where the actor-network theory comes into play 
again—we cannot simply assume that the black box problem as a political (or eth-
ical) issue only concerns the algorithm itself. Instead, the question encompasses 
many different mediators and media: legal aspects, institutional procedures, en-
vironmental issues, existing political as well as legal regulations, and so on.14
These aspects are also important to consider if we think about how DL pro-
grams exhibit racial or gender biases. There was great turmoil when Microsoft’s 
chatbot “Tay” was trained by Twitter users to learn racist, sexist, as well as an-
ti-Semitic statements (Vincent 2016). This scandal has been very insightful, since 
it demonstrates how many of the operations of learning algorithms actually de-
pend on the data and—even more importantly—on the people who label the data, 
at least in the case of supervised learning tasks. In other words: It is not or least 
not su much the algorithms that produce prejudices or political problematic out-
come, but in fact the human actors who design and generate the learning data, 
among them the hundreds or thousands of crowd-workers hired and organized 
through platforms like Amazon Mechanical Turk or CrowdFlower. Thus, if we 
want to talk about a bias problem of AI, we should also address the general struc-
tures of prejudices and ideology that still inform our society and thus the experts 
and workers who design the AI systems. Furthermore, this example clearly shows 
14  In order to shed light on problems of opacity concernin the broad spectrum of mediators, Bur-
rell’s (2016) account of black boxing might be of use, with he breaks into three levels: “(1) opacity 
as intentional corporate or state secrecy, (2) opacity as technical illiteracy, and (3) an opacity 
that arises from the characteristics of machine learning algorithms and the scale required to 
apply them usefully.”
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why it matters to take a closer look at the way certain forms of media act as key 
mediators of modern AI technology.
Without doubt, it is rather short-sighted that the discussion on AI as a black 
box so far has focused almost exclusively on the technological aspects in the nar-
rower sense. This also concerns the critique of a “democratic AI”. For example, phi-
losopher Nick Bostrom recently questioned the whole logic of making AI safer by 
making it more transparent: “If you have a button that could do bad things to the 
world, you don’t want to give it to everyone” (quoted after: Metz 2016). Prima facie, 
this argument may sound convincing, but at the same time, it seems a little bit 
odd. If we think about nuclear weapons, for example, one can easily observe how 
complicated it is to keep a possibly “dangerous button” just for yourself. (We might 
also point to recent discussions here about the US president’s right to decide if he 
uses nuclear weapons as a first strike or not). I do not want to argue that the con-
cept of a balance of deterrence during the Cold War actually had a peace-securing 
effect, nor do I want to put the specific technology of nuclear weapons on the same 
level as AI. I just want to illustrate why the whole practice and discourse of a re-
sponsible or transparent AI may be more complicated than Bostrom’s statement 
suggests. Neither is it true that the only alternative to the idea of a transparent 
AI would be to keep all the relevant knowledge about AI secret. At least, the latter 
strategy cannot be an option for OpenAI, since it would destroy the company’s 
very identity. 
Furthermore, it is important to highlight that as much as the black box prob-
lem does not only concern the technology itself, we also have to acknowledge that 
any attempt to democratize AI cannot just be reduced to activities of open-sourc-
ing the tools and knowledge around its technology (cf. for a further critical view 
on AI  as a black box beyond issues of transparency and accountability: Matzner 
2017). It is not a dystopian position to argue that we already live in a post-priva-
cy age where people have very little control over the processes of data collection, 
storage, processing, and transmission related to their personal lives and activi-
ties. The revelations of Edward Snowden have already confirmed the worst con-
spiracy theories about surveillance to be true (Sprenger 2015). The problem here 
is not only that companies or secret services, or governments in general, collect 
and analyse private data against our will. All too often, many people simply do not 
care enough about the data that they generate and circulate while being online 
or using this or that application. And even if they individually try to protect their 
private information, there is no guarantee that their friends, family, or colleagues 
will do the same.15 These aspects have been the subject of cultural critique long 
before the current AI boom took off. We should therefore not simply discuss how 
15  For example, as it has been revealed during the Cambridge Analytica scandal, the company 
used a back door in the Facebook API from c. 2012-2015 where a Facebook friend’s choice to opt 
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to democratize AI but continue our efforts to secure democratic standards for our 
data-driven world in general. To achieve this goal, linking the political analysis of 
AI with a broader discussion about datafication is nothing more than a first step, 
but arguably a very important one. 
Currently, it is hard to think of any institution or law, globally or locally, that can 
protect us from the dangers of AI as well as the misuse of big data. Neither do we 
have any profound reason to believe that specifically companies like Open-AI, Face-
book, or Google will achieve this goal. At the same time, it is perhaps short-sighted 
to think of these tech companies as the enemies of a democratic digital culture just 
because they are the hegemonic forces that control both the data as well as the intel-
ligent algorithms capable of making sense of it. Obviously, there are dangers of AI 
that are more urgent, for example, if non-democratic states use AI or DL technology 
to oppress political opposition or perhaps terrorists using AI for cyberattacks. This 
threat is not an instance of a big data or AI paranoia: As experts have recently demon-
strated, by only having access to a so-called API, you are able to reverse-engineer ma-
chine learning algorithms with close to 100% accuracy. Hackers are able to steal AI 
technology from IT companies like IBM or Microsoft for whatever their specific goals 
might be (for the technical details, see Claburn 2016). Of course, having a truly open 
AI might solve this particular problem in the first place. But then again, one has to 
ask how we can make sure that an open AI is not used for harmful purposes. 
As of now, OpenAI seems less concerned with any concrete political vision of 
AI and more keen on participating in the competitive race towards developing an 
artificial general intelligence. Hence, it is quite seductive to believe OpenAI’s po-
litical or ethical agenda is basically a PR stunt and nothing else. But instead of 
simply questioning if OpenAI’s concrete practices matches their agenda or not, 
it might be more productive for a media-political account to discuss the politi-
cal implications and effects of a transparent or responsible AI in the context of a 
broader focus: How the technology of learning algorithms reshapes the conditions 
of an instrumental rationality so deeply connected with every aspect of our digital 
culture and society. And this important project just has started.
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How to Safeguard AI
Ina Schieferdecker/Jürgen Großmann/Martin A. Schneider
1. Introduction
Artificial intelligence is a discipline within computer science that deals with the 
development of software-based systems that provide functions which require the 
execution of what is typically called (human) intelligence. However, since there is 
no widely accepted definition of human intelligence, there is also no widely ac-
cepted for artificial intelligence, sometimes also called machine intelligence (Legg, 
2007). AI uses methods and tools from logic, probability theory, and continuous 
mathematics in order to provide perception, reasoning, learning, and action via 
software-based systems (Russell, 2016). And it provides already numerous prac-
tical applications in transportation, energy supply, health services, finance and 
banking as well as law and regulation: “AI technologies already pervade our lives. 
As they become a central force in society, the field is shifting from simply building 
systems that are intelligent to building intelligent systems that are human-aware 
and trustworthy.” (Stone, 2016)
Fig. 1: Functional components in AI by Hammond (2016): Recognition of speech (Sr), 
audio (Ar), face (Fr) and image (Ir) and general recognition (Gr), Identification of speech 
(Si), audio (Ai), face (Fi) and image (Ii) and general identification (Gi); Data analytics 
(Da) and Text extraction (Te); Predictive inference (Pi), Planning (Pl), Explanatory 
inference (Ei), Problem solving (Ps), Synthetic reasoning (Sr), and Decision making 
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(Dm); Language generation (Lg) and understanding (Lu); Relationship learning (Rl), 
Category learning (Cl) and Knowledge refinement (Kr); Mobility at large (Ml) and at 
small (Ms); Manipulation (Ma), Communication (Cm) and Control (Cn), which can be 
used standalone or in combination e.g. to predict future events by recognizing sounds 
of technical systems and/or identifying images representing system states and/or 
correlating data and recognizing specific facts. 
Technologies that are used to build AI by machine learning (in short ML), which is 
about improving problem solving accuracy or efficiency by learning to do some-
thing better, are numerous. Machine learning can e.g. be grouped along the learn-
ing type into methods for supervised, unsupervised or semi-supervised learning 
or along the knowledge extraction by symbolic computation or sub-symbolic pro-
cessing. They can also be grouped along the principal approach, e.g. into regres-
sion, instance-based, regularization, decision tree, Bayesian, clustering,  neural 
network, deep learning, and quite many other algorithms. Based on these, like-
wise numerous AI applications can be developed.  Hammond (2016) presented a 
first taxonomy of AI functional components (Fig. 1). No matter which functional 
components are being used, AI-based systems are realized by use of software or 
also by use of sensors and actuators for the interconnection with the environment 
(Fig. 2). The software uses data which are interpreted by algorithms in order to 
provide automatisms for parts of or for entire processes in technical systems like 
in car engine control or in socio-technical systems like in autonomous driving.
Fig. 2: Elements of sof tware-based systems (WBGU, 2019). Sensors are part of the 
Internet of Things and generate dif ferent kinds of data such as measurements, series 
of measurements or data streams. Algorithms use these data in their computations or 
as training data. The algorithms are constrained by complexity, computability, and 
performance limits and possibly by the (in-)correctness of the implemented computation 
logic and by the (un-)biased (training) data. In result, sof tware-based systems of fer 
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automatisms for which it is essential to agree (and assure) decision sovereignty, 
traceability and fairness. Any decision in respect to the environment can finally be fed 
via sof tware (into the cyberspace) and via actuators (into the environment).
2. Software Verification and Validation
Since any AI is also a software-based system, it is to be seen to which extent AI can 
be verified and validated with the established verification and validation (in short 
V&V) methods for software in general. V&V methods for software were revealed 
already with the software crisis back in 1968 (Wirth, 2008), when the term soft-
ware engineering was coined. It pointed at the difficulties to design and develop 
useful and trustworthy software with the given resources and within the given 
time: “The major cause of the software crisis is that the machines have become 
several orders of magnitude more powerful! …(A)s long as there were no ma-
chines, programming was no problem at all; when we had a few weak comput-
ers, programming became a mild problem, and now we have gigantic computers, 
programming has become an equally gigantic problem.” (Dijkstra, 1972). And the 
newly coined term pointed at the necessity to develop practical and scalable engi-
neering methods for software development. Since then, constructive and analyt-
ic methods for software quality engineering have been developed. They include 
methods for software engineering processes, software engineering tools and for 
software as such. A rough overview on these methods is given in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3: Overview on sof tware quality engineering methods. Sof tware quality begins 
with the sof tware design that is represented by sof tware architectures which can make 
use of sof tware patterns. Programs can be (partially) generated from these sof tware 
designs and/or refined. The programs use typically high-level programming languages 
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which of fer guidelines for best practice programming and which are supported by 
programming frameworks and tools. The achieved sof tware quality is typically tested, 
checked by simulation or proven formally. The running sof tware can be monitored and 
watch-dogs can check for constraint violations at run-time. All these analytic methods 
can also be automated by V&V frameworks and tools. Three specific (sets) of methods 
can be used both constructively and analytically: that is the use of model in sof tware 
engineering, the early prototyping of sof tware (or of V&V sof tware) and the piloting of 
sof tware (or of V&V solutions).
The software (program or code) tells the computer what to do, “but that may be 
much dif ferent from what you had in mind”. (Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Scien-
tist, 1923-2008). However, by the systematic use of software quality engineering 
methods, software can be developed such that it is safe, secure, and trustworthy 
and that it can analyze and compute more data than any person and can do this 
more reliably. 
Numerous international software engineering standards put the ground for 
software quality such as ISO/IEC 25010 (ISO, 2011) for software quality require-
ments and evaluation (SQuaRE) and software quality models. It argues about 
quality in use, external quality and internal quality of software and differentiates 
between functional suitability, reliability, usability, security, compatibility, porta-
bility, maintainability and performance/efficiency. 
While these are all important software quality aspects that evolved over de-
cades, interestingly, new aspects arise for AI in their use within socio-technical 
systems. Apparently,
• understandability, i.e. users and operators can get to know the features and 
services of the systems, 
• interpretability, i.e. users and concerned people have access to clarifications of 
outcomes and their potential impacts, 
• traceability, i.e. users and concerned people have access to more detailed anal-
ysis of outcomes in relation to a given situation/problem statement, 
• explainability, i.e.  users and concerned people receive descriptions, reasoning 
and justifications on the outcomes, as well as 
• fairness, i.e. concerned people are treated the same wrt. commonly agreed 
rules for treatment, gain much more momentum. 
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3. AI Verification and Validation
Indeed, AI requires to quite some extent additional methods and tools for V&V 
(Van Wesel, 2017) since well-established testing technologies are short in V&V of 
AI. This is not only true because of the additional socio-technical quality aspects 
(see above), but also due to the different nature of logic-based software (most of 
the software in general so far and some of AI) and statistics-based software (most 
of AI, in particular in machine learning). Testing has limitations with respect to 
the dynamics of ML, the sheer size of the problem domain and the underlying 
oracle problem (Xie, 2011). 
In addition, most of the AI is controlled by data. In this sense, a neural net-
work is a generic function approximator whose structure ref lects the actual func-
tionality only to a very small extent. Hence, source code-oriented V&V techniques 
such as static analysis or white-box tests are only of limited use in this context. 
On the other hand, the trustworthiness and quality of the data becomes a central 
issue for the overall quality of the systems. 
However, since systematic dynamic testing of software is the best-known 
and most effective V&V method, it will most probably also form the main basis 
for testing ML. In recent decades, research has developed industrial-grade tech-
niques for increasing the quality, efficiency and reliability of testing. This includes 
in particular, automation strategies for dynamic testing such as automating test 
executions with test technologies like TTCN-3 (Testing and Test Control Notation 
[Grabowski, 2003]), for model-based testing to automate the generation of tests 
(MBT [Utting, 2012]), as well as the use of search and optimization algorithms 
for automated test selection and test suite reduction  (Harman, 2015). Moreover, 
the combination of dynamic testing with verification approaches like source code 
analysis, model checking and symbolic execution allows for improvements in 
testing, that combines the rigor of verification processes with the scalability of dy-
namic testing (Godefroid, 2018). These techniques are applied to testing for func-
tional as well as extra-functional properties like performance or security (Schiefer- 
decker, 2012). Finally, the close integration of testing with system development 
processes and risk management (Felderer, 2014) improved the efficiency and 
transparency of testing so that testing has matured as one of the most important 
software quality measures in industry. Still, test automation as well as the use 
of models in testing are still underexplored: although a strong test automation 
is required, less than 14% of software testing professionals say that they use MBT 
(Binder, 2015). The potential of risk-based testing to steer test processes based on 
uncertainties has been shown especially in the area of critical system in terms of 
security and safety, which will likewise be applicable to AI (Erdogan, 2014).
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Fig. 4: The AI V&V pyramid. AI-based systems are to be verified and validated both in 
predeployment phases and at runtime. A combination of V&V methods from formal 
verification and dynamic testing is recommended, in particular for safety- and security 
critical AI-based systems. V&V will help to assure both quality and explainability 
requirements as well as enable the justification of bias in the (training) data used in AI.
Research on dedicated methods for verification and validation of ML is still at its 
beginning. Even so, testing is already part of the overall training set-up in ML, 
most testing is done to achieve more accurate models with respect to the initial 
training objectives. In supervised learning for example, test and validation data 
sets are used to provide evaluation of the ML model. Validation data sets are typ-
ically used during training to fine-tune the model parameters while test data sets 
are used on the final model to measure generalization errors. However, since in-
dividual test sets only provide a single evaluation of the model and have limited 
ability to characterize the uncertainty in the results, more advanced statistical 
testing approaches like cross-validation are used for model selection. 
Ghosh et al (2016) combine ML and model checking in such a way that if the 
desired logical properties are not satisfied by a trained model, the model (‘model 
repair’) or the data from which the model is learned is modified systematically 
(‘data repair’). Fulton and Platzer (2018) propose to combine formal verification 
with verified runtime monitoring so that safe learning can be guaranteed. The ap-
proach intervenes in the learning process whenever safety properties are violated 
and guides the learning process so that the result is compliant with the verifica-
tion model. Approaches like DeepXplore  (Pei, 2017), DLFuzz  (Guo, 2018) and Ten-
sorFuzz  (Odena, 2018) provide metrics for the quantification of neural coverage 
and simplify test automation. DeepTest  (Tian, 2018) enables systematic testing of 
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neural networks under realistically changing environmental conditions especially 
for use in the automotive domain. 
One of the socio-technical limitations of ML is the lack of transparency, i.e. its 
black box-approach. In order to address it, different approaches have been pro-
posed such as 
• model interpretation for image classifications, e.g. by understanding the acti-
vation maximization with saliency maps (Simonyan, 2013), 
• model explanation by sensitivity analysis and local explanation vectors to pro-
vide reasons for the decisions of any classification method (Baehrens, 2010), 
• model decomposition for interpreting generic multilayer neural networks by 
decomposing the network classification decision into contributions of its in-
put elements  (Montavon, 2017), 
• extraction of decision trees from input data generated from trained neuronal 
networks  (Krishnan, 1999), 
• relevance propagation by pixel-wise decomposition of non-linear classifiers 
(Bach, 2015), and 
• deconvolution methods to give insight into the function of intermediate fea-
ture layers and the operation of classifiers (Zeiler, 2014). 
Another well-established way is to use test scenarios, i.e. test cases and their test 
data, for explaining ML decisions. The other socio-technical limitation of ML is 
the potential lack of fairness, i.e. the potential bias. Here, systematic generation 
of (training) data that cover well required categories and properties as known 
from test data generation is of help (Nguyen, 2016). 
The ability to effectively test AI will be fundamental for the acceptance in 
broad scale and central for safety-critical areas like transportation and automo-
tive, healthcare, or industrial automation. The provisioning of test technologies, 
tools, test scenarios with test cases and test data for AI will not only be a solid 
basis for V&V but also help in explaining AI and making them more transparent 
and unbiased. They can also be used to ensure safety and security of AI during 
runtime.
And last but not least, the tools for safeguarding AI contribute also to the de-
mocratization of AI: They are the basis for confirming or witnessing outcomes 
whenever AI-based systems are to be accounted. They can also become a digital 
common for the comparison and benchmarking of AI-based systems and by that 
contribute to a shared knowledge basis of AI.
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AI, Democracy and the Law
Christian Djeffal
Digital technologies are in the process of reconfiguring our democracy. While we 
look for orientation and guidance in this process, the relationship between tech-
nology and democracy is unclear and seems to be in f lux. Are technology and de-
mocracy mirroring each other?1 The internet was first hailed as genuinely demo-
cratic technology and ultimate enabler of democracy. It is now often perceived as 
a major threat to democracy. The story of artificial intelligence (AI) might turn out 
to be quite the opposite. While there are many ref lections on AI as a threat to or 
even as the end of democracy,2 some voices highlight the democratic potentials of 
AI.3 As is often the case, the research results depend on the premises underlying 
the research. This chapter is based on the assertion that technologies and media 
shape human affairs to a large extent, but that technology in turn is also shaped 
by human choices and decisions. There is a huge potential to endanger, game or 
even abolish democratic processes. On the contrary, there might also be opportu-
nities to further democracy. Therefore, the extent to which AI impacts democracy 
is subject to the paths that are chosen in research, development and application 
of AI in society. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to highlight the room for choice in the con-
struction of AI and its impacts on the future of democracy. It will also inquire 
into how law and jurisprudence relate to these questions. From this perspective, 
current impacts of AI on democracy have an important indicative function. But in 
the face of further possibilities of inventions and regulative measures on different 
levels, they are only precursors to what will and should be possible. In that sense, 
this chapter is also an attempt to deal with developments and inventions we can-
not yet grasp. The main argument is that it might be possible to inf luence them 
nevertheless. Therefore, the chapter will ref lect on the possibility and necessity to 
democratize AI from a legal and jurisprudential perspective. It will then look at 
different ways to democratize AI.
1  On this question see Hofmann (2018).
2  Hofstetter (2016); O’Neil (2016).
3  Helbing (2019); Ennals (1987).
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I. Democratizing AI: Possibility and Necessity
A. Understanding the Openness and the Power of Artificial Intelligence
In order to understand the relationship between artificial intelligence and democ-
racy, it is necessary to clarify the concept of AI. The concept’s crucial aspect lies 
not in a clear-cut definition of AI but in its openness. AI is a very broad concept in-
deed, and this might be the reason why this concept has outperformed other ideas, 
such as cybernetics, and is today the general term used in science, politics and the 
economy. Artificial intelligence is a term denoting a research question that in-
spires a hole sub-discipline of computer science today. This research question has 
been summarized as follows: Can systems solve complex problems independent-
ly?4 The openness can already be seen in the initial definition of the term from 1955 
in a grant proposal to the Rockefeller Foundation: 
We propose that a 2-month, 10 man study of artificial intelligence be carried out 
during the summer of 1956 at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire. The 
study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or 
any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a 
machine can be made to simulate it. An attempt will be made to find how to make 
machines use language, form abstractions and concepts, solve kinds of problems 
now reserved for humans, and improve themselves.5
It is clever to frame a grant proposal in a way that encourages the imagination 
of those reading it. The way AI was used here does exactly that. The first aspect 
regarding the openness of AI that can be derived from this definition is that AI 
is a research question. It is not a theory offering explanations. It is not a general 
hypothesis or an idea framing certain aspects in a particular manner. The general 
research question of whether systems can solve complex problems independently 
is based on certain conjectures, but those are reduced to a minimum. The fact that 
AI is a question might also explain the longevity of the term. AI has seen so many 
ups and downs that commentators speak about “AI winters” and “AI summers.”6 
As long as the general research question underlying AI is not solved in a manner 
that cannot be improved, it will continue to be interesting for AI researchers. An-
other aspect of the openness of AI relates to its basic assumptions. Comments by 
John McCarthy, one of the grant applicants and important figures in AI research, 
suggest that the term AI was coined to avoid the assumptions made in cybernet-
4  Mainzer (2019: 3).
5  McCarthy/Minsky/Shannon (1955).
6  Sudmann (57).
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ics research and to get around the inf luence of Norbert Wiener.7 While Wiener 
certainly made great contributions to the field of computer science and touched 
upon many important questions of AI that are still relevant today, he did so from 
another perspective. His idea of cybernetics, commonly held among many other 
important colleagues, is a general theory with strong assumptions. In contrast, 
the term AI has traditionally accommodated quite different views. One general 
disagreement has been termed as the strong and weak AI hypothesis.8 The strong 
AI thesis departed from the idea that AI can either replicate or even surpass hu-
man intelligence. In contrast, the weak AI thesis only requires machines to act as 
if they were intelligent. It focusses generally on certain specific problems to be 
solved. 
Another aspect of the openness of AI is that it does not relate to a single tech-
nology but to a whole set of technologies.9 At the moment, technologies of machine 
learning10 are considered to be either state of the art or even “real AI.” Artificial 
neuronal networks, for example, fulfil certain tasks such as image recognition. 
They are trained on the basis of a great amount of training data, which is labelled 
so that the mathematical models underpinning the learning may continuously 
be adapted and improved. In contrast, generative adversarial networks improve 
themselves in an adversarial manner without the input of human training data. 
There are still many general ideas and architectures that might have been more 
popular in the past, such as decision trees, or that might become more popular 
in the future, such as evolutionary AI. Since AI is open for new approaches and 
breakthroughs, AI research continues to be a moving target. Systems that rep-
resented state-of-the-art-AI at one point in time do not qualify as being truly 
intelligent later. Different technologies require different resources. While AI is 
sometimes associated with big data applications that rely on training or analysis 
of huge amounts of data, big data is not a necessary requirement. There are also 
small data applications or applications that do not require significant training 
data at all. The resources vary accordingly. Artificial neural networks need large 
amounts of training data, sufficient memory space to store this data and enough 
power to compute it. It is especially important to note that the training data has 
to be annotated by human beings. Whether it is the interpretation of x-rays, skin 
cancer detection or crosswalk recognition in the context of automated driving, 
the data to train deep neural networks is dependent on human input. Large pools 
of human resources were even more crucial with the old expert systems popular 
7  McCarthy (1989).
8  For a discussion see Russell/Norvig/Kirchner (2012: 1020). 
9  Gasser/Almeida (2017: 59).
10  For overviews from dif ferent perspectives see Shalev-Shwartz/Ben-David (2014); Sudmann/En-
gemann  Goodfellow/Bengio/Courville (2016).
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in the 1990s. Experts had to design decision trees in many cases, which would then 
assist other people.
Furthermore, the general purposes of AI are also open. While it is often as-
sumed that AI is synonymous with automation, there is indeed a disagreement 
about whether the goal of AI is rather augmentation than automation. While 
automation relates to the replacement of humans by machines, augmentation 
focusses on human-machine interaction in order to amplify human capabilities. 
This augmentation paradigm proved to be inf luential in different areas of com-
puter science. Even the earliest research agenda by its most inf luential proponent 
Douglas Engelbart shows that there is a clear link to the research agenda of arti-
ficial intelligence: 
By “augmenting human intellect” we mean increasing the capability of a man to 
approach a complex problem situation, to gain comprehension to suit his particu-
lar needs, and to derive solutions to problems. Increased capability in this respect 
is taken to mean a mixture of the following: more-rapid comprehension, better 
comprehension, the possibility of gaining a useful degree of comprehension in 
a situation that previously was too complex, speedier solutions, better solutions, 
and the possibility of finding solutions to problems that before seemed insoluble. 
And by “complex situations” we include the professional problems of diplomats, 
executives, social scientists, life scientists, physical scientists, attorneys, design-
ers—whether the problem situation exists for twenty minutes or twenty years. 
We do not speak of isolated clever tricks that help in particular situations. We re-
fer to a way of life in an integrated domain where hunches, cut-and-try, intangi-
bles, and the human “feel for a situation” usefully co-exist with powerful concepts, 
streamlined terminology and notation, sophisticated methods, and high-pow-
ered electronic aids.11
The systems capable of such an automation are to be “sophisticated” and able to 
deal with complexity. Those systems are to be combined with human intelligence. 
They are not intended to replace it. So, the general aim of artificial intelligence is 
also open regarding augmentation and automation. This openness in the general 
aim in the relationship of AI and humans is ref lected in the variety of purposes 
for which AI systems can be used. The set of technologies described by the term 
AI are so called general-purpose technologies (GPTs). While the concept of GPTs 
has mainly been applied in economics,12 it fits well as a category for analyzing so-
cial impacts of technology. The many purposes for the use of coal and steel have 
been captured in the phrase “swords to ploughshares.” Maybe the same might 
11  Engelbart (1963: 1). 
12  Rousseau (2009).
AI, Democracy and the Law 259
be said about AI, which can fuel lethal autonomous weapon systems as well as 
assistive care robots. In order to understand AI, the comprehension of the gen-
eral-purpose nature of the respective technologies is of the utmost importance. 
The technologies comprising AI are neither exclusively tied to certain risks and 
challenges nor to certain opportunities and advantages. There are many counter-
intuitive examples for this proposition, but data protection and privacy are again 
very illustrative in that regard. AI systems can certainly be a threat to privacy and 
data protection as they allow the extraction of a lot of personal information. One 
interesting aspect is AI-powered shadow profiling. This means that people are 
profiled without any significant activity of their own. The information is provid-
ed by people around them. Circumstantial evidence, such as search queries from 
other persons in a social network, allow smart systems to reconstruct a profile of 
a person within that network and collect relevant personal information, without 
them having personally revealed anything. However, AI can also help to serve as a 
privacy enhancing technology. There is, for example, a general push for chatbots 
that learn the privacy preferences of a person in a short and simple conversation 
and then go on to adapt the privacy preferences in all networks and online-ser-
vices the person uses. The purposes of AI systems can, therefore, both enhance 
and threaten privacy. As will be shown, the same is true for other principles and 
values such as democracy.
Aspect of Openness Alternatives
Research question Weak AI thesis, strong AI thesis
Technologies Machine learning technologies (artificial neural networks, genera-
tive adversarial networks), good old-fashioned AI
Resources Data, common sense, computation… 
Aims of use Automation vs. augmentation
Purposes General purpose technologies: can go many ways regarding 
purposes like transparency and data protection
Table 1: Dimensions of Openness of AI
The importance of this openness can be appreciated to a fuller extent when recog-
nizing the ways in which democracy can be shaped by technology. Firstly, there 
are different understandings and constructions of the meaning of democracy. 
While there is a common thread of self-government of a people, there are differing 
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views on how this self-government is to be exercised. Democracy is constituted in 
actual practices in society. Technology has always played a huge part in the actual 
practice of democracy. Democracy and technology are intertwined. “Democra-
cy is not enacted and then mediated. It is preformed through acts of mediation. 
Technologies of mediation are and always have been inherent in the social enact-
ment of democracy.”13 One, therefore, can go as far as tying practices of the use of 
certain technologies to specific ideas of democracy.14 The use of technologies con-
figures democracy. In the case of AI, being a set of general-purpose technologies, 
this configuration is generally open. Democracy is a process rather than a fixed 
and attainable state. It has to be constantly realized, using means like technolog-
ical innovation, institutions, markets and competition, law and administration.15 
In the face of this openness, it is interesting to look at current and potential uses 
of AI in the context of democracy.
B. Empirical Insights
While general purpose technologies like the internet or AI can play out very differ-
ently, they are usually described in a particular way. The discourse on the internet 
and democracy began by hailing the potential beneficial effects of the internet 
on democracy.16 Regarding AI, it seems to be the other way around: it is mainly 
regarded as a threat to democracy. AI is seen to have the potential to obstruct es-
tablished democratic processes like elections and votes. There is also a fear that AI 
takes over decision making in many contexts. In order to paint a more nuanced 
picture, one has to appreciate the contingency of the technology and how it can 
be used in very different ways. The literature on the internet today recognizes 
its positive and negative effects on democracy.17 The contingency of the internet 
means that “like every medium before it, from the alphabet to television, [it] is 
shaped by the ways that society chooses to use its available tools.”18
The general-purpose nature of AI is also ref lected in its relationship with 
the democratic process, especially in the context of elections. In this regard, AI 
is generally perceived as a threat. There have been several attempts to inf luence 
elections through automated systems that preformed different tasks. Fake news 
are spread in the context of elections to block and obstruct political discourse and 
to target voters on a granular level in order to engage or disengage them from 
13  Coleman (2017: 27).
14  Bozdag/van den Hoven (2015).
15  Irrgang (2002: 173).
16  Pernice (2016).
17  For an overview see Ceron/Curini/Iacus (2017: 6).
18  Coleman (2017: vii).
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voting.19 One of the activities that has been fueled by AI and other digital tech-
nologies is micro-targeting. Micro-targeting denotes attempts to inf luence the 
behavior of people based on personal profiles and actions that are grounded in 
specific features of that profile. Those profiles provide specific information about 
certain persons; people can then be targeted individually through social media 
advertising instead of being addressed as part of a group with political posters or 
TV commercials. These actions can range from attempts to inf luence or obstruct 
democratic discourse to inf luencing or obstructing the actual decision-making 
of individuals. While the first micro-targeting efforts were used for canvassing 
campaigns, in which humans went door-to-door in order to inf luence the elector-
ate, AI can also play a role in actions based on granular profiles of certain people. 
There have been several reports about the use of such technologies. Whereas the 
elections in the United States and Brazil and the Brexit vote have made the news, 
their use has also been debated in states like Switzerland and Austria.20 AI sys-
tems can enhance the possibilities of micro-targeting on different levels. AI can 
help with the extraction of information by crawling the web and analyzing oth-
er sources of unstructured data. AI systems can also help to profile people. Fur-
thermore, AI systems can automatically address persons based on their profiles 
through different channels like social media. Several aspects of these campaigns 
using micro-targeting are problematic.21 First, the respective data has often been 
collected from public sources, in some instances illegally. This violates the respec-
tive persons right to data protection if the data was collected and used illegally. It 
also violates their right to personal autonomy, in that they are being inf luenced 
based on the collected data. Opting out of micro-targeting is not yet an option. 
What is more, micro-targeting can also be used for purposes of manipulation. Re-
search on the topic also mentions the possible beneficial impacts—such as ensur-
ing that voters receive the information that is relevant for them.22 This could also 
make specific topics more relevant for elections and enhance the importance of 
certain groups, particularly when they are spread out and not organized.23 There-
fore, AI could help those conceived to be weak and less powerful to obtain more 
and better information.24 
19  Bodó/Helberger/Vreese (2017: 3).
20  Eidgenössischer Datenschutzbeauf tragter/Konferenz der schweizerischen Datenschutzbeauf-
tragten (2018); Der Standard (2019).
21  A mapping of the threats can be found with Zuiderveen Borgesius/Möller/Kruikemeier/Ó 
Fathaigh/Irion/Dobber/Bodo/Vreese (2018: 87) On the same page, they collected reference on 
privacy and manipulation trends. 
22  Zuiderveen Borgesius/Möller/Kruikemeier/Ó Fathaigh/Irion/Dobber/Bodo/Vreese (2018: 84f f).
23  Ibid.
24  Ennals (1987: 14).
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This shows again the general-purpose nature of AI and the difficulty of putting 
it into one box. Micro-targeting can be detrimental, but it can also be beneficial 
to democracy. Yet, the applications existing today are only a preliminary view of 
what could be possible. Technological improvements, but more importantly also 
creative and innovative uses of the technology could lead to an even more pro-
found impact of AI solutions on democracy. AI solutions can be something genu-
inely new or turn existing possibilities upside down. One example would be to em-
power voters through targeting and profiling candidates. A smart search engine 
could help to identify information concerning how parties or candidates think 
about certain issues. Empowering voters even further, one could come up with 
AI systems that predict future government behavior. One could try to compute the 
probability that parties or candidates act on certain promises. Indeed, it seems 
to be not entirely impossible to predict the likelihood of the question of whether 
certain promises will be kept in the future. This would be a use of profiling in a 
completely different way. While such a profiling of candidates and parties raises 
a series of problems and issues, it shows that the use of AI can vary greatly and 
also support voter empowerment. It could open their decision-making potential 
as opposed to narrowing it. Whereas there is currently great concern for using AI 
in the context of elections and votes, the future impact of AI is in fact open. 
C. Law and Technology: Limitation, Motivation, Design
The law and technology have a multi-facetted relationship. This relationship can 
be broadly summarized in three functions: limitation, motivation and design. The 
impact of law on the relationship of technology and democracy will be explained 
along these lines. The law can add to the democratization of artificial intelligence 
in different respects. To include all these functions in the picture is particularly 
important since they highlight different perspectives that are best suited to create 
a full picture of the challenges and opportunities of AI in relation to democracy.
1. Legal Limits and Democracy
Human rights limit the use of AI, especially by public authorities. Human rights 
also trigger the need for democratic justification. Thereby, they further limit the 
possible uses of AI. The function of the law as limit to technology is possibly its 
best-known function. Legal obligations stemming from data protection, for ex-
ample, limit the use of technology in several respects. Data protection law can 
ban the use of training data in machine learning, because there may be no legal 
grounds for such use or existing allowances do not cover the respective purpose. 
For instance, under the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) data pro-
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cessing has to be justified according to Art. 6.25 Systems taking automated de-
cisions have to comply with Art. 22 GDPR. This provision allows such decisions 
only when the requirements in sections 2 and 3 are met.26 Sections 2 and 3 refer to 
decisions based on contracts, statues or explicit consent. 
2. Motivation
The law can also motivate the use of technology in different forms. This motivation 
can relate to “the development, advancement and application of technology by the 
administration or even make it compulsory.”27 There are different ways in which 
democracy as a legal principle can motivate the use of technology and AI specif-
ically. Looking into international instruments about democracy, one can spot 
questions of technology in different contexts.28 In human rights law, there are 
several rights that point to democratic governance. Some human rights instru-
ments explicitly point to the crucial importance of technology in order to enhance 
democracy.29 One area in which this is of particular importance is the inclusion of 
persons who are not yet able to effectively participate in democratic procedures 
and democratic discourses. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities. Art. 4 para. 1 (g) obliges “to undertake or promote research 
and development of, and to promote the availability and use of new technologies, 
including information and communications technologies, mobility aids, devices 
and assistive technologies, suitable for persons with disabilities, giving priority 
to technologies at an affordable cost.” This is an example of a progressive human 
rights clause that motivates states and other actors to employ technologies in or-
der to further human rights. Many AI technologies help persons with disabilities, 
especially blind and death people. These technologies also empower their respec-
tive users to participate in democratic discourse. Therefore, Art. 4 para 1 (g) has an 
effect on people’s democratic inclusion.
3. Design
Another function of the law is to structure and guide the design process. The law 
sets design goals, it shows how to balance different goals and even highlights pos-
sibilities to solve issues on the technical level. A good example for that is the priva-
cy by design clause in Art. 25 sec. 1, which provides as follows: 
25  Art. 6 provides that processing of data is only lawful if its requirements are met.
26  Abel (2018); Martini (2018). 
27  Djef fal (2019: para 16).
28  This research is based upon the collection of documents by Ehm/Walter (2015).
29  See for example ga-Res. 68/164. Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in Enhancing 
Periodic and Genuine Elections and the Promotion of Democratization, United Nations A/
RES/68/164, adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2013 (70th plenary meeting). 
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Taking into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation and the nature, 
scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood 
and severity for rights and freedoms of natural persons posed by the processing, 
the controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the means for pro-
cessing and at the time of the processing itself, implement appropriate technical 
and organisational measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to 
implement data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an ef fective 
manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to 
meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects.
Art. 25 section 1 entails a direct obligation to include privacy considerations into 
the process of designing or adopting an application. It is, however, also possible to 
have rather indirect obligations. It has recently been claimed that constitutional 
principles such as human rights, the rule of law and democracy also should be 
included in the process of designing AI.30 This would further the law’s function to 
inf luence technologies at a very early stage. These obligations also have to be ap-
plied by those developing the systems directly. In order to meet those obligations, 
several methodologies have been invented in different domains. While there are 
different standardization processes regarding constitutional values, there is yet 
no specific standard in dealing with AI and democracy. To date, nothing specifies 
a general obligation to include the principle of democracy into the design of AI.31 
D. Legal Reasons and Lessons for the Democratization of AI
This section sketches the main legal reasons for democratizing AI as well as some 
learnings from the relationship of law and democracy. Democracy as a principle 
is enshrined in the constitutions of many states, be it implicitly or explicitly; it is 
also a basic value for international organizations such as the Council of Europe.32 
Such a constitutional principle demands its realization in the public sphere. Apart 
from this very general democratic requirement, there are more specific lessons 
that can be drawn from the way that law functions. Three insights will be dis-
cussed in greater detail below. 
30  Nemitz (2018).
31  Current value-sensitive design standards can be found with the respective ISO projects and in 
IEEE’s P7000 series. 
32  See for example the preamble of the statue of the Council of Europe from 5 May 1949, ETS No. 
001. 
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1. Justification
As mentioned above, human rights add another layer to the limitation of technolo-
gy. They set absolute limits on the behavior of public authorities and force them to 
realize human rights. Human rights are also tied to democratic decision-making. 
Whenever a measure touches upon human rights, it can only be lawful when there 
is a democratic justification underpinning it. The Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights uses the phrase “rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those 
which are provided by law.” Meanwhile, the European Convention on Human 
Rights uses the phrase “in accordance with the law.” This means that restrictions 
of human rights must be provided by law.33 In order to qualify as a justification, 
the impact must be described by law in a manner that is understandable for the in-
dividual. The law here is a proxy for a democratic ex ante decision-making. Any im-
pact upon human rights must be preceded by a democratic decision allowing for 
the precise impact and providing for safeguards for excessive and arbitrary uses. 
Another example is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
which provides that “[a]ny limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms 
recognized by this Charter must be provided for by law.”34 This provision makes 
the need for democratic justification explicit. In the absence of such a justification, 
a measure is necessarily unlawful. The law is a vehicle to enforce human rights. It 
is also a medium for democratic decisions. This strong link between human rights 
and democracy mediated by the law also affects the relationship between AI and 
democracy. Whenever AI systems have an impact on human rights, their use is to 
be justified.
This necessity for democratic justification does only depend on the fact that 
the human capacity to make decisions affected by an AI system. Democratic justi-
fication is not only triggered by specific human rights. The need for justification of 
AI systems certainly applies to so-called automated decision systems (ADMs) that 
are often in the focus of academic attention. This is only one among many ways in 
which human rights can be at issue. When AI is used as a watchdog for IT securi-
ty or for maintenance of critical infrastructure, it is crucial for realizing human 
rights. While the right to privacy and self-determination might be the most obvi-
ous examples of such impacts, other subtler inf luences also need to be considered. 
For example, ADMs are frequently regulated, but this regulation never applies to 
recommendation systems. Yet, these recommendation systems can have substan-
tial impacts on human rights. Highlighting the interdependence between artifi-
33  See for example the explanation by Greer (1997: 9).
34  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391-407. The re-
lationship between legal democratic justification and human rights is not as universal in every 
human rights instrument. The universal human rights covenants, for example, require legal 
democratic justification only in certain cases.
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cial intelligence and human rights, there is a rather clear criterion for the need of 
democratic determination. This is not the “power” of a machine to decide, but the 
impact on human rights. The interrelation between human rights and democracy 
can limit the public use of AI systems. If there is such a relationship, democratic 
justification is necessary—irrespective even of how human rights are affected.
2. Supremacy
Tied to this necessity for democratic justification issues impacting human rights 
is the idea of the supremacy of legitimate democratic decisions. This concept has 
found its expression in the idea that the norms made by the organization with 
the highest democratic legitimacy take precedence over other norms. Therefore, 
many jurisdictions which regard parliament as the highest democratic authority 
rely on the “sovereignty of parliament” and regard parliamentary laws as taking 
precedence over all other legislative acts. Other jurisdictions describe a norma-
tive hierarchy in which the constitution is at the top and acts of parliament in the 
second place. While constitutional law derives its legitimacy from the pouvoir con-
stitutant, statutory law relies on the legitimacy of parliament and yet other norms 
stem from actors with less legitimacy. Higher norms take precedence over lower 
norms, in cases of conf lict, lower norms are either rendered invalid or inappli-
cable. The hierarchy of legal norms is generally grounded in different levels of 
democratic legitimacy.35 In cases in which technology has normative force, this 
general idea would require that the law as a proxy of democratic decision takes 
precedence over functional requirements of technology and must actually guide 
democratic decisions.36
3. Democratic Rebalancing
From a legal point of view, the notion of democracy is open. While there are many 
ways to understand and construct what democracy ought to mean, constitution-
al law is generally open towards the multiple understandings and theories of de-
mocracy. This openness allows the law to adapt to different contexts and different 
situations, especially when changes and reforms are at issue. Such reforms can 
happen on different levels, but they always change prior democratic processes and 
sometimes even the notion of democracy itself. One pattern that can be discerned 
from the way in which courts deal with these issues could be described as the 
mode of rebalancing. Courts remain f lexible and open towards changing existing 
35  From a legal positivist standpoint, it would also be possible to arrive at the same conclusion ar-
guing with validity. One would then have to argue that the basic reason for validity is democracy.
36  See for example Schulz/Dankert (2016) It is important to note, however, that such a hierarchy 
must be based on democratic legitimacy and not on a formal distinction of primary and sec-
ondary rules.
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processes, but they require active steps that would rebalance the situation from a 
democratic standpoint. This rebalancing can mean that there are measures that 
effectively democratize the new institutional arrangements. Two examples from 
other contexts can illustrate this. In the process of European integration, there 
were many treaty revisions creating new competences or transferring competenc-
es from the national to the European level. The German Federal Constitutional 
Court had to deal with creation and transfer of competences on several occasions. 
In its famous Lisbon judgment, the court allowed for a transferal of competenc-
es, but it also required institutional arrangements in the German legal order, en-
abling the legislature to effectively play a role in European politics. So, while it 
agreed to supranational power transferals, it only did so on the condition that the 
national legislature could inf luence politics at the higher level.37 In another case, 
the Constitutional Court of Baden-Württemberg had to deal with a transferal of 
powers from the collegiate of professors to the president of a university. The court 
allowed for this transferal of power, but only on the condition that the president 
become accountable to the collegiate of professors, which in practice meant that 
a democratic election process had to be created.38 These cases show that changes 
and reforms with an impact on democratic processes are—from a legal stand-
point—not to be evaluated in a binary fashion of “yes” or “no.” Changes some-
times require democratic rebalancing. If there are disputes on how to rebalance 
those changes democratically, those disputes can ultimately be resolved in legal 
proceedings. These questions of rebalancing play an important role when actions 
and decisions are delegated to AI systems on a greater scale. Instead of arguing 
that this would be undemocratic, the question is rather whether this delegation to 
AI systems can be rebalanced. This f lexible view present in different democracy 
cases also has the potential to shift the relationship between AI and democracy. 
Instead of asking whether AI should be democratized, the question is how it can 
be democratized and whether the respective measures are enough.
II. How to Democratize AI
If there is a need to democratize AI, how can it be put into practice? An instru-
mental approach to that question would first look at instances in which there are 
democratic choices and secondly at ways in which these decisions can be made. As 
37  BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009—2 BvE 2/08—paras. (1-421), http://
www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208en.html para 273ff. 
38  Landesverfassungsgericht Baden-Württemberg, judgment 14.11.2016, 1 VB 16/15, obtaible at 
https://verfgh.baden-wuerttemberg.de/fileadmin/redaktion/m-verfgh/dateien/161114_1VB16- 
15_Urteil.pdf p. 43f f.
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in every other democratic decision, there are different tools ranging from the or-
dinary processes of parliamentary deliberations and decisions to more direct ver-
sions of democratic participation. Each method might have specific advantages in 
a certain setting. Such a democratic toolbox could contain the following elements 
among others:  
• ordinary parliamentary processes to debate and regulate artificial intelligence
• use of specialized parliamentary committees to determine certain issues
• empowerment of experts to make certain decisions according to preconfig-
ured principles
• direct involvement of citizens regarding certain questions through
 ° participatory methods
 ° sortition: involving groups of randomly selected citizens in order to fulfil 
an office or make certain decisions
 ° random sample voting: in order to vote on specific questions, a representa-
tive sample of the population is selected
For the sake of understanding the range of choices to be made about technologies 
and specific technical artefacts, it is helpful to distinguish between different lay-
ers analytically, despite the fact that the interrelations between the different lay-
ers are obvious. Focusing on specific choices regarding technical artefacts, there 
are choices that are rather technical and others that are rather social. Therefore, 
a distinction is to be made between a social and a technical layer. Furthermore, 
some decisions are not made with a view to a specific artefact but rather regarding 
a technology. These choices are situated in a layer of governance. On every layer, 
there are specific questions to be outlined.
A. Technological Layer
1. Design Choices
An important step in the democratic determination of technology is understand-
ing the choices that are made in the course of inventing or applying a technology. 
Many design choices are made in the development. Some design choices are made 
intentionally, some have important consequences. From a democratic perspective, 
one must understand and highlight specific choices. These choices relate to archi-
tectures, applications and all other features of the technologies used. Whenev-
er there is an alternative, there is a choice. Understanding choices also requires 
a democratic mindset that is open to several possibilities without automatically 
preferring certain outcomes. Computer scientists especially, who are trained to 
achieve specific goals such as efficiency, regularly do not see behind the choices 
that maximize their preferred value. 
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In order to appreciate choice in the case of machine learning, questions of 
optimization are very interesting.39 Machine learning systems are optimized to 
attain certain goals, they receive feedback and adjust their model accordingly. In 
many cases, the goals towards which a model is optimized are not set in stone 
but rather contingent. An algorithm that distributes children to certain schools 
within an area can be optimized according to different goal functions: One could 
be the shortest way to school. Another would be the safest way to school. Yet, one 
could also define other goals such as a good mix of students in school from an 
ethnical or economic perspective. Such choices often result in trade-offs. They 
require an active choice. One trade-off that has become better known as of late is 
the choice between using data and being able to understand discrimination. Ma-
chine learning models are often trained on data that contains implicit biases—at 
the same time, training data may not contain explicit references to age, gender or 
other criteria. Thus, the decisive information is not present and it becomes impos-
sible to understand whether there is bias in the data and consequently also in the 
algorithm and whether remedies are possible. Yet, including more data, e.g. age 
or gender, impacts the right to privacy and data protection. Especially in possible 
cases of discrimination, it would often be necessary to use special categories of 
personal data, such as data revealing racial or ethnic origins, that is heavily pro-
tected under many data protection regimes.40 Therefore, it is necessary to weigh 
privacy and data protection against fairness in this regard. Another trade-off can 
happen when it comes to weighing transparency and accuracy. It is possible that 
some algorithms have higher scores than comparable alternatives but are based on 
models so complex that they are not intelligible for humans. There is an increas-
ing awareness in the computer science community that choices are not only made 
in the process of using existing technologies but also in the process of research 
and development. In the same way that privacy enhancing technologies were in-
vented, new communities have sprung up doing research to improve AI in specific 
directions. One example is the ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and 
Transparency (ACM FAT), that looks specifically at new research on fairness, ac-
countability and transparency in socio-technical systems. Similar conferences or 
tracks on AI panels show how research and development can also be specifically 
directed towards certain aims. Again, there is an element of choice even when it 
comes to creating or improving technologies. In this case, these choices can be 
exercised by researchers, but also inf luenced by funding agencies. An element of 
choice is often present at different stages.
39  Haferkamp (2017).
40  See for example Art. 9 GDPR.
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2. The Principle of Designability
Scholars and institutions have called for the inclusion of democracy by design in 
the context of AI.41 In line with the idea of value-sensitive design, democratic val-
ues should be included in the design process. Not only are design choices to be 
made in a democratic manner, the very way in which the application operates is to 
be democratic. Yet, this general idea encounters several difficulties. One problem 
is that there are varying concepts of democracy and they can play out quite differ-
ently in the design of an application.42 One way to structure the different forms of 
democratic legitimacy is to divide them into input, output and process legitimacy. 
Technical requirements can be quite sophisticated. Depending on the context in 
which the AI application is used, democracy can involve very different actors as 
well: in the smart city context, democratic decisions will often require decision 
making or participation by the municipal population. In national settings, it will 
be more about involving parliament in decisions. For these reasons, the assertion 
of democracy by design means a lot of uncertainty for developers. What would 
be needed from a technical perspective is a principle that developers can grasp 
and one that supports democratic values in design processes without prejudging 
certain understandings of democracy.
My suggestion to address this challenge would be to formulate a design prin-
ciple of designability. The principle of designability is aimed at translating gen-
eral democratic values into design in a general and workable manner. It ought to 
have at least two tiers that need to be addressed by developers: The first tier is the 
changeability of the system. The second tier is its intelligibility. Different ideas of 
democracy rely on the idea that they are open and f lexible to different forms of 
change: changes in government, changes in opinion after an informed discourse 
and so on. This is particularly the case if there is uncertainty about how a decision 
plays out in practice. In such a situation, changeability is a requirement for dem-
ocratic participation. Yet, such changeability has to be enhanced by design. This 
can be done by choosing a specific architecture or using specific methods. Con-
sidering that machine learning entails the possibility to adapt, it is changeable by 
definition. Another tier for designability is the intelligibility of the system. Intel-
ligibility is not used in its general sense in computer science, that is the possibility 
to understand the logic behind a given system’s actions. Intelligibility must be 
constructed democratically. A general target here could be that a system is intel-
ligible for all people affected by the actions of the system. While not everybody 
will in effect decide upon whether and how to employ the respective AI system, 
the ideal would be that everybody should have the chance to. This standard of in-
41  See for example Nemitz (2018); Die Bundesregierung (2018: 33, 44); High Level Expert Group on 
Artificial Intelligence (19).
42  Bozdag/van den Hoven (2015).
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telligibility can be rather narrow in the case of systems that are targeted only at a 
specific group of people. In contrast, generally applicable AI systems should meet 
general standards of intelligibility. Therefore, the tier of democratic intelligibility 
fits in with current discourses on transparency. Yet, in the context of designability, 
intelligibility is not limited to specific actions or decisions made by the system. 
The people affected by the system have to understand it and the choices underly-
ing it. They have to know whether and how the system can be changed. Like any 
design principle, designability will hardly ever be achieved fully. But it can point 
developers in the right direction. While intelligibility points to the possibility 
of democratic deliberations, the tier of changeability indicates the possibility of 
change and opens up potentials to effectively govern the technical artifact. 
B. Social Layer
AI is not only designed on the technical level, many social constructions surround-
ing AI systems play a crucial role.43 These social constructions are not inevitable, 
they are the fabric of choices and assumptions that are shaping technology and 
society at the same time. The law is a mechanism that can make socio-technical 
choices subject to democratic determination.
1. Understanding Impacts
It is important to appreciate the social impact of technology, but also to under-
stand that the recognition of such impacts are social constructs themselves. Re-
cently, different methods to assess the impacts of AI have been proposed.44 Im-
pact assessment is a prerequisite for uncovering choices on the technological level. 
Sometimes, the respective choices only become apparent and understandable 
when the social impacts are known. The discussion about fairness in AI took off 
when several researchers criticized discriminatory effects of algorithmic systems. 
The same is true for transparency. To learn about the consequences of technolo-
gies before harm and damage occurs is far from easy. As the history of technology 
shows, the knowledge about the consequences of technologies often comes too 
late. The discovery of radiation is a telling and sad example, since many of the 
scholars discovering this technology did not know about its dangerous effects and 
later died from cancer. It took some time to understand the effects. In many other 
instances, the causal relationship between technology and impact was not as ap-
parent or more contested. In these instances, the law has profound effects on the 
social construction of technology. 
43  Stamper (1988).
44  Reisman/Schultz/Crawford/Whithattaker (2018); ECP (2018).
Christian Djeffal272
Firstly, human rights law can provide for a consensus that a certain consider-
ation is worthy of protection. In order to know what constitutes an impact, one 
has to construct a value that is to be protected. The law can create a consensus of 
what that is. The right to privacy is a good example of a right that has been invent-
ed through deduction in an evolutionary manner from other legal institutions.45 
Once there is an agreement on what is to be protected as human right, a special 
protection is in place. As has already been shown, this protection entails the need 
for democratic justification of decisions affecting human rights. Another import-
ant feature of the law is its ability to recognize and balance impacts in a holistic 
manner. Impacts are not negative by definition. They can equally be beneficial. 
While it is important to be critical towards new developments and to understand 
new dangers and disadvantages, it is as important to appreciate the benefits and 
potential opportunities. In order to assess the impacts of technologies, it is cru-
cial to have all of the future possibilities in mind. This is also true from a human 
rights perspective. As shown above, technologies also have the potential to further 
human rights. Therefore, the consequences have to be weighed against each other. 
In order to assess such situations in legal proceedings, several jurisdictions have 
developed a proportionality test.46 It is a practical way to assess a measure holisti-
cally and to structure the argument in a way that allows for many considerations 
and to weigh them against each other. It also arrives at practical conclusions that 
are communicated to those affected by the decisions. The principle of proportion-
ality actually allows for a socio-technical evaluation on different levels. 
2. Designing AI through Social Construction
Yet, there is an even wider sense in which the impacts of AI are socially construct-
ed. This applies to a large part of the inf luence of AI systems. Especially in the case 
of data analytics, there can be different goals and aims: to discover certain cor-
relations, to discover probabilities of certain actions or to actually show probabil-
ities of how certain alternative actions might play out.47 While it is true that those 
systems can have profound normative effects, such effects often stem from the 
social construction of the system instead of being falsely pinpointed as inherent 
in the technology. Whereas big data analytics tools compute certain probabilities, 
for example, the meanings of those probabilities and the role they should play is 
actively constructed.48 One illustrative example is the misuse of scores for cred-
45  See one early argument in Warren/Brandeis (1890).
46  Klatt/Meister (2012).
47  On this basis a distinction is made between descreptice, prescrpitive and descriptive analytics 
by Hof fmann-Riem (2017).
48  See for example Schlaudt (2018).
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itworthiness as a reliability score for employees.49 It is obvious that a system that 
is designed to compute the probability of a person repaying debts is not made to 
assess the respective persons reliability when it comes to the job. Yet, the choice 
to use the system in another context is by no means a choice that has anything 
to do with the design of the system. It is rather a social choice for a transfer to a 
different social context.
The same holds true for the use of certain probabilities. In many instances, the 
law shows how probabilities have completely different meanings in different con-
texts. In police and security law, there are also different probability requirements 
that are formulated from a social perspective. Measures that have low impacts 
on human rights have to meet a lower probability threshold, while measures with 
higher potential impacts have to meet higher probability standards. It is an active 
choice, and a democratic decision, to link a specific competence of the authorities 
to a certain probability. 
There are numerous ways in which to construct the meaning of outputs of AI 
systems. The law not only makes this meaning explicit; it opens up the social con-
struction of technology for democratic deliberation and democratic decision-mak-
ing. The outputs of AI systems can be rendered illegal and irrelevant. They can 
be made subject to human oversight and human decision-making. Furthermore, 
they can be bestowed with the force of the law. In German law the assessment 
of civil servants, decisions must not be based on fully automated assessments of 
specific personality features.50 The above-mentioned Art. 22 GDPR provides for a 
right of human oversight and makes fully automated decisions subject to human 
decisions. Yet, there are provisions clarifying that fully automated decisions do 
have the force of law. Take for example § 35a of the Federal Code of Administrative 
Procedure. The provision states: “An administrative act may be adopted in full by 
automatic systems, provided that it is authorised by a legal act and that there is 
no discretion or margin for assessment.” This provision clarifies that there can be 
completely automated administrative acts, i.e. decisions with legal force for spe-
cific individuals or groups. This basically means that those systems can render de-
cisions that have the force of law and can also be enforced. Two examples for such 
decisions are intelligent traffic systems that can automatically set speed limits or 
impose overtaking bans when there are dangers for the drivers due to wheather or 
traffic. Another example is fully automated speeding tickets issued from detec-
tion systems that automatically send the respective notices.
49  O‘Neil (2016: 147-149).
50  See § 114 section 4 of the German Federal Civil Servants Law. 
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3. AI as Customary Law
AI systems can have real world impacts which depend to a large extent on a social 
construction that attributes these consequences to the system. This leads to the 
question of what the requirements of such acceptance should be. This question is 
currently addressed by the field of computational social choice.51 The hidden mor-
al choices in the process of designing AI is one of the main motivations to engage 
with the interlaces of social choice and computer science. So, the proponents of 
computational social choice try to find criteria to design AI systems in a legitimate 
way. One feature that is striking with machine learning is that it is actually based 
on data that is often produced by those to whom the system applies. Research 
projects have, for example, used inquiries and simulations in order to obtain user 
data on how automated cars should react in specific situations.52 Yet, a democratic 
view on this ethical design focus reveals certain issues: The first problem is that 
different assumptions can lead to quite varied results, which might all have a 
claim to be ethical. Different ethical theories can even produce opposite results. 
Take for example utilitarianism and principled ethics. While certain actions det-
rimental to one person but beneficial for the majority could be regarded as ethical 
from a utilitarian perspective, they would be regarded as unethical from a prin-
cipled point of view. In the end, it might be necessary to choose among many al-
ternatives. To state that there is only one right and moral solution to be preferred 
over all other solutions is to discriminate against all other possible solutions. It 
neglects various approaches and different solutions to a single question. In such 
a setting, there is no room left for choice. Another question is whether artificial 
agents can genuinely make moral decisions or whether they are just simulating 
them. From a moral point of view, the question of actual judgement is paramount. 
This problem is tied to the question whether machines can actually think, which 
has attracted contentious ref lection from Turing to Searle.53
The basic argument of this section is that computational choice theorists should 
think in legal instead of moral terms. Building upon Kant, one could attribute ac-
tions with external effects to the law, while questions that remain internal are 
in the realm of ethics. AI systems often have profound normative effects. While 
most ethical considerations focus on output legitimacy, one could merge compu-
tation and law in a way that democratic input legitimacy is achieved through legal 
means. Machine learning applications are generally trained with data that rep-
resents the behavior of certain actors. While there is no general formalized rule 
about what the significance of such practice is, I would like to make the argument 
51  Brandt/Conitzer/Endriss/Lang/Procaccia (2016) A overview of the literature regarding AI is giv-
en by Prasad (2019).
52  Awad/Dsouza/Kim/Schulz/Henrich/Sharif f/Bonnefon/Rahwan (2018).
53  Turing (1950); Searle (1980).
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that machine learning could—under certain conditions—be regarded as custom-
ary law. This would highlight computational and social choices that allow for a 
democratic expression through an AI system. Building upon an analogy from cer-
tain law-creating practices, it could be possible to formulate requirements for AI 
as a medium for democratic decisions. 
Customary law used to play a very important role for the governance of cer-
tain communities that regarded specific practices as binding. Spurred by the 
increasing complexity of modern societies and the possibilities of new printing 
technologies, customary law lost much of its importance. It mainly relied on un-
written practices of smaller communities that formed over time. While courts in 
the common law countries continued to rely on once formed principles and turned 
them into arguments the judiciary could build on, one legal system in which cus-
tomary law has retained its importance is international law. In international law, 
there is still a manageable number of participants whose practice can be quali-
fied as custom. Several trends of digitization assist a new knowledge dimension 
that might lead to a revival of customary law in different areas. First, datafication 
opens new avenues to store and understand the behavior of certain actors. Big 
data represents the idea that huge amounts of data can be stored and analyzed. 
Secondly, trends like the internet of things allow for the collection of data in a con-
stant, automated and ubiquitous manner. The internet of things signifies a trend 
of networked devices in different human environments. AI technologies can help 
to analyze and understand the data in a way that makes the practice comprehen-
sible and understandable. Together, those technologies make actual practice of 
people visible. 
However, the question remains as to whether this custom is meant to be gen-
eralized in human exchange. Scholars of computational social choice have thought 
about this issue and come up with criteria that were to be considered in the pro-
cess of building an AI that represents practice. Baum, for example has developed 
with three general criteria: 
1. Standing: Who or what is included in the group to have its values factored into 
the AI?
2. Measurement: What procedure is used to obtain values from each member of 
the selected group?
3. Aggregation: How are the values of individual group members combined to 
form the aggregated group values?54 
The requirements of customary law are in some sense complementary, in some 
sense different from the questions above. The formal criteria for the formation of 
54  Baum (2017: 545).
Christian Djeffal276
customary law are a practice (consuetudo) and the belief that this practice is to be 
regarded as law (opinio iuris sive necessitatis). The practice must be consistent and 
general, even though this does not mean that the practice is uniform and uni-
versal.55 The most important question regarding general practice in the context 
of customary law is whether there is sufficient representation. This is due to the 
fact that some actors remain tacit and do not engage in the practice. The second 
criterion is the so-called opinio iuris. That is the belief that the respective practice is 
based upon a legal obligation to act in that way. This criterion actually legitimizes 
the normative force of the practice. In order to fulfil the criterion of opinio iuris, 
data subjects must produce the data in the knowledge with the purpose of inf lu-
encing a system that acts upon that data. This criterion makes the legitimacy of an 
AI system subject to a sovereign decision of users. The system simply learns what 
the practice of human beings is. It learns what the data subjects want the practice 
to be. In this setting, informational self-determination is not only the power of 
personal data; it is a conscious exercise of power through one’s data. The data sub-
ject is not a resource from which personal data are extracted. In this setting, the 
production of data becomes a democratic act like voting. 
C. Governance Layer
In order to analyze the impact of AI on democracy, it is not enough to look exclu-
sively at specific systems. It requires an analysis from the macro level focusing on 
technologies or even AI as a whole. This is here denoted as the governance layer.
1. Framing
The democratic governance of AI is inf luenced by the way in which AI is framed. 
AI is regularly put in specific contexts or seen a certain way. Frequently, scholars 
talk about the ethics of AI,56 another current is to talk about AI and human rights. 
While scholars discuss and analyze within one frame, there is relatively little dis-
cussion about the choice between frames. Yet, the frames do have significant ef-
fects. Take for example the choice between an ethical and a political frame.57 The 
frames lead to completely different ways of thinking about technology. Compare 
stem cell engineering and the creation of a 5G network infrastructure. Stem cell 
engineering is predominantly construed as an ethical issue whereas the latter 
is commonly perceived as a political issue. Of course, there are many issues we 
would conceive of as being political in the context of stem cell research and there 
can be many ethical questions in building a 5G infrastructure. Constructivist 
55  Crawford (2012: 23f f.).
56  Mittelstadt/Allo/Taddeo/Wachter/Floridi (2016).
57  For this reflection see Djef fal (2019).
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scholars have highlighted that frames and theories inf luence the object of scien-
tific inquiry. Therefore, it is an active choice to put AI in certain context and to 
inquire into the ethics or politics of AI or to look to the relationship of AI and hu-
man rights. This choice necessarily contains certain preferences that are inherent 
or follow from the frame that was adapted. Every frame also provokes some blind 
spots. Some aspects become invisible.
One attempt to generally describe the impact of AI on society is the concept of 
“algocracy.” This term contrasts other forms of government such as democracy or 
monarchy with a system in which power is (increasingly) exercised by automated 
systems.58 The term algocracy is mostly used in a critical manner.59 It highlights 
that algorithms are becoming more and more important when it comes to issues 
of governance. Instead of adding to the growing corpus of literature on this issue, 
I would like to highlight the constructivist nature of algocracy. This leads to the 
question of what is highlighted by this term and what is left out of the picture. 
Building on the basic insights from actor network theory (ANT), I argue that the 
frame of algocracy tends to blur and hide human agency. Algocracy highlights 
machine power but overlooks how humans impact the perceived automated ac-
tions. One of the basic arguments of ANT is to ignore the distinction between 
subjects and objects and to appreciate technology as part of the social in a net-
work with human actors using it.60 This analysis allowed the proponents of ANT 
to uncover the agency of technical artefacts. My basic argument is that this theory 
might today be used upside down in order to uncover human agency instead of 
machine agency. The theory of algocracy represents a critical part of the AI dis-
course that frames AI specifically as automated decision systems and looks at their 
increased power. With the focus on increasing ability and power of those systems, 
it is sometimes forgotten to ref lect on how these systems are used and interwoven 
with human agency. As outlined above, there are many ways in which the social 
surrounding determines the design of AI applications. In many cases, the law is 
part of constructive efforts to bestow AI with normative force. A frame that is 
complementary to algocracy would not exclusively look at the fact that more and 
more decisions are delegated but at how they are delegated and who controls and 
inf luences the automated systems. As many proponents of ANT have argued, the 
focus would not be on a single class of actors but rather on their interrelation.
58  Yeung (2018).
59  Danaher (2016).
60  Latour (2000: 180).
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2. Organizational aspects
Another way to impact the development and deployment of artificial intelligence 
is through organizational measures. Many of the recent AI strategies contain such 
measures. On the one hand, organizational changes are aimed at enhancing tech-
nological progress in the field of AI. New institutions are founded, either to en-
gage directly in research and development, to fund such activities or to enhance 
the network of already existing organizations. The United Arab Emirates made 
headlines with a minister for artificial intelligence61 and the German government 
recently founded an agency for “innovation leaps” tasked with funding research 
and development for ground-breaking innovations and increasing implementa-
tion. On the other hand, newly founded organizations also exercise oversight over 
AI systems. In fact, there are indeed many organizations endowed with this task 
already. Organizations like the US Federal Drug Administration or its counter-
parts in Europe and elsewhere have engaged in the certification of AI systems that 
are considered to be medical products. There are also calls for more oversight in-
stitutions.62 Following examples in Canada, some states have founded AI observa-
tories that aim to find out about the social consequences of AI. The future of work 
is one of the issues often addressed in this context.63 
Organizational change is not always expressed merely in new organizations. 
Sometimes, organizations change from within by adapting to new tasks. One im-
portant development in this regard is the question whether a new job profile is 
needed across organizations. Data scientists are one profile that is currently on 
the rise. Yet, some think that a completely new profile of algorithmists might be 
needed.64 The idea behind this is to have people with specific technical skills so 
that an organization maintains agency when it must deal with AI systems. The 
interesting aspect of this idea is that expertise would also be available to orga-
nizations that have previously not been associated with technological expertise. 
The job profile of an algorithmist has the potential to democratize agency when it 
comes to questions of algorithms. Knowledge about AI systems would be gener-
ally available. A question separate from this specific profile would be the interdis-
ciplinary mix of teams working on certain AI issues. If AI is used in specific con-
texts, there might be a minimum requirement of roles and perspectives that need 
to be present. Therefore, organizations developing, using or assessing AI systems 
should think about what the right mix of these teams would be. While computer 
scientists are a necessary component of such teams, they are never enough. All in 
all, organizational challenges and changes are a very good example of how algo-
61  Tendersinfo (2017).
62  Tutt (2017).
63  See for example Die Bundesregierung (2018: 26).
64  Mayer-Schönberger/Cukier (2013: 189-192); Hill (2015: 284).
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rithms impact their social surroundings and how changes in the socio-technical 
context of AI systems can effectively contribute to the respective governance.
III. Conclusions
The 1947 constitution of Bremen, an entity of the German federal state, contains a 
very interesting provision about the relationship between man and machine. The 
constitution states in Art. 12 section 1: “The human being ranks higher than ma-
chines and technology.” This provision addresses experiences from the process of 
industrialization, during which machines, technologies and the new possibilities 
of production gained importance. It is interesting that the founders of the con-
stitution felt the need to remind the people and those in power of the fact that 
human beings should rank higher. During industrialization, this did not address 
the increasing capabilities of machines to act so intelligently that they may even 
be considered as persons. It was rather the fact that, as capacities of production, 
so much importance was conferred upon them. So, the basic idea was to argue 
for a human-centered view despite the huge social and economic importance of 
technical artefacts. This basic idea can also be translated to the process of digi-
tization, in which machines engage in solving problems that require a degree of 
intelligence previously considered exclusively reserved for humans. One aspect of 
this normative centricity of human beings is their exclusive status as the bearers 
of human rights. Equally important is the aspect of effective self-determination 
of people in the face of technologies’ increasing possibilities. To rank higher does 
not only mean that humans must not be harmed by new technological possibili-
ties. It means that people need to be in the driver’s seat. It can be understood as a 
call for effective self-determination on different levels. 
If AI continues to fulfil the high expectations and has continued impacts on 
societal development, it will be even more important for an all-encompassing 
value-sensitive development. From the perspective of the constitution of Bremen, 
one necessary component would be to think about the democratization of AI. In 
order to do this, it will be crucially important to understand AI as a set of gen-
eral-purpose technologies that can be used in very different circumstances and 
very different ways to achieve multiple tasks. While it is important to understand 
where AI currently threatens democracy, it is as crucial to appreciate its opportu-
nities. To understand the openness of the use and potential of technology allows 
us to choose whether to develop the technology further and which path to take. 
When it comes to the democratization of AI, some general truths about democra-
cy apply: Democracy is a process, not an achievable result. It can be lost very easily, 
and everyone must work for it continuously along the way. Once we stop striving 
for it, it is gone. From this perspective, AI is just another challenge that has the 
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potential to bring society closer to the ideal lying behind Art. 12 section of the Bre-
men Constitution, as well as many other democratic provisions: to meaningfully 
put people in the normative center of all public power.
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Rethinking the Knowledge Problem    
in an Era of Corporate Gigantism1
Frank Pasquale
A preeminent theorist of laissez-faire, Friedrich von Hayek called the “knowledge 
problem” an insuperable barrier to central planning. Knowledge about the price of 
supplies and labor, and consumers’ ability and willingness to pay, is so scattered 
and protean that even the most knowledgeable authorities cannot access all of it. 
No person knows everything about how goods and services in an economy should 
be priced. No central decision maker can grasp the idiosyncratic preferences, val-
ues, and purchasing power of millions of individuals. That kind of knowledge, 
Hayek said, is distributed. 
However, in an era of artificial intelligence and mass surveillance, the allure 
of central planning has reemerged—this time, in the form of massive firms. Hav-
ing logged and analyzed billions of transactions, Amazon knows intimate details 
about all its customers and suppliers. It can carefully calibrate screen displays 
to herd buyers toward certain products or shopping practices, or to copy sellers 
with its own, cheaper, in-house offerings. Mark Zuckerberg aspires to omni-
science of consumer desires, profiling nearly everyone in Facebook, Instagram, 
and Whatsapp, and then leveraging that data trove to track users across the web 
and into the real world (via mobile usage and device fingerprinting). Indeed, you 
don’t have to use any of those apps to end up in Facebook/Instagram/Whatsapp 
files—profiles can be assigned to you. Google’s “database of intentions” is legend-
ary, and antitrust authorities around the world have looked with increasing alarm 
at its ability to squeeze out rivals from search results once it gains an interest in 
their lines of business. Google knows not merely what consumers are searching 
for, but also what other businesses are searching, buying, emailing, planning—a 
truly unparalleled match of data processing capacity to raw communication f lows.
Nor is this logic limited to the online context. Concentration is paying div-
idends for the largest banks (widely assumed to be too big to fail), and major 
1  This essay originally appeared as “Tech Platforms and the Knowledge Problem” in  American Af-
fairs, Summer 2018. It is reprinted with kind permission of American Af fairs.
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health insurers (now squeezing and expanding the medical supply chain like an 
accordion).  Like the digital giants, these finance and insurance firms not only act 
as middleman, taking a cut of transactions, but also aspire to capitalize on the 
knowledge they’ve gained from monitoring customers and providers in order to 
supplant them and directly provide services and investment.  If it succeeds, the 
CVS-Aetna merger betokens intense corporate consolidations that will see more 
vertical integration of insurers, providers, and a baroque series of middlemen 
(from pharmaceutical benefit managers to group purchasing organizations) into 
gargantuan health providers. A CVS doctor may eventually refer a patient to a CVS 
hospital for a CVS surgery, followed up by home health care workers employed by 
CVS who bring CVS pharmaceuticals—all covered by a CVS/Aetna insurance plan, 
which might penalize the patient for using any providers outside the CVS net-
work. While such a panoptic firm may sound dystopian, it is a logical outgrowth of 
health services researchers’ enthusiasm for “integrated delivery systems,” which 
are supposed to provide “care coordination” and “wraparound services” more effi-
ciently than America’s current, fragmented health care system.
The rise of powerful intermediaries like search engines and insurers may seem 
like the next logical step in the development of capitalism. But a growing chorus 
of critics questions the size and scope of leading firms in these fields. The Institute 
for Local Self-Reliance highlights Amazon’s manipulation of both law and con-
tracts to accumulate unfair advantages. International antitrust authorities have 
taken Google down a peg, questioning the company’s aggressive use of its search 
engine and Android operating system to promote its own services (and demote 
rivals). They also question why Google and Facebook have been acquiring at least 
two companies a month, for years. Consumer advocates complain about manipu-
lative advertising. Finance scholars lambaste megabanks for taking advantage of 
the implicit subsidies that too big to fail status confers.
Can these diverse strands of protest and critique coalesce into something 
more durable and consistent? This essay explores possible forms to channel social 
and economic discontent over the next few decades. I start by giving an account-
ing of where we are: a hierarchical, centralized regime, where corporate power is 
immense, and where large national apparatuses of regulation seem to be the only 
entities capable of reining it in. Against this economic reality, I can discern two 
vital lines of politico-economic critique at present. 
Populist localizers want a new era of antitrust enforcement to rein in giant 
firms.  These Jeffersonian critics of big tech firms, megabanks, and big health care 
combinations are decentralizers. They believe that power is and ought to be dis-
tributed in a just society. They promote strong local authorities, who are located 
closer to their own citizens. 
Others have promoted gigantism as inevitable or desirable, and argue that we 
simply need better rules to cabin abuses of corporate power. Today’s Hamiltoni-
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ans argue that massive stores of data are critical to the future of artificial intelli-
gence—and thus, to productive dynamism of the economy. They focus on better 
regulating, rather than breaking up, leading firms.
Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians have very different long-term views on what 
an optimal economy looks like. In the long-run, their visions are probably irrecon-
cilable. However, in the short run, both sets of reformers offer important lessons 
for policymakers grappling with the power of massive tech, finance, and health 
care firms. This essay explores those lessons, specifying when a Jeffersonian ap-
proach is most appropriate, and when Hamilton’s heirs have the better approach. 
The Jeffersonian/Hamiltonian Divide 
The tech policy landscape is often bleak. Corporate-funded think tanks strive to 
keep reform options in a relatively narrow window of tweaks and minor changes 
to existing law. The curse of over-specialization in the academy also keeps many 
law and policy professors on a short leash. Nevertheless, there are pockets of vital-
ity in the field. Two camps that have arisen include a decentralizing camp, which 
I’d call Jeffersonian, and a more centralizing, Hamiltonian tendency that is com-
fortable with industrial “bigness.” 
The Jeffersonian school has coalesced around the problem of lax antitrust en-
forcement in the United States, and competition promotion more generally. The 
Open Markets Institute, kicked out of the New American Foundation for being too 
hostile to Google, has led the charge. Leaders at OMI, like Matt Stoller and Barry 
Lynn, argue that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) should break up Facebook, 
establishing Instagram and WhatsApp as competing social networks. Lina Khan, 
also at OMI, has written an exhaustive critique of Amazon’s gigantism that is 
already one of the Yale Jaw Journal’s most downloaded articles. The emphasis on 
subsidiarity in Catholic Social Thought is also a font of decentralist theory, often 
invoked by conservatives to protect the autonomy of local authorities and civil so-
ciety institutions.
The Hamiltonians include traditional centrists (like Rob Atkinson, who re-
cently co-authored Big is Beautiful with Michael Lind), as well as voices on both 
ends of the political spectrum. Recapitulating Schumpeter’s praise of monopoly 
as a spur to growth, Peter Thiel’s Zero to One is a paean to monopoly power, justi-
fying its perquisites as the just and necessary reward for dramatic innovation. On 
the left, Evgeny Morozov does not want to see the data stores of the likes of Google 
and Facebook scattered to a dozen different versions of these services. Rather, he 
argues, they are most likely natural monopolies: they get better and better at each 
task they take on when they have access to more and more pooled data from all the 
tasks they perform. The ultimate left logic here is toward fully automated luxury 
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communism, where massive firms use machine learning and 3-D printing to solve 
hunger, save the environment, and end the problem of scarcity.2 Left centralizers 
also argue that problems as massive as climate change can only be solved by a 
Hamiltonian approach.
The Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian visions lead to very different policy rec-
ommendations in the tech space. Jeffersonians want to end Google’s acquisition 
spree, full stop. They believe the firm has simply gotten too powerful. But even 
some progressive regulators might wave through Google’s purchase of Waze (the 
traffic monitoring app), however much it strengthens Google’s power over the 
mapping space, in hopes that the driving data may accelerate its development of 
self-driving cars. The price of faster progress may be the further concentration of 
power in Silicon Valley. To Jeffersonians, though, it is that very concentration (of 
power, patents, and profits) in megafirms that deters small businesses from tak-
ing risks to develop breakthrough technologies.  
Facebook’s dominance in social networking raises similar concerns. Privacy 
regulators in the US and Europe are investigating whether Facebook did enough 
to protect user data from third-party apps, like the ones that Cambridge Analytica 
and its allies used to harvest data on tens of millions of unsuspecting Facebook us-
ers. Note that Facebook itself clamped down on third party access to data it gath-
ered in 2013, in part thanks to its worries that other firms were able to construct 
lesser, but still powerful, versions of its famous “social graph”—the database of in-
tentions and connections that makes the social network so valuable to advertisers. 
For Jeffersonians, the Facebook crackdown on data f lows to outside develop-
ers is suspicious. It looks like the social network is trying to monopolize a data 
hoard that could prove essential raw materials for future start-ups. However, 
from a Hamiltonian perspective, securing the data trove in one massive firm 
looks like the responsible thing to do (as long as the firm is well-regulated). Once 
the data is permanently transferred from Facebook to other companies, it may be 
practically very hard to assure that it is not misused. Competitors (or “frenemies,” 
in Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice Stucke’s terms) cannot access data that is secure in 
Facebook’s servers—but neither can hackers, blackmailers, or shadowy data bro-
kers specialized in military grade psy-ops. To stop “runaway data” from creating a 
full-disclosure dystopia for all of us, “security feudalism” seems necessary.
Policy conf lict between Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians, “small is beautiful” 
democratizers and centralist bureaucratizers, will heat up in coming years. To un-
derstand the role of each tendency in the digital sphere, we should consider their 
approaches in more detail.
2  Authors in this vein include Leigh Phillips and Michal Rozworski, People’s Republic of Walmart (Ver-
so, 2019); Aaron Bastani, Fully Automated Luxury Communism (Verso, 2019), and Peter Frase, Four 
Futures (2016).  
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The Jeffersonian Critique of Absentee Ownership
The largest, most successful firms of digital capitalism tend to serve as platforms, 
ranking and rating other entities rather than directly providing goods and ser-
vices. This strategy enables the platform to outsource risk to vendors and con-
sumers, while it reliably collects a cut from each transaction. Just as a financial 
intermediary may profit from transaction fees, regardless of whether particular 
investments soar or sour, the platform pockets revenues on the front end, regard-
less of the quality of the relationships it brokers.
This intermediary role creates numerous opportunities for platforms. For ex-
ample, they police transactions and adjudicate disputes that used to be the pre-
serve of governments. I call this powerful new role of platforms “functional sov-
ereignty,” to denote the level of power a private firm reaches when it is no longer 
one of many market participants, but instead, the main supervisor and organizer 
of actual market participants. Platforms like Amazon and Google are functionally 
sovereign over more and more markets, playing a quasi-governmental role as they 
adjudicate conf licts between consumers, marketers, content providers, and an 
expanding array of third and fourth parties.
Personalization is a mantra for digital strategists, who tend to assume it is a 
“win-win” proposition. For example, tailored search results both guard Google’s 
users against distraction and tend to connect them to products they want. How-
ever, online markets premised on ever greater knowledge of our desires and “pain 
points,” income level and wealth, can easily tip toward exploitation. Platforms 
have an interest in intensively monitoring and shaping certain digital spheres in 
order to maximize their profits (and, secondarily, to maintain their own repu-
tations). However, in their ceaseless quest to annex ever more sectors into their 
own ecosystems, they all too often bite off more than they can chew. They tend 
to overestimate the power of automation to process all the demands that modern 
marketplaces generate. 
This has led to another problem, familiar from the history of monopolistic 
enterprise: absentee ownership. When a massive firm buys a store thousands of 
miles away from its headquarters, it owns the store, and will seek profit from it, 
but it may only assess its performance in crude terms, with little interest in the 
community in which the store is embedded. The store may neglect traditional 
functions it served, simply in order to maximize the revenues that its absentee 
owner demands.  A present owner, resident in the community, is more likely to 
run the store in a way that comports with community interests and values, since 
the present owner will itself experience any improvement or deterioration the 
store causes in its community.
Similar dynamics emerge online. Google owns the largest collection of videos 
online, but its YouTube subsidiary’s profitability depends on calculated neglect 
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of many aspects of the platform. Over the past two years, a litany of critics have 
f layed the firm for promoting disturbing, tasteless, shocking, and abusive content, 
even to children. The recent Google announcement that it would promote Wikipe-
dia links to debunk the conspiracy theory videos YouTube does so much to pro-
mote, represents yet more layers of outsourcing—from a for-profit corporation to 
a non-profit that in turn delegates power over content to volunteers managed by a 
shadowy layer of administrators. 
For Jeffersonians, the answer here is obvious: there should not be one, behe-
moth corporation with power over so many videos. YouTube says it needs the scale 
to keep its offerings free; Jeffersonians respond that the ad-driven business model 
is just a way to undercut subscription services which could better manage their 
offerings. Jeffersonians also point out that it is very difficult to know the extent to 
which services like YouTube are actually serving users and content producers, and 
to what extent they exist simply to maximize ad revenue. 
A Hamiltonian Perspective on New Digital Utilities
The guiding spirit of Jeffersonians is the original intent of U.S. antitrust law—that 
immense corporations were so capable of dominating their customers, employees, 
and communities, that they needed to be broken apart. Dividing a large corpora-
tion into smaller part is a “structural remedy,” because it addresses fundamental 
ownership stakes and control in society. This populist demand to break up the 
largest corporations has inspired antitrust attacks on firms ranging from Stan-
dard Oil to Brown Shoe to Microsoft. 
More recently, though, antitrust authorities have been more cautious about 
breaking up large firms. Both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission have narrowed their interest to focus almost entirely on large firms’ 
present, price effects on consumers. So a massive firm that undercuts competi-
tors by reducing quality is of little concern to them. Nor is the possibility that the 
same firm will, eventually, once it has monopolized a space, raise prices dramati-
cally for customers (or reduce wages for workers).  Instead, there is a single-mind-
ed devotion to efficiency—more, for less, faster. Free or low prices in the short run 
trump other considerations.
To see the practical effects of this obsession with the short-term, imagine 
searching for “weather” in Google, and instantly seeing its own weather forecast 
filling your mobile screen. Had it linked to three forecasting sites in that pre-
cious screen space, it might have directed more exposure and advertising reve-
nue to sites with diverse interfaces, more or less information, or other variations. 
For example, the site WeatherSpark used to give a beautifully precise image of 
storms’ movement over time—the perfect visual analogue to Accuweather’s min-
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ute-by-minute forecasts of rain or clear skies. But WeatherSpark no longer offers 
that service, and who knows how many other startups gave up on occupying this 
space. To establishment antitrust authorities, there is no ground to intervene—
consumers get the basics of weather from Google’s interface, and it is free. It’s a 
short-termist outlook that omits long-run considerations in the name of a presen-
tist scientism. In their worldview, there is no room for argument about whether 
better or worse alternatives do or should exist. Antirust is supposed to protect 
“competition, not competitors”—and a singular lack of concern for quality trans-
lates into profound lack of interest in whether current or future competitors could 
do a better job than a digital behemoth. But how can we know if there is competi-
tion, if there are no competitors to provide it?
In the wake of this narrowing of antitrust law, more Hamiltonian voices have 
called for a revival of public utility law to cabin the power of massive online firms. 
The utility regulators of the early 20th century did not want to see 10 different 
phone companies digging up the streets to provide competition in calling services. 
Nor did they envision localized power generation (however tempting that pros-
pect may now be for those pursuing a distributed, renewable grid based on so-
lar power). Instead, these regulators accepted the massiveness of telecom, power, 
and other firms as an inevitable aspect of modern economic rationalization. They 
just wanted a state (and unions) massive enough to offer countervailing forces.
For the Hamiltonians, an agency like the Federal Communications Commis-
sion provides a behavioral alternative to structural remedies. A Federal Search 
Commission, for example, could monitor how Google treats competing firms in 
search results, and force it to provide alternatives to its own services in such re-
sults.3 European competition authorities may effectively create such an agency, if 
they are serious about policing Google’s treatment of vertical search competitors 
(that is, narrow gage searching for certain types of goods or services). 
Hamiltonians identify with technocratic left-liberalism. They want to deploy 
tools like cost-benefit analysis and advanced data analysis to calculate just when 
it might make sense for a service to be folded into a conglomerate, and when it 
makes sense to create rules that presume the independence of firms. Howev-
er, there are more ideologically ambitious endorsements of industrial scale and 
scope. For example, Evgeny Morozov warns against efforts to split up Google or 
Facebook, since advances in AI may only be possible when truly massive amounts 
of data are consolidated. In a recent podcast, the socialists of Chapo Trap House 
joked that they were happy to see Amazon consolidate power. Once it takes over 
every business in the country, it will be easy to “cut off the head” and simply im-
pose government control over the economy. “Free Whole Foods hot bar for every-
3  O. Bracha & F. Pasquale, Federal Search Commission: Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of 
Search, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1149 (2008). 
Frank Pasquale292
one!” was the imagined denouement. Similarly, if all the private health insurers in 
the US merged, the stage would finally be set for “single payer:” the government 
need only take over the one insurer left standing.
Authors at Jacobin (including Alyssa Battistoni, Peter Frase, Christian Parenti) 
are also articulating a neo-Hamiltonian approach of advanced corporate capaci-
ty tempered by countervailing power of government and labor unions. Allowing 
centralization into large peak organizations like Germany’s general trades union 
council and mega-manufacturers, would enable corporatist negotiations over 
the division of the spoils from the types of investment made possible by massive 
concentration of resources. Germany’s largest trade union recently negotiated to 
reduce its members’ workweek to 28 hours, while also getting a 4.3% pay raise—
exactly the type of deal U.S. workers could have gotten had productivity gains 
since the late 1970s been widely shared, and had business and labor been similarly 
organized. 
At its most ambitious, the Hamiltonian vision tends toward a dream of a ro-
bust universal basic income guaranteed under fully automated luxury commu-
nism.  Artificial intelligence and robots mimic workers, who still are paid for the 
data they (or their forbears) contributed to advance AI’s development. Hamiltoni-
anism can be the economic equivalent to geoengineering—an embrace of the rad-
ically new and large-scale, arising out of the sense that inequalities and climate 
change are such massive problems that only rapid technological advance can solve 
them. Jeffersonians adhere to something like a precautionary principle, question-
ing whether any entity should accumulate the power necessary to, say, compare 
everyone’s genomes, convert millions of workers’ movements into patterns of be-
havior programmable into robotics, or maintain social credit scores on all citizens.
Reconciling Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian Perspectives
All these trends suggest new fault lines in economic thought for the 21st century. 
To alleviate these tensions, we should return to some seminal tensions in the neo-
liberal project. In the 1930s and 40s, the University of Chicago economist Henry 
C. Simons warned that monopolies posed a mortal threat to classical liberal ide-
als of free and open markets. In his A Positive Program for Laissez Faire, written 
in 1934, Simons argued that “the great enemy of democracy is monopoly, in all 
its forms: gigantic corporations, trade associations and other agencies for price 
control, trade-unions—or, in general, organization and concentration of power 
within functional classes.” However, by the 1950s, George Stigler and Aaron Di-
rector supplanted Simons at Chicago, and offered a far more hands-off approach 
to antitrust law. They viewed concentrated state and union power as a far greater 
threat to society than concentrated corporate power. And since the former was 
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needed to combat the latter, they downplayed the harm that massive corporations 
could pose (outside a narrowly delimited category of conduct that was to become 
ever smaller as Chicago scholars like Robert Bork shrank the domain and force of 
antitrust law).
What if Chicago had followed Simons’s path instead of Director’s? Neoliber-
als might have embraced a more even-handed approach to confronting excessive 
power in society. Antitrust authorities would have better resisted behemoth firms’ 
aspirations to centralize data collection and control of workers. Policymakers 
could have better balanced efforts to reduce state power with parallel efforts to 
decrease corporations’ ability to work their will upon communities and workers. 
A 1950s era policy agenda to reduce union power looks risible in the 2010s, when 
union density has declined so precipitously, while corporate concentration has 
risen.
Jeffersonians have their own blind spot when it comes to labor. Too much of 
the Jeffersonian literature idealizes small-holders, advancing an idea of every-
man-as-entrepreneur. But most of us are, and will be, working for someone else 
for most of our life. Thus Atkinson and Lind are right to argue, in Big is Beautiful, 
that small businesses should be held to many of the same labor and consumer pro-
tection laws that now only govern larger corporations. Otherwise, the wizards of 
franchising and platform capitalism will simply find new ways to disaggregate 
existing concerns into smaller units, to get around regulation. Undercapitalized 
and judgment-proof small businesses are the perfect business law-breakers, since 
they have little to lose if caught. 
However, a core insight of the Jeffersonians must be respected: there really 
is no “one best way” to handle many products and services.  The question then 
becomes, how to identify optimal scale and scope of enterprise in different in-
dustries. When a firm has a bona fide need for data to solve a problem (such as 
calculating optimal routes for a f leet of self-driving cars), that is a much better 
rationale for “bigness” than simply using data to rearrange commercial transac-
tions to its own advantage. Stacy Mitchell of the Institute for Local Self-Reliance 
has observed that, “when third-party sellers post new products, Amazon tracks 
the transactions and then starts selling many of their most popular products.” 
However much that practice increases economic productivity, it does so at an un-
acceptable cost of concentrating power in one firm while discouraging entrepre-
neurship outside it. Policymakers should protect vulnerable sellers against it.
The structural concerns of the Jeffersonians are a first line of defense against 
over-concentration in the economy. Competition authorities should take them se-
riously, particularly when there is no substantive productive rationale for bigness. 
If Amazon needs to buy equipment manufacturers to pursue vertical integration 
to make a better Kindle, fine—but if it is acquiring other firms simply (or mainly) 
to enhance its bargaining power relative to consumers or suppliers, that is not a le-
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gitimate rationale for mergers. Similarly, authorities need to recognize that merg-
ers in the name of “better service” or “cheaper inferences” about users can lead to 
overwhelming bargaining power for a platform vis a vis advertisers it serves—and 
its ability to intrude upon the privacy of its users. Those are the key reasons why 
the FTC should have blocked Google’s purchase of DoubleClick, and Facebook’s 
acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp.4
It will be politically difficult to “unscramble the omelet” of currently dominant 
firms. Authorities are wary of reversing mergers and acquisitions, even when they 
are obviously problematic in hindsight. While Jeffersonians may keep our digital 
giants from getting bigger, Hamiltonians will need to monitor their current prac-
tices, and intervene when they transgress social norms. Thanks to the movement 
for algorithmic accountability, we know that algorithmic corporate decisionmak-
ing is frequently deployed to arbitrage around extant anti-discrimination, due 
process, and media law. Agencies like the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and 
state attorneys general, should closely monitor platforms in order to ensure that 
they are actually giving their users a fair shot at access to customers, advertising, 
and growth. These firms no longer are mere market participants. They make mar-
kets, and need to be treated as such. Even Mark Zuckerberg recently conceded that 
the question is not whether to regulate Facebook, but how. Other tech CEOs should 
adopt a similar openness to the societal values they have shunned for so long.
Context Matters 
There is ongoing struggle over what responsibilities the domination of an online 
space should entail. Investors demand a fantasy of monopolization: their firm not 
merely occupying a field, but developing “moats” against entrants, to guarantee 
both present returns and future growth. However, the day-to-day reality of op-
erational budget constraints pushes the same firms toward the pathologies of ab-
sentee ownership. 
Law can help resolve these tensions. Competition laws take aim at the function-
al sovereignty of large tech platforms, reducing the stakes of a firm’s domination 
of a field. At the very least, antitrust authorities should have blocked Facebook’s 
purchases of Instagram and Whatsapp, instead of letting its juggernaut of dom-
ination over communication roll up some of the few entities capable of providing 
alternative modes of association online. Ten, twenty, or one hundred social net-
4  For more on the advantages and disadvantages of antitrust policy here, see Frank Pasquale, 
Dominant Search Engines: An Essential Cultural & Political Facility, in The Next Digital Decade 
(2011). 
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works could eventually emerge, if competition law were properly enforced, and in-
teroperability standards could assure smooth connections among confederations 
of social networks, just as AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon customers can all talk to 
one another seamlessly. If that diversity emerged, we could worry less about a few 
persons in Silicon Valley essentially serving as a world Supreme Court deciding 
which expression was appropriate for a so-called “global community,” and what 
should be banned or obscured (in oft-secretive algorithmic manipulation).5
When industrial giants can’t be broken up, there are still many ways to neu-
tralize their power. Utility-style regulation mitigates the worst failures of absen-
tee owners, as well as the caprices of the powerful. The state can require Google to 
carry certain content on YouTube, just as it has required cable networks to include 
local news. Moreover, whenever policymakers are afraid that firms like Google, 
Amazon, or Uber are taking too large a cut of transactions, they can take a page 
out of the playbook of insurance regulators, who often limit insurers to taking 
15% to 20% of premiums (the rest must be spent on health care). That kind of limit 
recognizes the infrastructural quality of these firms’ services. We would not want 
to live in a world where the electric company can endless jack up charges in order 
to take advantage of our dependence on it. Digital monopolists should face similar 
constraints.
Though Jeffersonian trust-busters and Hamiltonian utility regulators have 
very different views of political economy, each counters the untrammeled aspira-
tions (and disappointing quotidian reality) of stalwarts of digital capitalism. They 
also help us understand when giant firms can help us solve the “knowledge prob-
lem” Hayek identified, and when they exacerbate it via obscurity and obfuscation.6 
If conglomeration and vertical mergers actually help solve real-world problems—
of faster transport, better food, higher-quality health care, and more—author-
ities should let them proceed. Such industrial bigness helps us understand and 
control the natural world better. But states should block the mere accumulation 
of bargaining power and leverage. Such moves are exercises in controlling per-
sons—a much less salubrious aim of industrial organization. Economic policy 
focused on productivity and inclusive prosperity will balance and do justice to im-
portant insights from both Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian critics of our increas-
ingly sclerotic economy.
5  Kate Klonick and Thomas Kadri, “How to Make Facebook’s ‘Supreme Court’ Work,” N.Y. Times, Nov. 
17, 2018. 
6   Walter Adams and James W. Brock, The Bigness Complex (Stanford University Press, 2004). 

Artificial Intelligence and the Democratization of Art
Jens Schröter
I want to be a machine
Andy Warhol
I. Introduction
The current hype on Artificial Intelligence is exaggerated insofar, as the much-dis-
cussed procedures of machine learning adress relatively specialized problems, e.g. 
of image recognition or more generally of pattern discrimination. A universal, 
general artificial intelligence is not the goal and perhaps not even possible. Nev-
ertheless, there is one related phenomenon that emerges in sometimes nervous 
discussions nowadays: It is the question whether the systems of machine learning 
can be ‘creative’. This discussion heated up as Alpha Go was able to beat Lee Sedol 
in Go—especially the famous move 37 in match two on the 10th of march 2016, 
which seemed radically new even for experienced Go-Players was discussed: No 
one foresaw this move—so could it be considered as creative or not?1 For obvious 
reasons, this essay cannot go into the depths of the theory of creativity or ‘creative 
subjectivity’2, but it will adress a recent phenomenon in the discourse on the ‘new’ 
AI, a phenomenon, in which the question of creativity is especially urgent: that is 
the field of art, art created by AI.
1  See the fundamental critique of the idea of machine creativity by Mersch (2019).
2  Cp. amongst many others Sternberg (1999) and Reckwitz (2012).
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Fig. 1: AI Art Goldrush is here
The AI Art Gold Rush is here is the title of a critical essay by Ian Bogost (2019). The 
images depicted somehow look like deformed Renaissace portraits, perhaps with 
a little Francis Bacon in it (Fig. 1). 
Fig. 2: Portrait of Edmond de Belamy
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Especially the slightly fuzzy character of the portraits resembles the famous Portrait 
of Edmond de Belamy, auctioned for 432.500 $ at Christie’s in october 2018. That this 
computergenerated image was sold for a comparatively high price was surprising, 
the joke with an algorithm as the signature spurred again a discussion on the ‘cre-
ativity’ of AI and the question emerged if an AI system can be an artist or an author. 
In addition, a discussion began whether the art collective Obvious who used the AI 
system is the ‘real’ author or even the programmer who developed some of the al-
gorithms.3 But the artwork was surprising also in another respect: It took recourse 
to a quite conservative genre and a quite conservative style of depiction: the blur-
riness seemed not only to evoke a certain ‘technicity’, but a conservative notion of 
artiness4—see the somewhat weird discussions on the ‘blurred’ style of the impres-
sionists (cf. Payne 2007). Given that the development of painting in the twentieth 
century developed new forms like abstraction raises the question why one needs a 
conservative style of painting in order to demonstrate the creativity of AI? 
And even the joke with the signature shows a certain traditional understanding 
of art, insofar as many artists (see the famous quote of Andy Warhol above) prob-
lematized the traditional myth of the artist: just think of surrealistic automatic 
writing, Cage’s aleatoric processes or the doubling gestures of Elaine Sturtevant 
to name just a few. Perhaps Obvious understood the painting as purely ironical—
and intended to ridicule the the ‘newness’ of AI by the very act of foregrounding 
its conservative ‘taste’. Often the ‘democratization’ of new technologies need the 
adaption of conservative and established forms to be adaptable to mass markets. 
Therefore, an abstract work of art might be regarded as insufficient to prove AI’s 
creativity, for the simple reason that many people still have problems in accepting 
abstract art forms as art at all—or as ‘too easy’ for real art.
Hence and this is the central argument of my short essay it is crucial to his-
toricize this discussion on ‘AI art’, the implications of ‘machine creativity’, and 
therefore the (possible) automatization of artistic work: Sometimes, we forget that 
the idea of computational machines, or more specifically AI, making art adds to a 
rather nervous discourse on the automation of work through smart machines.5 If 
machines can produce art, the assumption goes, they could mass produce art for 
everyone, serially, industrially. Then there would no longer be auratic works of art 
made by rare geniuses. And nobody would have to pay millions for artworks.
3  Cp. the insightful article by Sudmann (2019).
4  AI systems do not necessarily have to produce blurry images—but ‘modern art’ in a way has to 
transgress notions of realism in a way.
5  Cp. my article “Digitale Technologien und das Verschwinden der Arbeit” (2019). See also Bo-
gost (2019): “Given the general fears about robots taking human jobs, it’s understandable that 
some viewers would see an artificial intelligence taking over for visual artists, of all people, as a 
sacrificial canary.” 
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In part II, I want to look specifically on ‘information aesthetics’, a discourse 
and practice from the 1960s, already driven by the idea to produce art by com-
puters (not mainly with computers as tools).6 In part III, I will discuss somehow 
speculative reasons why the idea to automatize artistic work (and hence simply 
mass produce ‘art’ with machines) did not seem to work back then.7 In part IV, I’ll 
come back to the recent ‘gold rush’ in ‘AI art’ and re-read it in the light of the dis-
course on information aesthetics. 
II. Short Remarks on Information Aesthetics
The origin of information aesthetics is the attempt to formally determine the 
‘measure’ of aesthetics. In 1933, David Birkhoff formulated an equation (Fig. 3) in 
which the variable O denotes the measure of the order of a given work and the 
variable C the ‘complexity’. M is the degree of how aesthetic an artwork is.
M = O/C
Fig. 3: Birkhof f-Equation
According to it, the more ordered and the less complex a work of art is, the more 
aesthetic it would be. Apart from the fact that it is difficult to understand exactly 
how to determine the degree of order and complexity in a specific case, this at-
tempt to express the ‘aesthetic quality’ of art in an equation seems strange to us 
today. Nonetheless, especially in the 1960s there were several attempts to formally 
understand art and its aesthetic criteria and consequently to produce it syntheti-
cally with computers (although the computers were slow, the output possibillities 
limited and computer technologies were only available in research institutions 
and large companies).
6  There are even more precursors, for example the computer cluster Iamus, who is composing 
music and even released an album, (see: http://melomics.uma.es/). The slogan is, not surprising, 
“music for everybody, everything“, promising a democratization of art. Another important exam-
ple would be Aaron, which is a sof tware system that in collaboration with its inventor Harold Co-
hen produces paintings (see: https://www.computerhistory.org/atchm/harold-cohen-and-aar-
on-a-40-year-collaboration/).
7  It’s quite problematic that an otherwise excellent collection of essays on ‚Computers and Cre-
ativity‘ (McCormack/d’Iverno 2012) does not include a single contribution that tries ot relate the 
central question of the volume to sociological questions concerning the art system. ‘Art History’ 
is only mentioned a few times in the outstanding contribution by Frieder Nake—except of Nake’s 
paper most contributions in this volume de-socialize and de-historicize the question of the pos-
sible creativity of machines. 
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Fig. 4: Piet Mondrian, Composition With Lines (1917)
In 1967, Michael Noll describes in his essay “The Computer as a Creative Medium” 
an information aesthetic experiment with a painting by Mondrian (Fig. 4).8 Noll 
writes:
[An] experiment was performed using Piet Mondrian’s “Composition With Lines” 
(1917) and a computer-generated picture composed of pseudorandom elements 
but similar in overall composition to the Mondrian painting. Although Mondrian 
apparently placed the vertical and horizontal bars in his painting in a careful and 
orderly manner, the bars in the computer-generated picture were placed accord-
ing to a pseudorandom number generator with statistics chosen to approximate 
the bar density, lengths, and widths in the Mondrian painting. Xerographic copies 
of the two pictures were presented, side by side, to 100 subjects with educations 
ranging from high school to postdoctoral; the subjects represented a reasonably 
good sampling of the population at a large scientific research laboratory. They 
were asked which picture they preferred and also which picture of the pair they 
thought was produced by Mondrian. Fif ty-nine percent of the subjects preferred 
the computer-generated picture; only 28 percent were able to identify correctly 
the picture produced by Mondrian. In general, these people seemed to associate 
8  It is by the way one of the earliest texts in which the computer is described as a medium—the 
computer’s becoming a medium thus goes back to questions of art and aesthetics.
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the randomness of the computer-generated picture with human creativity where-
as the orderly bar placement of the Mondrian painting seemed to them machine-
like. This finding does not, of course, detract from Mondrian’s artistic abilities. 
His painting was, af ter all, the inspiration for the algorithms used to produce the 
computer-generated picture, and since computers were nonexistent 50 years ago, 
Mondrian could not have had a computer at his disposal. (1967: 92)
Fig. 5: Simulated Mondrian by Michael Noll
Noll thus simulates a Mondrian (Fig.  5) on the basis of a statistical distribution 
which is supposed to describe the arrangement of the lines in Mondrian’s work. And 
since this distribution looks more ‘disordered’, a group of observers, presumably not 
to be regarded as representative, identifies the simulated Mondrian as the real one, 
while the real one appears too regular and mechanical.9 Does this preference show 
that the disorderly picture is understood to have a higher aesthetic quality? That 
would contradict Birkhoff, but it does remind us in an uncanny manner of the dis-
9  A similar discourse can be found in recent AI art: “According to Elgammal, ordinary observers 
can’t tell the dif ference between an AI-generated image and a ‘normal’ one in the context of a 
gallery or an art fair” (Bogost 2019).
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torted, blurred, and ‘arty’ qualities of recent AI-generated portraits. Or is it because 
the disorder is simply understood as a reference to human authorship? It could also 
reveal that the artiness of a given picture does not depend on perceptual features 
alone… It should be noted that Noll tries to find formal, algorithmic rules, allowing 
the production of a work of art that can be identified as a work of art. Noll is not the 
only one following this approach. Frieder Nake, one of the most important theorists 
and practitioners of information aesthetics, also tried to trace the pattern of image 
production in Paul Klee’s work and thus produce a computer-generated Klee (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6: Simulated Klee by Frieder Nake
Admittedly, these examples are taken out of context and an appropriate discus-
sion of information aesthetics would have to consider at least the positions of Max 
Bense, Rul Günzenhäuser, and Abraham Moles, which can’t be addressed in this 
essay. In any case, from today’s point of view, these attempts seem rather strange, 
because they remove the works of art from their historical context and reduce them 
to abstract structures that can be formalized—similar to recent AI-produced art. 
It must be therefore emphasized that the aesthetic strategies of Mondrian and 
Klee have reacted to certain historical questions, not the least of them the history 
of art itself. Information aesthetics and AI art seem to understand artworks as 
ahistorical, formal structures—although they could also be seen as responses to 
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a certain historical, in this case computational, context of art as such (cf. to the 
vexed relation between form and history amongst others Buchloh 2015). This also 
seems to reappear in recent AI art: “That might be an inevitability of AI art: Wide 
swaths of art-historical context are abstracted into general, visual patterns.” (Bo-
gost 2019)10
However, these attempts are relatively characteristic of a larger development, 
namely the attempts to formalize cognitive labor and, if possible, to transfer it 
partially or entirely to machines, for which computers as symbol-processing ma-
chines are suitable. 11 Early texts from the domain of Computer Science, such as 
Douglas Engelbart’s “Program on Human Effectiveness” or J.  C.  R.  Licklider’s 
“Man-Machine Symbiosis” from the 1960s, are programmatic for this. (cf. Licklid-
er 1960: 4-11; Engelbart 1991: 235-244). Noll, Nake and others try to make aesthetic 
work formalizable and, in principle, executable by machines. Their attempts can 
be understood, whether intentionally or not, as contributions to the automation 
of aesthetic work.
In other forms of commodity production, these processes normally contribut-
ed to the cheapening of commodities—and therefore to ‘democratization’ in the 
sense of goods becoming more affordable for more people. That was obviously not 
the goal of information aesthetics, since—for instance—Nake operated as the au-
thor of the work (and not Klee); and if he would have called his work a Klee, this 
could have led to serious legal problems. But even if this democratization of art 
would have been the goal of information aesthetics—to start an industrial, cheap 
mass production of, say, Mondrians and Klees—this would not have worked in 
the art system: Art is not only a question of formal structures and strategies, it 
is also a question of historical and especially social places and roles. We will now 
turn to that.
III. Art, knowledge and work
Apparently, art it is not directly threatened by computerization. Art does not 
appear in the highly discussed Oxford research report, which started a nervous 
discussion on the disappearance of work: the only activity that resembles artis-
tic practice is that of the ‘art director’, who gets off quite lightly with a 95th place 
on the computerizability probability list.  (cf. Frey/Osborne 2013:  59) Artists can-
10  The same is true for Schmidhubers contribution to McCormack/d’Iverno (2012). It’s again an 
approach to formalize aesthetic value of an object—without really posing the question if this 
value is not derived from the relative historical position of the artefact and not (only) of its for-
mal, internal structure.
11  Cp. on the history of Automation Noble (1984).
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not become the object of rationalization and their works will continue to be called 
‘works’. Artistic work seems to be a type of work that cannot or should not be 
formalized, algorithmized, and consequently neither reproduced mechanically 
without further ado. This suggests the suspicion that artistic work is not really 
work, but another form of activity or—at least—another form of work. But why?
At least at first glance, the art market looks exactly like any other market: art-
ists are well aware that they have to earn money with their work. Some succeed 
to an almost inconceivable degree, but most have serious difficulties competing 
in the art market. Artists are also subject to the fact that work is “a necessity of 
refinancing their expenses” (Luhmann 1994: 191). Work, money for one’s own work, 
market, competition, rich versus poor—this first  glimpse suggests that the art 
business does not differ in any way from other forms of production. It is not a 
realm of freedom, but only a kind of service or consumer goods industry that 
serves a special market. 
Therefore, we can find cases where work is technologically made superf luos 
in the art business. If one looks at a large studio, such as Studio Olafur Eliasson, 
one could observe that the introduction of new computer-assisted technologies 
directly leads to the disappearance of work. A series of jobs, e.g. website main-
tenance, management, public relations, logistics, up to the people that clean the 
studio, may be replaced. Inasmuch as Studio Olafur Eliasson also operates under 
capitalist conditions, it is likely to save costs by rationalizing the way work is done. 
However, this aspect is external; it does adress the problem that information and 
generative aesthetics have pointed to, mainly if the work of making art itself can 
be rationalized. Although Olafur Eliasson could not realize any of his elaborate 
projects without his team, the disappearance of the teamwork in the black box of 
the author’s name does not seem to affect art ‘in itself’. And insofar the teamwork 
is blackboxed it may change its composition without changing anything in the 
‘artiness’of Eliasson’s art.
This finally brings us to the core of the problem raised by information aesthet-
ics. Obviously, the idea of art without the intervention of a human author or caus-
er—and even if its role consists precisely in demonstratively withdrawing—does 
not seem plausible to us. We do not see art appearing in nature.12 The question 
implied in information aesthetics and AI art is different from the observations in 
Walter Benjamin’s famous essay Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Re-
produzierbarkeit, where everything revolves around the question of the technical 
reproduction of the product, the work of art. But in information aesthetics and AI 
art the question of the reproducibility of the work that produces the work of art is cen-
tral. The fact that the technical reproduction of this work does not seem possible 
12  Although art was historically sometimes understood as being close to nature (‘Kunstschönes’ 
vs. ‘Naturschönes’), cp. on this Kant (1914 [1790]).
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does not have to be attributed—this would be a very traditional answer—to the 
‘genius’, which is ultimately of divine origin and thus per se untechnical. Luhmann 
remarks: “The artist’s genius is primarily his body” (2000: 38). One could therefore 
simply say that the separation of knowledge from the working body, characteristic 
of the progression of capitalism and perhaps first discovered by Marx, does not or 
cannot take place in art. But why?
One possible reason would be that the work of art—despite the attempts of 
the information aesthetics (at least according to Birkhoff) to formalize precisely 
the complexity—is too complex and thus the work that produces it cannot be suf-
ficiently understood. Thus, it is noticeable that Noll and Nake focus on a certain 
type of painting, which is determined by the extensive recourse to basic geomet-
ric forms. Such forms seem simple enough to suggest their formalization, while 
other more complex ones would elude them. Obviously, technology progressed: 
Nowadays geometric patterns do not suffice to demonstrate the creativity of com-
puting systems, it has to be (albeit blurry) portraits. Portraiture is historically con-
nected to a history of ‘genius’. As was remarked in the beginning, such portraits 
are hardly the status quo of art today13—using machines to create figurative art 
is less about AIs critically ref lecting on contemporary art (at least when Nake and 
Noll made their works, abstract painting was quite central), it is more about the 
new powers of computer graphics.
But coming back to the vexed question of auctoriality: Even with geometric 
forms, it is true that we cannot quite imagine their existence as art without an art-
ist. For even if an artist—like Nake, for example—were to define himself precisely 
by delegating all work to machines, we would still call the result ‘a work by Nake’, 
which is similar to the finding already mentioned that the production within a 
studio with a division of labour is ‘black boxed’ under an author‘s name. A similar 
process seems to occur with the debate regarding the Portrait of Edmond de Belamy 
on who is the author in the last instance.
The work of art is the result of a work in which body and knowledge, i.e. the 
knowledge of how this specific work is to be produced, cannot be separated—and that 
means that the function of the ‘author’ is central.  (cf. Graw 2012: 43-45) At least, 
this is the ideological figure that has historically emerged as characteristic of the 
art system. Therefore, works of art must not be the connection between knowl-
edge and a false body—this would be what we call forgery. Even if, for example, 
one were to take a work by Donald Judd that according to Sebastian Egenhofer 
(2008: 214) is “dissolved in the anonymity of the industrial dispositive” , it would 
still be pointless if another person or simply a company, based on the knowledge 
of how it is made, were to produce the same object again, as it is also done in 
principle in the industrial production of reproductions—it would not be possible 
13  Perhaps with the exception of some types of ‘post-modernist’ neo-figurative painting.
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to recognise this reproduction as a work of art (of ‘Donald Judd’). Or let us take 
another example: Elaine Sturtevant borrowed the screen printing matrices from 
Warhol for the Flowers and printed the Flowers again, in 1991 even made an entire 
exhibition with Warhol Flowers—and Warhol, referring to the production process 
of the Flowers, is frequently quoted for saying: “I don’t know. Ask Elaine.”  (Quoted 
in: Arning  1989:  44) Nevertheless, Sturtevant’s appropriation of Warhol’s knowl-
edge is not a rationalization of Warhol’s work in the sense that Sturtevant now 
simply makes ‘cheaper Warhols’, but she rather makes ‘Sturtevants’. Diedrich 
Diederichsen points out that the work of assigning relevance by curators, critics, 
audiences, etc. also belongs to the work that creates the artwork and its market 
value. (cf. Diederichsen 2012: 99) The ‘distributed’ character of this work makes it 
impossible to rationalize—since it continuously accompanies the work, i.e. never 
ends, and can also take unpredictable turns in the future. ‘Sturtevants’ can be-
come more important and more expensive than ‘Warhols’ in the future. It could 
even be argued, that Sturtevant by her appropriation makes the author-function 
of Warhol visible in the first place.
Of course, you can try to save production costs, but it does not make sense to 
offer Warhol’s Flowers cheaper, because only Flowers from Warhol’s Factory are ac-
cepted as originals, which of course does not exclude the possibility of producing 
inexpensive reproductions of Flowers as posters (which do not count as work of art, 
but its reproduction). Warhol’s life ended in 1987 and that stopped the production 
of original ‘Warhols’—and that’s a necessity: In the long run, the mortality of art-
ists makes artworks scarce and that’s why they have market-value (cf. critically on 
the notion of scarcity Panayotakis 2012). In capitalism, no one can have an interest 
in a ‘democratic’ production of artworks.
Obviously, the crucial difference is that in art itself, reproductions, such as 
Sherrie Levine’s re-photographs or Sturtevant’s repetitions, are always originals 
(which, through repetition, exhibit the discourse of the original). In contrast, in 
‘conventional’ commodity production there are no originals,14 but only series of re-
productions, e.g. of Flowers posters, which all refer to the original pieces of art but 
are all serially of equal rank. And once again: to be original means to be connected 
with the body of the artist. This work cannot be detached from the body, which is why it 
cannot be formalized and rationalized. The attempts of information aesthetics may 
seem pointless because here a rationalization dispositive from industrial produc-
tion is transferred to an area that blocks it. Or as Adorno puts it:
14  A dif ficult case seems to be product counterfeiting, insofar as the term already implies an ‘orig-
inal product’—but even original products exist as a series of identical products. Product coun-
terfeiting means that a product wrongly claims to belong to that series. This dif fers from the 
relationship between original and copy in art.
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On the other hand, however, whenever autonomous art has seriously set out to 
absorb industrial processes, they have remained external to it. [...] The radical in-
dustrialization of art, its undiminished adaptation to the achieved technical stan-
dards, collides with what in art resists integration. (1997 [1970]): 217).
But to be clear about this: That does not mean that art in itself is an utopian realm 
of freedom, freed from the restrictions and rules of commodity production. It just 
means that it is a field of commodity production with different, historical, contin-
gent rules and that’s why art is in a way economically exceptional (cf. Beech 2015)
IV. Conclusion
It seems that the question whether machines can be creative or not can not be 
answered ontologically. What ‘creative’ means seems to be too historically contin-
gent and malleable. Think of the statements why machine-learning is not creative: 
Bogost (2019) insists that “any machine-learning technique has to base its work on 
a specific training set.” That’s true—but doesn’t that also apply to human artists 
who have to train their perceptual and e.g. painterly skills? Or, again Bogost (ibid.): 
“A neural net couldn’t infer anything about the particular symbolic trappings of 
the Renaissance or antiquity—unless it was taught to, and that wouldn’t happen 
just by showing it lots of portraits.” Is that not true for humans too? And more-
over: Is ‘creativity’ not always distributed between human and non-human actors? 
Don’t human artists often say that their artwork ‘answers’ while they are in the 
painting process? Can one be an artist without any kind of non-human materi-
als and mediators that are not only transparent tools for a pre-given ‘vision’ of a 
work (cp. Hensel/Schröter 2012)? And couldn’t we even imagine advanced AIs, per-
haps in the shape of humanoid robots that could be artists (cp. Kjøsen 2012 for a 
similar argument relating to the labour theory of value)? Could not the works they 
produce then be tied in the same way to their ‘bodily’ presence as is the case with 
human artists? Think of virtual popstars like Miku Hatsune15, which can operate 
as a kind of enunciator, having a kind of ‘signature’ (here: her voice)—but of course 
the mortality of the artist as a kind of natural scarcity that limits the work is not 
given in such a case (on the notion of a virtual star, see Schröter 2000).
Although at the moment the idea of artworks produced by machines seems 
ahistorical and absurd, because artworks have a place in history and have to be 
tied to the body of the artist and therefore be scarce and so on, it may neverthe-
less be that in a far future things could change: Perhaps a democratization of art 
needs a different social context—as does the democratization of AI, ripping it out 
15  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hatsune_Miku.
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of the hands of big monopolies. That’s why it seems so appropriate that the much 
discussed AI-painting is a portrait of Edward Bellamy—since Bellamy wrote in 
1888 the famous novel Looking Backward 2000-1887. The AI looked back, so to speak, 
to a historical mode of painting in a historical style and with somewhat dated ges-
tures (the signature), but this might also be a metaphor of looking back from a 
possible future, in which AI can be an artist. Bellamys novel centrally is about a 
very different economy of the future, a kind of post-capitalism, that might indeed 
be the precondition for the democratization of AI as of art. And in the novel sever-
al futuristic media are mentioned, which nowadays seem absurd of course—but 
which can also be read as metaphors of a future mediality, in which even ‘creativ-
ity’ might at least partially be automatized (for an opposing view, see Kelly 2019). 
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“That is a 1984 Orwellian future at our doorstep, right?“ 
Natural Language Processing, Artificial Neural Networks 
and the Politics of (Democratizing) AI
Andreas Sudmann in conversation with Alexander Waibel, professor for Computer 
Science at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and also professor at the School of 
Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University.
Andreas Sudmann: Alex, you are one of the pioneers in the area of Artificial Neural Net-
works (ANN) and Natural Language Processing (NLP). What was your initial motivation 
to enter this field of research?
Alexander Waibel: I have been working in academia for around forty years. Born 
in Germany and having German parents, I went to study at MIT and later to Car-
negie Mellon, the leading universities in computer science and AI. And it was at 
those institutions that I developed the main thrust and inspiration for all my work, 
which is the question of how we learn and communicate as human beings and how 
we can build technology to help improve human communication. Back then, in the 
1970s, when I went to university, people had already been thinking about AI, given 
that the first definitions of the field were proposed in the 1950s.  In fact, Nobel 
laureate Herbert Simon, who was part of my thesis committee, had participat-
ed in the famous Dartmouth conference on building intelligent machines in 1956, 
where he and other researchers defined this early vision of AI. 
In those days, everybody was attempting to build intelligent machines by 
search algorithms, rules, and logic formulas. But for me as a student, this seemed 
a bit like “des Kaisers neue Kleider” (the emperor’s new clothes).  I was listening to 
these famous people talking about a problem that to me would never be solvable 
with a rule-based approach to AI.  It was intuitively clear to me that the amount 
of knowledge and facts that we learn in a lifetime is just so enormous that pro-
gramming it all into rules would be impossible.  And worse, they would have to 
be changed all the time, because the world around us is changing all the time. In 
fact, this is totally impossible, and so it was an early concern for me to say from the 
start: We will never achieve such goals unless we develop learning machines that 
can acquire such knowledge by themselves.
Andreas Sudmann/Alexander Waibel314
Aside from this fundamental scientific quest, though, another dimension always 
mattered to me as a scientist:  Even though this might now sound like a cliché – it 
was a continuing desire to make contributions to society and to make the world a 
better place, as opposed to just following my own personal pursuits or interests. 
As a researcher, I am not so much simply curiosity-driven, but driven by practical 
goals.  Practical goals provide a way to evaluate progress and can impact society 
in a positive way, once we are successful.  And among them perhaps one of the 
most consistent goals for my work as a foreigner who grew up with 5 languages, 
was to build machines that can help us humans to translate between languages, by 
text or by spoken language. Throughout history, there have been many attempts 
to use machines for translating texts, which is hard enough in its own right. But 
when you try to connect people across language barriers, you also have to translate 
spoken language.  In the 70’s this seemed like a preposterous goal, and indeed, it 
seemed unsolvable, as speech added a whole new dimension of complexity and 
complication to the problem due to the fact that turning speech into text (before 
translating it) was an unsolved AI problem in itself.  We did not know how to 
recognize speech and worse people never speak clean text… they make mistakes 
when they speak, they stutter, hesitate and correct themselves during speaking. 
And how would you then combine it with the other hard AI problem of transla-
tion?  And all of that combined was so hard that it was unthinkable to realize in 
the early days of AI.  But for me the dream was born and with youthful naivety and 
optimism we went for it.  Needless to say, it was and remains a hard problem, a 
problem that we are still working to this very day.  But despite the obstacles, chal-
lenges and delays along the way, we were able to see the fruits of our efforts.  In 
retrospect, it is quite a privilege, actually, to be living in the one generation of hu-
mankind that sees language barriers disappear and to have had the opportunity 
to be working on the technologies made it possible.
The key to success scientifically was due to progress in machine learning 
methods combined with the explosive growth in available computing power and 
data that supports them. But for the vision to become reality also meant that ac-
ademic progress had to be transferred to societal deployment. To do so, we start-
ed several companies that specialized on building wearable speech and language 
technology and eventually mobile speech translators.  One of them, Jibbigo, built 
and sold the first ever Dialog translator on a phone.  It was sold via the App Store 
and helped Tourists and Healthcare workers to communicate.  The company was 
later acquired by Facebook, and we continued working on even more advanced 
deployments.  For example, we are now developing new interpreting tools that 
help migrants in Germany to communicate with doctors if they cannot speak the 
language.  In a University setting, we have installed automatic simultaneous in-
terpretations services at KIT, so that foreign students can study in Germany and 
follow a German lecture by way of simultaneous interpretation during the lecture. 
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My team in Karlsruhe and I have also performed early experiments at the Euro-
pean Parliament to see if such a technology can be of assistance in this most chal-
lenging language environment.  So it’s really ultimately not only about translation 
alone but about how we can build technology that can bridge across barriers, that 
can bring the world together and make people understand each other better.  And 
in order to master this hard problem, you really have to build machines that can 
learn effectively at multiple different levels.
And you have already worked out the necessary fundamentals in the 1980s and 1990s, espe-
cially with your research on so-called TDNN models. Perhaps you can tell us a little about 
how you came up with this particular approach and explain how it works?
Back while I was writing my PhD thesis at Carnegie Mellon I became fascinat-
ed with the idea of building learning algorithms that would mimic more closely 
the massively parallel, holistic learning that we perform as humans in the brain. 
I discovered that researchers in the 1950’s had already proposed so-called “per-
ceptrons”, which did learn, but could only solve very simple classification tasks. 
Still, the fact that one could actually learn those functions was not only exciting, 
but seemed to be directly applicable to the fuzzy and ambiguous language and 
perception problems that I was working on.  Again, this was a time when people 
believed they could solve speech recognition and language translation primarily 
by rules, a belief that seemed preposterous to me, given the enormity of facts and 
details that would have to be assembled.  Nevertheless, simple perceptrons and 
similar methods also had severe limitations for speech recognition, because one 
could only train a single neuron at a time.  The whole magic of the brain, by con-
trast is that it does not train single neurons but it trains entire networks of neurons, 
and that an ensemble of neurons can do much more powerful tasks.  But how would 
we train an entire network?
It was just during that time that fortuitously a young assistant professor by 
the name of Geoffrey Hinton came to Carnegie Mellon, and started working on 
something called Boltzmann machines.  While he was there, we had many won-
derful discussions, and he introduced me to something they had been tinkering 
with at USC San Diego, an algorithm called backpropagation.  It was much closer 
to what I was looking for and I immediately jumped on it.  Backpropagation was 
a simple algorithm, an extension of the simple perceptron – except that this algo-
rithm would now optimize the whole network of perceptrons and make sure that 
it was functioning in an optimal way.  If you tell the entire network what it’s sup-
posed to do, it can in fact adjust each internal neurons in such a way that each of 
them will try to contribute to what is best for the whole ensemble of neurons. This 
seemed like a big step in the right direction, a big improvement toward classify-
ing patterns, but for speech and language this was not enough.  Because in most 
real world problems, recognizing patterns is not the only problem, but finding the 
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pattern that is to be classified in the first place.  This always meant that one would 
have to segment a signal first to find the interesting patterns (sounds, images) 
before they could be classified.  In speech, one would have to cut speech in such 
a way that you identify the beginning and the end of a particular phoneme, and 
then once you have that, you can try to apply a neural network for classifying these 
sounds and assemble them into a speech sequence.  However, this meant com-
pounding multiple separate hard problems. And the hard learn lesson in speech 
was that this is deadly as each of them makes mistakes. Therefore, it became clear 
to me that we needed a neural network that was not only a wonderful classifier but 
that would also recognize patterns independent of position, a property we would 
call “shift invariance”.  So what does that mean?  It means that you are building 
a neural network that you do not just apply to a particular pattern, but that you 
move all neurons over a range of input, and let them essentially scan that input un-
til it lights up whenever it finds a useful, helpful pattern.  Networks of such units 
could thus learn to assemble all useful evident independent of small shifts in the 
signal.  Such shift-invariance is, of course, necessary for speech, because speech 
f lows by and changes all the time, but as it turns out it is also necessary for many 
other problems in AI, including images, music, games, language, and many more. 
In all of these situations, your first challenge is to know where the useful pat-
terns are before you can classify them correctly. Hence, classifying things by de-
tecting them in a shift-invariant fashion was the key problem that we needed to 
solve.  With that goal in mind, I then went to Japan as a post-doc, where I had 
access to some of the most powerful super-computers at that time. And with this 
computing power, I had the chance to develop a new model which then became 
known as the time-delay neural network (TDNN).  It was still a multilayered 
(“deep”) neural network, but it was now trained specifically for shift invariant 
classification. And as it turned out it worked fantastically well; it worked better 
than all other methods that existed back then.
So did this new TDNN model then replace other methods?
Sadly, we still did not have the necessary computing power to build networks that 
were large enough. Back then in Japan, we used the biggest supercomputers avail-
able, and compared them with other statistical or rule-based methods over bench-
mark data – and we found them to be much, much better. But when we tried to 
build larger networks and practical speech recognition systems, we still ran up 
against computational limits and had to make many compromises that hurt per-
formance, and so other researchers could use simpler methods to gradually catch 
up, and get similar or even slightly better performances then we did. As a conse-
quence – and this was in the late 1990s, early 2000s – people lost interest in neural 
networks and simply used other statistical methods. 
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Ten years passed and few people continued to work on neural networks, until 
around 2008, when – rather by coincidence – various people in the US actually 
tried these old neural networks again, but with the help of much more comput-
ing power and with much larger amounts of learning data that is now available 
over the internet.  And, as it turned out, these neural network methods that had 
already been developed in the 1980s suddenly worked amazingly better than any 
other approach in the field of AI. And they did not just work a little better, but in 
fact they worked like 30 percent better. In our area, you know, entire PhD theses 
are written when progress of half a percent is made; so doing something that is 30 
percent better is simply revolutionary.  As a result, the entire community switched 
to neural approaches within two years. The other thing that came as a surprise is 
what happens when you add more layers in the network. In the 1980s, we had one 
or two so-called hidden layers and that was all we could compute. But now, with 
all this new computing power, we can do three, four, five, and more layers. No 
one expected that this would continue to improve performance, but it did. Today, 
we have networks used for speech recognition in our laboratory with 40, 80 or 
even hundreds of layers.  And the exciting neural models that worked so well 20 
years ago work even better today, too.  TDNN’s went on and got applied to image 
processing, games, speech, and other problems and became known by the more 
generic name: “Convolutional Neural Nets”.  They can now be found at the heart of 
most modern AI engines.
In terms of having access to powerful hardware and large amounts of data, it was certainly 
helpful that you worked for Facebook for some time.
Right, I was with Facebook for two years as a director, but of course I also have 
many friends working at Google, Amazon and Microsoft.  Many of our students 
are now with Google, Amazon, Microsoft and so on. And many of them graduated 
from our labs.  The massive amounts of data that these companies control is of 
course a treasure trove for learning programs.  In those large Internet companies, 
they train huge neural networks over huge amounts of data using huge amounts 
of computing power, and the performance gains still grow. And that’s surprising 
and impressive. But if you ask me what’s the new breakthrough in AI today as op-
posed to 20 years ago, I would have to tell you: not that much.  They are again very 
much the same network techniques and training algorithms as we were working 
on in the 1980s, except that we now use orders of magnitude more data and more 
computing power, and they actually work much, much better than we ever imag-
ined.
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So far, we have mainly talked about the technological aspects of speech recognition, machine 
translation, and ANN. Perhaps we can now talk about the political dimension of these mod-
els and applications of AI. What would you consider to be the most relevant political aspects 
concerning the field of natural language processing in general and speech recognition and 
machine translation in particular? 
There is of course much to say about this. One important aspect would be the pol-
itics of research funding that affects us directly in terms of how we are doing sci-
ence. Scientific support depends on political factors, and sometimes they work, 
sometimes they don’t. And there are really fascinating differences between the 
US and Germany, or between countries in Europe and Asia, because each of these 
countries or cultures approaches scientific support differently and therefore has 
specific strengths and weaknesses. So I am politically active at that level to intro-
duce and improve better mechanisms for research support in Europe. The other 
political dimension, though, is what we do with our research. As I have mentioned 
before, in my view of the world, I like to do projects with which I try to improve 
some aspect of society. And as I said before, research always meant for me to make 
people understand each other better. If with our research we can build machines 
that allow us to communicate better, then this means having fewer misunder-
standings. 
Throughout my career, I have founded several companies, and one of them 
was for building a handheld speech translator on a phone. It was the first mobile 
speech translation system on a phone ever. We launched that in 2009. The start-up 
company was called “Mobile Technologies” and the product was called “Jibbigo”. 
You could speak into the phone and then the system translated the input into an-
other language. It was a huge success. Apple, for example, ran commercials with 
it. It was used everywhere and people came back to us, saying: “I can finally under-
stand my in-laws!”, and “I can really understand other people!” And we also start-
ed doing humanitarian projects, for example, we built systems, say, in Thai and 
Khmer, so that American, European, or Japanese doctors could help rural people 
get healthcare, and we deployed similar things in South America. 
Due to broad interest in this type of technology, the company was then ac-
quired by Facebook (making the world “open and connected”) in 2013 and for two 
years I led a team of scientists to build translation technology there. At Facebook, 
the use of the technology for translation of posts and other company use cases, 
however, turned out to be of higher priority than the interactive communication 
aspect of our speech translators I was keen on advancing, and so I returned to the 
University to continue our work on the educational and humanitarian aspects of 
this technology.
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Due to Cambridge Analytica and other scandals, Facebook has increasingly been confront-
ed with massive criticism, which is why the tech giant is all the more under pressure to meet 
their idealistic agenda. At the same time, companies like Microsof t or OpenAI are demand-
ing the democratization of AI. What is your general opinion on this concept?
Again, you know, the world is much more complex than a simple slogan suggests. 
Facebook is a good case in point. I am sure their initial goal was to democratize 
news. If anyone can post news, how wonderful that can be! If anyone can pro-
vide facts on Wikipedia, how wonderful would that be! No more experts dictating 
their opinions, right? But if you really think this through – if anybody can publish 
trash about anybody and reach a worldwide audience – the benefit is not necessar-
ily that you are making people heard that were unheard before, but you also open 
up a worldwide potential for abuse and manipulation. And that is exactly what 
we are realizing now. So democratization is fine. But the potential for massive 
manipulation and abuse is equally there in the same process, and therefore one 
has to be really careful. 
In other words: You are more or less skeptical about this concept?
Once again, we should be careful and keep on thinking about what we are do-
ing because tools like the Internet are so powerful.  Sometimes you create things 
that have unintended consequences.  And one must reevaluate the technology and 
strive to move it in a good direction.  While the internet lead to democratization of 
information, we now see again massive concentration of information and power 
as well.  Would you rather have a world in which only Google, Microsoft, Facebook, 
Amazon or Apple can have intelligent systems and everybody else is at their mercy 
with regard to using this technology? Would you like to have a world in which only 
one of the big tech giants can recognize anybody’s face by a machine and nobody 
else is able to? These technologies effectively encourage monopolies, that are hord-
ing incredible amount of data and generate a lot of knowledge, but – despite the 
best intentions – at the same time also provide a lot of potential for manipulation. 
We have recently seen that this is the case with the Cambridge Analytica scandal. 
So, again, the question is: Would you like to see all data and AI to be concentrated 
with only three or four companies in the world? 
These concerns also play out on a geo-political stage. While the internet was 
designed to be a great global unifying force, it now also threatens to break into 
major regional spheres with different moral and societal attitudes that compete 
for supremacy.  In China, where there are fewer laws or restrictions to data col-
lection and handling, we see that AI feeds the emergence of an automated mass 
surveillance state that is overseen by the government. Will this – by way of compe-
tition – undermine Western values of privacy, freedom, and independence?  That 
is a 1984 Orwellian future at our doorstep, right?  Indeed, democratizing it at least 
distributes the technology to a broader set of players and that is why antitrust 
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efforts are so important, domestically.  But, if we talk about global balances – for 
example  – Europe versus America: Europe does not have a large internet com-
pany and this creates asymmetries, where one continent is critically dependent 
on AI systems from another for its information and data management.  This still 
works, because relations between America and Europe are amicable and support-
ive because both are Western democracies. But what about China, Russia, India? 
China is making dramatic progress in AI right know, and is spending billions of 
dollars on AI.  So it is only a matter of time until China and others will be on par, 
if not more advanced then the US. And, without its own clear technology base 
and vision, Europe, could be at the mercy of what other players are doing and be 
much more vulnerable to external meddling and manipulation. For me, these are 
worrisome developments. 
Nevertheless, it still makes a dif ference whether we talk about American or Chinese tech 
monopolies. 
Right, the so-called GAFA [Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon] have to be consid-
ered differently in some sense. In China, companies like Baidu, Alibaba or Ten-
cent have very strong government connections. In the US, the playing field looks 
different because there is a public that watches these companies, and whenever 
one of them abuses their data power, it becomes a scandal and is immediately all 
over the news, which is very bad for the company. While I was with Facebook, I 
do have to say that – despite all the scandals – I was impressed by how much the 
company actually attempted to deal with their data in a responsible way. And the 
fact that they still produce scandals simply shows how hard it is to do that and 
how sensitive an issue it is.  But I think that companies in the US also embrace 
the idea of democratizing AI because it is part of their business model. Of course, 
companies ultimately are very selfish and try to do what is best for them. But in 
the American context, protecting data is good for business, since scandals are ter-
rible. Hence, Microsoft and Google are into democratizing AI because it supports 
their business strategies. Take Amazon, for example: One of its largest businesses 
is Amazon Web Services (AWS) that, among other things, includes renting nodes, 
so that a small company can do its computation on Amazon’s servers. Microsoft 
or Google provide similar computational resources, and if they can provide AI ser-
vices on top of that, then it is obviously also good for their business.
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So which would you consider to be the most important political challenges of AI in the near 
future, from your perspective as a computer scientist?
I think that, first of all, we as scientists have a responsibility to be vigilant. But 
it gives rise to optimism that there are actually a lot of idealistic people working 
inside those big companies. Thus, the fact that there are scandals is good news, 
because it means that you cannot keep such things secret, that it forces society to 
keep thinking these things through, which is good. And regarding how politics 
should respond: Well, if you look at some of these senatorial debates, you realize 
that politicians cannot be deeply involved in every aspect of every technology, and 
hence may lack intuition about where it may go and how to respond.  For this rea-
son, I think it is very important for AI scientists to be vocal and active in a public 
dialog, so we (science, public, and governments) can ensure that we build these 
technologies to serve humanity, as opposed to serving our own political or finan-
cial interest. 
What worries me in this context, however, is the fact that large companies are 
voraciously hiring scientists, and that universities have difficulties retaining tal-
ented people. And we should remember that universities are (or should be) spac-
es for open discussion and debate so that we are not manipulated by economic 
or political interests.  So my point is that we should maintain a strong academic 
environment in all major areas in which AI is used.  And this is a particular chal-
lenge in Europe:  Without major internet companies, it naturally suffers from a 
continuing loss of talent. With a reference to my own AI laboratory in Germany, 
I can tell you that many of the best scientists, as soon as they are done with their 
pitches or degrees, get offers that are like seven times higher (or even more) than 
the ones we can afford at a university. And when young people are being offered 
those amounts of money plus a chance at building something with a major compa-
ny like Amazon, Apple, or Facebook, they jump at the opportunity. In other words, 
the brain drain is enormous, not just from academia to industry, but between 
countries. Therefore, in an age of AI, Europe must move much more aggressively 
to provide for its future.
What can Europe do to change that? And how do politicians, people, or the public know 
which experts they can trust?
Well, as to your last question, I think by being less risk averse and doing more 
to encourage technology disruption:  Europe has outstanding scientists and en-
gineers.  There is also outstanding support and freedom in Europe to carry out 
innovative and fundamental science.  Europe has very bright, well-educated, and 
idealistic scientists.  I could even argue that many of the top scientists in America 
were trained or started their career in Europe.  That is not just an empty phrase, I 
could name many famous examples.  But the area in which we are doing badly is 
letting the scientific advances challenge the status-quo in society.  What is needed 
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is fast, practical, and disruptive moonshot projects.  DARPA in the US, for exam-
ple, has done that very successfully for the government. And so do companies like 
Google, Tesla, Amazon, all of which did not exist 30 years ago.
The other thing that should be improved is the technology transfer into in-
dustrial exploitation. In Europe, we actually have many entrepreneurs who start 
companies. The risk takers are there, the young people are there, the bright ideas 
are there, and the excitement and the eagerness to do this are there. What’s miss-
ing is capital to support such activities and also more willingness and speed of 
mergers and acquisitions. For example, in the US, small companies are bought 
up very quickly. Some of the companies exist only twelve or eighteen months be-
fore they are being absorbed by a larger corporation. This is a healthy process as it 
speeds the transition from idea to concept to product to industry.  But in Europe, 
that is very rare. Here, it is very difficult for companies to be bought. It takes a 
long time to go public, to enter the stock market and so on.  The transition from a 
small successful start-up to a large business has so much friction in Europe that it 
misses many opportunities; speed is of the essence in this kind of game.  And this 
ultimately drives many small companies and their young entrepreneurs to the US 
and China.
Another political-ethical concern that many people talk about these days is the problem of 
algorithmic biases. How are these problems related to your research in natural language 
processing and the translation of spoken languages? 
I am glad that you are bringing us back to this topic. So far, we talked a lot about 
how AI affects society. Another important political dimension is to discuss how 
we pick projects that contribute to a society that we want to live in. And for me that 
means speech translation, because I think this is one of the big problems in Eu-
rope. Europeans speak 23 different languages, and these are only the official ones. 
In fact, there are many more languages in Europe. And this situation generates 
separation, misunderstandings, and also a considerable loss in business opportu-
nities. One big reason why e-commerce is more challenging in Europe is because 
it is so fragmented. Each country in Europe has a different legal system, a differ-
ent delivery system, and much of that is of course fossilized in language, because 
if everything has to be done in multiple languages, it complicates transnational 
business exchanges. But saying that everyone should learn English, Esperanto, or 
something like that would be ridiculous and also not desirable. In fact, having the 
variety and diversity of languages is something Europeans are rightfully proud of. 
Against this background, technology must not be regarded as an obstacle, but 
as a tremendous problem solver if we want to develop a technology capable of text 
and speech translation that bridges these language barriers on all fronts, so that 
we actually have a language-transparent world. Imagine you are going to China, 
Russia, or Spain, and like to operate in these countries as if you are at home, with-
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out any language disadvantages. But if you think that through, what such a sce-
nario would mean if you are in all these countries without knowing the respective 
language, what all kind of assistance it would require so that you do not notice 
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